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After having obtained my law degree at Leiden University in October 1998, I was 
approached by Tanja Bender and Kees van Raad, my former teachers in international tax 
law, to teach that subject in Leiden and to write a dissertation in that area. Since I had 
enjoyed both the topic of international tax law and the academic environment at Leiden 
University very much, I gladly accepted their offer. The topic of my research became the 
tax treatment of cross-border employment under the OECD Model Tax Convention and 
I published several articles on it. After some one and a half years I realized, however, that 
I wanted to broaden my legal horizon before really writing a book on the subject. In 2000 
I was appointed as a legal clerk with the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). I decided to 
put the taxation of cross-border workers on ice and to concentrate fully on my new tasks. 
My academic interest was awakened again in 2002. In that year I was asked to write 
a preliminary report for the Dutch Association of Tax Research (Vereniging voor 
Belastingwetenschap) on the delimitation of the Dutch corporate income tax jurisdiction 
on the basis of the ‘nationality’ of the company. After having completed and defended 
this report1, I considered the idea of using it for a PhD. thesis and to keep the taxation 
of cross-border workers on ice still. In 2004 this idea became concrete when I left the 
Dutch Supreme Court to teach again at Leiden University and to prepare a dissertation 
there. I also became a part-time tax advisor with PricewaterhouseCoopers, where I 
started working with PwC’s EU Direct Tax Group which focuses on the EU law aspects of 
direct taxation. Obviously, these aspects were also present in the provisional topic of my 
dissertation: the delimitation of a State’s tax jurisdiction on the basis of nationality. Would 
such a delimitation be in line with EU law? During the course of my initial research on the 
delimitation of a State’s direct tax jurisdiction and the compatibility thereof with EU law, 
I came across the copious literature which relates in one way or the other to this problem. 
Terms such as discrimination, dislocation, fragmentation, disparity and economic and 
juridical double taxation were frequently used, without their content having been clearly 
defined. Nevertheless, I noted that the ECJ was criticized heavily in various publications for 
not complying with alleged principles of (international) tax law or its own earlier case law.2 
I came to the conclusion that clarity in this discussion was needed first. This has resulted 
in the present research, aimed at developing a theoretical assessment model for reviewing 
direct tax cases which is independent of the case law and literature published so far. This 
model makes both a normative claim (how should the ECJ assess whether a certain tax 
measure is compliant with the EU free movement provisions?) and a descriptive claim 
(the model is able to explain why the ECJ arrives at certain conclusions in its case law and 
is able to structure the ECJ’s case law in a coherent manner). 
1 Douma 2002.




It will be clear that the tax treatment of cross-border employment under the OECD 
Model Tax Convention will remain on ice. Fortunately, I can refer to the dissertation of 
Frank Pötgens for an excellent study on the taxation of income from international private 
employment.3
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many conversations and discussions we have had on the topic of my dissertation remain a 
great inspiration. My special thanks must also go to Prof. Axel Cordewener, Prof. Malcolm 
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manuscript as members of the PhD Committee. Their comments and suggestions for 
improvement have been invaluable for the completion of this dissertation. I also owe 
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ECJ Court of Justice of the European Union (per 1 December 2009) or Court of 
Justice of the European Communities (before 1 December 2009)
EC Reference to a provision of the EC Treaty in its numbering after 1 May 
1999 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EC Treaty Treaty establishing the European Community
 If used as reference to a provision – e.g. Article 6 of the EC Treaty – it 
indicates the numbering before 1 May 1999
EEA Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992
EU European Union
 If used as reference to a provision it indicates the numbering after 1 May 
1999
FCC German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
TEU Treaty on European Union
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1.  Scope, structure and purpose of 
this study
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1.1 The conflict between tax sovereignty and free movement
Although, as EU law stands at present, direct taxation does not fall within the purview 
of the Union, the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless be exercised 
consistently with EU law. This is the now classic statement of the ECJ in Schumacker.4 
This proposition very clearly reveals the conflict between two areas of legal competence of 
which the rules are more or less carved in stone. 
On the one hand, it is settled ECJ case law that EU law takes precedence over national 
law and that it has direct effect if its provisions are clear, precise and unconditional enough 
to be invoked and relied upon by individuals before national courts. The TFEU’s provisions 
of free movement of goods, persons, services and capital meet the criteria of direct effect,5 
so that any national tax measure which contravenes a free movement provision is rendered 
automatically inapplicable (the TFEU contains only a few possible exceptions6 which are 
almost never applicable to national direct tax rules). 
On the other hand, the Member States as a matter of principle retain extensive 
competences in tax matters. They remain free to determine the organization and 
conception of their tax system and to determine the need to allocate between themselves 
the power of taxation.7 Apart from these ‘internal’ objectives, the Member States are also 
at liberty to pursue ‘external’ objectives through tax measures such as the protection of the 
environment or stimulation of research and development. Indeed, as Ghosh has stated, it 
is hard to conceive of a more sensitive area of domestic Member States’ competence, either 
legally or politically, than direct taxation.8 
The ECJ, called upon to interpret and apply the free movement provisions of the 
TFEU in direct taxation cases, has the difficult task of interpreting and applying the free 
movement provisions in relation to national direct tax measures. It seems obvious that a 
literal interpretation of the free movement provisions – without any further exceptions 
than the express Treaty derogations – would severely undermine the powers retained by 
4 Case C-279/93 Schumacker, § 21. 
5 E.g. Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos.
6 Express Treaty derogations are laid down in Articles 36, 45(3), 52(1), 62 and 65(1)(b) TFEU and 
typically relate to reasons such as public policy, public health and public security.
7 Opinion AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, § 23-24. See for a similar 
statement in the context of Article 107 TFEU (State aid) Joined Cases T-211/04 and T-215/04 
Government of Gibraltar v Commission, § 46, and the Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Joined Cases 
C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P Commission and Spain v Gibraltar and UK, § 137 et seq. 
8 Ghosh 2007, p iii.




the Member States in the field of direct taxation. In turn, not to apply the fundamental 
freedoms to direct taxation on the ground that the latter does not fall within the purview 
of EU law would deny the existence of the obligations to which the Member States have 
committed themselves when they concluded the TEU and the TFEU with the creation of 
an internal market as the primary objective. As a consequence, the ECJ has the difficult 
task of reconciling the consequences of the fiscal sovereignty retained by EU Member 
States with the obligations flowing from EU law (an internal market without frontiers). 
How should sovereign rights be reconciled with the obligations enshrined in the TEU and 
the TFEU? 
1.2 A wide variety of criticism 
The ECJ has been criticized on several points for the way it balances fiscal sovereignty 
against free movement. It has been accused of going too far in striking down national 
direct tax rules, thereby effectively failing to appreciate that the Member States have 
intended to retain their national tax sovereignty.9 It has been accused of not understanding 
the difficult area of tax law.10 Also, the ECJ has been blamed for acting as a legislator rather 
than as a court by positively harmonizing national tax law instead of only (negatively) 
reviewing national tax measures for compatibility with the fundamental freedoms.11 Other 
authors have argued that the ECJ is fully competent to positively harmonize national tax 
laws and that it should use this power.12 At the same time, especially in recent years, the 
ECJ has been blamed for giving the Member States too much leeway.13 Apart from these 
9 Warren & Graetz are of the opinion that the ECJ is “undermining the fiscal autonomy of 
Member States by articulating an interpretation of income tax arrangements that is ultimately 
unstable”; see Graetz & Warren 2006, at p. 1188. Eric Kemmeren fears that the ECJ does not 
respect integrated tax systems anymore; Kemmeren 2008. Dennis Weber states that the ECJ 
case law is incorrect from a dogmatic point of view because the Court does not pay heed to the 
consequences of its own basic assumptions e.g. that the Member States are free to determine the 
criteria for taxation in order to delimit tax jurisdiction and to avoid double taxation and that 
“the ECJ does not always have sufficient respect for a Member State’s tax jurisdiction”; see Weber 
2007. 
10 E.g. Wattel has accused the ECJ of “bloopers” and “conceptual confusion, erroneous 
understanding of international tax law, or even incompatibility with EC Law itself ”; see Wattel 
2004, p. 81.
11 Ghosh has argued that the ECJ sometimes requires Member States to extend their legislative 
tax jurisdiction, thereby positively integrating tax systems and overstepping its competence; 
see Ghosh 2007, p 81. Wattel has submitted that the ECJ wrongly applies a kind of ‘always 
somewhere’ principle which apparently positively requires that a taxpayer should be able to 
deduct negative items of his income somewhere in the Community; see Terra & Wattel 2008, p 
350-351.
12 E.g. Vanistendael is of the opinion that the ECJ is competent to prescribe that a Member State 
should employ a system of capital and labour-import neutrality (CLIN); see Vanistendael 2008, 
p 96.
13 Kofler and Mason criticize the judgment in Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres in which the 
ECJ decided that international juridical double taxation does not breach the free movement 
provisions; they argue that this outcome is not acceptable in an internal market; see Kofler & 
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criticisms of the ECJ’s alleged policy, many writers have argued that the ECJ applies the 
free movement provisions in the area of direct taxation inconsistently and unclearly. As a 
result, neither national legislators nor taxpayers would be able to tell which national tax 
measures are ‘EU-proof ’ and which are not.14 
Traditionally, the literature on this subject attempts to identify mistakes or missed 
opportunities by the ECJ by taking generally accepted principles of national and 
international tax law and existing ECJ case law as a starting point. In my view, this 
‘internal’ approach cannot lead to a satisfactory answer to the question of whether the 
ECJ’s case law is correct or incorrect with respect to the reconciliation of national direct 
tax sovereignty and free movement. As can be seen in the literature just mentioned, it 
results in an over-simplified discussion in which positions are taken which are often 
motivated only by referring to the position itself. For instance, the view that the ECJ has 
given a decision which goes against a Member State’s tax sovereignty in an unacceptable 
way is often motivated by reference to the importance of sovereignty itself. That, however, 
is a petitio principii. As a consequence, the present tax literature does not provide for a 
structured approach through which it can be determined whether the ECJ has taken a 
‘right’ decision and whether a fair balance has been struck in a particular case or not. 
1.3 Towards a theoretical assessment model
It is submitted that a proper analysis can only be made in the light of an assessment model 
which is external to and independent of the ECJ’s current case law. This model should, 
first, explain how the ECJ’s case law in the area of free movement and direct taxation 
should be structured in theory. Secondly, the assessment model should be able to provide 
for a better description of ECJ case law than is currently available in literature. Thus, the 
assessment model should enable scholars to assess whether the decisions arrived at by 
the ECJ are well-founded or not. The assessment model should also be able to anticipate 
possible future developments in the case law.
1.4 Methodology
The present study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses literature on the most 
controversial case law of the ECJ in the area of free movement and direct taxation. The 
purpose of the summary of the most outspoken views in literature is to facilitate the design 
of a theoretical assessment model which should be able to structure the case law and make 
a response to these views possible. 
Part II of the present study designs such a model. As stated earlier, this model 
should be external to the ECJ’s current case law. It will be explained in chapter 3 that it 
Mason 2007, p 79-81. See for criticism on the judgment in Case C-376/03 D, in which case the 
ECJ found against the taxpayer, Van Thiel, who calls this decision “very unfortunate, mainly 
because its wider implications undermine very basic principles of Community law”; see Van 
Thiel 2005, p 457. Compare also Van Thiel 2002, p 486-525.
14 According to Snell, for example, the use by the ECJ of the language of obstacles and restrictions 
in direct tax cases leads to “legal uncertainty and lack of predictability”; see Snell 2007, p 367.
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is an internationally accepted method to understand, structure and assess the practice of 
courts around the world through external theories of law. Subsequently, chapter 3 gives 
an introduction to and account of the choice of the legal theory which may serve as a 
blueprint for a theoretical assessment model. The choice of the appropriate legal theory 
will be limited by the basic presumption in ECJ case law that although, as EU law stands at 
present, direct taxation does not fall within the purview of the Union, the powers retained 
by the Member States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with EU law. Another 
approach would lead to the design of an assessment model without any connection to the 
present stance of EU law. Chapters 4, 5, 6 examine to what extent the legal theory chosen 
in chapter 3 is applicable to the conflict between tax sovereignty and EU free movement. 
Chapter 7 subsequently provides a tailor-made theoretical assessment model which serves 
as a conceptual framework. In doing so, this study makes a normative claim as to how 
the conflict between free movement and tax sovereignty should be resolved in theory. It 
should be stressed that this study does not claim that the theoretical assessment model 
arrived at necessitates only one solution in an individual case. Rather, the model prescribes 
the method through which the problem should be solved, thus limiting the number of 
possible outcomes and structuring the analysis in a coherent manner.15 
Part III of this study analyzes the ECJ’s case law in the light of the assessment model 
developed in part II. It will be shown that the – sometimes implicit – approach followed 
in the vast majority of the case law can be explained and structured by the theoretical 
model. If the case law deviates from the model, an explanation for that will be provided, 
if possible. In addition, it will be shown that the theoretical assessment model predicts 
certain future developments in the case law which would at present be regarded as highly 
controversial. Thus, this study also makes a descriptive claim. 
Part IV contains the conclusions of this study. 
The approach taken in this book is new in the sense that it tests the ECJ’s case law in 
the area of direct taxation against a theoretical assessment model. As a result, this study 
does not make extensive reference to the vast body of literature which exists in the area of 
direct taxation and free movement, apart from the following chapter’s discussion of some 
of the most provocative and outspoken tax literature. The ECJ’s case law and opinions of 
Advocate Generals with the ECJ will however be dealt with in detail. The aim of this study 
is not to give an overview of the status quo, but rather to examine the conflict between the 
competing principles of tax sovereignty and free movement from a different angle. Finally, 
this study covers a subject the title of which is very close to the recent and impressive 
study by Mathieu Isenbaert, EC law and the Sovereignty of the Member States in Direct 
Taxation, published as No. 19 of IBFD’s doctoral series16. However, the approach taken in 
the present study is completely different from the approach in Isenbaert’s thesis, because 
its objective is to develop an objective assessment model to optimize free movement 
and national sovereignty based on an established legal theory about the nature of and 
the relationship between principles and rules, whereas Isenbaert’s study approaches the 
issue from the theory of constitutional pluralism and function-sovereignty. This is clearly 
15 Compare Von Bogdandy 2010, p 101.
16 Isenbaert 2010.
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demonstrated by some citations taken from his final observations.17 The novelty of the 
theory of constitutional pluralism is the idea that the relationship between the State 
and the supra-State locus of authority should be perceived as heterarchical rather than 
hierarchical.18 Further, the traditional meaning of ‘sovereignty’ as a territorially exclusive 
claim to ultimate authority can no longer be upheld in a heterarchical context.19 The 
epistemic dimension of sovereignty can only be maintained by dividing the object of the 
ultimate claim to authority, the body politic, instead of the claim itself. In that respect, 
the concept of function-sovereignty has been proposed by Isenbaert, which implies that 
the dividing lines between the level of the Union and the level of the respective Member 
States, are based on the functions performed and the objectives pursued by those bodies.20 
Thus, constitutional pluralism entails that the EU constitutional structure can only be 
effectively analysed if one accepts that the two levels of sovereignty (or claims to ultimate 
authority) co-exist without a clear and generally applicable hierarchy as regards their 
respective entitlements to ultimate authority. In other words, the functions and objectives 
of the policy area over which the Member States have retained their sovereignty stand 
principally on an equal footing with the functions and objectives of the policy areas over 
which the EU has a sovereign claim.21 This demonstrates the essential difference between 
Isenbaert’s study and the present thesis: Isenbaert establishes the ultimate authority of 
the EU to intervene in matters of direct taxation on the basis of the core function to be 
performed by the EU level of authority – the establishment of the internal market – , 
taking into account the core function of the Member States, which is raising revenue. The 
present study’s approach is to evaluate the ECJ case law in direct taxation on the basis of an 
assessment model which is not based on the constitutional relationship between the EU 
and the Member States, but which is rather derived from established legal theory which 
distinguishes between principles and rules. This theory examines what happens in case 
of a conflict between these different categories of norms. The confrontation between the 
principles of free movement and the principle of sovereignty should be decided, not on 
the basis of the core functions performed by the respective levels of government, but on 
the basis of an optimization process which consists of six subsequent stages (questions) 
described in this study.
17 Isenbaert, p 755-756, nrs. 1899-1902.
18 Isenbaert 2010, p 755, nr. 1899.
19 Isenbaert 2010, p 756, nr. 1900.
20 Isenbaert 2010, p 756, nr. 1901.
21 Isenbaert 2010, p 756, nr. 1902.
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2.1 Introduction
In direct taxation cases the ECJ generally uses the following model to assess whether 
a direct tax measure is a prohibited restriction on free movement (assuming that the 
taxpayer has “access”22 to fundamental freedoms):
Does the direct tax measure constitute a restriction on free movement? 1. 
If so, does the direct tax measure pursue a legitimate objective which is compatible 2. 
with the TEU and the TFEU and is it justified by overriding reasons in the public 
interest? 
If so, does the application of the direct tax measure ensure achievement of the aim 3. 
pursued? 
If so, does the application of the direct tax measure not go beyond what is necessary 4. 
for that purpose?23
The approach taken in three of the four steps in the ECJ’s model in direct taxation cases 
has received considerable criticism. In this chapter a selection thereof will be discussed. 
The evaluation of this chapter will show that much of the criticism lacks a surrounding 
conceptual framework. 
2.2 The concept of a ‘restriction’ on free movement in direct tax cases
2.2.1 Introduction
The first and most important criticism is directed at the (too) broad interpretation by the 
ECJ of the concept of a ‘restriction’ on free movement in direct tax cases. This wide scope 
of the free movement provisions undermines the tax sovereignty of the Member States 
in an unacceptable manner, according to various authors. In order to fully appreciate 
this criticism, it is important to explain first the direct tax jurisdiction of a State under 
22 Access meaning that the situation of the taxpayer falls within the personal, geographical and 
material scope of the TFEU’s free movement provisions; see Kingston 2007, § 2.1, p 1323-1329. 
Compare e.g. Case C-112/91 Werner; Case C-492/04 Lasertec; Case C-102/05 A and B; Case 
C-157/05 Holböck; Case C-415/06 Stahlwerk Ergste Westig. 
23 E.g. Case C-527/06 Renneberg, § 81; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, §35; Case C-196/04 
Cadbury Schweppes, § 47.
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international law and the inherent consequences of the co-existence of discrete national 
fiscal jurisdictions. Once this has been clarified, it will be discussed how the ECJ has dealt 
with these consequences under the EU free movement provisions and how this approach 
has been criticized. 
2.2.2 The scope of a Member State’s direct tax jurisdiction
Legislative jurisdiction under customary international law
The traditional approach of establishing jurisdiction is founded on the territorial and 
personal bases of jurisdiction. As Jeffery has demonstrated, the fundamental jurisdictional 
connection is the territorial basis that refers to jurisdiction over persons, matters and 
things within the geographical boundaries of a State.24 In relation to fiscal jurisdiction, 
this is illustrated by the taxation of income with its source, or a person residing, within 
the territory.25 The other jurisdictional connection is personal, based on the nationality or 
domicile of a person as the connecting factor.
Nationality is widely accepted as a valid jurisdictional basis for the assertion of a State’s 
jurisdiction over persons. A person with the nationality of the taxing State can be liable 
to tax on his full, worldwide assets and income, from whatever source.26 Consequently, 
a State has unlimited fiscal jurisdiction over its nationals. International law leaves it to a 
State to decide who are its nationals.27 According to Jeffery, the incorporation of a company 
in a State is analogous to nationality with regard to persons, so that this is also a basis for 
unlimited fiscal jurisdiction.28
The principle of fiscal territoriality refers to jurisdiction over persons, matters and 
things within the geographical boundaries of a State. A State may tax a person residing in 
its territory or income arising there. The scope of jurisdiction of persons or income is by 
its nature different. A State has unlimited fiscal jurisdiction over individuals and companies 
residing within its territory. Consequently, a State is competent to tax the worldwide 
income of individuals and companies. Customary international law leaves it to States to 
determine who are their residents, including the nature and extent of presence within 
the territory that is required.29 The concept of residence does, however, make it clear 
that a more permanent nature of contact is required to establish worldwide jurisdiction. 
As Martha has pointed out, fiscal jurisdiction on the basis of residence is, in the view 
of general international law, only relevant with regard to foreigners.30 A State may tax 
non-resident aliens, individuals and companies, but only with regard to the particular 
sources of income within its territory. Accordingly, the fiscal jurisdiction of a State in 
respect of non-resident aliens is limited to the sources of income within the State.31 Thus, 
the jurisdictional principle of fiscal territoriality includes unlimited fiscal jurisdiction with 
regard to resident aliens and limited fiscal jurisdiction in respect of non-resident aliens.
24 Jeffery 1999, p. 44.
25 Compare Case C-451/99 Cura Anlagen, § 40.
26 Martha 1989, p. 48.
27 Jeffery 1999, p. 49. The ECJ respects this; see Case C-200/02 Chen, § 37.
28 Jeffery 1999, p. 49.
29 Jeffery 1999, p. 45.
30 Martha 1989, p. 50-51.
31 Martha 1989, p. 54.
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The jurisdictional principles to tax referred to in the previous paragraphs may also 
be formulated negatively. A State may tax a foreign company with no headquarters in 
the State and carrying on business in the State on the income derived from that business, 
but not on its worldwide income. A State may also tax persons who are not nationals or 
residents of the State with regard to income derived from property in the State, but the 
property and income do not justify the taxation of property or income outside the State.32 
The American Law Institute has taken the position that the jurisdiction over tax nationals 
and residents implies that a State may tax a parent corporation on its worldwide income, 
including that of its branches and subsidiaries.33
Allocation of jurisdiction in tax treaties
It is clear from the outset that the application of these previously discussed rules of 
customary international law with regard to fiscal jurisdiction may lead to international 
juridical double taxation. International juridical double taxation can be generally defined 
as the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in 
respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods.34 According to the Commentary 
to the OECD Model Tax Convention, the harmful effects on the exchange of goods and 
services and movements of capital and persons are so well known that it is unnecessary 
to stress the importance of removing the obstacles that double taxation presents for the 
development of economic relations between countries. The primary purpose of the OECD 
Model is to provide a way of settling, on a uniform basis, the most common problems in 
respect of international juridical double taxation. Most bilateral tax treaties are, to a large 
extent, based on the OECD Model. The OECD Model allocates the jurisdiction to tax and 
prescribes the method by which double taxation is eliminated. 
Self-imposed unilateral limitations on jurisdiction
Many States have imposed unilateral limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction. For example, 
most States do not fully apply their worldwide jurisdiction on the basis of nationality.35 
With regard to the taxation of income, the Netherlands, for instance, only applies the 
personal basis for jurisdiction (the nationality of the taxpayer) to companies.36 France 
operates a territorial system for corporate income tax purposes. In principle, account is 
only taken of profits realized in undertakings operating in France or in those liable to 
taxation in France by virtue of a tax treaty.37 Consequently, France does not make use of 
its unlimited fiscal jurisdiction with regard to companies incorporated under French law 
32 Restatement of the Law, Third, 1987, § 412(a).
33 Restatement of the Law, Third, 1987, § 412(e).
34 Commentary to the OECD Model, Introduction, § 1.
35 An exception is the United States, which, in principle, taxes its nationals on their worldwide 
income.
36 Although the principle of nationality also plays a minor role with regard to individuals, 
and in particular, in respect of diplomatic staff (Art. 2.2 of the Individual Income Tax Law 
(Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001)). For the worldwide jurisdiction with regard to companies 
incorporated under Netherlands law, see Art. 2(4) of the Corporate Income Tax Law (Wet op de 
vennootschapsbelasting 1969).
37 Art. 219 General Tax Code (Code Général des Impôts (Territorialité de l’impôt sur les sociétés)).
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and those resident in France. Instead, France applies a strict territoriality principle for the 
taxation of company profits.
2.2.3 Consequences of the overlaps and limitations of direct tax jurisdiction
The co-existence of discrete national fiscal jurisdictions has various consequences. First, 
it leads to international juridical double taxation. After all, the application of the rules of 
customary international law with regard to fiscal jurisdiction – nationality, residence and 
source – leads to an overlap. 
Secondly, disparities, or variations, will exist between these jurisdictions. 
Thirdly, a State may treat situations that arise fully within its own jurisdiction differently 
from those that are only partly within its jurisdiction and partly in the jurisdiction of 
another State. If, for example, a French company opens a branch in Luxembourg, the 
losses attributable to the French head office will normally not be taken into account for 
determining the profits of the branch for Luxembourg corporation tax purposes, whereas 
the losses of a domestic head office would be deductible. The reason for this different 
treatment is that the French company – neither a national nor a resident of Luxembourg 
– is only subject to limited taxation in Luxembourg. Another example concerns a 
German company with income from industrial or commercial activities. Such a company 
is precluded, when calculating its profits, from deducting losses from a permanent 
establishment in another Member State on the ground that, according to the applicable 
tax treaty, the corresponding income from such a permanent establishment is not subject 
to taxation in Germany.38
Fourthly, a taxable subject or object may leave the tax jurisdiction. If a taxpayer owning 
assets with an unrealized gain leaves a State’s tax jurisdiction or if these assets themselves 
leave the jurisdiction, that State will normally impose an exit tax on that unrealized gain. 
The reason for this is that the State concerned loses its jurisdiction to tax, as a result of 
which it considers it reasonable to tax the unrealized gains which have accrued on its 
territory. 
2.2.4 ECJ case law on disparities, double taxation and discrimination
Now it has been established which consequences occur as a result of the co-existence 
of discrete national tax systems, it will be discussed how the ECJ has dealt with these 
consequences under the EU free movement provisions. Three categories can be 
distinguished: cross-border situations in which a disadvantage arises as a result of a 
disparity, international juridical double taxation, and discrimination.39
Disparities 
A consequence of the co-existence of discrete national tax systems is that disparities, or 
variations, exist between these jurisdictions.40 For example, a Member State may choose to 
38 These examples are inspired by Case C-250/95 Futura and C-414/06 Lidl Belgium.
39 See for a more extensive discussion Douma 2006.
40 See Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group 
Litigation, § 43.
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impose a relatively high tax rate within its jurisdiction. The existence of these disparities 
has inevitable distorting effects on investment, employment and, for companies and self-
employed persons, establishment decisions. Possible distortions resulting from mere 
disparities between tax systems do not, however, fall within the scope of the free movement 
provisions in the TFEU. The ECJ has consistently held that the free movement provisions 
are not concerned with any disparities in treatment which may result, between Member 
States, from differences existing between the laws of the various Member States, so long as 
they affect all persons subject to them in accordance with objective, non-discriminatory 
criteria and without regard to their nationality.41 Accordingly, it is clear that the obstacles 
resulting from disparities may be contrasted with obstacles resulting from discrimination, 
which occurs as a result of the rules of just one tax jurisdiction. It is important to note that 
the ECJ has accepted the power of the Member States to define, by tax treaty or unilaterally, 
the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation. If an allocation of jurisdiction to one 
of the Member States results in, for instance, a higher tax rate than a rate that would have 
applied in respect of an allocation of jurisdiction to another Member State, the resulting 
disadvantage is the outcome of a disparity and is not discrimination.42
International juridical double taxation
The impediments caused by international juridical double taxation are not the result of 
discriminatory treatment within one jurisdiction. Therefore, according to now settled 
ECJ case law, the adverse consequences of overlapping tax jurisdictions do not amount to 
prima facie restrictions on that ground.43 
Discrimination: general remarks
According to the majority of scholars, a direct tax measure only constitutes a restriction 
on free movement if it treats a cross-border activity more harshly than a domestic activity: 
a discrimination approach.44 Discriminatory treatment can consist both of different 
treatment of cases which are objectively the same, and of the same treatment of cases 
which are objectively different. This follows inter alia from the ECJ’s consideration in the 
case of Mertens: 
“it is settled case law that there is unequal treatment when two categories of 
persons, whose factual and legal circumstances are not fundamentally different, 
are treated differently and when situations which are not comparable are treated 
in the same way”.45
 
41 Case C-177/94 Perfili. See also Case 57/65 Lütticke; Case 61/79 Denkavit italiana, § 30-31; and 
Case C-427/05 Porto Antico di Genova, § 19-20.
42 Case C-336/96 Gilly. Compare also Case C-403/03 Schempp.
43 Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres; Case C-298/05 Columbus Container Services; Case 
C-67/08 Block; Case C-128/08 Damseaux.
44 Kingston 2007a, p 309
45 Case C-431/01 Mertens, § 32.
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The same approach was taken by the ECJ in the cases of, for example, Schumacker46 and 
Kerckhaert & Morres47. The question of whether two cases are in an objectively comparable 
situation must be answered in light of the object and purpose of the measure under 
consideration. This is clear from the ECJ’s consideration in the case of Papillon: 
“In order to establish whether discrimination exists, the comparability of a 
Community situation with one which is purely domestic must be examined by 
taking into account the objective pursued by the national provisions at issue.”48
A direct tax measure which does not lead to a disadvantage, either in law or in fact, for 
cross-border investment would in this view not constitute a restriction on free movement. 
If this were true, the application of the TFEU’s free movement provisions to direct taxation 
would be different from other areas of law where national rules of a Member State which 
directly affect access to the market by reason of their objective or effects are regarded as 
restriction on free movement.49 This approach focuses on the more general question of 
whether a national measure is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede access to the market 
or exercise of free movement.50 In any event, the ECJ has so far not had the opportunity to 
deal expressly with this approach in direct taxation cases. The discrimination approach of 
the ECJ in direct taxation cases will now be discussed.
Discrimination on grounds of nationality 
The classic four freedoms of the TFEU – free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital – all prohibit distinctions which are directly based on the origin of the product 
or on the (foreign) nationality of the taxpayer concerned. Such distinctions can only be 
justified on grounds of the express Treaty derogations51 such as public morality, public 
policy, public security and public health.52 However, the rules regarding equality of 
treatment forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert 
forms of discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead 
in fact to the same result.53 The criterion of ‘residence’ which is used by all national tax 
systems is such a criterion. As the ECJ explained in Biehl, even though the criterion of 
permanent residence in the national territory applies irrespective of the nationality of the 
taxpayer concerned, there is a risk that it will work in particular against taxpayers who 
46 Case C-279/93 Schumacker, § 30.
47 Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres, § 19.
48 Case C-418/07 Société Papillon, § 27. This approach is also apparent in Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 
38.
49 Opinion AG Tizzano in Case C-442/02 CaixaBank France, § 76.
50 See for example Case C-76/90 Säger, § 12; Case C-19/92 Kraus; Case C-55/94 Gebhard, § 37. An 
insightful discussion is provided by Snell 2010.
51 These are laid down in Articles 36, 45(3), 52(1), 62 and 65(1)(b) TFEU. Note that there are 
no treaty derogations for direct discrimination of goods on grounds of their origin as regards 
internal taxation of these goods (Article 110 TFEU).
52 Case C-423/98 Albore, § 16-17 and Case 2/74 Reyners.
53 Case 152/73 Sotgiu, § 11.
Severe criticism on the European Court of Justice in direct tax matters
27 
are nationals of other Member States.54 A tax exemption based on the criterion that the 
company should employ at least five people in the territory of the Member State concerned 
is another example of a condition which unquestionably can be fulfilled more easily by 
‘national’ companies than by ‘foreign’ companies, as a result of which this criterion leads 
to covert discrimination on grounds of nationality.55 This broad formulation of indirect 
discrimination focuses on the potential effect on free movement.56 Indirect discrimination 
on grounds of the origin or nationality of a product or person includes not only the 
different treatment of comparable situations, but also the equal treatment of comparable 
situations. 
The case law in the field of direct taxation so far has mainly concerned the application 
of different rules to comparable situations.57 Prima facie indirect discrimination on 
grounds of nationality in the area of direct taxation includes, for example, the application 
of withholding taxes only to non-resident taxpayers where resident taxpayers are not taxed 
on the income concerned,58 the imposition of gross taxation on non-resident taxpayers 
and net income taxation on resident taxpayers,59 the prevention of economic double 
taxation of dividends only with respect to resident shareholders,60 the imposition of a 
higher effective income tax rate in respect of non-resident taxpayers,61 legislation which 
lays down minimum tax bases only for non-resident taxpayers,62 the non-availability of 
certain tax credits,63 the imposition of rules which limit interest deduction only in respect 
of non-resident parent companies,64 the refusal in respect of non-resident taxpayers to be 
able to deduct costs directly related to their source State income,65 and the obligation for 
non-resident taxpayers to appoint a tax representative.66
54 Case C-175/88 Biehl, § 14. See also Case C-151/94 Commission v. Luxemburg (Biehl II).
55 Case C-464/05 Geurts and Vogten.
56 Barnard 2010, p 241.
57 Case C-431/01 Mertens is an exception.
58 Case C-290/04 Scorpio, § 33-34; Case C-282/07 Truck Center; Case C-303/07 Aberdeen; Case 
C-540/07 Commission v Italy.
59 Case C-234/01 Gerritse, § 28; Case C‑345/04 Centro Equestre da Lezíria Grande, § 24. In 
Case C-105/08 Commission v. Portugal the ECJ could not answer the question of whether the 
application of a gross withholding tax to non-resident financial institutions constituted an 
infringement of freedom to provide services because the Commission had failed to provide 
adequate evidence.
60 Case 270/83 Avoir fiscal, § 16; Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain, § 36-43; Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank, 
§ 18-26; Case C-170/05 Denkavit, § 26-28; Case C-379/05 Amurta, § 27-28.
61 Case C-107/94 Asscher, § 45-49; Case C-433/06 Hollmann; Case C-43/07 Arens-Sikken; Case 
C-510/08 Mattner. Compare also Case C-562/07 Commission v. Spain and Case C-384/09 
Prunus.
62 Case C-383/05 Talotta.
63 Case C-512/03 Blanckaert.
64 Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst; Case C‑524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group 
Litigation; Case C-105/07 Lammers & van Cleef; Case C-201/05 Test Claimants in the CFC and 
Dividend Group Litigation; Case C-311/08 SGI.
65 Case C-234/01 Gerritse, § 28; Case C-265/04 Bouanich, § 35; Case C‑345/04 Centro Equestre da 
Lezíria Grande, § 24; Case C-364/01 Barbier; Case C-11/07 Eckelkamp.
66 Case C-267/09 Commission v Portugal.
Chapter 2
28
Discrimination against cross-border (economic) activity
The free movement provisions prohibit discrimination not only on grounds of nationality 
of the taxpayer but also on the basis of place of his (economic) activity. In Daily Mail, for 
example, the ECJ explained that even though the provisions on freedom of establishment 
are directed mainly towards ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in 
the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the 
Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of one 
of its nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation.67 This is also true for 
the free movement of workers,68 the freedom to provide services,69 the free movement of 
capital,70 and the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States.71 It 
should be noted that the free movement provisions not only prohibit the disadvantageous 
treatment of cross-border economic activity vis-à-vis domestic economic activity, but also 
the unilateral disadvantageous treatment of one cross-border economic activity vis-à-vis 
another cross-border economic activity.72
Prima facie discriminations on grounds of the place or destination of the (economic) 
activity in the area of direct taxation include, for example, the avoidance of economic 
double taxation on profits only for domestic investments,73 exit taxation on unrealized 
gains in the case of ‘emigration’ of persons or assets,74 the exclusion of relief for losses 
connected with a foreign permanent establishment,75 a higher effective tax rate for cross-
border investments,76 non-recognition of foreign charitable entities for tax purposes,77 
non-deductibility of contributions to occupational pension schemes paid to insurance 
undertakings established abroad,78 non-deductibility of fees for foreign schools,79 the 
absence of tax credits for cross-border economic activity where they are available for 
67 Case 81/87 Daily Mail and General Trust plc, § 16.
68 Case C-18/95 Terhoeve, § 37-39.
69 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments, § 30.
70 Case C-370/05 Festersen, §  24.
71 Case C-520/04 Turpeinen, § 20. see further Case C-470/04 N, § 22; Case C-345/05 Commission 
v. Portugal, § 13; Case C-76/05 Schwarz, § 34.
72 See for the free movement of goods Case 13/63 Commission v. Italy (Italian refrigerators). For 
freedom of establishment see Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 45. For free movement of 
capital see C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund NV, § 56.
73 Case C-251/98 Baars, § 30 et seq.; Case C-35/98 Verkooijen, § 34-36; Case C-319/02 Manninen, 
§ 20-24; Case C-242/03 Weidert & Paulus, § 13-14; Case C-292/04 Meilicke, § 20-24; Case 
C-48/07 Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves, § 47; Case C-406/07 Commission v. Greece; Joined Cases 
C-439/07 and C-499/07 KBC Bank.
74 Case C-436/00 X & Y, Case C-9/02 De Lasteyrie du Saillant, Case C-268/03 De Baeck; Case 
C-470/04 N; Case C-345/05 Commission v. Portugal; Case C-104/06 Commission v. Sweden.
75 C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, § 29-32; Case C-414/06 Lidl Belgium GmbH.
76 Case C-334/02 Commission. v. France (‘fixed levy’), § 23-25; Case C-315/02 Lenz, § 20-22; Case 
C-157/05 Holböck, § 24; Case C-436/06 Grønfeldt; Case C-256/06 Jäger; Case C-360/06 Bauer; 
Case C-377/07 STEKO; Case C-233/09 Dijkman; Case C-20/09 Commission v. Portugal.
77 Case C-386/04 Stauffer; Case C-318/07 Persche; Case C-25/10 Heukelbach.
78 Case C-522/04 Commission v. Belgium. Compare also Case C-544/07 Rüffler.
79 Case C-318/05 Commission v. Germany.
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domestic activity,80 the refusal of group taxation in cross-border situations,81 the non-
exemption of income from foreign lotteries,82 and the application of anti-abuse legislation 
such as CFC-legislation or limitations on the deduction of interest payments only in cross-
border situations or only in some cross-border situations and not in others.83 
2.2.5 Criticism of the ECJ: reluctance to solve double taxation and failure to recognize 
‘dislocations’
The above-mentioned judgments in Gilly and Schempp – disadvantages as a result of 
disparities between national direct tax systems – have not been subject to much debate. 
They are widely accepted. The judgment in Kerckhaert and Morres – international juridical 
double taxation does not amount to a prima facie prohibited restriction on free movement 
– has however been received with some disapproval. The most outspoken critics of the 
ECJ in this regard are Kofler and Mason.84 They have called this decision disappointing 
from an internal market perspective and subject to criticism on multiple levels. First, 
they contend that the ECJ could have applied its case law on ‘double burdens’.85 This case 
law means that measures which apply in law to both national and domestic products or 
services may in fact place a particular burden on imported goods or services. This different 
burden may arise because while the national producer or service provider has to satisfy 
only one regulator (the home State), the imported goods or services have to satisfy a dual 
regulatory burden (home State and host State regulation). According to Barnard, this is 
a more covert type of discrimination.86 In the view of Kofler and Mason, the ECJ could 
have applied this case law to situations of international juridical double taxation, thereby 
effectively dividing tax jurisdiction between the Member States. Kofler and Mason further 
argue that the judgment in Kerckhaert and Morres leads to a non-symmetrical treatment 
of Member States vis-à-vis taxpayers: in prior cases the ECJ has decided that a taxpayer 
should not be able to offset tax losses in more than one Member State,87 so why would the 
Member States, in turn, not be obliged to make sure that they tax a taxpayer only once on 
the same income? Finally, according to Kofler and Mason, the judgment in Kerckhaert and 
Morres rewards the inactivity of Member States, which – contrary to their obligation in 
80 Case C-254/97Société Baxter; Case C-39/04 Laboratoires Fournier; Case C-330/07 Jobra; Case 
C-287/10 Tankreederei.
81 Case C-264/96 ICI; Case C-200/98 X AB & Y AB; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer; Case 
C-418/07 Société Papillon; Case C-337/08 X Holding.
82 Case C-42/02 Lindman; Case C-153/08 Commission v. Spain.
83 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 43-46; Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap 
Group Litigation; Case C-311/08 SGI.
84 Kofler & Mason 2007, p 79-81. See for a critical analysis also Snell 2007, p 360 et seq.
85 This case law is based on the principle of mutual recognition. It means that products and services 
lawfully produced and put on the market in Member State A can and should be allowed access to 
the market of Member State B which can only restrict free movement on the basis of overriding 
reasons in the general interest. See Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, § 8 and Case 261/81 Rau, § 12. 
86 Barnard 2010, p 92-93 and p 240-241.
87 E.g. Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer.
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Article 293 EC88 – have not achieved or attempted to achieve comprehensive abolition of 
double taxation in the European Union by means of a multilateral tax treaty. 
The second criticism of the ECJ is of an entirely different nature. This criticism relates 
to the refusal of the ECJ to distinguish the concept of ‘dislocation’ or ‘fragmentation’ of 
the tax base from the concepts of discrimination and disparity. The most prominent 
representative of this criticism is Wattel.89 According to this author, the fourth category 
of ‘dislocations’ concerns cases in which a disadvantageous tax effect occurs because of a 
cross-border activity of a taxpayer, but one cannot say that one single jurisdiction (either 
the residence State or the source State) is to blame (therefore, no discrimination is afoot), 
and one cannot say either that the effect is caused by a disparity, since both States apply the 
same (but equally inconsistent) tax system. Thus, the disadvantageous tax effect is caused 
by the fact that the tax base (the income) falls within two tax jurisdictions, causing the 
need to divide that tax base between the two jurisdictions involved and to apply double 
tax relief mechanisms.90 
Bosal,91 Manninen92 and Marks & Spencer93 are three examples in which the distinguishing 
measure in question was defended by arguing that the disadvantageous treatment of the 
cross-border situation was caused by a jurisdictional mismatch. According to the Member 
States concerned, the national measures could not therefore be discrimination prohibited 
by EU law. The ECJ, however, did not share this view in any of these cases. 
In Bosal, the ECJ held a Netherlands rule to be contrary to freedom of establishment. 
Under this rule, Netherlands resident parent companies could only deduct costs 
relating to the income from shares in a subsidiary if the subsidiary was taxable in the 
Netherlands or if its costs were indirectly instrumental in the making of profits taxable 
in the Netherlands.94 According to AG Geelhoed, who was clearly influenced by Wattel’s 
above-discussed writings, the ECJ has not accorded sufficient recognition to the Member 
States’ division of tax jurisdiction in that case. He specifically refers to the finding of the 
ECJ that the comparability criterion is satisfied. It is, in AG Geelhoed’s view, crucial to 
the analysis that the Netherlands exempted from taxation all ‘inward’ profits from non-
domestic subsidiaries. According to the AG, the division of the tax jurisdiction between 
the Netherlands and the Member States of residence of the subsidiaries is such that 
jurisdiction to tax the foreign subsidiaries’ profit fell solely on the source state. As a result, 
it appears to AG Geelhoed to be wholly consistent with this division of jurisdiction for the 
Netherlands to allocate those charges paid by the Netherlands parent that are attributable 
to the exempt profits of the foreign subsidiaries to the Member State of the subsidiaries. In 
AG Geelhoed’s view, the position of a domestic parent company with a subsidiary whose 
profits are taxable in that Member State, on the one hand, and such a parent company with 
88 Note that this provision has been repealed per 1 December 2009 (entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon). See on this provision Raingeard de la Blétière 2008, p 91-105.
89 Wattel 2003, p 198 et seq. 
90 Terra & Wattel 2008, p 48.
91 Case C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV, to a large extent confirmed in Case C-471/04 Keller Holding.
92 Case C-319/02 Manninen.
93 Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer.
94 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, 
§ 62.
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a subsidiary whose profits are not taxable (exempt) in that Member State, on the other, are 
not comparable. According to AG Geelhoed, Bosal is a classic example of a difference in 
treatment resulting directly from dislocation of tax base. The AG thinks that the result of 
the judgment is to override the Member States’ choice of division of tax jurisdiction and 
priority of taxation. This choice, according to AG Geelhoed, lies solely within Member 
States’ competence. 
Manninen concerned Finnish legislation, whereby Finland granted a full imputation 
tax credit to Finnish shareholders in respect of Finnish corporate income tax levied on 
profits distributed as dividends. No tax credit in respect of foreign corporate income tax 
levied on foreign-source profits distributed as dividends was, however, granted. The ECJ 
held that Article 56 EC (free movement of capital; now Article 63 TFEU) required Finland 
to extend this tax credit to account for corporate income tax levied on dividends from 
another Member State - in this case, Sweden.95 Wattel has, however, criticized the judgment 
in Manninen. In his view, domestic company profits may only be regarded as equal to 
company profits outside the jurisdiction if the existence of separate fiscal jurisdictions and 
jurisdictional mismatches is ignored. Wattel states that, if jurisdictional mismatches are 
ignored, fiscal sovereignty is also disregarded. He argues that the differential treatment 
is the result of a ‘dislocation’, i.e. a mismatch caused by exposure to more than one 
jurisdiction, and not of a discrimination or restriction within the scope of the EU law. He 
blames the ECJ for being a substitute legislator by prescribing which jurisdiction should 
remove the fiscal impediments caused by jurisdictional mismatches.96 
The case of Marks & Spencer concerned the UK system of group relief that allows UK 
resident companies in a group to offset their profits and losses amongst themselves. This is 
not allowed for losses incurred by a group company established in another Member State 
which does not conduct any trading activities in the United Kingdom. The ECJ considered 
that this system of group relief is a restriction on the freedom of establishment (Article 
49 TFEU), in that it applies different treatment for tax purposes to losses incurred by a 
resident subsidiary and losses incurred by a non-resident subsidiary. The ECJ rejected 
the idea that, with regard to a group relief system, resident subsidiaries and non-resident 
subsidiaries are not in comparable tax situations, because a company resident in another 
Member State is not located within the fiscal jurisdiction of the United Kingdom (as 
a result of which that State cannot tax the profits of the subsidiary). The ECJ, in effect, 
stated that the fact that the United Kingdom does not, in accordance with the principle of 
territoriality enshrined in international tax law and recognized by EU law, tax the profits 
of the non-resident subsidiaries of a parent company established on its territory, does 
not in itself justify restricting group relief to losses incurred by resident companies. The 
UK has to accept losses from a non-resident subsidiary if the possibilities of using the 
losses have been exhausted in the subsidiary’s Member State and the UK parent company 
demonstrates this.
The position that jurisdictional arguments are not, by definition, decisive was 
confirmed by the ECJ judgment in the N-case.97 The N-case concerned the Dutch taxation 
95 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, § 44.
96 Peter Wattel, case note to Case C-319/02 Manninen, BNB 2004/401, § 11.
97 Case C-470/04 N.
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of latent increases in value of shares, the taxable event being the transfer of the residence 
of a taxpayer, with a ‘substantial holding’ in a company, outside the Netherlands. It was 
possible to benefit from suspension of payment until the disposal of the shares, subject to 
conditions, such as the provision of guarantees. In addition, decreases in value occurring 
after the transfer of residence were not taken into account in order to reduce the tax debt. 
The ECJ considered that the ‘exit tax’ at issue is in itself in accordance with the fiscal 
jurisdictional principle of territoriality. Nevertheless, the ECJ went on to examine whether 
such a measure goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective it pursues. It concluded 
that in order to be regarded as proportionate to the objective pursued, such a system for 
recovering tax on the income from securities would have to take full account of reductions 
in value capable of arising after the transfer of residence by the taxpayer concerned, unless 
such reductions have already been taken into account in the host Member State. One can 
recognize a parallel here with Marks & Spencer, since losses suffered outside a State’s direct 
tax jurisdiction should be taken into account under certain conditions.98 
Thus, the judgment in N makes it again perfectly clear that the circumstance of certain 
facts occurring outside a State’s jurisdiction cannot in itself justify that such facts should 
fall outside the scope of comparison with a situation which does occur (fully) within a 
State’s jurisdiction. This has been confirmed in the judgments in Rewe Zentralfinanz,99 Oy 
AA,100 Lidl Belgium101 and Renneberg102. Weber has summarized the criticism of this line of 
reasoning as being incorrect from a dogmatic point of view because the ECJ does not pay 
heed to the consequences of its own basic assumptions, namely that the Member States 
are free to determine the criteria for taxation in order to delimit tax jurisdiction and to 
avoid double taxation. Moreover, the ECJ does not show sufficient respect for a Member 
State’s tax jurisdiction; the Marks & Spencer judgment, for example, allegedly constitutes 
“a major breach of Member States’ sovereignty”.103 
Thus, the ECJ is criticized from different angles. According to authors such as Kofler and 
Mason, the ECJ is too hesitant towards Member States which should have been compelled 
by it to eliminate international juridical double taxation. According to authors such as 
Wattel and Weber, however, the ECJ does not show sufficient respect for a Member State’s 
98 Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, § 55.
99 Case C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz, § 43: “a difference in tax treatment between resident parent 
companies according to whether or not they have subsidiaries abroad cannot be justified merely 
by the fact that they have decided to carry on economic activities in another Member State, in 
which the State concerned cannot exercise its taxing powers. Accordingly, an argument based 
on the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States cannot in 
itself justify a Member State systematically refusing to grant a tax advantage to a resident parent 
company, on the ground that that company has developed a cross-border economic activity 
which does not have the immediate result of generating tax revenues for that State.”
100 Case C-231/05 Oy AA: “the mere fact that parent companies which have their corporate 
establishment in another Member State are not subject to tax in Finland does not differentiate 
the subsidiaries of those parent companies from the subsidiaries of parent companies which 
have their establishment in Finland, and does not render the positions of those two categories of 
subsidiary incomparable”.
101 Case C-414/06 Lidl Belgium. 
102 Case C-527/06 Renneberg. See for severe criticism of this judgment Kemmeren 2009.
103 Weber 2007.
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direct tax sovereignty. The authors however have in common that they criticize the ECJ 
from one viewpoint: the principle of free movement or the principle of tax sovereignty, 
either one of which would not have been given sufficient weight by the ECJ. A conceptual 
framework to determine whether the concrete decision in a certain case is correct or not is 
currently missing. Part II of the present study attempts to provide such a framework. First, 
however, some criticism on the second level of the ECJ’s assessment model is reviewed. 
2.3 justification analysis in direct tax cases
It is settled ECJ case law that a restriction on free movement can be justified only if the 
restrictive measure pursues a ‘legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty’ and is ‘justified 
by overriding reasons of public interest’ (in the literature referred to as the ‘rule of 
reason’).104 Four comments are made in respect of the discussion of these conditions in 
the literature.
First, most tax literature examines these requirements by making lists with ‘actually 
accepted’ grounds of justification, ‘in principle accepted justifications, but never in 
practice’ and ‘rejected justifications’.105 
Second, after having completed these lists, tax literature finds it difficult to explain 
why a certain ground of justification appears in one of these three lists and not in another. 
Mason, for example, finds it ‘significant’ that the ECJ has uniformly rejected justifications 
based on loss of tax revenue and the need to maintain the domestic tax base.106
Third, literature criticizes the way in which the ECJ interprets a ground of justification 
once it has been categorized in one of the lists. For example, an ‘accepted’ justification 
ground such as the need to maintain the cohesion of the tax system is examined as if such 
a justification were an autonomous object of interpretation. Vanistendael, for example, 
has analyzed the justification on grounds of cohesion in an article discussing how this 
justification has arisen as a phoenix from the ashes.107 In Verkooijen, the ECJ allegedly 
held that the need to ensure the cohesion of a tax system may justify rules liable to restrict 
fundamental freedoms only if a direct link exists, in the case of one and the same taxpayer, 
between the grant of a tax advantage and the offsetting of that advantage by a fiscal levy, 
both of which relate to the same tax.108 In the above-discussed cases of Manninen and 
Marks & Spencer a “new principle of cohesion” would have been born in a “movement of 
cautious relaxation”.109 This is the common view among scholars.110 
Fourth, tax literature criticizes the terms which the ECJ uses in referring to certain 
grounds of justification. The ECJ would wrongly suggest that some of these grounds 
should be regarded as separate justifications, where they would essentially reflect one and 
the same ‘real’ justification. According to Wattel, for example, the justification ground 
104 E.g. Case C-360/06 Heinrich Bauer Verlag, § 34.
105 See for instance Roth 2008, p 79 and 94; Kingston 2007, p 1347.
106 Mason 2007, p 85.
107 Vanistendael 2005.
108 Case C-35/98 Verkooijen, § 56.
109 Vanistendael 2005. 
110 E.g. Kingston 2007, p 1348-1349
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of “[f]iscal coherence is really the fiscal territoriality principle”.111 Also, the ‘principles’ 
of coherence, territoriality and the allocation of taxing powers were basically the same 
thing: just another name for the same justification.112 Another matter which has exercised 
many minds concerns the question of ‘how many’ justifications have to be present in 
order for a restriction on free movement to be justified. Should three justifications be 
present, or are two or even one enough?113 Apart from this, Lang has argued that the ECJ 
should refrain from introducing ‘new’ grounds of justification, because they would lead 
to uncertainty.114
These four comments, although based on careful legal reasoning, show that tax 
literature is currently not capable of placing the ECJ’s justification analysis in a conceptual 
framework which goes beyond the necessarily coincidental fact patterns of the case law and 
which is apt to clarify the choices which the ECJ has made and is making. As mentioned 
earlier, part II of the present study aims at providing such a conceptual framework. First, 
however, some criticism on the third level of the ECJ’s assessment model needs to be 
reviewed.
2.4 Proportionality analysis in direct tax cases115
Once it has been established that a direct tax measure constitutes a restriction on free 
movement which can be justified by overriding reasons of general interest, a proportionality 
analysis needs to be performed. As stated in section 2.1 of this study, it should be examined 
i) whether the application of the direct tax measure ensures achievement of the aim 
pursued (suitability test), and ii) whether the application of the direct tax measure does 
not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose (necessity test). The suitability test is not 
controversial in tax literature. The necessity test, however, is subject to some criticism, in 
particular in cases where the ECJ might be accused of making political decisions in the 
framework of this test. Ghosh and Wattel are prominent critics of the ECJ when it comes 
to the performance of this test.116
The above-discussed judgment in Marks & Spencer can serve as an example.117 To 
recapitulate, Marks and Spencer was a UK-based group with subsidiaries in several 
Member States. The continental European subsidiaries (in Belgium, France and 
Germany) ran into losses during the 1990s. UK resident Marks & Spencer plc sought to 
offset these losses against the profits derived in the United Kingdom. As the UK group 
relief system only allowed for the surrender of losses from UK resident companies or 
non-resident companies carrying on trade in the United Kingdom via a permanent 
establishment (PE), Marks & Spencer plc was denied the offset of the losses incurred in 
111 Wattel 2004, p 92.
112 Wattel 2007 and Terra & Wattel 2008, p 373-374.
113 Isenbaert 2009, p 274.
114 ang 2009, p 113.
115 Reference is made to Emiliou 2006 and Jans et al. 2007, p 142 et seq. for an extensive discussion of 
proportionality analysis in ECJ case law in general. The present study will discuss the application 
of the principle of proportionality in direct taxation cases in detail in chapter 8.
116 Ghosh 2007, p 81 et seq; Terra & Wattel 2008, p 350-351.
117 See for further comments on this case Douma & Naumburg 2006. 
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the non-resident subsidiaries. As explained before, the ECJ decided that this constitutes 
a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment. In deciding whether or not the 
UK restriction could be justified, the ECJ stated that it is necessary to analyze what the 
consequences would be if the domestic advantage, i.e. the loss surrender, were to be 
extended unconditionally.118 This statement forms the basis for the subsequent analysis. In 
this framework, the ECJ considered three justification arguments. First, according to the 
ECJ, the need to preserve a balanced allocation of taxing powers between the Member 
States could make it necessary to apply to the economic activities of companies established 
in one of those Member States only the tax rules of that Member State for both profits and 
losses. Second, the ECJ accepted that Member States must be able to prevent losses from 
being used twice. A double use of losses would occur if the losses of a foreign subsidiary 
could be used both in the subsidiary’s Member State and in the parent’s. Third, the ECJ 
noted that there is a risk that losses will be transferred to companies established in the 
Member States which apply the highest rates of taxation. It held that “in the light of 
those three justifications taken together” the restriction in the UK system was justified. 
However, turning to proportionality analysis, the ECJ finally held that the preservation of 
a balanced allocation of taxing rights, the prevention of the double use of losses and tax 
avoidance could be attained by less restrictive measures. This was to accept losses from a 
non-resident subsidiary if the possibilities of using the losses had been exhausted in the 
subsidiary’s Member State and the parent demonstrated this.
This performance of the necessity test has been criticized severely by Ghosh and Wattel. 
The ECJ would have no competence to decide under what circumstances a certain loss of a 
foreign subsidiary should be transplanted from one tax jurisdiction to another. Wattel has 
coined the term of ‘the-always-somewhere-principle’ which the ECJ allegedly observes 
in direct tax cases – a tax loss or deduction should be able to be deducted somewhere 
in the Union – but for which there would be no basis whatsoever in EU law.119 Similarly, 
Ghosh has accused the ECJ of requiring that a Member State exercises tax jurisdiction 
where it has explicitly chosen not to do so: the foreign subsidiaries of Marks & Spencer 
were fully outside the UK’s tax jurisdiction. To require that a tax loss of these subsidiaries 
should under the circumstances be transferred to the UK nevertheless amounts to 
positive integration by the ECJ, according to Ghosh. The ECJ – being a court and not a 




The criticism discussed in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 shows that tax literature is wrestling 
with the reconciliation of tax sovereignty and free movement. Wattel has called this a 
“struggle between the two in principle irreconcilable positions of allowing Member States 
to protect their taxing jurisdictions as defined by them, and at the same time prohibiting 
118 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, § 41.
119 Opinion AG Wattel before HR 22 December 2006, No. 39258, BNB 2007/134, § 3.2; Terra & 
Wattel 2008, p 350-351.
120 Ghosh 2007, p 93-94.
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them to tax cross-border positions less favourably than comparable domestic positions.” 
Accordingly, the “key question is where the right balance lies between free movement 
rights and tax share protection.”121 The above analysis has shown that tax literature is 
currently unable to explain why the ECJ does not distinguish dislocations from ‘real’ 
restrictions, why international juridical double taxation does not lead to a restriction 
on free movement, why certain justifications are rejected in some cases and accepted in 
others and on which grounds the ECJ performs a balancing test like the one in Marks 
& Spencer. The ECJ would fail to recognize that EU Member States have retained their 
sovereignty in the field of direct taxation, it would wrongly harmonize direct taxation by 
formulating positive rules and it would ‘invent’ new grounds of justification or ‘re-invent’ 
grounds once rejected. The current literature attempts to explain this by taking existing 
ECJ case law as a starting point or by emphasizing the importance of either tax sovereignty 
or free movement. As appears from the discussion above, however, this ‘internal’ approach 
cannot lead to a satisfactory answer to the question of whether the approach taken in ECJ 
case law is correct or incorrect with respect to the reconciliation of national direct tax 
sovereignty and free movement. As can be seen in the literature just mentioned, it results 
in a politicized ‘tis-’tisn’t argument without bringing the discussion to a level where it can 
be objectively determined whether the ECJ has taken a ‘right’ approach in rendering its 
decision or not. 
It is submitted that a proper analysis can only be made in the light of an assessment 
model which is external to and independent of the ECJ’s current case law. This model 
should recognize that free movement and national direct tax sovereignty are fundamentally 
equal principles. One cannot say that free movement always prevails over national direct 
tax sovereignty. Nor can one say that national direct tax sovereignty always prevails over 
free movement. A theoretical assessment model which places the ECJ’s case law on direct 
taxation in a conceptual framework will be designed in Part II of the present study.
121 Terra and Wattel 2008, p 343-344.
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Part II designs a theoretical assessment model which places the ECJ’s case law on direct 
taxation in a conceptual framework which is currently missing in the literature. As stated in 
earlier, this model should be external to current case law. Such an approach – a method to 
understand, structure, explain and assess the practice of courts through external theories 
of law – is widely used and accepted. Dworkin, for example, has designed a normative 
theory of adjudication, which emphasizes the distinction between arguments of principle 
and policy. This theory defends the claim that judicial decisions based on arguments of 
principle are compatible with democratic principles. Subsequently, Dworkin has applied 
this normative theory to the central and politically controversial cases of constitutional 
adjudication. This made it possible to criticize the debate between judicial activism and 
restraint in constitutional law.122 Other authors have specifically used general theories 
of law to understand and structure ECJ case law. Bengoetxea, for example, has applied 
insights derived from general legal theory to ECJ case law practice.123 The more recent 
doctoral thesis by Conway examines the theory of conflict of norms in order to provide 
conceptual insight into justification and the role of value choices in ECJ legal reasoning. 
His thesis seeks to present an account, both descriptive and normative, of norm conflict 
resolution in EU law and the legal reasoning of the ECJ.124 Harbo has discussed the work 
of inter alia Dworkin, Hart, Rawls, Raz, Habermas and Alexy to understand and structure 
the function of the proportionality principle in EU law.125 And there are many others who 
have used insights from general theories of law to structure and assess ECJ case law.126 
The question arises as to whether there is a model available in studies on legal theory 
which may serve as an inspiration for understanding and structuring the conflict between 
tax sovereignty and EU free movement.127 This model should recognize that the Member 
States have retained their sovereignty in direct tax matters. In the absence of European 
harmonization, the ECJ is not competent to interfere in the conception or organization 
of the tax systems of the Member States.128 On the other hand, under Union law, fiscal 




126 E.g. Paunio 2009 has drawn from Habermas’ discourse theory of law, to discuss how the principle 
of legal certainty may be conceptualized within the context of EU law from the viewpoint of 
ECJ legal reasoning; Weyland 2002 has used Kelsen’s theory of the legal system to answer the 
question how conflicts between EU and national constitutional norms should be resolved.
127 Compare for a similar search for a theory of judicial argumentation Bäcker 2008, p 26 et seq. 
128 Opinion AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, § 60.
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sovereignty cannot be construed as meaning ‘fiscal autarchy’. By subscribing to the TEU 
and the TFEU, the Member States agreed to submit to the regime of free movement 
within the Union. As AG Poiares Maduro has explained, that regime specifically requires 
the Member States to take account of transnational situations when applying their tax 
rules and to adapt those rules accordingly.129 This proposition – one cannot say that free 
movement always prevails over national direct tax sovereignty nor that national direct 
tax sovereignty always prevails over free movement – means that both the EU free 
movement provisions and national tax sovereignty should be seen as relative ‘principles’ 
rather than absolute ‘rules’ (chapter 4 explains this widely accepted distinction between 
rules and principles in detail). Therefore, theories which regard some principles as being 
absolute – instead of relative – cannot serve as an inspiration for the development of a 
theoretical optimization model. For instance, Nozick’s refusal to accept that claims of need 
can sometimes outweigh claims to property – that is taxation in a welfare State – is no 
inspiration for the present study because it makes an absolute political choice between 
two competing principles.130 Nozick’s strong defence of free-market libertarianism cannot 
be used in order to develop our theoretical assessment model, because neither the TEU 
nor the TFEU contains any explicit choice for a particular economic order.131 For the same 
reason, Rawls’ defence of egalitarian liberalism cannot serve as a direction for the ECJ.132 
Also, legal theories which are based on legal positivism cannot provide much guidance 
for the present study, because both national direct tax sovereignty and free movement 
cannot be regarded as positive rules. Positivism is a model of and for a system of rules.133 
These rules, however, are missing in the area which concerns the present study. A theory 
is needed which regards national direct tax sovereignty and free movement as prima facie 
reasons or principles and which provides a framework for reconciling these principles. 
This framework should be designed in such a way that no principle would always trump 
the other, which means that these principles should be given a very wide scope. After all, 
if one would narrow the scope of one of the principles in advance, this would essentially 
result in one principle always trumping the other in conflict situations which are outside 
the scope of the pre-limited principle.
For this reason, the present study will also not use Maduro’s much-praised account 
of Article 34 TFEU (free movement of goods: prohibition of quantitative restrictions on 
imports and all measures having an equivalent effect; before 1 December 2009: Article 28 
EC).134 The model developed by Maduro seeks to take into account problems of legitimacy 
by limiting the scope of Article 34 TFEU. Problems of legitimacy arise because national 
measures which regulate the free movement of goods may affect interests which have not 
been represented in the – national – democratic legislative process. Similarly, decisions 
of the ECJ on the validity of such measures may imply playing a legislative role without 
democratic legitimization. Maduro has also argued that EU law does not direct the ECJ to 
129 Opinion AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, § 62.
130 Nozick 1974, p 30-31.
131 Compare Ossenbühl 2000, p 561, for a similar statement with respect to the German 
constitution.
132 Rawls 1971. 
133 Dworkin 1977, p 22.
134 Maduro 1998.
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review the degree of public intervention in the market and that “hidden” uniformisation 
of national regulations through Article 34 TFEU should be prevented. At the same time, 
according to Maduro, it is clear that an interpretation which only prohibits protectionist 
measures is insufficient in the present stage of European integration. All decisions 
concerning the common market should take all affected interests into account. Maduro 
suggests that the ECJ “should not second-guess national policy choices, but should instead 
ensure that there is no under-representation of the interests of nationals of other Member 
States in the national political process.” In order to design a test to identify suspect 
measures, Maduro distinguishes between two types of interests affected by national 
measures which interfere with the free movement of goods: cross-national interests 
(uniform throughout the Union) and national interests (diverging throughout the Union). 
National measures which regulate market circumstances often regulate uniform interests: 
the way in which goods are, for example, sold on the market. In this case there is no danger 
of an over-representation of national interests or an under-representation of foreign 
interests. Rules on the characteristics of products do, however, tend to lead to under- or 
over-representation, because they may relate to typically national production habits. In 
short, if a national measure regulates uniform or cross-national interests it will not prima 
facie fall under Article 34 TFEU. The aim of this approach is that the ECJ will only review 
national measures if there is reason to fear for a representative malfunction in the national 
political process with regard to nationals of other Member States.135 Thus, Maduro tries to 
reconcile three principles – free movement of goods, national sovereignty and democratic 
legitimacy – by a definition of the scope of Article 34 TFEU. Such an approach essentially 
means that it is defined in advance in which situations one of the principles always trumps 
another: by limiting the scope of a free movement principle, proportionality analysis is 
excluded in situations which fall outside the scope. In my view, this is an unnecessarily 
blunt result, whereas a more fine-tuned model should be possible by giving the principles 
their widest possible scope, after which it is examined to what extent all principles can 
be realized. This is perfectly possible in Maduro’s model, which focuses on the interests 
recognized in the national political process and thus on the objectives of the national 
measure at stake. It should be possible to examine to what extent these objectives, which 
should indeed not be second-guessed from a legitimacy point of view, are realized in a way 
which is the least burdensome for free movement. 
Alexy’s theory of principles, which is closely related to Dworkin’s rights theory, regards 
all principles as being relative.136 Importantly, Alexy’s theory of principles differs from 
Dworkin’s rights theory, where Dworkin distinguishes principles from policies. According 
to Dworkin, a policy is a “kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an 
improvement in some economic, political or social feature of the community (though some 
goals are negative, in that they stipulate that some present feature is to be protected from 
adverse change).” Conversely, a principle is “a standard that is to be observed, not because 
it will advance or secure an economic, political or social situation deemed desirable, but 
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.”137 
135 Maduro 1998, p 173-174.
136 Alexy 2002 and Dworkin 1977.
137 Dworkin 1977, p 22.
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In Dworkin’s theory, the term ‘principles’ points towards individual rights which are 
designed to safeguard the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the community. Rights are 
clearly more important than policies, because a right of an individual can only be limited 
by competing rights of other individuals and not by policies.138 This is problematic for the 
present study, because the rights which individuals derive from the EU free movement 
provisions should not automatically trump the policies which Member States pursue 
through their tax systems. If that were to be the case, national tax sovereignty would in 
fact be denied. The present study will, therefore, not use Dworkin’s rights theory. Instead, 
Alexy’s theory of principles will be used for the development of a theoretical model for the 
optimization of national direct tax sovereignty and free movement. This theory does not 
juxtapose principles and policies. It does, however, distinguish rules from principles by 
examining what happens in the case of a conflict between those norms. If two rules conflict 
with each other, the solution will be to disapply one of the rules. If two principles collide, 
however, the solution is not found by disapplying one of the principles, but by realizing 
both of them within what is factually and legally possible. Contrary to rules, principles 
are not definitive but only prima facie requirements. They typically lack the resources to 
determine their own extent, which should be assessed in the light of competing principles 
and what is factually possible.139 Thus, principles are optimization requirements. Their 
extent can be determined only in confrontation with another principle in the framework 
of an optimization model.140 
This idea of the optimization of colliding principles perfectly fits the conflict between 
direct tax sovereignty and free movement. Sovereignty is to be framed as a principle and 
not as a rule in international law.141 The principle of sovereignty – a prima facie general 
freedom of action of States, as limited by international law142 – requires that its corollaries 
are realized within what is legally and factually possible. The extent of sovereignty, which 
can never be absolute, can be determined only in confrontation with other principles and 
rules. This confrontation can never lead to the disapplication of competing principles 
as such, but leads to the optimization of all interests involved under Alexy’s theory of 
principles.143 An example may clarify this. Weber has defended the position that a Member 
State should be able to exclude losses suffered by a foreign permanent establishment from 
the taxable basis of a resident company. This disadvantage should be outside the scope of the 
free movement provisions, because it follows directly from the sovereign right of a Member 
State to delimit its tax jurisdiction as it sees fit.144 Thus, in Weber’s view, the principle of 
sovereignty is in some cases absolute or, in other words, a rule. This view disregards the 
138 Dworkin 1977, p 194.
139 Alexy 2002, p 57.
140 This does not mean that Alexy’s theory is free of criticism; see for example Sieckmann 2009, p 
42-43. In the view of the present author, however, Alexy’s theory is the best theory available for 
purposes of solving the conflict between the principles of tax sovereignty and free movement.
141 Noll 1997, p 440. Verschuuren has also shown that sovereignty should be seen as a principle 
and not as a rule; see Verschuuren 2006, p 39. This point is further developed in chapter 5 of the 
present study.
142 Bernhardt 1985, p. 410.
143 Noll 1997, p 339-441.
144 Weber 2006, p 594.
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fact that sovereignty cannot be understood as an absolute notion. The same applies to the 
principle of free movement in the EU’s internal market. This principle prima facie protects 
a general freedom of (economic) action of persons. The extent of the principle of free 
movement can only be determined in confrontation with competing rules and principles. 
If it were otherwise, and its extent were unlimited, it would de facto deny that there is 
such a thing as sovereignty of Member States: it would prohibit taxation as such because 
taxation is undoubtedly an obstacle to free movement. Again, this confrontation between 
the two principles cannot lead to the disapplication of tax sovereignty, but the extent of the 
principle free movement should be determined through an optimization process. After 
all, both principles are of a fundamental equal weight.145 It should be stressed that the 
notions of precedence and direct effect of EU law146 do not mean that free movement 
should always set aside the principle of tax sovereignty. This is only the case after it has 
been assessed that a certain direct tax measure is indeed contrary to a free movement 
provision. This assessment is the object of the present study. 
Alexy’s theory has been criticized by many authors,147 the most prominent of whom 
is Habermas.148 Habermas is mainly concerned about two things.149 Firstly, the idea that 
principles should be optimized in view of competing principles without any pre-determined 
outcome makes a goal-oriented weighting necessary. This means that individual rights 
could be sacrificed for the benefit of collective goals. This would rob constitutional 
rights of their strict priority over other considerations (policy arguments). The ‘fire wall’ 
between the protection of constitutional rights and the pursuit of public policy would 
collapse. Secondly, there would be no rational standards for balancing. This would open 
the door for arbitrary and unverifiable results. In my view, the objections brought forward 
by Habermas do not render Alexy’s theory any less suitable for the purposes of the present 
study. After all, this purpose is to design a theoretical assessment model which meets 
the fundamental starting point in ECJ case law that EU Member States have retained 
their sovereignty in the area of direct taxation but that they should nevertheless exercise 
that competence consistently with EU law. This means that the policy goals pursued by 
145 Compare Maduro 2003, p 532: “any legal order (national or European) must respect the identity 
of the other legal orders; its identity must not be affirmed in a manner that either challenges the 
identity of the other legal orders or the pluralist conception of the European legal order itself ”. 
Pluralism means that no formal hierarchy exists among the applicable legal orders (Komárek 
2007, p 30). In other words, both legal orders should respect each other competence. Compare 
Gerards 2011 who argues “that good use of the instrument of deference might help the EU courts 
to deal with the situation of pluralism that is currently visible in the European legal order. By 
means of deferential judicial review, the EU courts can pay due respect to national constitutional 
traditions and to national legislative and policy choices, thus preventing situations of real 
conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU courts to take into account the intricacies related 
to judicial review of norms drafted by co-equal institutions or by national elected bodies.” See 
also Isenbaert 2010, p 226-227.
146 E.g. Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos; Case 6/64 Costa/ENEL; Case 106/77 Simmenthal III.
147 Reference is made to Sieckmann 2009, Pavlakos 2007, Clérico & Sieckmann 2009 and Bäcker 
2008.
148 Habermas 1996, p 254 et seq.
149 Compare Greer 2004, p 414, and Alexy 2002, p 388-389.
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tax systems do not a priori have less weight that the principles of EU free movement.150 
With regard to the second objection brought forward by Habermas it must be admitted 
that there is a certain degree of arbitrariness to balancing. Alexy, however, has argued 
extensively that the balancing process does take place, to a large extent, in a rational and 
logical manner.151 This will be dealt with more extensively in chapter 4.
Two other alternatives to Alexy’s theory should be discussed. The first alternative 
is reflected by Hesse’s notion of praktische Konkordanz (practical concordance).152 This 
notion should be understood against the German idea of the unity of the community and 
the constitution. The notion of praktische Konkordanz has been accepted by the German 
constitutional court. It implies that all rights protected by the German constitution should 
be achieved as much as possible in individual cases: the right solution to a collision of 
norms is the decision where all of the competing principles and interests protected by 
them gain. An open question is to what extent praktische Konkordanz can be applied to 
constitutional rights which are accompanied by a limitation clause. The second alternative 
is reflected by the notion of categorizations.153 When using this method a court gives clear 
general guidance on the application and interpretation of fundamental rights in certain 
categories of cases instead of engaging in a balancing exercise in individual cases. This 
leads to a higher degree of legal certainty. In my view, both alternatives are useful for 
the present study. They do not conflict with Alexy’s theory, at least not in a way which 
would be harmful to the present study. Indeed, the notion of praktische Konkordanz sees 
fundamental rights as norms which should be optimized. This study will use Alexy’s theory 
in order to give a more precise and dogmatic meaning to the process of optimization. This 
process may indeed result in specific ‘rules’ for certain categories of cases, which we will 
see in chapter 4.
I was certainly not the first to link Alexy’s theory to the conflict between national 
sovereignty and free movement. Although no link has been established in literature 
between this theory and the direct taxation case law of the ECJ, Borgmann-Prebil, for 
example, has been a strong defender of applying Alexy’s theory to the conflict in general. He 
states that the advantage of Alexy’s approach lies in the fact that it employs the mechanism 
of balancing of principles for the settlement of conflicts between individual rights and 
the public good, as well as between conflicting public interests. Consequently, it may 
also serve as a doctrinal tool for the balancing of Member States’ interests against Union 
interests, as is necessary in the application of the rule of reason. In this regard Borgmann-
Prebil finds Alexy’s notion of ‘optimization precepts’ particularly useful, because it dispels 
any sense of a conceptual hierarchy between the free movement provisions and the 
derogation grounds.154 Also according to Moral Soriano, the ECJ has in fact included the 
theory of principles as commands to optimize in its model of legal reasoning.155 Recourse 
150 Compare Harbo 2010, p 169.
151 Alexy 2002, p 401 et seq.
152 Hesse 1999, p 28.
153 See Gerards & Bomhoff 2007 with reference to an extensive body of literature.
154 Borgmann-Prebil 2008, p 340-341. This idea may seem to be at odds with ECJ case law stating 
that derogation or justification grounds should be interpreted narrowly (Barnard 2010, p 480). 
In practice, however, there does not seem to be significant difference (see section 4.4).
155 Moral Soriano 2003, p 316. See also Pontier & Burg 2003, p 14-15.
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to Dworkin’s and Alexy’s rights theories, and in particular Alexy’s conception of rights as 
prima facie entitlements or ‘optimization precepts’, helps to assess the optimum between 
national sovereignty and free movement.156 Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano 
have argued that the ECJ should not formulate a systematic order of principles, but should 
rather promote all of them (demand of proportionality). According to these authors, the 
ECJ understands proportionality in Alexy’s sense: as a command to optimize - that is, as 
a command to find an equilibrium among all colliding interests and values.157 Andenas 
and Zleptnig have reached similar conclusions with respect to WTO law.158 It is the aim 
of part II of the present study to take these observations one step further and to formulate 
a theoretical optimization model on the basis of Alexy’s theory which can be applied in 
direct tax cases. Subsequently, part III will examine to what extent ECJ case law reflects 
this theoretical model. In addition, it will discuss future developments in ECJ case law 
which can be expected on the basis of the theoretical model.
Chapter 4, which follows here, will analyze Alexy’s theory on the optimization of 
competing principles. This will show how a conflict between competing principles should 
be resolved in theory. Subsequently, the prima facie meaning of the two competing 
principles at issue should be defined more precisely. The principle of direct tax sovereignty 
will be restated in chapter 5. The principle of freedom of movement in the EU’s internal 
market will be outlined in chapter 6. The results of chapters 4, 5 and 6 will be used for the 
development of a theoretical optimization model for direct tax cases in chapter 7. 
156 Borgmann-Prebil 2008, p 341.
157 Bengoetxea, MacCormick & Moral Soriano 2001, p 76.
158 Andenas & Zleptnig 2007, p 376-379.
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4.1 A theory of principles: introduction
Robert Alexy’s A Theory of Constitutional Rights’ central thesis is that rights are principles 
and that principles are optimization requirements.159 As such, they are open to balancing 
and proportionality analysis. This highly original idea has been praised as one of the 
most penetrating, analytically refined, and influential general accounts of constitutional 
rights available.160 Although Alexy has written his work in a German constitutional 
context, the argument he makes is of universal application.161 This chapter will summarize 
Alexy’s theory so that it can be applied to the competing principles of national direct tax 
sovereignty and free movement in chapter 7, after they have been restated in chapters 5 
and 6. For a thorough understanding of the theoretical optimization model in chapter 
7 it is recommended to read chapters 4, 5 and 6 in advance. Chapter 7 does, however, 
contain cross-references to the other chapters so that it can also be read independently; 
occasionally the reader will have to thumb back to earlier sections as indicated. By 
definition, a summary of a theory as elaborate and refined as Alexy’s theory is bound to 
be incomplete and too short to do justice to it fully. For the purposes of the present study, 
however, I believe the account given below should be sufficient.
Section 4.2 describes how rules and principles should be distinguished. This is 
important, because only principles are optimization requirements and it will be argued 
later that both national tax sovereignty and free movement are principles (sections 5.1 
and 6.1). It will be argued in section 4.3 that the nature of a principle as an optimization 
requirement implies that its widest possible scope is adopted in order to be optimized 
in relation to competing principles. Section 4.4 shows that any competing principle 
may limit the application of a principle. This is important, because current ECJ case law 
requires that only ‘compelling’ or ‘overriding’ reasons in the general interest can serve 
as a limit. The optimization of competing principles is operationalised in section 4.5 
through proportionality analysis. Notably, section 4.5.2 infers from Alexy’s theory that 
a ‘respectful aims’ test should be introduced, although this test is not formally part of 
159 Alexy 1985 and Alexy 2002.
160 Kumm 2004, p 574-575.
161 See also Alexy 2009, p 6: “The principle of proportionality consists of three sub-principles: 
the principles of suitability, of necessity, and of proportionality in the narrow sense. All 
three principles express the idea of optimization. To apply the principle of proportionality to 
constitutional rights means to treat them as optimization requirements, that is, as principles. For 
that reason, the term “principle” in what follows will often be used instead of the term “right”.” 
See also Alexy 2009a.




Alexy’s work. This test is pivotal to the argument made in the present study and evolves 
around the idea of a twofold neutrality between tax sovereignty and free movement. It will 
be argued in section 4.6 that the general public international law principle of good faith is 
not essentially different from Alexy’s theory in the way in which conflicts are resolved on 
an international level. This is important, because the conflict which is central to this study 
is ultimately decided by an international court which is bound to apply the principle of 
good faith. Section 4.7 contains the conclusions of this chapter. 
4.2 A distinction between rules and principles
It is crucial for a proper understanding of the theory of principles that norms should be 
divided into rules and principles. In respect of rules, Hart has made a distinction between 
primary rules and secondary rules.162 Primary rules are rules of obligation (“drive on 
the right side of the road”). Secondary rules specify how to identify a rule as being part 
of the system (rules of recognition), how to change a rule (rules of change) and how to 
apply a rule (rules of adjudication).163 Thus, law is mainly understood as a system of rules. 
Law, however, does not only consist of rules but also of principles. Hart’s legal positivism 
has been criticized in this respect by Dworkin, who has emphasized the importance of 
principles in the law.164 Dworkin has made a distinction between rules on the one hand 
and principles and policies on the other. A policy is a “kind of standard that sets out a goal 
to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political or social feature of 
the community (though some goals are negative, in that they stipulate that some present 
feature is to be protected from adverse change).” A principle is “a standard that is to be 
observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political or social situation 
deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality.”165 Principles include, for instance, the right to free speech or the 
right not to be discriminated against. According to Dworkin, the difference between legal 
principles (and policies) and legal rules is a logical distinction: “Both sets of standards 
point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular circumstances, but they 
differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing 
fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case 
the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing 
to the decision.”166 Contrary to a rule, a principle does not set out conditions that make its 
application necessary. “Rather, it states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not 
necessitate a particular decision.”167 Rules do, but Dworkin acknowledges that a rule may 
have exceptions. An accurate statement of the law would take this exception into account. 
Without the appropriate exceptions – even if there are theoretically many – a rule would, 
strictly speaking, be incomplete. In theory, all exceptions to a rule could be listed; the more 
162 Hart 1994, p 91-99.
163 Summary by Taekema 2000, p 10.
164 Gribnau 1998, p 49 et seq.
165 Dworkin 1977, p 22.
166 Dworkin 1977, p 24.
167 Dworkin 1977, p 26.
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of them there are, the more accurate is the statement of the rule.168 A complete statement 
of a principle, however, would not be possible. The situations in which the application 
of a principle would be limited by ‘counter-instances’ could not be enumerated.169 Thus, 
Dworkin’s distinction between rules and principles is essentially based on the argument 
that rules apply in an all-or-nothing fashion, whereas principles do not because they have 
a dimension of weight. The ‘closed’ character of rules as opposed to the ‘open’ character 
of principles becomes apparent in the case of competing principles and conflicts of rules. 
According to Dworkin, one who must resolve the conflict between intersecting principles 
has to take into account the relative weight of each. If two rules conflict, one of them 
cannot be a valid rule. “The decision as to which is valid, and which must be abandoned 
or recast, must be made by appealing to considerations beyond the rules themselves. A 
legal system might regulate such conflicts by other rules, which prefer the rule enacted 
by a higher authority, or the rule enacted later, or the more specific rule, or something 
of that sort. A legal system may also prefer the rule supported by the more important 
principles.”170 
Alexy, who does not distinguish between principles and policies,171 makes a similar 
point when he states that a conflict between two rules can only be resolved in that 
either an appropriate exception is read into one of the rules, or at least one of the rules 
is declared invalid. The question of which rule should be declared invalid or into which 
rule an exception should be read can be solved by maxims such as ‘lex posterior derogat 
legi priori’ or ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’, but it is also possible to proceed according 
to the substantive importance of the conflicting rules. Competing principles should be 
resolved in a fundamentally different way. If two principles compete, one of them must 
be outweighed. This neither means that the outweighed principle is invalid nor that it has 
to have an exception built into it. The principle continues to exist and may itself outweigh 
the other principle in other circumstances. If two rules conflict, one of them has to be 
declared invalid. As a consequence, conflicts of rules are played out at the level of validity 
and competitions between principles are played out in the dimension of weight.172 
Thus, Alexy basically agrees with Dworkin’s distinction between rules and principles. 
The grounds which underlie this distinction are, however, fundamentally criticized by 
Alexy. He states that Dworkin’s all-or-nothing criterion for the identification of rules is 
inextricably linked to the theoretical possibility of listing all exceptions to a rule, which 
theoretical possibility would be absent in case of principles. Alexy challenges this position 
by pointing out that a principle may be a reason for a court for adding an exception to a rule 
(assuming that the court would be competent to do so under the constitution concerned). 
168 Dworkin 1977, p 25.
169 Dworkin 1977, p 25-26.
170 Dworkin 1977, p 26-27.
171 This is important, because in Dworkin’s theory individual rights – which he calls ‘principles’ - 
are clearly more important than ‘policies’, because a right of an individual can only be limited 
by competing rights of other individuals and not by policies. This is problematic for the present 
study, because the rights which individuals derive from the EU free movement provisions should 
not automatically trump the policies which Member States pursue through their tax systems 
(chapter 3).
172 Alexy 2002, p 49-50.
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If the counter-instances of a principle are numberless, then likewise the instances of its own 
application are also numberless.173 If that is true, then the number of exceptions to a rule 
can also not be listed, not even theoretically. As a consequence, Dworkin’s all-or-nothing 
criterion for the identification of rules cannot be upheld, because principles cannot be 
applied in this fashion. Thus, both rules and principles may appear only prima facie. Their 
prima facie character, however, may be fundamentally different due to ‘formal principles’. 
The setting aside of a rule raises a host of issues that do not arise when a principle is set 
aside, due to the fact that the institution that has legislated the rule has already made 
a judgment on how the relevant background principles apply to the regulatory context 
specified by the rule.174 A principle can be outweighed by another principle. By contrast, 
a rule is not automatically trumped when the competing principle is of greater weight 
than its own underlying principle on the facts of the case. Here, Alexy explains, there are 
other – formal – principles which also need trumping, such as the one that rules passed 
by an authority acting within its jurisdiction are to be followed, and the principle that one 
should not depart from established practice without good reason. Only if these formal 
principles would not apply in a particular jurisdiction do rules and principles have the 
same prima facie character.175 Since these formal principles do not apply if a tax measure 
is tested against the EU free movement provisions, therefore national tax rules – which 
are an emanation of the principle of sovereignty – and EU principles have the same prima 
facie character. This fact that both rules and principles may appear only prima facie – here 
Alexy disagrees with Dworkin – does not mean that no meaningful distinction between 
rules and principles can be made. According to Alexy, the doctrine of collision, already 
briefly touched upon, is a meaningful criterion.176 This can be explained by giving two 
examples. These examples are derived from Dutch case law and not from ECJ case law, 
because the analysis in Part II of the present study should, in principle, not be influenced 
by ECJ case law. After all, Part III of the present study will discuss this case law in the light 
of the model developed in Part II. 
In 1993 the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) decided the case of a Dutch BV (a 
limited liability company) which was effectively managed in Ireland and which had 
suffered a loss.177 According to Dutch internal law, this loss should be available to carry 
forward in future taxable years in the Netherlands (under the Dutch corporate income 
tax act, a BV incorporated under Netherlands law is deemed to be a tax resident of the 
Netherlands). Under the Ireland-Netherlands tax treaty, however, BV was regarded as a 
tax resident of Ireland. As a consequence, its results were taxable only in Ireland. The 
Hoge Raad resolved the conflict between the tax treaty and the corporate income tax by 
disapplying the latter: the loss could not be taken into account in the Netherlands. This 
case is a typical example of a contradiction of rules. One rule permits something which the 
other rule prohibits. This conflict is resolved by declaring one of the rules as not valid and 
thus removing it from the legal order.
173 Alexy 1985a, p 16.
174 Kumm 2004, p 578.
175 Alexy 2002, p 58.
176 Compare Huerta 2009, p 190-191.
177 HR 17 February 1993, No. 28260, BNB 1993/163.
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The Hoge Raad took a totally different approach in 1979 in a case concerning a 
disabled person who wanted to deduct costs which related to his transportation by car 
(a certain amount per kilometre).178 The taxpayer claimed that he suffered extraordinary 
costs because he had no other means of transportation due to his disability. The Court of 
Appeal refused this deduction on the ground that similar taxpayers without the disability 
suffered similar car transportation costs. Hence, the costs suffered by the taxpayer could 
not be attributed to his disability. The Court of Appeal rejected the taxpayer’s argument 
that some statements made by the tax inspector over the phone had given rise to legitimate 
expectations that the costs would be deductible. Before the Hoge Raad the taxpayer argued 
that the Court of Appeal made an error in law by holding that the principle of legitimate 
expectations does not set aside the strict application of the law in this case. The Hoge 
Raad’s reply to this argument is extremely interesting, because it reveals that this case is 
not about a contradiction of rules but rather about an area of tension between colliding 
norms. It first stated that the case at issue concerns the question of whether the principle 
that the law should be applied conflicts with the principle of legitimate expectations to 
such a degree that the law should not be applied. This question should be answered by 
balancing the principle of legality against the principle of legitimate expectations. The 
Hoge Raad subsequently formulated detailed rules which the lower courts should follow 
when performing this balancing exercise in concrete situations. 
The example of the loss-making dual resident BV concerned a conflict between two 
rules which was solved by placing one of the rules outside the legal order. The example of 
the disabled taxpayer concerned a tension between two principles which was not resolved 
by disapplying one of the principles, but by giving precedence to one of them under 
particular circumstances. Accordingly, the conflict between rules is an inside-outside 
problem, whereas a collision between principles takes place within the legal order.179 This 
is what Alexy means with the doctrine of collision: a conflict between two rules can only 
be resolved in that either an appropriate exception is read into one of the rules, or at least 
one of the rules is declared invalid – for example by maxims such as ‘lex posterior derogat 
legi priori’ or ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ – whereas a conflict between principles is 
resolved in a weighing process. This neither means that the outweighed principle is invalid 
nor that it has to have an exception built into it. The principle continues to exist and may 
itself outweigh the other principle in other circumstances. A comparison with the conflict 
between tax sovereignty and EU free movement shows that this conflict is not played out 
at the level of validity but at the level of weight. As stated earlier, tax measures enacted as a 
result of the exercise of a State’s tax sovereignty thus appear only prima facie in the context 
of EU free movement. 
The question arises as to why principles collide in the manner just described. According 
to Alexy, this has to do with a deeper distinction between principles and rules. Principles 
are norms which require that something is realized to the greatest extent factually and 
legally possible. They prescribe the highest degree of realization of an ideal or value under 
certain legal and factual conditions.180 Principles are thus optimization requirements 
178 HR 26 September 1979, No. 19250, BNB 1979/311.
179 Alexy 1985a, p 19.
180 Taekema 2000, p 12.
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which are characterized by the fact that they can be fulfilled in various degrees and that 
their fulfilment depends on factual and legal possibilities. Their extent is therefore in 
concrete cases determined by competing rules and principles.181 Typically, the principle 
itself is not capable of determining its own extent in the light of competing principles and 
what is factually possible.182 This means, for instance, that budgetary reasons can never 
justify an infringement which a tax measure imposes on a competing principle.183 If it 
were otherwise, the extent of tax sovereignty would be unlimited and absolute. In contrast 
to a principle, a rule is a closed norm, the scope of which has already been determined 
by the authority which has passed it. Rules are norms which are always either fulfilled or 
not. If a rule has been adopted by the competent authority, then the requirement is to do 
exactly what it says. In such a case, rules contain fixed points in the field of the factually 
and legally possible.184 They cannot be fulfilled in various degrees. An example may clarify 
this. In the Netherlands, the tax inspector can only impose an additional tax assessment 
if a ‘new fact’ has become known after the original tax assessment was imposed or the 
taxpayer has acted in bad faith.185 This rule is the result of a weighing process performed 
by the legislator of various principles: the principles of legitimate expectations, legality, 
careful public administrative procedure and equality. This process has resulted in a rule. 
As a result, there is no room for the court to come to another appraisal. Canaris has taken 
a similar stance in this respect. He states that principles, unlike rules, have an explicit 
axiological content. They lack rules in order to be realized. Therefore, principles receive 
their meaning only by means of a dialectic process of complementation and limitation.186
Alexy explains that the observation that principles are optimization requirements 
explains their characteristics.187 First, this observation explains why principles collide in 
the manner just described. Second, it clarifies the different prima facie character of rules 
and principles. Principles are always prima facie reasons and rules are definitive reasons, as 
long as no exception has been read into them. If the court takes the position that such an 
exception should be added to the rule, it has to have a very strong argument because the 
rule has been adopted by the competent authority. In such a case, the reason for adding 
an exception to the rule should also be able to outweigh the principle that rules passed 
by an authority acting within its jurisdiction are to be followed. Thus, the prima facie 
character of rules and principles differs. Principles are the starting point of a balancing 
exercise, whereas rules are rather the result of balancing the relevant competing interests. 
Principles represent reasons which can be displaced by other reasons. The circumstances 
under which one principle takes precedence over another constitute the conditions of 
181 Alexy 1985a, p 19-20. See also Alexy 2002a, p 70, and Alexy 2009, p 2.
182 Sieckmann defines the notion of a principle slightly differently. He sees principles as normative 
arguments which form at the same time the object of a balancing exercise and the reasons for 
that exercise; Sieckmann 2007, p 37.
183 See, for instance, HR 14 June 1995, No. 29254, BNB 1995/252, § 3.4.4, where the Dutch Supreme 
Court stated that budgetary reasons cannot justify a breach of the principle of equality enshrined 
in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
184 Alexy 2002, p 47-48. 
185 Article 16 of the Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen (General Tax Act). 
186 Canaris 1983, p 50, 53 and 55, summarized by Ávila 2007, p 9.
187 Alexy 1985a, p 20.
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a rule which has the same legal consequences as the principle taking precedence: the 
result of the balancing act is enshrined in the rule. Alexy calls this the Law of Competing 
Principles.188 The balancing activity of the courts and scholars may over time result in 
rules with a relatively high degree of precision stating which principle takes precedence 
in which situation. The content of the rules thus formulated will differ depending on the 
competing principles involved.189 This goes back to the idea of categorization, briefly 
discussed in chapter 3. 190
4.3 The nature of a principle implies its widest possible scope 
Before one can identify a potential conflict between principles one has to identify the 
prima facie scope of the principles involved. It has just been explained that principles 
should be regarded as optimization requirements which should be realized to the greatest 
extent legally and factually possible. This nature of a principle necessitates that it has the 
widest possible scope. Principles are optimization requirements and in order to achieve 
the optimum between competing principles it is necessary that their widest possible scope 
is adopted in the beginning of the optimization process. After all, if a narrow scope were 
adopted, this would mean that no further fine-tuned optimization would be possible. 
Alexy explains this by distinguishing between two theories on the scope of a right and 
its limit. The ‘external theory’ presupposes that there are two things: a principle and its 
limit. First, there is the principle in itself, which is not limited, and secondly there is what 
is left over once the limit has been applied (the principle as limited). Alexy points out that 
the external theory can accept that principles in legal systems appear mostly as limited 
rights, but it insists that they are also conceivable without limits. As a consequence, 
there is no necessary relationship between the concept of a principle and the concept 
of a limit. This relationship “arises first with the requirement external to the right itself 
to reconcile it with the rights of other individuals or with other individual rights and 
collective interests.” According to the ‘internal theory’, however, there are not two things, 
a right and its limit, but only one: a right which has a certain content. The idea of a limit 
is in this theory replaced by that of extent or scope. In the internal theory, doubts about 
the extent of principles are not doubts about how far they can be limited, but doubts 
about their content.191 An example given by Gerards and Senden illustrates that this is 
not a purely theoretical discussion. If hate speech is defined as a form of ‘expression’ that 
is protected by the freedom of expression, it clearly comes within the scope of article 10 
of the ECHR. This means that restrictions of hate speech, such as imposing a penalty on 
someone for distributing racist flyers, must be justified. As a consequence, the ECtHR 
would be competent to examine the reasonableness of the national justification and to 
give a binding judgment on the matter. By contrast, if freedom of expression were defined 
more narrowly, cases of hate speech might fall outside the scope of article 10 of the ECHR. 
That would mean that there would be no need to justify a penalty imposed because of hate 
speech,192 unless, for example, another possibly applicable principle would so require.
188 Alexy 2002, p 54.
189 Alexy 2002, p 108. See also Gribnau 1998, p 57.
190 See Gerards & Bomhoff 2007.
191 Alexy 2002, p 178-179.
192 Gerards & Senden 2009, p 620.
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Alexy argues that the question of whether the external or the internal theory is correct 
depends upon whether constitutional norms – e.g. free speech, freedom of profession 
or, as we shall see in section 6.1, the EU free movement provisions – are seen as rules or 
principles, that is, whether they give rise to definitive or prima facie positions. In the event 
that they would give rise to definitive positions, the internal theory should be adopted. In 
the event that they would be viewed as prima facie positions, the external theory should 
apply. In Alexy’s theory of principles the external theory should be adopted. Principles 
include a guaranteed prima facie right which is subsequently limited (section 4.2). They 
require a maximally extensive protection of interests. The limitation of a protected interest 
is thus always a limitation of a prima facie position established by the principle. Both 
principles and rules are capable of limiting a principle’s prima facie position.193
The external theory leads to a model of two domains. The first domain is that of potential 
infringement cases, the second that of the actual ones. A case is a potential infringement 
case whenever a principle is “relevant”, no matter how surely the principle is outweighed 
by competing principles. Alexy rejects any form of threshold which would have to be met 
before it can be said that a certain principle prima facie competes with another principle. 
The adoption of the widest possible scope of a principle enables the courts to optimize all 
relevant principles involved, without the risk of not meeting a certain threshold. It may 
thus be said that a wide scope of principles derives from their very nature as optimization 
requirements.194
Alexy realizes that a wide conception of the scope of a principle may be criticized 
because it may, at first sight, lead to an unacceptably wide jurisdiction of the courts. He 
argues, however, that this is not a necessary consequence of a wide conception of scope. 
After all, the doctrinal conclusion that a certain act falls within the scope of a principle 
does not at all mean that it will not be covered by a limitation (e.g. another principle).195 
We shall now turn to these limitations. 
4.4  The limits to principles; no ‘compelling interest’ test
It has been shown in section 2.3 that current ECJ case law formally requires that only 
‘compelling’ or ‘overriding’ reasons in the general interest can serve as a limit to the 
principle of free movement. It will be argued in the present section, however, that any 
competing principle may be a limit. Although this seems to be going against settled ECJ 
case law, chapter 8 will show that no practical difference exists between both approaches, as 
a result of which the least complicated formulation should be adopted (i.e. the formulation 
proposed here).
Principles require a maximally extensive protection of interests. The limitation of these 
interests thus implies a limitation of the prima facie position of a principle. This brings 
Alexy to the following definition of limits to principles: limits to principles are norms 
193 Alexy 2002, p 179-184.
194 Alexy 2002, p 214-217.
195 Alexy 2002, p 216. It is, therefore, doubtful whether a wide scope actually leads to a growth in 
the number of cases pending before the courts.
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limiting prima facie positions of principles.196 Alexy then turns to the question of what it 
is that turns a norm into a limit. He starts with a general point. A norm can only limit a 
principle if it is itself ‘constitutional’. This means that norms are only limits to principles 
(e.g. constitutional rights) if they are themselves compatible with the constitution197 (or 
in case of EU law: the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union). The importance of this cannot be underestimated. It means that 
all norms which are compatible with norms of a similar status – e.g. enshrined in the 
constitution or in the TEU and TFEU – are capable of being a limit to a principle. No 
additional requirements, such as a certain weight of the norm before it can serve as a limit, 
need to be met.
The question arises as to how to identify limits to a principle. Commanding and 
prohibiting norms have by definition a limiting character, so that they come within the 
scope of the principle limited by them. A different approach applies to formative powers. 
Alexy gives the norms of private law institutions as an example. Without the norms of 
property law the constitutional guarantee of property would be meaningless. So the norms 
which give meaning to this constitutional guarantee cannot be regarded as limiting it. 
In other words, the creation of (private law) powers as such has no limiting character. 
Sometimes, however, a power may be removed. According to Alexy such a removal would 
have a limiting character if it hinders the realization of a principle. If the removal of a 
power obstructs the realization of a principle, it is not merely outworking that principle, 
but it is limiting it.198 An example from tax law relates to the impossibility for a company 
to carry forward losses in case of a change of ownership (e.g. 50% of the shares in the 
company are acquired by a third party). This removal of the power to offset losses against 
future profits may equally limit the realization of a principle. 
As stated, commanding and prohibiting norms addressed to the citizen, as well as 
norms removing certain powers, may function as a limit to a constitutional right (a 
principle). According to Alexy it is of fundamental importance to distinguish between 
rules and principles in this context.199 A rule limits a principle when, if it is applicable, a 
definitive ‘no-liberty’ or ‘no-right’ of the same content applies in place of a constitutional 
prima facie liberty or right. An example of a no-liberty is the obligation to drive on the 
right side of the road. This rule limits the basic principle of freedom of action (the general 
right to liberty of Article 2 of the German Basic Law). An example of a no-right concerns 
the obligation to grant the tax inspector access to one’s building or premises insofar as this 
is deemed necessary for purposes of fiscal supervision (Article 50 of the Dutch General 
Tax Act). This limits the principle of Article 8 of the ECHR in the sense that the owner of 
these premises has no right to invoke the prima facie right to respect for private and family 
life. A principle can also act as a limit to another principle, but the mechanism of limitation 
is different. As Alexy explains, limiting principles on their own are not capable of putting 
the individual in specific, definitely limited, positions (no-liberties, no-rights). In order to 
reach a definitive limitation one needs to balance the relevant principle with its limiting 
196 Alexy 2002, p 181-182.
197 Alexy 2002, p 182.
198 Alexy 2002, p 219-221.
199 Alexy 2002, p 183-184.
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principle. Thus, the extent to which principles limit another principle is not clear from the 
start – this is the case with limiting rules – but becomes apparent only after a balancing 
exercise. Alexy gives the following definition of limiting principles: a principle is a limit 
to another principle if there are cases in which it is a reason that in place of a prima facie 
liberty or right, a definitive no-liberty or no-right with the same content applies.
Thus, principles are capable of being limited in the light of countervailing principles. 
The extent of this limitation is itself also limited. An actual limitation of a (constitutional) 
principle arises only if that principle has a greater weight than the principle underlying 
the limit in the concrete situation at hand. The question arises of whether the limit should 
meet additional criteria besides the possession of sufficient weight in such a case and the 
requirement that it is compatible with the constitution.200 Article 19(2) of the German 
Basic Law seems to answer this question positively, because it provides: “In no case may 
the essence of a basic right be affected.” This provision seems to set another criterion to a 
norm before it counts as a limit by prohibiting action in the core of each right (a guarantee 
of an inalienable core as a limit to limits). Alexy takes the position that this provision is 
redundant in the theory of principles. He explains this position by distinguishing between 
absolute and relative guarantees of an essential core. According to the relative theory, the 
essential core is what is left over after a proportionality analysis has been performed (is the 
limit suitable, necessary and well balanced in relation to the limited principle), even if in 
the end nothing is left of the principle in an individual case. This would make Article 19(2) 
of the German Basic Law redundant. According to the absolute theory, however, there is a 
core to each principle which cannot be limited under any circumstances. Alexy rejects the 
absolute theory which implies that there is such a thing as absolute principles. He explains 
this as follows. Principles can be related either to collective interests or individual rights. 
If an absolute principle relates to a collective interest, constitutional rights of others would 
be non-existent in that area. Obviously, this cannot be the case. If an absolute principle 
guarantees individual rights it may result in a conflict with itself if the right it protects of 
one person comes into conflict with the similar rights of other individuals; in such a case 
the latter must give way, which is inconsistent. From this, Alexy draws the conclusion that 
absolute principles are either incompatible with constitutional rights or can only apply 
where the rights which they create benefit just one person.201 This shows that principles 
are by their very nature relative and never absolute. This does not mean, however, that 
relative limits cannot look like absolute limits in concrete cases. Alexy argues that the 
more a principle is restricted, the more ‘resistant’ it gets: the strength of the countervailing 
principles has to grow disproportionately. This, Alexy argues, corresponds to the ‘law of 
diminishing marginal utility’. There are thus conditions under which it is almost certain 
that no countervailing principle will take priority. The level of certainty, however, remains 
a result of the relation of the different interests involved.202 
It will be clear from the above that a ‘compelling interest’ test does not form a part 
of Alexy’s theory. The process of optimization of competing principles evolves around 
the aim or reason of the measure which infringes a principle. Alexy’s theory does not 
200 Alexy 2002, p 192-193.
201 Alexy 2002, p 62.
202 Alexy 2002, p 195.
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require that this aim has any special weight in advance. It does not have to be ‘compelling’ 
or in any other way special. Also, nothing in Alexy’s theory prioritizes rights from the 
start. There is no conceptual hierarchy between the principle and its limitations, because 
both the principle and its limitations are interests that seek optimization of legitimate 
interests.203 Neither does it seem reasonable to overprotect certain interests through a 
compelling interest test. Indeed, if proportionality analysis, taken seriously, means that all 
relevant considerations must be taken into account and accorded the weight they deserve, 
then what could justify protecting an interest beyond what proportionality requires?204 
According to Kumm, the absence of a compelling interest test has at least two advantages. 
In the first place, a court which uses the model of constitutional rights as principles might 
plausibly produce better outcomes because of the emphasis this model places on reason-
giving in concrete cases. In the second place, this reason-giving in concrete cases without 
the development of a list of possible ‘compelling’ aims improves the way in which the 
courts justify their decisions to the public. Such a list may be perceived as exhaustive and 
would in each case require an in-depth investigation into precedents which would have 
to reveal whether a certain motive is sufficiently fundamental or compelling. This may 
result in a public rights discourse which is “shrill, dogmatic, and categorical”.205 A possible 
illustration of this is provided by Lang who has argued that “the ECJ should refrain from 
introducing new grounds of justification that lead to uncertainty”.206 It is, in my view, a 
fundamental misconception that a court would itself ‘introduce’ justifications, because 
a court merely examines which objectives underlie a certain measure and whether these 
objectives may serve as a limit to a principle. Lang is, in my view, however right to point 
out that the approach advocated by Kumm may lead to legal uncertainty if court decisions 
become wholly unpredictable. This seems to be a temporal problem, because the case 
law tends to arrive at categorizations for similar problems: the collisions of principles in 
similar cases tends to lead to ‘rules’ which are relatively clear to taxpayers and Member 
States.207
4.5  Proportionality analysis: principles as optimization requirements
4.5.1 Introduction 
It has been argued above that principles are norms which require the greatest possible 
realization of something relative to what is factually and legally possible. In other words, 
principles are to be realized to the greatest extent possible given empirical and normative 
constraints.208 They should be accorded their widest possible scope. At the same time, they 
should accept any other principle as their limit. According to Alexy, this definition of a 
principle implies the principle of proportionality:
203 Borgmann-Prebil 2008, p 341.
204 Kumm 2004, p 593.
205 Kumm 2004, p 595.
206 Lang 2009, p 113.
207 See, for instance, the case law on CFC legislation (Case C-196/04 Cadburry Schweppes and Case 
C-201/05 Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation). Compare also Cordewener 
2002, p 34, who states that the level of certainty will increase with more ECJ judgments.
208 Rivers 2002, p xxviii.
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“It has already been hinted that there is a connection between the theory of principles 
and the principle of proportionality. This connection is as close as it could possibly 
be. The nature of principles implies the principle of proportionality and vice versa. 
That the nature of principles implies the principle of proportionality means that 
the principle of proportionality with its three sub-principles of suitability, necessity 
(use of the least restrictive means), and proportionality in its narrow sense (that is, 
the balancing requirement) logically follows from the nature of principles; it can 
be deduced from them.”209
The test of proportionality in its narrow sense, that is, the requirement of balancing, derives 
from its relation to the legally possible. The tests of necessity and suitability follow from 
the nature of principles as optimization requirements relative to what is factually possible. 
Thus, the latter tests take the aim of the tested rule or principle against another principle 
as a given, whereas the former test may, wholly or partially, set aside that aim. In the words 
of Alexy, “[t]he question whether any of the alternatives should be chosen at all is not a 
question of the factually possible, that is, of necessity, but a question of what is legally 
possible, that is, one of balancing”.210
Rivers has argued that the test of suitability can be subsumed under the test of necessity: 
any State action which is necessary, in the sense of being the least intrusive means of 
achieving some end must, by definition, be capable of achieving the end in the first place. 
It has to be suitable. Nevertheless, Rivers is of the opinion that the test of suitability serves 
a practical function as an initial filter. The test of proportionality in its narrow sense also 
has a threshold counterpart, because proportionality presupposes that the State action in 
question be directed towards the pursuit of an end which is generally legitimate. If the end 
is illegitimate, then no limitation of any right is justifiable.211 In short, the entire principle 
of proportionality could be seen as consisting of two threshold requirements (i. pursuit 
of a legitimate end and ii. by an effective means, which are both conditions which are 
either fulfilled or not) and two optimization requirements (iii. the use of the least intrusive 
means and iv. to achieve something worth achieving given the costs involved, which are 
both conditions which require a fine-tuning or optimization of competing principles).
Kumm describes the four phases of the proportionality test in a slightly different way. 
According to him two of these – suitability and necessity – focus on empirical concerns, 
demanding that principles be realized to the greatest extent that is factually possible. The 
other two – legitimate ends and balancing – are normative, requiring that principles be 
realized to the greatest extent possible in the light of countervailing norms.212 
In contrast to Rivers and Kumm, Alexy does not require that the norm limiting a 
principle has a ‘legitimate aim’. At least, he is not using this terminology. The question of 
whether the restricted principle has a greater weight than the principle underlying the 
limit has to be answered within the framework of the last phase of the proportionality test 
(proportionality in the narrow sense or the balancing requirement). It will be argued in 
209 Alexy 2002, p 66. Footnote omitted.
210 Alexy 2002, p 68.
211 Rivers 2002, p xxxii.
212 Kumm 2004, p 579. See also Kumm 2006a, p 348.
Optimization of competing principles
59 
section 4.5.2, however, that a ‘legitimate aims’ test is implicit in Alexy’s theory (if rephrased 
as a ‘respectful aim’ test). In addition, it will be argued that it is better to replace the 
‘necessity’ test by two separate tests which relate to the ‘degree of fit’ and the ‘subsidiarity’ 
of norms in the optimization process (section 4.5.4).
A rule or principle which is tested against another principle is allowed to stand if the 
four phases of proportionality analysis are met: a. legitimate ends, b. suitability, c. necessity 
and d. balance. They will be discussed in more detail below. In the following paragraph 
I will try to give a precise definition of the first phase of the optimization model. For 
reasons I will explain shortly, I will not use the term ‘legitimate ends’, but rather develop 
a ‘respectful ends’ test.
4.5.2 Respectful aim
Introduction 
According to the above-mentioned writers, the first phase of the proportionality test is 
of a normative nature. This view is generally accepted in literature.213 It requires that a 
judgment be made on whether a certain reason is ‘acceptable’ as a potential limit to a 
principle of not. In other words, the court should assess whether a rule (or principle upon 
which the rule is based) which is tested against a principle has a legitimate aim. Current 
literature does not, however, define the criteria according to which the question should be 
answered of whether a certain measure has a legitimate aim or not. Therefore, an attempt 
will be made here to formulate such criteria. This attempt will replace the ‘legitimate aim’ 
test with a ‘respectful aim’ test. This test will prove to be pivotal to the argument made 
in the present study and evolves around the idea of a twofold neutrality between tax 
sovereignty and free movement. 
The test of a ‘respectful aim’
Firstly, in the case of a conflict between a rule and a principle, the principle may require that 
an exception is added to the rule in certain circumstances. Thus, both rules and principles 
may appear only prima facie (section 4.2). Their prima facie character, however, may be 
fundamentally different due to ‘formal principles’ which may require that rules passed 
by an authority acting within its jurisdiction be followed. Since these formal principles 
do not apply if a tax measure is tested against the EU free movement provisions, national 
tax rules – which are an emanation of the principle of sovereignty – and EU principles 
have the same prima facie character. The widest possible scope of principles – i.e. both the 
restricted principle and its limit – should be adopted in the theory of principles (section 
4.3).
Secondly, Alexy has shown that principles can never be absolute (section 4.4). This 
means that neither the restricted principle nor its limit can be absolute in the sense that 
they can never be outweighed. It should always be possible to perform a balancing exercise. 
If one of the principles regards itself as inviolable this is impossible. A principle which does 
not recognize other principles cannot engage in balancing with another principle (which it 
would regard as irrelevant). The balancing requirement of the principle of proportionality 
213 See Gerards 2005, p 32-34, and the literature there referred to.
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requires that the greater the degree is of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, 
the greater the importance must be of satisfying the other.214 It is clear that principles or 
(tax) measures which do not accept that they may be outweighed, constitute such a high 
degree of infringement of another principle – which is completely neglected – that these 
principles or rules will always lose in the balancing test.
Thirdly, as stated in section 4.2, a principle itself is not capable of determining its own 
extent in the light of competing principles and what is factually possible. This extent is 
determined by proportionality analysis (suitability, necessity and balance), which should 
be able to be performed. This means that neither the extent of the restricted principle 
nor the extent of its limit can be determined in advance by reference to that principle or 
that limit itself. Principles and limits which are nevertheless characterized by the wish to 
determine their own extent and, consequently, to disregard other principles cannot be 
qualified as principles or limits. In other words, the goal of a limit to a principle should be 
external to the goal of being a limit. And, conversely, the restricted principle should accept 
in abstracto the possibility of being limited.
These three observations lead to the following definition of the requirement of a 
‘respectful aim’, which has to be observed by the limit to a restricted principle: a limit to 
a principle does not have a respectful aim if it has no other objective than limiting that 
principle. Also, a restricted principle does not have respectful aim if it does not accept that 
it may be limited. In both cases, the principle and limit do not ‘respect’ each other, hence 
the terminology of ‘respectful aim’.215 In my view, no other requirements may be imposed, 
apart from being formally and substantively compatible with other principles with a 
similar status (Alexy calls this, in a German context, ‘compatibility with the Constitution’; 
in a European context one would read ‘compatibility with the TFEU’, for instance with the 
prohibition of State aid or the common environmental policy). This means, for instance, 
that budgetary reasons can never justify an infringement which a tax measure imposes 
on a competing principle.216 If it were otherwise, the extent of tax sovereignty would be 
unlimited and absolute: it would not accept other principles as limits. 
The replacement of the ‘legitimate aim’ test by a ‘respectful aim’ test takes the sting out 
of the normative character of the ‘legitimate ends’ test, because the ‘respectful ends’ test 
defines in advance which objectives of a limiting measure are not acceptable. Once the 
objectives of a limiting measure are clear, no further normative judgments are necessary; 
it needs only to be determined whether the objectives fall under the definition. This is an 
advantage of the ‘respectful ends’ test, because it is not desirable that an assessment model 
starts with a request for normative judgment: such a judgment should be the end of the 
reasoning rather than the beginning. 
The definition of a ‘respectful aim’ places a very high emphasis on the objective of a 
limit to a principle which may be difficult to determine. Gerards has shown that at least 
two difficulties may arise when assessing the aim of a measure. 
214 Alexy 2005, p 573. See also Alexy 2009, p 7.
215 Ávila 2007, p 101, reaches essentially the same conclusion under the postulate of ‘prohibition of 
excess’.
216 See, for instance, HR 14 June 1995, No. 29254, BNB 1995/252, § 3.4.4, where the Dutch Supreme 
Court stated that budgetary reasons cannot justify a breach of the principle of equality enshrined 
in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The same is 
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How to determine the aim of a measure?
Firstly, it may be difficult to discover which aim exactly underlies a certain rule. This is 
a problem every court is familiar with; it should be solved though the normal rules of 
interpretation.217 They can have recourse to the legislative history of the measure, the 
system of the law of which the measure is a part, the social and political circumstances 
under which it was enacted and the effects generated by the provision.218 If a rule prima 
facie infringes a certain principle without any known ‘real’ objective, its effects become 
more important. If these effects are such to infringe upon a certain principle, this may be 
an indication that the objective of the legislature has not been respectful. As the WTO 
Appellate Body held in Japan Alcohol:
“We believe it is possible to examine objectively the underlying criteria used in a 
particular tax measure, its structure, and its overall application to ascertain whether 
it is applied in a way that affords protection to domestic products.
Although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, 
nevertheless its protective application can most often be discerned from the design, 
the architecture, and the revealing structure of a measure. The very magnitude of 
the dissimilar taxation in a particular case may be evidence of such a protective 
application, as the Panel rightly concluded in this case. Most often, there will be 
other factors to be considered as well. In conducting this inquiry, panels should 
give full consideration to all the relevant facts and all the relevant circumstances in 
any given case.”219
How to deal with a plurality of objectives?
Secondly, a rule may pursue various aims at the same time: a plurality of objectives. If 
one of the aims is ‘legitimate’ – or, in my terminology, ‘respectful’ – but the other is not, 
the question arises as to whether the rule is acceptable or not. Gerards distinguishes two 
situations: a provision may pursue different objectives with a similar value, but it is also 
possible that the aims are of differing weight. In the latter situation the main objective may 
be rather general, such as ensuring public safety. Its sub-objectives are then subsidiary to 
the main goal. Both situations require a different approach. In the case of a plurality of 
objectives with the same weight, Gerards observes that the majority of scholars is of the 
opinion that the rule can be saved by the ‘legitimate’ objective even if one or more of the other 
objectives are not ‘legitimate’. In case of a plurality of objectives which have a hierarchical 
relationship – a primary goal with one or more sub-goals – the majority of scholars argues 
that not only the principle aim but also all sub-goals should be ‘legitimate’. If this were 
different, these authors argue, it would be too easy to hide an ‘illegitimate’ narrower aim 
behind the ‘legitimate’ broader objective. Gerards, however, is of the opinion that there 
are cases in which the distinction between aims of equal and non-equal weight cannot be 
fully upheld. In her opinion, it is possible to think of cases where the ‘legitimate’ objectives 
of a measure are so important that the classification should be maintained, even if at the 
217 Gerards 2005, p 35.
218 Gerards 2005, p 39.
219 WTO Appellate Body Report of 4 October 1996 (Japan Alcohol), No. AB-1996-2, p 29.
Chapter 4
62
same time there are unacceptable goals subsidiary to the main one. According to Gerards, 
it is therefore preferable in this situation to maintain the same methodology as with goals 
of equal weight, which means that the courts should investigate, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether the measure would also be justified if the unacceptable goal were eliminated.220 
I agree with the objections brought forward by Gerards. The distinction between aims of 
equal and non-equal weight is useful in giving weight to the various objectives. It may, for 
example, occur that a certain sub-goal cannot fully be achieved because that would mean 
that the primary goal would become illusionary. In other words, a disrespectful sub-goal 
may be justified by the primary goal. Another way of looking at the issue of plurality 
of objectives is to approach it from the perspective of the affected principle rather than 
from the perspective of the rule in question. This affected principle serves as a limit to 
the principle which underlies the rule with a plurality of objectives. The application of 
the affected principle should respect the other principle in the sense that it accepts that it 
can serve as its limit. This may explain why an illegitimate sub-goal may be ‘justified’ by 
the primary goal if the sub-goal is an essential element of the underlying principle. An 
example may clarify this: a system of group contribution which does not allow a company 
resident in one Member State to make a tax deductible group contribution to its parent 
company resident in another Member State. The primary goal of a tax system is structural 
in nature: the collection of resources for the State. The sub-goal of the measure in question 
is to do so in an equitable fashion and to give groups of companies the possibility to have 
profits taxed at the level of the best-placed group company by making a tax deductible 
contribution of profits by one group company to another group company in the hands 
of which the profits are then taxed. This makes it, among other things, possible that 
losses within a group of companies can be used to offset profits made by the group. A 
further sub-goal of such a group contribution regime is that the primary goal – collecting 
resources for the State – is not jeopardized by the first sub-goal (equitable taxation), as 
a result of which the possibility of making group contributions is limited to domestic 
group companies. The extension of the group contribution regime cross-border would 
have meant that groups of companies would be allowed to choose freely the Member State 
in which the profits of the group company are to be taxed. This would have been a result 
which would jeopardize the primary goal in a disproportionate way, so that the limitation 
to domestic group companies – which may appear illegitimate – is justified by the primary 
goal. Another way of putting it, and this is what the ECJ has done in the case of Oy AA, is 
to say that the possibility of cross-border group contributions would severely jeopardize 
inter-nation equity. It would undermine the system of the allocation of the power to tax 
between Member States because, according to the choice made by the group of companies, 
the Member State of the subsidiary would be forced to renounce its right to tax the profits 
of the transferring company in favour of the Member State in which the receiving company 
has its establishment. Ultimately this would mean that the choice of the Member State 
of taxation would be a matter for the group of companies.221 In other words, if taxation 
were a voluntary choice and not an obligation, this would essentially deprive the Member 
State concerned of its right to collect taxes and, therefore, its tax sovereignty as such. The 
220 Gerards 2005, p 40-41.
221 Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 56 and 65.
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principle of free movement cannot lead to such a conclusion because it would, in that 
scenario, not recognize the principle of tax sovereignty as a possible limit: its aim would 
become disrespectful.
4.5.3 Suitability
The requirement of suitability is of an empirical nature. It entails an optimization 
requirement relative to what is factually possible (as opposed to what is legally possible).222 
The test of suitability takes the respectful aim as a given and examines whether the rule 
at issue is apt to attain the objectives pursued. It should in other words be ‘capable’ of 
actually protecting the interest that needs to be protected, meaning that there must be a 
causal relationship between the measure and the objective.223 A measure is appropriate if 
it is a tool, in the abstract and in general, to further the purpose.224 The test of suitability 
is none other than an expression of the idea of Pareto-optimality: one position can be 
improved without detriment to another.225 Alexy gives the example of a rule on retail 
trade which prohibits the sale of cigarettes through a vending machine on someone’s 
property without permission. Permission can be granted if the applicant demonstrates 
that he has the ‘necessary expertise’. This requirement of proof of commercial ability 
prima facie infringes the freedom of profession. The aim of the restrictive rule was to 
protect consumers from financial and health risks. It is clear, however, that a ban on 
placing vending machines unless commercial ability has been proven is not a suitable 
means to achieve these ends. This requirement can thus be dropped without any harm to 
both interests involved: freedom of profession and protection of the consumer. This equals 
the attainment of Pareto-optimality.226 Another example from Dutch practice concerned 
a pharmacist who asked a trainee, who was of the Islamic faith, to take off her headscarf 
while working. If the trainee would not do so, she would no longer be welcome to work 
in the pharmacy. The reason for this request was, according to the pharmacist, to ensure 
that all his employees continued to work with the utmost precision, thereby emphasizing 
that any mistake in a pharmacy implies a serious risk for the public health. The pharmacist 
feared that the headscarf could lead to an intense debate among his staff during working 
hours which would jeopardize their carefulness. The Equal Treatment Commission held 
that the ban on the headscarf constitutes an act of indirect discrimination on grounds of 
religion which is prima facie prohibited. The objective of ensuring a working environment 
in which the utmost precision is ensured is a legitimate objective which is in principle 
capable of limiting the principle of equal treatment. However, the ban on the headscarf 
is – according to the Commission – not suitable to achieve that objective. A prohibition of 
the headscarf can by no means prevent a discussion taking place about religious topics. As 
a consequence, the infringement of the principle of equal treatment could not be limited 
222 Alexy 2002, p 67. See also Alexy 2009, p 6.
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by the need to ensure a careful working environment.227 The prohibition of the headscarf 
could be dropped without any harm to one of the principles involved. In such a case, 
Pareto-optimality requires that it is cancelled.228
4.5.4 Necessity
Introduction 
The requirement of necessity derives from the very nature of principles, just as the suitability 
test.229 It requires that of two broadly equally suitable means, the one which interferes less 
intensively should be chosen. Thus it entails an optimization requirement relative to what 
is factually possible. The necessity test can be divided into two sub-tests: a test which 
examines the degree of fit of a measure and a test which examines the subsidiarity of a 
measure.
Over- and underinclusiveness, or the assessment of the degree of fit
Gerards explains that the assessment of the over- and/or underinclusiveness of a 
classification relates to the degree to which it matches the aim of the measure.230 
Overinclusiveness typically occurs when the group on which a particular burden is placed 
(or an advantage is granted) is defined too widely. Underinclusiveness typically occurs 
when the group on which a particular burden is placed (or an advantage is granted) is 
defined too narrowly. Thus, both over- and underinclusiveness share a comparable defect: 
a shortcoming in the precision of the definition of the classification with regard to the 
intended goal. The solution to the problem of over- and underinclusiveness is to adjust the 
definition of the group so that it meets its objective. As Gerards observes, it is important 
that the formulation of each classification matches as closely as possible the intended goal, 
so that the degree of over- and/or underinclusiveness is kept to a minimum. Only in this 
case, Gerards notes, can it be avoided that persons unjustifiably fail to receive certain 
benefits or are unjustly burdened or disadvantaged.231 A good example in tax law is that 
of anti-abuse measures: these are often designed in such a way that they contain ‘overkill’ 
(situations which are not aimed at tax avoidance do fall within the scope of the anti-abuse 
rule).
It should be noted that the correspondence between the definition of the classification 
and the objective of the measure can never be perfect. Gerards argues that for this reason 
the mere determination that there is a lack of precision in the definition cannot lead to the 
illegality of the rule. Only “a lack of care” which is unacceptable in a particular case can 
lead to the conclusion that the classification is unjustified. The question of whether there 
is a lack of care in the degree of fit between the aim of a measure and the definition of the 
classification varies according to the intensity of the review that is carried out. In the case 
227 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling 20 June 2007, judgment 2007-104.
228 It should be noted that the application of the requirement of suitability may also depend on 
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of a marginal review, a court may be satisfied with a reasonable degree of fit, whereas the 
requirements for an intensive assessment may be considerably higher.232 
Gerards has identified a number of factors which determine this level of intensity.233 
Some of these are of particular relevance for the present study. The first factor which 
should be mentioned is the ground of distinction. If a distinction is made on a ‘suspicious’ 
ground which is expressly mentioned in, for example, an equal treatment provision, a high 
level of intensity is required. This high level of intensity should be extended to distinctions 
which are not directly based on ‘suspicious’ grounds but which factually do affect the 
group defined by the suspicious grounds. The second factor for determining the level of 
intensity relates to the weight of the interests affected. The weightier the affected interest, 
the higher the level of intensity. Conversely, the weight of the principle which is affecting 
that interest can be so high that a marginal assessment should be carried out. 
Subsidiarity
The requirement of subsidiarity does not so much address the way in which the 
classification is defined, but relates to the choice of the classification as a means of achieving 
the intended goal. When assessing against this criterion the question is thus primarily 
whether it was actually necessary to make a distinction, aside from the question as to how 
this distinction is actually defined.234 Thus, the requirement of subsidiarity does not take 
the classification of the contested measure as a given, but requires that the court more 
or less independently investigates the available alternatives which are equally suitable to 
achieve the objective pursued. This politically more sensitive task distinguishes the over- 
and underinclusiveness test from the subsidiarity test. 
Alexy gives an example of conflicting interests in the field of freedom of profession and 
consumer protection. A German regulation prohibited the sale of confection containing 
cocoa powder but consisting substantially of puffed rice and thus not a genuine chocolate 
product. The aim of this prohibition was to protect consumers from mistaken purchases. 
The German Constitutional Court held that the prohibition is suitable to achieve this 
aim but not necessary. There was an equally suitable but less interfering means available, 
namely a labelling requirement aimed at removing possible risks of confusion. Thus both 
interests involved would be satisfied without any cost for either principle but with a clear 
benefit for one of them (the freedom of profession). It is clear that the principle of necessity 
is an expression of the idea of Pareto-optimality as well: the existence of a less intensively 
interfering and equally suitable means; one position can be improved at no cost to the 
other.235 
Alexy acknowledges that the application of the principle of necessity is more complicated 
in the case of a plurality of objectives.236 The achievement of one of the objectives through 
the least intrusive means may have as a result that the other objective is not fully achieved. 
Alexy gives the example of a German rule prohibiting the business of hiring out workers 
232 Gerards 2005, p 48.
233 Gerards 2005, p 84-99.
234 Gerards 2005, p 52.
235 Alexy 2002, p 398-399.
236 Alexy 2002, p 400. This is also true for the requirement of suitability.
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to building contractors for a fee (a prima facie restriction of the freedom of profession). 
The aim of this prohibition was to counter abuse of inter alia labour law and tax law. The 
companies concerned argued that this aim could be achieved through a less burdensome 
measure: more effective supervision on building sites. The government however argued 
that this would be too costly and would go beyond what can reasonably be expected of 
society in terms of countering abuse of law. Since a prohibition and effective controls 
are two equally suitable means to counter abuse of law, the question is whether a high 
burden on public resources affects the choice for one of these alternatives. According to 
Alexy, this question takes us out of the field of optimization relative to what is factually 
possible, and into the greatest possible realization relative to what is legally possible. The 
question is whether the need to counter abuse of law and the protection of public resources 
taken together justify the relatively intensive interference with the freedom of profession 
contained in the prohibition.237 This is a problem of balancing which should be solved in 
the fourth stage of the principle of proportionality to which we shall now turn.
4.5.5 Proportionality stricto sensu
After having established that a measure has a respectful objective in the light of the 
principle which is prima facie infringed and that this measure is both suitable and 
necessary to achieve this objective, the fourth step is to look at the result of this exercise 
and to assess whether ultimately a fair balance is struck between the competing interests. 
In case of normative classifications, a full abstract assessment can be carried out. It should 
be examined whether the legislator has in abstracto weighed the various interests against 
each other in a reasonable manner. If this abstract assessment leads to the conclusion that 
the classification is acceptable in itself, one should examine whether the application of 
the normative regulation in concreto takes sufficient account of the individual interests of 
the party whose prima facie right was affected. It may be examined whether a reasonable 
balance is struck between those interests and the other interests involved. In particular, it 
should be assessed how important a full application of the legislative act is in the concrete 
case at hand.238 This assessment may lead to the conclusion that the classification which 
was found to be generally acceptable should provide for certain exceptions in individual 
cases.
As Alexy explains, this test of proportionality in the narrow sense expresses the meaning 
of optimization relative to competing principles. It is identical with the Law of Balancing 
which states: the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, 
the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.239 Thus, the Law of Balancing 
makes it clear that the weight of principles can never be determined independently or 
absolutely, but that one can only ever speak about relative weight.240 The very idea of 
a principle means that balancing is not a matter of all or nothing but a requirement to 
237 Alexy 2002, p 400-401.
238 Gerards 2005, p 56.
239 Alexy 2005, p 573. See also Alexy 2009, p 7.
240 Alexy 2002, p 102.
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optimize.241 Alexian balancing of two principles can be broken down into three stages. 
The first stage involves establishing the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, the 
first principle. This is followed by a second stage in which the importance of satisfying the 
competing principle is established. Finally, in the third stage, it is established whether the 
importance of satisfying the latter principle justifies the detriment to, or non-satisfaction 
of, the former.242 
Alexy emphasizes that balancing is not a procedure which necessarily leads to precisely 
one outcome in every case.243 But he does maintain that one outcome can be rationally be 
established through the use of balancing, not in every case, but in at least some cases, and 
that the class of these cases is interesting enough to justify balancing as a method.244 In 
order to give some more precise meaning to the concept, Alexy proposes a three-stage 
scale distinguishing between minor, moderate and serious infringements of a principle on 
the one hand, and very important, moderately important and relatively unimportant gains 
on the other.245 These classifications may serve to give a quick solution in relatively easy 
cases of, for example, a serious infringement of principle A versus a relatively unimportant 
gain to principle B at the other end: the infringement is disproportionate. In case of a ‘draw’ 
– the principles involved are equally important – the decision-maker enjoys ‘structural 
discretion’. The court will in these situations have to respect the choices which have been 
made by the legislature, just as it would have to respect the mirror situation in which the 
legislature would have given preference to the competing principle.246 
An example from Dutch practice may clarify the requirement of proportionally in 
the narrow sense of the word. The example concerns a case on the taxation of tips paid to 
taxi drivers.247 The taxpayer in this case had received an income tax form. The taxpayer 
appeared in the distribution system of tax forms because he had previously worked as a 
waiter and had received tips in that capacity which had not been taxed under the wage 
tax. The overwhelming majority of the taxi driver’s colleagues did not however receive 
an income tax form, notwithstanding the fact that it was at the time publicly known that 
an average taxi driver annually receives substantial tips. As a consequence, there was an 
unequal treatment between the taxpayer and his fellow taxi drivers. The question arose 
as to whether this unequal treatment infringes the principle of equality. The Hoge Raad 
stated that the functioning of the distribution system for income tax forms reveals a certain 
tension between the need to ensure efficient procedures in the tax administration on the 
241 Alexy 2002, p 107.
242 Alexy 2002, p 401.
243 This is an important objection to Alexy’s theory: the balancing exercise would lead to arbitrary 
and unpredictable results (e.g. Habermas 1996, p 254 et seq.). Alexy however maintains that 
the balancing exercise can be performed in a rational manner; see his response to Habermas in 
Alexy 2002, p 401 et seq.
244 Alexy 2002, p 402.
245 Alexy 2002, p 405-406.
246 Alexy 2002, p 411-412. See elaborately on this notion Rivers 2007.
247 HR 23 October 1985, No. 23036, BNB 1986/158. The reason for providing an example form 
Dutch case law here instead of an example from ECJ case law is that, at this stage, the study 
design a model which is used to structure ECJ case law later on. Reference is made to section 8.7 
for examples from ECJ case law.
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one hand and the need to ensure that every person pays taxes according to the law so that 
no inequality arises. The Hoge Raad subsequently weighed these interests against each 
other. The mere fact that it would have been possible for the tax administration, having 
had regard to the information available, to issue tax forms to all taxi drivers is not enough 
to outweigh the need for efficiency. A factual investigation was necessary to find out 
whether the tax administration could not reasonably have decided to refrain from issuing 
tax forms to all taxi drivers with regard to administration problems. It was for the lower 
court to decide how big the infringement on efficiency would be. The bigger the impact, 
the sooner it will outweigh the principle of equality. If the tax administration could have 
issued tax assessments without any major efficiency problems, this small infringement 
of the principle of efficiency cannot outweigh the bigger infringement of the principle of 
equality.
4.5.6 Two concluding remarks
The above discussed four-phase structure of proportionality analysis – respectful aim, 
suitability, necessity and balance – illustrates, as Kumm has shown, two characteristic 
features of rights reasoning under Alexy’s conception of rights (“rights as principles”). 
In the first place, having a right does not confer much on the rights holder. In other 
words, a prima facie right does not ensure the effectiveness of it in a concrete situation. 
An infringement of a prima facie right merely triggers an assessment of whether the 
infringement is justified. Thus it is clear that the focus of rights adjudication is generally 
on the reasons which justify the infringement; this is the second characteristic feature. 
Proportionality analysis is aimed at ensuring that the infringement of a principle is 
justified by “good reasons under the circumstances”.248
4.6 The principles of good faith and systemic integration in public 
international law
Above I have discussed the structure of principles and the way in which competing 
principles should be optimized, in particular with respect to the way in which the conflict 
should be solved between the principle of free movement in the TFEU and the principle 
of direct tax sovereignty. The application of the principle of good faith in general public 
international law shows a striking resemblance with this discussion: the exercise in good 
faith of international rights and obligations. I will now explain why it is important to 
discuss this here.
The principle of good faith is key to the functioning of public international law. Some 
authors have stated that the duty to interpret and apply treaties in good faith, as laid down 
in Articles 26 and 31 of the VCLT, constitutes a rule of jus cogens.249 The principle of good 
faith has found expression in Article 4(3) TEU which requires that the Member States 
shall take any appropriate measure to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of 
the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union and that the Member 
248 Kumm 2004, p 582.
249 Vanhamme 2001, p 39 and 58-60; Hilf 2001, p 128.
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States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives. Article 4(3) TEU requires 
the Member States to act in good faith to achieve the objectives of the EU law.250 It is a 
special expression of the general principle of good faith which governs the exercise of 
competence both by the Member States and the European Union.251
On the international judicial level, the principle of good faith tends to transform 
absolute rights into relative rights in the course of a balancing process. 252 As Cheng has 
argued, a reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right is one which is “appropriate and 
necessary for the purpose of the right (i.e., in furtherance of the interests which the right is 
intended to protect).”253 A bona fide, reasonable exercise of a right entails that the principle 
of proportionality be respected. Proportionality is a corollary of the principle of good 
faith.254 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case makes this very clear.255 Great Britain 
had by treaty granted citizens of the United States the right to pursue fishery activities 
in its territorial waters off the coast of Canada (a British Crown colony at the time). Even 
though the treaty did not include any specific provision about the powers retained by 
Great Britain to regulate fishery activities in its territorial waters, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration was asked to address the question of whether it was contrary to the treaty if 
such fishery regulations would restrict citizens of the United States in the exercise of the 
rights granted to them by the treaty. 256 The Permanent Court of Arbitration held:
“In any event, Great Britain, as the local sovereign, has the duty of preserving and 
protecting the fisheries. In so far as it is necessary for that purpose, Great Britain is 
not only entitled, but obliged, to provide for the protection and preservation of the 
fisheries; always remembering that the exercise of this right of legislation is limited 
by the obligation to execute the Treaty in good faith.”
Thus, Great Britain pursued a legitimate – or ‘respectful’ – objective in regulating fishery 
activities in its territorial waters. The Permanent Court subsequently decided and awarded 
as follows:
“The right of Great Britain to make regulations without the consent of the United 
States, as to the exercise of the liberty to take fish referred to in Article I of the 
Treaty of October 20th, 1818, in the form of municipal laws, ordinances or rules 
of Great Britain, Canada or Newfoundland is inherent to the sovereignty of Great 
Britain.
250 Balzacq, Bigo, Carrera & Guild 2006, p 3 and 11; Constantinesco 1987, p 102; Hatje 2001, p 
37 and 39. Lenaerts, Van Nuffel & Bray 2005, p 115-116, are of the view that the principle of 
co-operation in good faith is a reflection of the principle of “federal good faith”. Compare also 
Klabbers 2009, p 193.
251 It is perhaps for this reason that Conway 2010 examines in detail what Article 31 VCLT and the 
commentaries and literature thereon may mean for the conflict of norms in EU law. 
252 Schwarzenberger & Brown 1976, p 35-36. Compare also O’Connor 1991, p 123-124.
253 Cheng 1953, p. 125.
254 Compare Kolb 2006, p. 8, and Andenas & Zleptnig 2007, p 375-392.
255 11 U.N.R.I.A.A. 167, 1961.
256 Engelen 2006, p. 15.
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The exercise of that right by Great Britain is, however, limited by the said Treaty in 
respect of the said liberties therein granted to the inhabitants of the United States 
in that such regulations must be made bona fide and must not be in violation of 
the said Treaty.
Regulations which are (1) appropriate or necessary for the protection and 
preservation of such fisheries, or (2) desirable or necessary on grounds of public 
order and morals without unnecessarily interfering with the fishery itself, and in 
both cases equitable and fair as between local and American fishermen, and not 
so framed as to give unfairly an advantage to the former over the latter class, are 
not inconsistent with the obligation to execute the Treaty in good faith, and are 
therefore reasonable and not in violation of the Treaty.”
These requirements brought about, inter alia, that light and harbour dues, if not imposed 
on Newfoundland fishermen, should not be imposed on American fishermen while 
exercising the liberty granted by the Treaty:
“To impose such dues on American fishermen only would constitute an unfair 
discrimination between [American fishermen] and Newfoundland fishermen and 
one inconsistent with the liberty granted to American fishermen to take fish, etc., 
in common with the subjects of His Britannic Majesty”.
In abstract terms, in the words of Engelen, the limit of the powers retained by Great 
Britain to regulate fishery activities in its territorial waters is where it can no longer be 
said that the treaty obligations have been performed in good faith, whilst the limit of these 
obligations themselves is defined in terms of what is reasonably necessary for achieving the 
legitimate objectives pursued by such fishery regulations, because otherwise, the powers 
retained would be devoid of any substance.257 This makes it clear that the four phases of 
the proportionality test (see section 4.5 above) – respectful aim, suitability, necessity and 
balance – are supported by the principle of good faith. In my view, at least, this inevitably 
follows from the quotation from the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case above.
The WTO Appellate Body seems to have confirmed this view in 1998 in the Shrimp-
Turtle case when, speaking of good faith, it quoted Cheng in assent: 
“A reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right (…) is one which is appropriate and 
necessary for the purpose of the right (i.e., in furtherance of the interests which 
the right is intended to protect). It should at the same time be fair and equitable as 
between the parties and not one which is calculated to procure for one of them an 
unfair advantage in the light of the obligation assumed. A reasonable exercise of 
the right is regarded as compatible with the obligation. But the exercise of the right 
in such a manner as to prejudice the interests of the other contracting party arising 
out of the treaty is unreasonable and is considered as inconsistent with the bona 
fide execution of the treaty obligation, and a breach of the treaty.”258
257 Engelen 2006, p. 15.
258 Appellate Body World Trade Organization 12 October 1998, Shrimp-Turtle Case, No. 98-3899, 
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Hilf has concluded from this judgment that it is for the principle of proportionality to 
balance such conflicting interests in the light of the further legal requirements as listed 
in the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. Trade measures of the WTO Members, 
designed to follow a legitimate non-economic interest, should be ‘effective’, necessary’, 
and ‘reasonable’, thus referring to the classical three requirements of the principle of 
proportionality.259 Appleton has drawn a similar conclusion. In his opinion the Appellate 
Body requires that the rights and obligations of the Members are exercised in good faith 
(‘reasonably’), which necessarily leads to the adoption of some sort of proportionality 
inquiry.260 Similarly, Van Aaken has taken the position – referring to the Israeli Supreme 
Court – that proportionality is recognized today as a general principle of international 
law.261
The already-mentioned Shrimp-Turtle case reveals very clearly that the principle 
of good faith can play an important role in the resolution of normative conflicts. The 
case concerned a US import ban on shrimp harvested without approved “turtle excluder 
devices” which would prevent turtles being caught in the nets used for shrimps. The 
conflict between the objective of general elimination of quantitative restrictions between 
the WTO Member States (see Article XI GATT) and the competence to take measures 
which are necessary to protect the environment (Article XX GATT) is obvious. The 
Appellate Body of the WTO dealt with this conflict under the principle of good faith.262 It 
held that Article XX embodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need 
to maintain a balance of rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke 
one or another of the exceptions of Article XX, such as the protection of the environment, 
on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under the GATT 1994, 
on the other hand. Exercise by one Member of its right to invoke an exception, if abused 
or misused, will, to that extent, erode or render naught the substantive treaty rights in, for 
example, Article XI, of other Members. Similarly, in recognition of the legitimate nature 
of the policies and interests embodied in Article XX, the right to invoke one of those 
exceptions is not to be rendered illusory. Thus,
“a balance must be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception 
under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of 
the other Members. To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke 
an exception would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty 
obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other Members. If the abuse or 
misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect, reduces its treaty 
obligation to a merely facultative one and dissolves its juridical character, and, in 
so doing, negates altogether the treaty rights of other Members.”
§ 158 footnote 156 (citing Cheng 1953, p 125).
259 Hilf 2001, p 128.
260 Appleton 1999, p 492.
261 Van Aaken 2009, p 502.
262 WTO Appellate Body 12 October 1998, Shrimp-Turtle Case, No. 98-3899, § 156-159.
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The WTO Appellate Body subsequently considered that Article XX is, in fact, but one 
expression of the principle of good faith which controls the exercise of rights by States. 
One application of this general principle, the Appellate Body observes, is the application 
widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit which prohibits the abusive exercise of 
a State’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right impinges on the field 
covered by a treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably. An 
abusive exercise by a Member of its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty 
rights of the other Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member 
so acting. The task of the Appellate Body is, hence, essentially to locate and to mark out:
“a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under 
Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive provisions 
(e.g. Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will 
cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights 
and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The 
location of the line of equilibrium (…) is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves 
as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up 
specific cases differ.”
These considerations make it very clear that the principle of good faith requires that a State 
which exercises rights in the sphere of a treaty obligation strikes a fair balance between the 
rights which it has retained and the obligations which it has accepted by signing on to the 
treaty. An equilibrium should be struck between the right and obligation in such a way 
that neither of the two will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair 
the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the contracting parties to the treaty 
(compare the requirement of a ‘respectful aim’ discussed in section 4.5.2).
Thus, the principle of good faith has a very important role to play in the application of 
rules and principles of international law. It does not seem to differ substantially from Alexy’s 
theory of constitutional rights.263 Van Aaken also places Alexy’s theory in the context of 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT which provides that the interpretation of a treaty shall take into 
account, together with the context, any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties.264 As a part of the VCLT rules on treaty interpretation – 
Articles 31 to 33 VCLT – this provision fully reflects customary international law and follows 
from the principle of good faith.265 It has recently been taken up by the International Law 
Commission and its Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law has prepared a 
report on this topic. According to the Study Group, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT may be taken to 
express what may be called the principle of “systemic integration”, whereby international 
obligations are interpreted by reference to their normative environment (“system”).266 The 
rationale for such a principle is understandable:
263 Compare Andenas & Zleptnig 2007. Similarly Petersen 2008, p 291.
264 Van Aaken 2009, p 512.
265 Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), ICJ Reports 1999, p. 1059, 
paragraph 18; Engelen 2004, pp. 54-56 and p 251 and the case law there referred to.
266 International Law Commission, 58th session, nr. A/CN.4/L.682, p 208, § 413.
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“All treaty provisions receive their force and validity from general law, and set 
up rights and obligations that exist alongside rights and obligations established 
by other treaty provisions and rules of customary international law. None of such 
rights or obligations has any intrinsic priority against the others. The question of 
their relationship can only be approached through a process of reasoning that 
makes them appear as parts of some coherent and meaningful whole.”267
As McLachlan argues, the principle of systemic integration may be articulated as a 
presumption with both positive and negative aspects:
(a) negatively that, in entering into treaty obligations, the parties intend not to act 
inconsistently with generally recognized principles of international law or with 
previous treaty obligations towards third states; and
(b) positively that the parties are to be taken to refer to such principles for all 
questions which the treaty does not itself resolve expressly and in a different 
way.268
McLachlan further explains that the significance of such rules is that they perform a 
systemic or constitutional function in describing the operation of the international legal 
order. The principle of systemic integration furnishes the interpreter with a master key 
which enables him to find an appropriate accommodation between conflicting values and 
interests in international society.269 As Van Aaken has put it:
“Systemic integration can be achieved through interpretation mainly through 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. But the Vienna Convention tells us 
only which other international law can be considered when adjudicating. It does 
not tell us how to do it. The principle of proportionality, as a meta-principle of 
international law, is the most probable candidate for integration. It considers 
conflicting principles and harmonizes them through balancing.
The legal theoretical background of doing so has been elaborated by Robert Alexy. 
This allows for the consideration of other areas of PIL and helps to defragment 
PIL.”270
The conclusion that the general public international law principle of good faith and Article 
31(3)(c) VCLT support Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights is important for this part 
of the present study, the aim of which is to formulate a theoretical assessment model for 
the optimization of two principles of international law: direct tax sovereignty and EU 
free movement. The above-discussed case law and literature shows that this optimization 
is performed in general public international law by application of the principle of 
267 International Law Commission, 58th session, nr. A/CN.4/L.682, p 208, § 414.
268 McLachlan 2005, p 311, with further references.
269 McLachlan 2005, p 318. See for a similar statement International Law Commission, 58th session, 
nr. A/CN.4/L.682, p 234, § 465. Compare also Sands 1998, p 95.
270 Van Aaken 2009, p 512.
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proportionality through which an equilibrium is struck between the right and obligation 
in such a way that neither of the two will cancel out the other: a process of systemic 
integration.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has been dedicated to an extensive summary and analysis of Robert Alexy’s 
theory of principles, because this theory is able to provide a theoretical framework for 
resolving the conflict between national direct tax sovereignty and EU free movement (see 
chapter 3 and section 4.1 for an account of the choice for Alexy’s theory).271 Although 
Alexy has written his work in a German constitutional context, the argument he makes is 
of universal application. Alexy’s theory will be applied to this conflict in chapter 7, after 
the competing principles have been restated in chapters 5 and 6.
Alexy divides norms into rules and principles (section 4.2). A principle is an open norm, 
the scope of which depends on its application in a certain legal environment. By contrast, 
a rule is a closed norm, the scope of which has already been determined by the authority 
which has passed it. Principles are norms which require that something be realized to the 
greatest extent possible given the legal and factual environment. They are optimization 
requirements, characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied to varying degrees. By 
contrast, rules are norms which are always either fulfilled or not. Thus, principles are 
always prima facie reasons and rules are definitive reasons. Typically, a principle itself is 
not capable of determining its own extent in the light of competing principles and what 
is factually possible. In case of a conflict between a rule and a principle, the principle 
may require that an exception be added to the rule in certain circumstances. Thus, both 
rules and principles may appear only prima facie (section 4.2). Their prima facie character, 
however, may be fundamentally different due to ‘formal principles’ which may require that 
rules passed by an authority acting within its jurisdiction are to be followed. Since these 
formal principles do not apply if a tax measure is tested against the EU free movement 
provisions, national tax rules – which are an emanation of the principle of sovereignty – 
and EU principles have the same prima facie character. 
The nature of a principle as an optimization requirement demands that a maximally 
wide scope of its protected interests be adopted (section 4.3). Alexy rejects any form 
of threshold which would have to be met before it can be said that a certain principle 
prima facie competes with another principle. The adoption of the widest possible scope 
of a principle enables the courts to optimize all relevant principles involved, without the 
risk of not meeting a certain threshold. This means, in relation to the EU free movement 
provisions, that every tax obstacle – this term will be explained in detail in chapter 6 – 
prima facie infringes the principle of free movement.
As principles require a maximally extensive protection of interests, the limitation of 
a protected interest is always a limitation of the prima facie position of a principle (see 
section 4.4). All norms which are compatible with the Constitution – or in a European 
context: the TEU and the TFEU – are capable of being a limit to a principle. No additional 
271 The account given in this conclusion does not refer to specific sources, because it is a summary 
of chapter 4. Reference is made to the specific paragraphs for acknowledgements. 
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requirements, such as a certain weight of the norm before it can serve as a limit, need to 
be met. This means that in current ECJ case law the formal requirement could be dropped 
that only ‘compelling’ or ‘overriding’ reasons in the general interest can serve as a limit to 
the principle of free movement. 
Rules and principles which limit the realization of a principle can be divided into 
three different types. Commanding and prohibiting norms have by definition a limiting 
character, so that they come within the scope of the principle limited by them. A different 
approach applies to formative powers. The creation of (private law) powers as such has 
no limiting character. Its removal would however have a limiting character if it obstructs 
the realization of a principle. According to Alexy it is of fundamental importance to 
distinguish between rules and principles in the context of the mechanism of limitation. 
A rule limits a constitutional right when, if it is applicable, a definitive no-liberty or no-
right of the same content applies in place of a constitutional prima facie liberty or right. A 
principle can also act as a limit to another principle, but the mechanism is different. The 
extent to which principles limit another principle is not clear from the start – this is the 
case with limiting rules – but becomes apparent only after a balancing exercise. 
The fact that principles are to be realized to the greatest extent possible given empirical 
and normative constraints implies the principle of proportionality with its three sub-
tests of suitability, necessity (use of the least restrictive means), and proportionality in 
its narrow sense (that is, the balancing requirement). According to Alexy, this logically 
follows from the nature of principles; it can be deduced from them (section 4.5.1). The test 
of proportionality in its narrow sense, that is, the requirement of balancing, derives from its 
relation to the legally possible. The tests of necessity and suitability follow from the nature 
of principles as optimization requirements relative to what is factually possible. Thus, the 
latter tests take the aim of the tested rule or principle against another principle as a given, 
whereas the former test may, wholly or partially, set aside that aim. 
Alexy does not require that the norm limiting a principle has a ‘legitimate aim’, that is, 
he is not using this terminology. The only ‘absolute’ requirement of a limit would be that it 
is compatible with the Constitution. The question of whether the restricted principle has 
a greater weight than the principle underlying the limit should be answered solely within 
the framework of the last phase of the proportionality test (proportionality in the narrow 
sense or the balancing requirement). 
Section 4.5.2 of the present study argues that a ‘respectful ends’ test is implicit in Alexy’s 
theory. The definition of this test has been developed as follows: a limit to a restricted 
principle does not have a respectful aim if it has no other objective than limiting that 
principle. Also, a restricted principle does not have a respectful aim if it does not accept that 
it may be limited. In both cases, the principle and the limit do not ‘respect’ each other. In my 
view, no other requirements may be imposed, apart from being formally and substantively 
compatible with other principles with a similar status, such as the prohibition of State aid 
in Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. The introduction of a ‘respectful ends’ test is based on the 
fact that principles can never be absolute. This means that neither the restricted principle 
nor its limit can be absolute in the sense that they can never be outweighed. It should 
always be possible to perform a balancing exercise, and insofar as one of the principles 
regards itself as inviolable this is impossible. A principle which does not recognize other 
principles cannot engage in balancing with another principle. In addition, a principle itself 
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is not capable of determining its own extent in the light of competing principles and what 
is factually possible. This extent is determined by proportionality analysis (suitability, 
necessity and balance), which should be able to be performed. This means that neither the 
extent of the restricted principle nor the extent of its limit can be determined in advance 
by reference to that principle or that limit. Principles and limits which are nevertheless 
characterized by the wish to determine their own extent and, consequently, to disregard 
other principles, cannot be qualified as principles or limits because such a qualification 
would be ‘disrespectful’ towards other principles. In other words, the goal of a limit to a 
principle should be external to the goal of being a limit. Conversely, the restricted principle 
should accept in abstracto the possibility of being limited. This means, for instance, that 
budgetary reasons can never justify an infringement which a tax measure imposes on a 
competing principle. If it were otherwise, the extent of tax sovereignty would be unlimited 
and absolute: it would not accept other principles as limits. 
The definition of a ‘respectful aim’ places a very high emphasis on the objective of a 
limit to a principle which may be difficult to determine. At least two difficulties may arise 
when assessing the aim of a measure. Firstly, it may be difficult to discover which aim 
exactly underlies a certain rule. This is a problem every court is familiar with; it should 
be solved through the normal rules of interpretation. Secondly, a rule may pursue various 
aims at the same time: a plurality of objectives. If one of the aims is ‘legitimate’ – or in my 
terminology ‘respectful’ – but the other is not, the question arises of whether the rule is 
acceptable or not. Gerards distinguishes two situations: a provision may pursue different 
objectives with a similar value, but it is also possible that the aims are of differing weight. 
In the latter situation the main objective may be rather general, such as ensuring public 
safety. Its sub-objectives are then subsidiary to the main goal. I agree with Gerards that 
the courts should investigate, on a case-by-case basis, whether the measure would also be 
justified if the unacceptable goal were eliminated. 
The test of suitability is of an empirical nature (see section 4.5.3). It entails an 
optimization requirement relative to what is factually possible (as opposed to what is 
legally possible). The test of suitability takes the respectful aim as a given and examines 
whether the rule at issue is apt to attain the objectives pursued. According to Alexy, the 
test of suitability is none other than an expression of the idea of Pareto-optimality: one 
position can be improved without detriment to another. 
The test of necessity derives from the very nature of principles, just as the principle of 
suitability (see section 4.5.4). It requires that of two broadly equally suitable means, the 
one which interferes less intensively should be chosen. Thus it entails an optimization 
requirement relative to what is factually possible. As such it is an expression of the idea 
of Pareto-optimality as well. The necessity test can be divided into two sub-tests: a test 
which examines the degree of fit of a measure and a test which examines the subsidiarity 
of a measure. The first test examines whether the classification is sufficiently fine-tuned in 
relation to its objective. The subsidiarity test, which is politically more sensitive, examines 
whether another classification should have been chosen to achieve the objective of the 
measure; this requires that the court itself examines which alternative measures would 
have been available. Alexy acknowledges that the application of the necessity test is more 
complicated in the case of a plurality of objectives. The achievement of one of the objectives 
through the least intrusive means may have as a result that the other objective is not fully 
achieved. 
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The test of proportionality in the narrow sense expresses the meaning of optimization 
relative to competing principles (section 4.5.5). It is identical with the Law of Balancing 
which states: the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, 
the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other. This reflects a requirement to 
optimize. Balancing can be broken down into three stages. Alexy shows that the first stage 
involves establishing the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, the first principle. 
This is followed by a second stage in which the importance of satisfying the competing 
principle is established. Finally, in the third stage, it is established whether the importance 
of satisfying the latter principle justifies the detriment to, or non-satisfaction of, the former. 
In order to give some more precise meaning to the concept, Alexy proposes a three-stage 
scale distinguishing between minor, moderate and serious infringements of a principle on 
the one hand, and very important, moderately important and relatively unimportant gains 
on the other. Alexy’s classifications may serve to provide a quick solution in relatively easy 
cases of, for example, a serious infringement of a principle versus a relatively unimportant 
gain to another principle at the other end: the infringement is disproportionate. In case 
of a ‘draw’ – the principles involved are equally important – the decision-maker enjoys 
‘structural discretion’. The court will in these situations have to respect the choices which 
have been made by the legislature, just as it would have to respect the mirror situation in 
which the legislature would have given preference to the competing principle.
It has been argued in section 4.6 that the general public international law principle of 
good faith and Article 31(3)(c) VCLT support Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights. The 
case law and literature discussed there shows that optimization of competing international 
rights and obligations should be performed by application of the principle of proportionality 
through which an equilibrium is struck between the right and obligation in such a way 
that neither of the two will cancel out the other: a process of systemic integration. The 
four above-described phases of proportionality analysis should be applied where a State 
exercise rights on the international level which prima facie interfere with rights of other 
States. 
We will now apply Alexy’s theory of principles to this conflict. Chapters 5 and 6 will 
explain their prima facie position and chapter 7 will provide for a theoretical optimization 
model through which both principles can be optimized.
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5.1 Sovereignty as a principle
Although much criticized, the principle of sovereignty is still very central to almost all 
thinking about international law.272 As Jeffery has noted, sovereignty refers to the bundle 
of rights and competences which go to make up the nation State, as a consequence of 
which it can be equated with Statehood. Jurisdiction refers to particular rights of the 
bundle of rights which comprise Statehood. It refers to a State’s right of regulation in its 
judicial, administrative, and legislative competence.273 Because jurisdiction is a corollary 
of sovereignty, the jurisdiction of a State cannot extend further than its sovereignty. 
Isenbaert, who has done impressive research on the notions of sovereignty and of income 
tax sovereignty, has stated that the essence of the sovereignty concept is reflected by the 
establishment and justification of a claim to supreme authority within a particular body 
politic;274 it is a claim to “ultimate, and thus exclusive, authority.275 Of course, States are 
always free to limit their jurisdiction unilaterally or by means of a treaty.276 This proves that 
even today the sovereign State remains the principal actor in the international arena.277 In 
the words of Isenbaert:
“As a consequence of the ever-growing body of international law and the 
resulting binding international obligations, the sovereign state has turned into an 
organization that can no longer be considered as the sole wielder of all political 
authority. Even in this situation of multilateral obligations, the state is seen as 
exercising its sovereignty through concluding international treaties or becoming 
a member of a supranational organization in order to transform the functions and 
objectives of its sovereign powers into different or more advanced functions and 
objectives of the international treaty or the supranational organization. By those 
means, the exercise of the state of its sovereign powers gains a new functionality. 
Hence, it can be said that external sovereignty has become a concept of functional 
freedom for the states, through which they can alter and enhance the functions of 
their sovereign power and the level on which these functions are exercised.”278
272 Jackson 2006, p. 57.
273 Jeffery 1999, p. 26, with further references.
274 Isenbaert 2010, p 62.
275 Isenbaert 2010, p 72.
276 Vanhamme 2001, p 52.
277 Isenbaert 2010, p 66.
278 Isenbaert 2010, p. 67. Italics by the present author.




Also according to the Lotus principle, any attempt to constrain the State’s freedom of action 
in the absence of a legal prohibition is a violation of State sovereignty.279 Thus, in the 
present author’s view, sovereignty should be understood as a prima facie general freedom 
of action of States, as limited by international law.280 
Sovereignty is also quite central to the concept of equality of nations. Sovereignty 
presumes that there is no higher power than the nation State and negates the idea that 
there is a higher power, internationally or foreign (unless consented to by the nation 
State).281 According to Jeffery, the sovereign nature of jurisdiction means that it is linked 
to the principle of the equality of nation States, which together with sovereignty, has been 
described as ‘the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations’.282 Since every State 
enjoys the same degree of sovereignty, jurisdiction implies respect for the corresponding 
rights of other States.283 This means that sovereignty can never be absolute.284 It represents 
an aspiration rather than a concrete stipulation. The extent of a State’s sovereignty can be 
determined only if it is confronted with the sovereignty of other States or other principles 
or rules of international law.
The question arises whether new supranational levels of authority can be said to have 
acquired sovereignty in their own right and, if so, what the relationship is between those 
new levels of authority and the sovereignty of the individual nation States. Isenbaert has 
discussed a number of different views in literature on this issue. First, there is the approach 
which considers sovereignty as something which can be delegated. This approach denies 
that supranational organizations would have any sovereignty of their own.285 A second 
approach considers sovereignty to be something which can be divided between States 
and supranational organizations.286 Thirdly, there is the idea which focuses on ‘function-
sovereignty’ or ‘constitutional pluralism’. The essence of constitutional pluralism is that 
two (or more) parallel and equivalent legal claims to ultimate authority are made by two 
(or more) sovereign entities situated at different levels.287 According to Isenbaert, however, 
the idea that two more or less similar sovereign claims are made at the same time is 
unsatisfactory, because it results in a clash between those claims. A better approach would 
be to acknowledge that a part of the sovereign functions and objectives of the State are 
brought to and transformed by the supranational level by instating a supranational body, 
279 S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (formulating the background assumption in 
intemational law that a state is constrained only by rules to which it has consented). See Petersen 
2008, p. 303.
280 Bernhardt 1985, p. 410. Jeffery 1999, p 30-31, is critical about this so-called ‘positivist’ view 
of State freedom of action. In his view, the better approach is the one that requires a party to 
establish a particular ground of jurisdiction and not just to show that it is not prohibited. For 
purposes of the present study the difference between these two approaches is not that relevant, 
because in both approaches sovereignty would be regarded as a principle in Alexy’s sense.
281 Jackson 2006, p. 58.
282 Jeffery 1999, p. 26.
283 Mann 1990, p. 4, quoted by Jeffery 1999, p. 27.
284 Compare Isenbaert 2010, p 49-50 and p 54-55.
285 Isenbaert, p 68-69.
286 Isenbaert, p 70-71.
287 Isenbaert, p 72.
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the existence of which is confined to the functions and objectives of the supranational 
level (an internal functional boundary, e.g. a certain policy area) and geographically 
restricted by the territory of the Member States (a geographical boundary). Isenbaert calls 
this function-sovereignty.288 Isenbaert stresses that function-sovereignty over a certain 
policy area does not entitle the body politic concerned to absolute or exclusive competence 
within that area, because the body politic must be cautious as not to render impossible the 
performance of the functions and the pursuit of the objectives of policy areas over which 
the other body politic is function-sovereign.289 The circumstance that the sovereignty 
of a certain body is limited not only by geographical boundaries but also by functional 
boundaries, raises the question to what extent such a body is competent to determine 
its own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetentz). In this regard, Isenbaert distinguishes 
legislative competence-competence and judicial competence-competence. Through the 
first competence, the body in question would be able to expand its competence, whereas 
this would occur less frequently with respect to the second competence.290 The issue 
of judicial competence-competence is however very much debated in the area of free 
movement and direct taxation (see chapter 2 of the present study). 
The considerations above indicate that sovereignty has to be regarded as a principle 
rather than as a rule of international law: it is regarded as a prima facie general freedom 
of action by States which is not absolute but relative and the extent of which cannot 
be determined in isolation.291 Indeed, Alexy’s doctrine of collision – see section 4.2 – 
would identify sovereignty as a principle. A conflict between a State’s sovereignty and 
the sovereignty of another State or between the functions of a State and a supranational 
body is not solved by declaring one of these invalid or by placing one of them outside the 
legal order, but by giving precedence to one of them under particular circumstances; the 
sovereignty of one State cannot annul the sovereignty of another State of supranational 
body. This exercise takes place within the legal order, which is shown by the fact that the 
result may be different if the circumstances change. A good example is provided by the 
Separate Opinion of Judge Wellington Koo in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory 
Case before the International Court of Justice.292 This case concerned the accessibility 
of Portuguese enclaves on Indian Territory. The opinion of Wellington Koo contains 
interesting elaborations on the reconciliation of Portuguese and Indian sovereignty and 
the potential value of the principle of good faith in reconciling the co-existence of two 
legal rights.293 Wellington Koo notes that the right of passage has two concurrent features: 
on the one hand, it is necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the 
enclaves, and, on the other hand, its exercise is subject to control and regulation of India 
insofar as the passage takes place over the intervening Indian territory. This means that 
with the right on each side there also exists an obligation – that of India to accord passage 
and that of Portugal to respect the rules of procedure respecting the application for, and 
288 Isenbaert 2010, p 72-73.
289 Isenbaert, p 75-76.
290 Isenbaert, p 77-78.
291 Compare Isenbaert 2010, p 5-6 and p 56-57 with further refrences.
292 ICJ 12 April 1960, Right of Passage over Indian Territory Case, ICJ Reports 1960, p 6.
293 O’Connor 1991, p. 122.
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grant of, passage. In other words, the rights and obligations of both sides are concomitant 
and correlative. This does not mean, however, that they are not reconcilable with each 
other. According to Wellington Koo, neither Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves nor 
Indian sovereignty over its territory can be regarded as an absolute, unrestricted right. An 
obligation rests on both States to strike a fair balance between the conflicting interests in 
accordance with the principle of good faith which States have to take into account when 
pursuing their own national interests. A similar approach is followed by the case law and 
literature discussed in section 4.6. Therefore, Noll has rightly argued that, under Alexy’s 
theory, sovereignty is to be framed as a principle and not as a rule in international law. The 
conflict between sovereignty and competing principles may be solved by weighing them 
against each other under Alexy’s theory of principles.294 
Before an optimization model can be provided for that purpose in chapter 7, the 
prima facie position of direct tax sovereignty – a general freedom of action of States – 
should be elaborated a little further. According to Brownlie, the principal corollaries of 
the sovereignty and equality of States are: 1) a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a 
territory and the permanent population living there; 2) a duty of non-intervention in the 
area of exclusive jurisdiction of other States; and 3) the dependence of obligations arising 
from customary law and treaties on the consent of the obligor.295 With regard to EU law, 
Isenbaert has indeed concluded that direct taxation as a policy area has remained part 
of the function-sovereignty of the Member States. This means that the Member States 
are able to pursue the core functions and essential objectives of that policy area, which 
is the essence of function-sovereignty.296 The three most important aspects of direct tax 
sovereignty include i) the freedom for a State to determine within its domestic jurisdiction 
the organization and objectives of the tax system; ii) the obligation for a State to respect 
the direct tax sovereignty of other States; and iii) the fact that a State’s tax jurisdiction is 
limited by customary international law and bilateral tax treaties. These three aspects are 
now discussed.
5.2 Direct tax jurisdiction
It should be noted at the outset that a short overview of a State’s tax jurisdiction has 
already been provided in section 2.2.2. Although the overview given in section 5.2 is more 
comprehensive, there are overlaps between the two sections. With a view to service to the 
reader, I have decided not to cross-refer but to include the whole comprehensive account 
in section 5.2. Readers who are familiar with the concept of direct tax jurisdiction may 
skip section 5.2 and go directly to section 5.3.297
294 Noll 1997, p 339-441. Verschuuren has also argued that sovereignty should be seen as a principle 
and not as a rule; see Verschuuren 2006, p 39.
295 Brownlie 2003, p. 287.
296 Isenbaert 2010, p 223.
297 Persons who would like to read more on the subject are referred to Monsenego 2011, p 57-102, 
for an insightful overview.
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5.2.1 Legislative jurisdiction under customary international law
Territorial and personal bases of jurisdiction
The traditional approach of establishing jurisdiction is founded on the territorial and 
personal bases of jurisdiction. As Jeffery has demonstrated, the fundamental jurisdictional 
connection is the territorial basis that refers to jurisdiction over persons, matters and 
things within the geographical boundaries of a State.298 In relation to fiscal jurisdiction, 
this is illustrated by the taxation of income with its source, or a person residing, within 
the territory.299 The other jurisdictional connection is personal, based on the nationality or 
domicile of a person as the connecting factor.
The personal basis of jurisdiction: nationality
Nationality is widely accepted as a valid jurisdictional basis for the assertion of a State’s 
jurisdiction over persons. A person with the nationality of the taxing State can be liable to 
be taxed on his full, worldwide assets and income, from whatever source.300 Consequently, 
a State has unlimited fiscal jurisdiction over its nationals. International law leaves it to 
a State to decide who are its nationals.301 According to Jeffery, the incorporation of a 
company in a State is analogous to nationality with regard to persons, so that this is also a 
basis for unlimited fiscal jurisdiction.302
The territorial basis of jurisdiction
The principle of fiscal territoriality refers to jurisdiction over persons, matters and things 
within the geographical boundaries of a State. A State may tax a person residing in its 
territory or income arising there. The scope of jurisdiction of persons or income is by its 
nature different.
A State has unlimited fiscal jurisdiction over individuals and companies residing within 
its territory. Consequently, a State is competent to tax the worldwide income of those 
individuals and companies. Customary international law leaves it to States to determine 
who their residents are, including the nature and extent of presence within the territory 
that is required.303 The concept of residence does, however, make it clear that a more 
permanent nature of contact is required to establish worldwide jurisdiction. As Martha 
has pointed out, fiscal jurisdiction on the basis of residence is, in the view of general 
international law, only relevant with regard to aliens.304
A State may tax non-resident aliens, individuals and companies, but only with regard 
to the particular sources of income within its territory. Accordingly, the fiscal jurisdiction 
of a State in respect of non-resident aliens is limited to the sources of income within the 
State.305 
298 Jeffery 1999, p. 44.
299 Compare Case C-451/99 Cura Anlagen, § 40.
300 Martha 1989, p. 48.
301 Jeffery 1999, p. 49.
302 Jeffery 1999, p. 49.
303 Jeffery 1999, p. 45.
304 Martha 1989, p. 50-51.
305 Martha 1989, p. 54.
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Thus, the jurisdictional principle of fiscal territoriality includes unlimited fiscal 
jurisdiction with regard to resident aliens and limited fiscal jurisdiction in respect of non-
resident aliens.
Implied limitations on jurisdiction to tax
The jurisdictional principles to tax referred to in the previous paragraphs may also be 
formulated negatively. A State may tax a foreign company with no headquarters in the 
State and carrying on business in the State on the income derived from that business, 
but not on its worldwide income. A State may also tax persons who are not nationals or 
residents of the State with regard to income derived from property in the State, but the 
property and income do not justify the taxation of property or income outside the State.306 
The American Law Institute has taken the position that the jurisdiction to tax nationals 
and residents implies that a State may tax a parent corporation on its worldwide income, 
including that of its branches and subsidiaries.307
5.2.2 Allocation of jurisdiction in tax treaties
It is clear from the outset that the application of the rules of customary international 
law with regard to fiscal jurisdiction may lead to international juridical double taxation. 
International juridical double taxation can be generally defined as the imposition of 
comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same 
subject matter and for identical periods.308 According to the Commentary to the OECD 
Model Tax Convention, the harmful effects on the exchange of goods and services and 
movements of capital and persons are so well known that it is unnecessary to stress the 
importance of removing the obstacles that double taxation presents for the development 
of economic relations between countries. The primary purpose of the OECD Model is 
to provide a way of settling on a uniform basis the most common problems in respect of 
international juridical double taxation. Most tax treaties are, to a large extent, based on 
the OECD Model. The Introduction to the OECD Model explains that it establishes two 
categories of rules for the purpose of eliminating double taxation. “First, Articles 6 to 21 
determine, with regard to different classes of income, the respective rights to tax of the 
State of source or situs and of the State of residence, and Article 22 does the same with 
regard to capital. In the case of a number of items of income and capital, an exclusive right 
to tax is conferred on one of the Contracting States. The other Contracting State is thereby 
prevented from taxing those items and double taxation is avoided. As a rule, this exclusive 
right to tax is conferred on the State of residence. In the case of other items of income and 
capital, the right to tax is not an exclusive one. As regards two classes of income (dividends 
and interest), although both States are given the right to tax, the amount of tax that may 
be imposed in the State of source is limited. Second, insofar as these provisions confer on 
the State of source or situs a full or limited right to tax, the State of residence must allow 
relief so as to avoid double taxation; this is the purpose of Article 23 A and 23 B. The 
306 Restatement of the Law, Third, 1987, § 412(a).
307 Restatement of the Law, Third, 1987, § 412(e).
308 Commentary to the OECD Model, Introduction, § 1.
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Convention leaves it to the Contracting States to choose between two methods of relief, 
i.e. the exemption method and the credit method.”309 Consequently, the first category of 
rules allocates the jurisdiction to tax. The second relates to the method by which double 
taxation is eliminated. There are basically two methods of relief, i.e. the exemption method 
and the credit method.
5.2.3 Self-imposed unilateral limitations on jurisdiction
Many States have imposed unilateral limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction. For example, 
most States do not fully apply their worldwide jurisdiction on the basis of nationality.310 
With regard to the taxation of income, the Netherlands, for instance, only applies the 
personal basis for jurisdiction (the nationality of the taxpayer) to companies.311 France 
operates a territorial system for corporate income tax purposes. In principle, account is 
only taken of profits realized in undertakings operating in France or in those liable to 
taxation in France by virtue of a tax treaty.312 Consequently, France does not make use of 
its unlimited fiscal jurisdiction with regard to companies incorporated under French law 
and those resident in France. Instead, France applies a strict territoriality principle for the 
taxation of company profits.
5.2.4 Consequences of the overlaps and limitations of direct tax jurisdiction
Introduction
The outline of a State’s direct tax jurisdiction shows that tax jurisdictions may overlap and 
that a tax jurisdiction is necessarily limited in scope. The consequences of that have been 
subject to extensive ECJ case law (see section 2.2.4). The purpose of the present section 
is not to discuss this case law, but to clarify the consequences apart from any case law. 
Chapter 8 will discuss how the ECJ should have dealt with these consequences in relation 
to EU free movement under the theoretical optimization model outlined in chapter 7.
Overlap of direct tax jurisdictions
The co-existence of discrete national fiscal jurisdictions leads to international juridical 
double taxation. After all, the application of the rules of customary international law with 
regard to fiscal jurisdiction – nationality, residence and source – may lead to an overlap. 
Three concurrences of bases of jurisdiction may typically arise.313
 
309 Commentary to the OECD Model, Introduction, § 19.
310 An exception is the United States, which, in principle, taxes its nationals on their worldwide 
income.
311 Although the principle of nationality also plays a minor role with regard to individuals; 
in particular, in respect of diplomatic staff (Art. 2.2 of the Individual Income Tax Law 
(Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001)). For the worldwide jurisdiction with regard to companies 
incorporated under Netherlands law, see Art. 2(4) of the Corporate Income Tax Law (Wet op de 
vennootschapsbelasting 1969).
312 Art. 219 General Tax Code (Code Général des Impôts (Territorialité de l’impôt sur les sociétés)).
313 Van Raad (loose-leaf), 1.2.2. See also Bender 2000, p 16-25.
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 1. Concurrence of subject and object related bases of jurisdiction. The most frequently 
seen concurrence is a simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction by two States based on 
residence and source respectively. As Van Raad shows, two main items of income should 
be distinguished.314 In the first place, there is the category of dividends and interest and 
royalty payments. The source State may want to impose a withholding tax on such a 
dividend, whereas the State of residence (or nationality) taxes the recipient of the income 
on his worldwide income. Under tax treaties, many residence States would grant an 
ordinary credit for the foreign withholding tax (the withholding tax levied on the payment 
maximized by the domestic taxation attributable to it). In the second place, there is income 
from foreign real property, a foreign business (permanent establishment), dependent 
services and similar ‘active’ income. Normally, the source State will tax this income, 
whereas the State of residence (or nationality) also taxes the recipient of the income. Under 
tax treaties, many residence States would grant an exemption of this foreign income.
2. Concurrence of two subject related bases of jurisdiction. Three different situations 
should be distinguished here.315 In the first place, jurisdiction based on residence and 
nationality respectively may lead to an overlap of jurisdiction. This may occur, for 
example, in respect of a company incorporated under Netherlands law of which the 
effective management in situated in another State. In this situation two States will tax the 
Dutch company on its worldwide income: the Netherlands on the basis of the ‘nationality’ 
of the company and the other State on the basis of its residence there. In the second place 
it is possible that two States will simultaneously treat a person as a resident taxpayer 
(worldwide taxation). In the third place, a taxpayer may have a double nationality, as a 
result of which he may be subject to worldwide taxation in both States. 
3. Concurrence of two object related bases of jurisdiction. This situation occurs if a 
person is subject to limited taxation in a source State on income which has arisen in a third 
State. Van Raad gives the example of profits attributable to a permanent establishment, 
where interest payments from a third State are included in that profit. The third State may 
have imposed a withholding tax on the interest payment, whereas the source State also 
taxes the interest.316
Limitation of direct tax jurisdictions by customary international law 
The fact that national tax systems are necessarily limited in geographical and personal 
scope has two consequences. In the first place, disparities, or variations, exist between 
these jurisdictions. In the second place, a State may – in the exercise of its sovereignty – 
treat situations that arise fully within their own jurisdiction differently from those that 
are partly within their jurisdiction and partly in the jurisdiction of another State. These 
consequences are discussed below.
1. Disparities. A consequence of the co-existence of discrete national tax systems is 
that disparities, or variations, exist between these jurisdictions. For example, a State may 
choose to impose a relatively high tax rate within its jurisdiction. The existence of these 
disparities has inevitable distorting effects on investment, employment and, for companies 
314 Van Raad (loose-leaf),1.2.2.B.
315 Van Raad (loose-leaf),1.2.2.C.
316 Van Raad (loose-leaf),1.2.2.D.
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and self-employed persons, establishment decisions. A taxpayer who wishes to transfer his 
activities to a State other than that in which he previously resided will not necessarily be 
neutral as regards taxation. Given the disparities in the tax legislation, such a transfer may 
be to the taxpayer’s advantage in terms of taxation or not, according to circumstance.
2. Items of income outside the tax jurisdiction. If, for example, a French company opens 
a branch in Luxembourg, the losses attributable to the French head office will normally 
not be taken into account for determining the profits of the branch for Luxembourg 
corporation tax purposes, whereas the losses of a domestic head office would be deductible. 
The reason for this different treatment is that the French company – neither a national nor 
a resident of Luxembourg – is only subject to limited taxation in Luxembourg.
3. A taxable subject or object leaves the tax jurisdiction. If a taxpayer owning assets 
with an unrealized gain or these assets themselves leave a State’s jurisdiction, that State 
will normally impose an exit tax on that unrealized gain. The reason for this is that the 
State concerned loses its jurisdiction to tax, whereas it considers it reasonable to tax the 
unrealized gains which have accrued on its territory. In the Netherlands, for example, if 
an individual who has a substantial interest (more than 5%) in the shares of a company 
emigrates to another country, the Netherlands will in principle tax the unrealized gain 
present in the shares.317 Also, a State may consider it as an abuse of its tax legislation that 
a taxpayer or asset leaves its jurisdiction in order to benefit, for example, from the tax 
regime of a low taxing country. An example of specific anti-abuse legislation aimed at 
combating such abusive transfers can be found in CFC-legislation. This legislation leads to 
the taxation of the profits of a subsidiary established in a low taxing country at the level of 
its parent company. Rules which limit the deduction of interest paid to a recipient which is 
a resident of another country have a similar aim. The reason for these types of anti-abuse 
legislation is that the State applying that legislation has an absolute lack of jurisdiction 
over adjusting the tax rate of the tax base applied in the other country. 
Limitation of direct tax jurisdictions by tax treaties or internal law
States are competent to determine the criteria for taxation of income and wealth with a view 
to eliminating double taxation either unilaterally or by means of international agreements. 
They are, in other words, free not to fully exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to them by 
customary international law. Two phenomena should be distinguished. In the first place, 
States may not fully exercise the tax jurisdiction to which they are entitled on the basis of 
the person of the taxpayer (e.g. a national). In the second place, States may exclude certain 
categories of income from the tax base. These categories will now be discussed.
1. Exclusion of a taxable subject from the tax jurisdiction. Many States have unilaterally 
decided not to exercise tax jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of natural persons, 
whereas they do tax residents on the basis of their world-wide income. Other exclusions 
of taxpayers from the tax jurisdiction are also possible.
2. Exclusion of a taxable (negative) object from the tax jurisdiction. A German 
company with income from industrial or commercial activities is precluded, when 
calculating its profits, from deducting losses from a permanent establishment in another 
Member State on the ground that, according to the applicable double taxation convention, 
317 Article 4.16(1)(h) Wet IB 2001.
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the corresponding income from such a permanent establishment is not subject to taxation 
in Germany. Similar measures may be taken unilaterally. In this category of ‘dislocations’ 
or ‘tax base fragmentations’, to which Wattel has drawn attention, a disadvantageous tax 
effect is caused by the fact that the tax base (the income) is created in two tax jurisdictions 
and the resulting need to divide that base between the two jurisdictions (fragmentation) 
and for double tax relief mechanisms.318 This issue has also been dealt with in the 
paragraph on customary international law, with one important difference: the exclusion 
of a (negative) item of income from the tax base unilaterally or bilaterally is a choice, 
whereas the exclusion of an item of income on the basis of customary international law is 
an obligation, if other States refuse to conclude an international agreement which deviates 
from customary international law.
3. Allocation of tax jurisdiction in tax treaties and disparities. Tax treaties divide the 
tax jurisdiction between the contracting States. Obviously, the choices laid down in the tax 
treaty directly affect taxpayers. An allocation of tax jurisdiction to the State with the highest 
level of taxation leads to a tax treatment which is harsher than it would have been if the tax 
jurisdiction had been allocated to the State with the lowest level of taxation. Consequently, 
the worse treatment is caused by two circumstances: i. the choice to allocate the taxing 
power to State A and ii. the fact that State A has a higher effective tax rate than State B. The 
second cause is the direct result of the fact that direct taxes are not harmonized: a different 
treatment caused by disparities. The first cause reflects the freedom of States to choose the 
connecting factors for allocating jurisdiction in tax treaties.
4. A taxable subject or object leaves the tax jurisdiction as defined by a tax treaty or 
unilaterally. The choice made in a tax treaty or unilaterally not to exercise a State’s full 
tax jurisdiction under customary international law normally leads to more exit taxes: if a 
taxpayer owning assets with an unrealized gain or leaves a State’s jurisdiction thus defined, 
that State will normally impose an exit tax on that unrealized gain. The same applies to 
assets leaving that tax jurisdiction. The reason for this is that the State concerned loses its 
jurisdiction to tax, thus it considers it reasonable to tax the unrealized gains which have 
accrued on its territory.
5.3 equality of nation States, the reserved domain and the principle of non-
intervention
The fact that a State’s tax jurisdiction is limited by customary international law, bilateral 
tax treaties and unilateral delimitations implies an obligation for that State to respect the 
direct tax sovereignty of other States. Sovereignty implies a right against interference 
or intervention from any foreign (or international) power.319 It is important to discuss 
this aspect of sovereignty, because it may serve as a limit to free movement under the 
theoretical assessment model (see section 7.4.4). The content of the concept of sovereign 
equality of States is developed in the Declaration on Friendly Relations:
 
318 Terra & Wattel 2008, p 48. See section 2.2.5 for a discussion.
319 Jackson 2006, p. 58; Vanhamme 2001, p. 48-50.
The principle of direct tax sovereignty
89 
“All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are 
equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of 
an economic, social, political or other nature. In particular, sovereign equality 
includes the following elements:
(a) States are juridically equal;
(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States;
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable;
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, 
economic and cultural systems”.320
Jeffery has noted that it is implicit in the principle of the equality of nation States that 
sovereign rights are not exercised in a vacuum but in the context of the existence of other 
States with commensurate jurisdiction. Consequently, what one State sees as an exercise of 
its sovereign jurisdiction may be seen by the other as an infringement of its own sovereign 
jurisdiction. “How the balance is to be established between competing sovereign interests, 
especially in the case of an extra-territorial assertion of jurisdiction, lies at the heart of the 
questions relating to legislative jurisdiction.”321 In this context, the German Constitutional 
Court has handed down an interesting judgment in 1983. It held that the imposition of 
taxes upon a foreigner living abroad requires sufficiently appropriate points of contact 
for taxation by the taxing State in order to prevent interference with the foreign State’s 
claims to sovereignty (“eine völkerrechtswidrige Einmischung in den Hoheitsbereich 
eines fremden Staates”).322
According to Jeffery, a three-step approach to the meaning of the reserved domain of 
exclusive domestic jurisdiction should be followed. Under this approach the operation of 
international law can be divided into three different areas. Firstly, there is that area which 
international law governs by means of positive rules. According to Jeffery, the prime tax 
illustration of this are the provisions of the OECD Model allocating a State’s jurisdiction to 
tax. Secondly, comes the true reserved domain - that area which international law does not 
want to regulate because it is best suited to regulation by States operating independently of 
its prescriptions. Jeffery states that this would include such matters as the determination 
of which persons and transactions will be taxable and the types and rates of taxes that 
will be imposed. Thirdly, there is that area which it has not succeeded in, or got around 
320 General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 Oct. 
1970, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV).
321 Jeffery 1999, p. 21.
322 BVerfGE 63, 343 (Beschluß des Zweiten Senats vom 22. März 1983): “Für die Auferlegung 
von Abgaben gegen einen im Ausland lebenden Ausländer, die an einen Sachverhalt 
anknüpft, der ganz oder teilweise im Ausland verwirklicht worden ist, bedarf es, soll er nicht 
eine völkerrechtswidrige Einmischung in den Hoheitsbereich eines fremden Staates sein, 
hinreichender sachgerechter Anknüpfungsmomente für die Abgabenerhebung in dem Staat, 
der die Abgaben erhebt (compare F. A. Mann, The doctrine of jurisdiction in international law, 
in: Recueil des Cours, 111 [1964 - I], S. 9 ff., 44 ff., 109 ff.). Diese Anknüpfungsmomente und 
ihre Sachnähe müssen von Völkerrechts wegen einem Mindestmaß an Einsichtigkeit genügen.”
Chapter 5
90
to, regulating which by its nature is susceptible to regulation by international law. Jeffery 
suggests that international direct tax distortions would come under this category.323
Thus, the rules on direct tax jurisdiction as they are laid down in customary international 
law have two functions which are essentially two sides of the same coin. Firstly, these rules 
permit a State to determine the organization and aims of its tax system within its domestic 
jurisdiction. Secondly, they prohibit that a State interferes with the domestic jurisdiction 
of other States. 
5.4 Freedom to determine the organization and aims of the tax system 
within the domestic jurisdiction
5.4.1 Introduction
It has been argued in the previous section that States have the exclusive right to regulate 
within their domestic jurisdiction. This means that national States are competent to 
determine the objectives of their respective tax systems.324 Obviously, the first goal would 
be to collect taxes for the financing of the State in a manner which is conceived as equitable 
and fair, but there will also be other – external – objectives. Internal objectives include the 
way in which the tax is levied: the definition of the taxable persons, the tax base and the 
tax rate. External objectives include fiscal incentives which are granted to foster objectives 
outside the scope of the tax system itself such as the promotion of the environment. 
Secondly, States are competent to allocate between themselves the jurisdiction to tax 
through the conclusion of tax treaties or unilaterally. They are also free not to remedy 
international juridical double taxation.
The distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ objectives of the tax system has 
been – and still is – subject to wide debate among economists and tax scholars in the 
discussions on the desirability of so-called tax expenditures.325 In 1973, Surrey argued 
that the income tax system really consists of two parts: one part comprises the structural 
provisions necessary to implement the income tax on individual and corporate net income; 
the second part comprises a system of tax expenditures under which Governmental 
financial assistance programs are carried out through special tax provisions rather than 
through direct Government expenditures.326 Together with McDaniel, Surrey developed 
this distinction between ‘taxing’ and ‘spending’ provisions further. They argued that an 
income tax is composed of two distinct elements. “The first element consists of structural 
provisions necessary to implement a normal income tax, such as the definition of net 
income, the specification of accounting rules, the definition of the entities subject to tax, 
the determination of the rate schedule and exemption levels, and the application of the 
tax to international transactions. These provisions compose the revenue-raising aspects 
of the tax. The second element consists of the special preferences found in every income 
323 Jeffery 1999, p. 38-39.
324 Compare in an EU context Isenbaert 2010, p 223, who confirms the function-sovereignty of EU 
Member States in the policy area of direct taxation.
325 See for a comprehensive summary of the debate Infanti 2005.
326 Surrey 1973, p. 6.
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tax. These provisions, often called tax incentives or tax subsidies, are departures from 
the normal structure and are designed to favour a particular industry, activity or class of 
persons. They take many forms, such as permanent exclusions from income, deductions, 
deferrals of tax liabilities, credits against tax, or special rates. Whatever their form, these 
departures from the normative tax structure represent government spending for favoured 
activities or groups, effected through the tax system rather than through direct grants, 
loans, or other forms of government assistance.”327
The difference between ‘structural’ provisions of an income tax and exceptions thereto 
is also relevant for identifying State aid under Article 107 TFEU. As the Commission states 
in its Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business 
taxation:
“A distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the external objectives 
assigned to a particular tax scheme (in particular, social or regional objectives) 
and, on the other, the objectives which are inherent in the tax system itself. The 
whole purpose of the tax system is to collect revenue to finance State expenditure. 
Each firm is supposed to pay tax once only. It is therefore inherent in the logic 
of the tax system that taxes paid in the State in which the firm is resident for tax 
purposes should be taken into account. Certain exceptions to the tax rules are, 
however, difficult to justify by the logic of a tax system. This is, for example, the 
case if non-resident companies are treated more favourably than resident ones or 
if tax benefits are granted to head offices or to firms providing certain services (for 
example, financial services) within a group.”328
This distinction between internal and external objectives of a tax system is necessary to 
assess whether the tax system in question grants an advantage to certain taxpayers, which 
may – for example – amount to illegal State aid.329 External objectives of a tax system can 
however be achieved not only through tax preferences, but also through tax penalties: 
negative tax expenditures.330 If such a disadvantage is only directed at certain taxpayers, 
this might amount to a prima facie prohibited obstacle in the European Union’s internal 
market. 
The identification of advantages or disadvantages boils down to the benchmark tax 
system: what is the ‘normal’ rule and what is the exception? Indeed, as stated in the 
1996 OECD Report on tax expenditures, defining a tax expenditure is a classification 
exercise: dividing the provisions of the tax system into a benchmark or norm and a series 
of deviations from that norm.331 Scholars have not been able to reach consensus on the 
327 Surrey & McDaniel 1985, p 3.
328 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct 
business taxation, OJ C 384 , 10/12/1998 p. 3-9, § 26. 
329 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct 
business taxation, OJ C 384 , 10/12/1998 p. 3-9, § 26. See recently Joined Cases T-227/01 to 
T-229/01, T-265/01, T-266/01 and T-270/01 Territorio Histórico de Álava, § 182.
330 This term is used, inter alia, by Shaviro 2003, p 39.
331 Tax Expenditures, Recent Experiences, OECD 1996, p 9.
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definition.332 Goudswaard and Vording have observed that there are two ways of looking 
at it.333 Firstly, one can take the ‘normative income tax’ as the benchmark. This includes 
the formulation of an ideal notion of income, regardless of the notion of income which is 
in fact the basis for the income tax act in question. Secondly, one can take the statutory 
notion of income as the point of reference. In that case, one should ascertain whether a 
certain deduction or exemption fits within the general principles on which the income tax 
is based. If not, the deduction or exemption is a tax expenditure.
In my view, the categorization of a measure either in the category ‘structural 
provisions’ or ‘tax preferences or penalties’ should be inferred from the aim of the measure 
in question, having regard to the fact that States are themselves competent to determine 
whether they want to impose an income tax in the first place and, secondly, to define the 
concept of income which they want to tax. States are also at liberty to grant advantages 
or disadvantages to certain (groups of) taxpayers or activities. Normally, as Infanti states, 
the arguments made by the legislator in support of a provision will identify it either as 
structural in nature or as a tax preference or penalty.334 Thus, the policy choices made by 
the tax legislator of the State concerned will determine the classification of a certain tax 
measure. 
Section 5.4.2 will describe selected internal and external aims which may be adopted 
by national tax legislators. This overview has two goals. In the first place, it is an illustration 
of national tax sovereignty – a concept which has to be reconciled with the free movement 
provisions of the TFEU (the specific aims referred to below are inspired by the ECJ’s case 
law). In the second place, the categorization of tax measures as structural or as exceptional 
in the light of the objective of the overall system may prove to be useful for the EU law 
analysis of a certain measure: an analysis under the free movement provisions or under 
the State aid rules. 
5.4.2 Measures of general income tax policy
The primary and classical function of taxation is to collect the money necessary to pay for 
the burden of social charges. This burden should be spread in such a way that the members 
of the society regard it as just and acceptable.335 Therefore, tax systems are designed in 
such a way that the tax is levied according to what is considered reasonable and fair by 
a society at a certain point in time. Stiglitz has formulated five basis principles by which 
a tax system should abide.336 In the first place, a tax system should be efficient. It should 
not be distortionary and if possible it should be used to enhance economic efficiency. 
In the second place, it should meet requirements of administrative simplicity: low costs 
of administration and compliance. In the third place, the tax system should allow easy 
adaptation to changed circumstances (flexibility). In the fourth place, the tax system should 
be transparent (political responsibility). In the fifth place, the tax system should be, and 
332 See Kraan 2004 and Hemels 2005, chapter 2.
333 Goudswaard & Vording 1990, p 232.
334 Infanti 2005, p 724.
335 Stevens 2004, § 1.2.
336 Stiglitz 1999, p 458.
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should be seen to be, fair, treating those in similar circumstances similarly, and imposing 
higher taxes on those who can better bear the burden of taxation. Measures which are 
aimed at achieving these goals may be seen as a part of the ‘structural’ provisions of an 
income tax. Some of these are discussed below.
Taxable persons, taxable basis and tax rate
The main function of income taxation remains the collection of public funds. The backbone 
of an income tax system is therefore formed by the definition of taxable persons, taxable 
income and the tax rate. These are the core elements of each income tax system, just as – 
for example – depreciation rules and rules on loss carry-overs. States are free to exempt 
persons or entities from income tax, to define the concept of income and to determine the 
tax rate including, for example, a withholding tax rate to be withheld at source (e.g. on 
dividend, interest and royalty payments). More secondary goals are laid down in general 
measures of tax policy, to which we shall now turn.
Personal ability to pay tax
States may think of income as evidencing ability to pay, which has been selected as the 
proper criterion for distributing the costs of government.337 Most States consider it fair to 
take account of the personal and family circumstances of the individual tax payer. Thus, 
income taxes tend to have a progressive tax rate – a certain amount of income should not 
be taxed at a high tax rate because every person needs a certain amount of money for 
the primary necessities of life – and specific deductions aimed at taking account of the 
specific situation of the individual taxpayer (e.g. handicapped, divorced, married etc.). 
These advantages are not enacted to induce certain activities or behaviour in response 
to the monetary benefit available, but are generally intended to relieve hardships. These 
hardships can be either personal (e.g. extraordinary medical expenses or blindness) or 
administrative (e.g. complex tax computations) in nature.338
The avoidance of international juridical double taxation
The application of the rules of customary international law with regard to fiscal jurisdiction 
may lead to international juridical double taxation. Many States provide for a relief for 
the avoidance of international juridical double taxation, either unilaterally or though tax 
treaties. Reference is made here to section 5.2 where these rules have been discussed. The 
choice to avoid international juridical double taxation and the way in which this should 
take place is normally reflected in an income tax system. One could say that these rules 
are in some ways different from other measures of general income tax policy, because they 
are not only aimed at achieving taxpayer equity, but also inter-nation equity. I will come 
back to this in section 5.5.
The avoidance of economic double taxation
Many States consider it unreasonable that profits of a company are taxed more than one 
time with an income tax. They have developed systems which are aimed at avoiding 
337 Shaviro 2003, p 34.
338 Infanti 2005, p 727, with further references.
Chapter 5
94
economic double taxation either at the level of the shareholder receiving a dividend or 
at the level of the distributing company. Various relief systems or integration systems 
coexist. The 2003 General IFA Report on “Trends in company shareholder taxation: 
single or double taxation?” provides a good overview of possible systems.339 The systems 
illustrated in the General Report are a full imputation/tax credit system, a classical system, 
a dividend exemption system (that is, where the dividend is exempt from tax in the hands 
of the shareholder), a half inclusion system, a flat rate dividend tax system (generally done 
by final withholding tax), and a dual income tax system.340 In addition, a split rate system 
can be identified. Often combinations of two or more of these systems can be seen. 
A split rate system taxes distributed profits at the level of the distributing company at a 
lower rate than retained profits. The purpose of this lower tax rate is to serve as a mitigation 
of the economic double taxation arising in the hands of the shareholder receiving the 
dividend. 
An imputation system grants a tax credit to the shareholder receiving the dividend 
for the corporation tax paid by the distributing company. The result is that the company’s 
income is effectively taxed at the top individual tax rate. 
A classical system does not grant relief for the avoidance of economic double taxation. 
In those systems, arguments of simplicity are considered to weigh heavier than the goal of 
taxing the same income only once. 
A dividend exemption system exempts the distributed dividend in the hands of 
the shareholder. As a consequence, the tax burden on the company income equals the 
corporation tax paid by it. 
A half inclusion system taxes one half of the dividend paid out in the hands of the 
shareholder. In this way, economic double taxation is not avoided but mitigated. 
A flat rate system usually applies a final flat rate withholding tax to the dividend. This 
rate is lower than the “normal” rate of the system, as a result of which economic double 
taxation is mitigated. 
A dual income tax system applies different tax rates to different types of income. 
Normally income from capital is taxed at a lower income tax rate than labour income.
Group taxation
From an economic point of view, a corporate group forms an economic unit. Many States 
find it desirable to adapt their tax systems to this.341 They may treat a corporate group 
as if it were a single corporation through a full tax consolidation of the different entities 
belonging to the group (e.g. the Netherlands). It is also possible to adopt another form 
of consolidation model which does not lead to a full consolidation. In such a system, 
corporate income is computed separately at the level of each member (intra-group 
transactions are visible), and combined at the group level after some adjustments. The 
339 Vann 2003.
340 Vann 2003, p 28.
341 See for an overview IFA Cahiers 2004, Group taxation, No. 89b. Some EU Member States do 
not find it necessary to have any form of group taxation: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic.
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parent company is liable to pay tax on behalf of the entire group.342 A third manifestation 
of a form of consolidation can be found in the concept of Organschaft (known in Germany 
and Austria). The German Organschaft envisages the attribution (Zurechnung) of profits 
and losses from a subsidiary (Organgesellschaft) to a parent (Organträger) for economic 
and tax purposes. Companies within an Organschaft remain separate tax subjects and the 
taxation of intra-group transactions is not eliminated.343 A fourth form of group taxation 
can be seen in the system of group relief.344 It enables the transfer of losses from one group 
company to another. A fifth form of group taxation is the system of group contribution 
(Sweden, Norway and Finland). It allows the transfer of profits from one group company 
to another.
Equal treatment of direct and indirect investment
A last example of a measure of general income tax policy is provided by the regimes on 
fiscal investment funds which many States have in place. The Dutch regime for portfolio 
investment companies, for example, is aimed at an equal treatment of direct portfolio 
investments vis-à-vis indirect investments through the intervention of a portfolio 
investment company.345 To that end, the portfolio investment company is taxed in such 
a way as if the revenues gained by the portfolio investment company had been gained 
by the funds’ shareholders directly: the fund is subject to a corporation tax rate of 0% 
if it meets the statutory requirements, notably the obligation to distribute its profits to 
the shareholders within eight months after the book year concerned. Subsequently, the 
shareholders are taxed on the dividend.
Procedural rules and collection of the tax
States are at liberty to set out the rules according to which income taxes are levied. They 
are free, for example, to tax through the imposition of a tax assessment or through 
withholding taxes. Also, States set rules under which mistakes made by the tax authorities 
may be repaired. Statutory time limits for claiming advantages by taxpayers or for issuing 
a tax assessment by the authorities are also to be determined. The way in which a taxpayer 
should prove that he is entitled to a certain tax advantage will also be determined by the 
State.
Measures to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance
Taxes are high in a modern social welfare State. Citizens and companies are tempted either 
to commit fraud or to make improper use of the tax law in order to avoid taxation. It is, 
therefore, essential for each tax system that it is capable of combating tax evasion and tax 
avoidance. Were it not capable of doing that, the primary function of collecting taxes for 
the benefit of the common interest would not be achieved. Also, it would lead to an unfair 
342 See Masdui 2004, p 30. The following EU Member States have such a system: Austria, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.
343 Douma & Naumburg 2006. For a further analysis of the compatability of this concept with EU 
law see Lüdicke, Brink & Braunagel 2010, p 310-311.
344 In force in the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia and Malta.
345 See for a summary of this system Case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund NV, § 3-11.
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allocation of the total tax burden to the ‘honest’ taxpayers who do not engage in improper 
activities. Tax evasion is usually suppressed by a system of penal sanctions, since it may 
involve criminal offences like forging documents, the concealment of taxable income or 
the deliberate provision of false information. Operations by taxpayers which are not aimed 
at outright fraud but rather at the circumvention of the tax law or at obtaining unintended 
advantages are usually dealt with by specific anti-avoidance provisions or by general anti-
avoidance rules. As the European Commission has explained, “[t]he notion of “anti-abuse 
rules” covers a broad range of rules, measures and practices. Some Member States apply a 
general concept of abuse based on legislation or developed in case law. Others apply more 
specific anti-abuse provisions, such as Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin 
capitalization rules which aim to protect the domestic tax base from particular types of 
erosion. Other types of specific anti-abuse provisions include switch-over from exemption 
to credit method in certain cross-border situations (where foreign source income has 
been subject to a low or preferential tax rate) and provisions explicitly targeted at passive 
investment in other countries. Many Member States apply a combination of general and 
specific anti-abuse rules.”346
A Dutch example of a general anti-avoidance rule can be found in the unwritten 
concept of fraus legis. It is settled case law of the Hoge Raad that two criteria have to be met 
simultaneously before fraus legis can be applied: a subjective criterion (that the avoidance 
of tax is the only, or paramount, motive for the transactions) and an objective criterion (a 
conflict with the intention and purport of the law).347 The legal transactions entered into 
by the taxpayer to obtain a fiscal advantage can either be ignored (elimination) or replaced 
by other transactions (substitution), depending on which option gives the best expression 
to the intention and purport of the law. Application of the doctrine of fraus legis in tax 
matters does not change the legal qualification of the transactions for any other purposes 
than that of taxation. 
Examples of specific anti-abuse measures include CFC rules and thin capitalization 
rules. As summarized by the Commission, the main purpose of CFC rules is to prevent 
resident companies from avoiding domestic tax by diverting income to subsidiaries in 
low tax countries. The scope of CFC rules is generally defined by reference to criteria 
regarding control, effective level of taxation, activity and type of income of the CFC. They 
typically provide that profits of a CFC may be attributed to its domestic shareholders 
(usually a parent company) and subjected to current (immediate) taxation in the hands 
of the latter (whereas normally the parent company would be taxed on the profits of its 
foreign subsidiary only at the time of repatriation).348 As regards thin capitalization rules, 
the Commission has noted that there are many different approaches to the design of 
thin capitalization rules but the background to these rules is similar. “Debt and equity 
financing attract different tax consequences. Financing a company by means of equity will 
normally result in a distribution of profits to the shareholder in the form of dividends, 
but only after taxation of such profits at the level of the subsidiary. Debt financing will 
346 Communication on the application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation – within 
the EU and in relation to third countries, COM(2007) 785 final, p 2.
347 HR 20 March 1985, BNB 1985/171.
348 Memo of 10 December 2007, No. MEMO/07/558.
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result in a payment of interest to the creditors (who can also be the shareholders), but 
such payments generally reduce the taxable profits of the subsidiary.” 349 To counter this 
problem, many Member States have introduced specific thin capitalization provisions 
dealing with structured debt financing schemes. Typically these limit the deductibility of 
interest paid on loans taken with (or otherwise arranged by) shareholders to the extent 
that the subsidiary is considered to be excessively ‘thinly’ capitalized.
Specific anti-avoidance rules are not necessarily limited to situations with a cross-
border character. An example of a Dutch anti-abuse provision which applies to the same 
extent to domestic and cross-border situations concerns the carry-over of losses upon 
changes in ownership of the company concerned. Losses incurred by a company that 
wholly discontinues its business may generally only be carried forward if at least 70% of 
its shares continue to be held by the same individual shareholders. If a company reduces 
its business by more than 70% and less than 70% of its shares continue to be held by the 
same shareholder(s), losses that have not been offset may only be set off against future 
profits arising from the original business activities.350
5.4.3 Measures of general economic policy
Whereas general measures of tax policy reflect the wider interest of collecting taxes for 
financing the social welfare State, general measures of economic policy aim at specifically 
promoting a certain goal. In other words, measures of tax policy aim at collecting 
money in a manner which is considered fair, whereas measures of economic policy aim 
at spending money or at discouraging certain behaviour by imposing a special burden 
on a product or a producer. Thus, States try to influence the structure of the domestic 
production and consumption pattern. This is called the allocational function of tax law.351 
Special burdens to discourage behaviour are normally imposed through excise duties (e.g. 
on tobacco), customs duties or specific consumer taxes. Special advantages to encourage 
certain behaviour may be granted through (corporate) income taxes. Examples include 
a reduction of the tax burden related to certain production costs such as research and 
development (R&D), the environment, training and employment.352 Economic literature 
refers to these advantages with the term ‘tax expenditures’. As I have argued in 5.4.1, the 
categorization of a measure in either the category ‘structural provisions’ or ‘tax preferences 
or penalties’ should be inferred from the aim of the measure in question. The arguments 
made by the legislator in support of a provision will identify it either as structural in nature 
or as a tax preference or penalty. 
Tax expenditures
Tax preferences may be expressly enacted with the idea of inducing action in the national 
349 Communication on the application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct taxation – within 
the EU and in relation to third countries, COM(2007) 785 final, p 7.
350 Offermans 2008; see Article 20a of the Dutch CITA.
351 Stevens 2004, § 1.3.b.
352 Examples derived from the Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to 
measures relating to direct business taxation, OJ C 384 , 10/12/1998, p. 3-9, § 13.
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interest, while others may have unclear origins but are now defended on incentive 
grounds.353 The deductions for accelerated depreciation and charitable contributions are 
examples of income tax provisions in the former category, and the deductions for home 
mortgage interest are examples of income tax provisions in the latter category.354 
According to a 1996 OECD Report, tax expenditures may take a number of forms.355 
In the first place, income may be excluded from the tax base (exemptions). In the second 
place, allowances may be granted, e.g. amounts may be deducted from gross income to 
arrive at taxable income. In the third place, a system of tax credits may be introduced 
(amounts deducted from tax liability). If these are not allowed to exceed the tax liability 
they are termed ‘wasteable’; if an excess of the credit over the liability is returned to the 
taxpayer the credit is called non-wasteable. In the fourth place, States may opt for a rate 
relief. In such a case a reduced rate of tax is applied to a class of taxpayers or activities. In 
the fifth place tax deferrals may be enacted. This is a relief which takes the form of a delay 
in paying tax.
Non-fiscal objectives which national governments wish to achieve through these 
measures often concern the promotion of environment-friendly economic activity, 
research and development, training, employment, stimulating starting businesses, housing, 
increasing economic activity in certain regions and many other social-economic goals.
Tax penalties
Tax penalties are the converse of tax preferences. Rather than departing from the normative 
income tax in order to provide government assistance to a taxpayer by lowering her tax 
burden, a tax penalty departs from the normative income tax by requiring a greater tax 
payment than would occur under the normative net income base, thereby increasing the 
taxpayer’s tax burden.356 Geelhoed has contrasted tax preferences and tax penalties as 
follows:
“between and within national economies imbalances may (…) occur in parts 
of sectors: these are referred to as specific distortions. They stem from specific 
interventions by the authorities as a result of the imposition of exceptional charges 
on certain kinds of production or on certain undertakings or as a result of the 
grant of exceptional benefits. In regard to exceptional burdens those are frequently 
interventions by the authorities which are known in modern management terms 
as burdens imposed with a view to regulating conduct. They occur more and more 
frequently in environmental and planning policy. In a certain sense they are the 
mirror image of exceptional benefits or aid which seek to influence the conduct of 
market participants by means of incentives rather than disincentives.”357
 
353 Infanti 2005, p 725, with further references.
354 Infanti 2005, p 725-726.
355 Tax Expenditures, Recent Experiences, OECD 1996, p 9.
356 Infanti 2005, footnote 60, with further references.
357 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case 308/01 GIL Insurance, § 64.
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An example of tax penalties in income taxes can be found in various ‘public policy’ 
provisions that deny deductions for certain business expenses involving lobbying, bribes, 
or fines.358 
5.5 Taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity
The preceding sections have discussed three main consequences of national tax sovereignty. 
In the first place, States are in principle free to adopt tax legislation within their domestic 
tax jurisdiction, as determined by customary international law, and to pursue any kind 
of policy objectives they consider necessary. These objectives may involve measures of 
general tax policy or measures of general economic policy. Measures of general tax policy 
reflecting the “structural” provisions in the tax system generally seek to achieve taxpayer 
or inter-individual equity. The meaning of the concept of income in a certain national 
income tax reflects a decision concerning equity. Horizontal equity means that taxpayers 
in similar circumstances should pay a similar amount of tax. Vertical equity means that 
taxpayers who earn more income should pay more tax.359 Measures of general economic 
policy include provisions in a tax system which are not regarded as structural but as 
“preferential” or “punishing”. These measures do not reflect decisions about equity as 
such. They are, however, implemented in accordance with ideas of equity. In other words, 
taxpayers who find themselves in similar situations in the light of the aim and purpose 
of the economic policy goals pursued by the measure should be taxed in a similar way. 
It is important to note that the concept of taxpayer equity can only be applied by a State 
to taxpayers in its own jurisdiction. In an example given by Jeffery, it is not an achievable 
goal to expect a taxpayer earning € 20,000 in country A in particular circumstances to 
pay the same amount of tax as a taxpayer in country B in similar circumstances. These 
taxpayers are in inherently unequal positions due to the variations which exist in different 
countries.360 
In the second and third place, customary international law limits the scope within 
which States can exercise direct tax jurisdiction. Within these limits States are free to 
allocate among themselves, either unilaterally or bilaterally, the power to tax certain 
items of income. Thus, they are free to determine which State should not tax the income 
(negatively) and which State should be entitled to tax the income (positively). The allocation 
of direct tax jurisdiction through customary international law, treaties or unilateral rules 
concerns an entirely different level of equity, namely ‘inter-nation equity.’361 This requires 
that the worldwide tax base be fairly shared between States.362 
The competence to ensure both taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity are fundamental 
aspects of direct tax sovereignty. This includes the definition of what is equitable as well 
as the competence to ensure these equitable principles, either unilaterally or through 
international agreements. It is important to stress this, because both aspects of equity are 
358 Infanti 2005, footnote 60, with further references.
359 Jeffery 1999, p 10.
360 Jeffery 1999, p 11.
361 The term has been coined by Musgrave & Musgrave 1972.
362 Jeffery 1999, p 11.
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capable as serving as a limit to the principle of EU free movement under the theoretical 
optimization model which will be outlined in chapter 7.
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the notion of national direct tax sovereignty. It has been argued 
that sovereignty should be regarded as a principle – i.e. an optimization requirement – in 
Alexy’s sense rather than as a rule of international law: it is a prima facie general freedom 
of action by States which should be realized to the greatest extent relative to what is 
factually and legally possible. Tax sovereignty is, in other words, in no way absolute. Its 
extent should be determined in the context of a theoretical optimization model which will 
be outlined in chapter 7. 
The purpose of the present chapter has been to illustrate the prima facie position of 
the principle of tax sovereignty and the consequences thereof. States are free to adopt tax 
legislation within their domestic tax jurisdiction, as determined by customary international 
law, and to pursue any kind of policy objectives they consider necessary. Tax systems 
generally consist of ‘structural’ provisions and ‘tax preferences or tax penalties’. Thus, tax 
systems have both internal and external objectives. It is important to emphasize these two 
essentially different objectives, because the compatibility of a certain tax measure with 
competing principles should be assessed in the light of the aims pursued by the measure 
in question. Another consequence of national tax sovereignty is that the domestic 
jurisdiction of States is necessarily limited in scope. This makes it likely that disparities or 
variations exist between the tax systems enacted in the various jurisdictions. At the same 
time, domestic tax jurisdictions tend to overlap, as a result of which international juridical 
double taxation arises. In that context, States are competent to define, by tax treaty or 
unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation. The choices made in this 
regard may give rise to different treatment either because the State to which the taxing 
power has been allocated has a higher level of taxation or because certain negative items of 
income have been allocated to another jurisdiction than certain positive items of the same 
taxpayer. In addition to these types of different treatment, the fact that tax jurisdictions 
are necessarily limited in scope restrains the extent to which States can effect their internal 
and external policy objectives in their tax legislation. 
The following chapter will discuss the prima facie requirements of the free movement 
provisions of the TFEU.
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6.1 Free movement as a principle
Articles 30, 34-35 and 110-112 TFEU (free movement of goods), Article 45 TFEU (freedom 
of movement for workers), 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment), 56 TFEU (freedom to 
provide services) and Article 63 TFEU (free movement of capital and payments) contain 
a prima facie prohibition of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital. In addition, Article 21 TFEU guarantees the right of citizens to travel and 
reside freely in the EU. Thus, the principle of free movement prima facie protects a general 
freedom of cross-border (economic) action of persons. The question arises as to whether 
these provisions should be regarded as either rules or principles in Alexy’s sense (see 
section 4.2). Alexy’s theory distinguishes rules from principles by examining what happens 
in the case of a conflict between those norms. If two rules conflict with each other, the 
solution will be to disapply one of the rules. If two principles collide, however, the solution 
is not found by disapplying one of the principles, but by realizing both of them within 
what is factually and legally possible. If free movement were a rule rather than a principle, 
it would either trump national tax sovereignty in all circumstances, or it would need to 
be disapplied (a rule applies unless it is not valid; see section 4.2). Obviously, this is not 
the case. The confrontation between tax sovereignty and free movement cannot lead to 
the disapplication of either of the two, but their extent should be determined through an 
optimization process. The idea that the extent of free movement can only be determined 
in confrontation with competing rules and principles is important because, if it were 
otherwise and its extent were unlimited, it would de facto deny that there is such a thing 
as sovereignty of Member States. Borgmann-Prebil has therefore rightly stated that free 
movement is “best understood as a general, wide-ranging, prima facie right that can be 
limited by virtue of countervailing ‘objective considerations of public interest’ whether 
specific manifestations of these are enshrined in specific provisions of (secondary) 
Community law or not.” Both the fundamental right as well as those countervailing 
considerations are best conceptualized as optimization precepts in Alexy’s sense.363 I fully 
agree with this observation. 
The prima facie position of the principle of direct tax sovereignty has been discussed 
in chapter 5. The prima facie requirements of free movement will now be examined. This 
examination will be carried out without reference to the case law of the ECJ, because the 
widest scope of the free movement principle should be adopted according to Alexy’s theory 
on the scope of principles (section 4.3). If the ECJ’s case law were taken into account here, 
the theoretical optimization model which will be presented in the next chapter would 
become ‘polluted’, as a result of which it would no longer be possible to test the case law 
against that model. 
363 Borgmann-Prebil 2008, p 349. See also Conway 2010, p 69.
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6.2 Aims of the internal market
According to Article 3(3) TEU, the Union shall establish an internal market.364 Article 26(2) 
TFEU states that the internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaties. The TEU and the TFEU do not contain, however, a 
general definition of the notion of an internal market. There are a number of possible ways 
of looking at it.
The first approach is an economic one. As Barnard explains, economists have 
developed a set of labels to describe different levels of intensity of market integration. 
The term ‘common market’ is perceived as involving a free trade area, a common external 
policy in respect of non-Member States (e.g. a single customs tariff) and free movement 
of persons, services and capital.365 A free trade area and a customs union focus on the free 
movement of products. A common market is broader, because it allows for free movement 
of production factors (workers and capital) as well as products. In a common market, both 
goods and factors of production can move.366 A common market would thus imply the 
removal of barriers to trade.
The second approach pays more attention to the system of the TFEU which Articles 
28-118 TFEU lay down. This approach emphasizes that the notion of an internal market 
comprises more than free movement alone. The reference to the term ‘internal market’ 
in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (competition rules applying to undertakings), Articles 
107 and 108 TFEU (a prima facie prohibition of State aid) and Articles 114-118 TFEU 
(approximation of laws) demonstrates that these areas are also relevant for the realization 
of an internal market. Barents and Brinkhorst argue that the internal market may therefore 
be described as a situation in which the obligations Articles 28-118 TFEU impose on 
the Member States, the institutions of the Union and individuals are fully observed and 
realized.367 
The third approach clarifies the term ‘internal market’ by drawing a parallel with the 
market which existed within one single Member State. Barents and Brinkhorst point out 
that national markets are normally characterized by an unqualified free movement of 
goods, services, persons and capital, the existence of competition rules and a common 
legal system.368
The fourth approach places a high emphasis on fundamental rights and freedoms. This 
approach interprets the internal market in terms of economic freedom of the individual. 
Barents and Brinkhorst contend that the rules on free movement and competition 
essentially mean that natural and legal persons can enjoy their rights to property anywhere 
in the Union and that there are freedoms of contract and profession.369 Every European 
364 According to Article 2 EC the basis of the European Community was formed by the establishment 
of a ‘common’ or ‘internal’ market (these terms are, just as the term ‘single’ market, largely 
synonymous; Barnard 2010, p 12).
365 Barnard 2010, p 9. See also Craig & De Búrca 2008, p 605.
366 Barnard 2010, p 9-10.
367 Barents & Brinkhorst 2006, p 298.
368 Barents & Brinkhorst 2006, p 298.
369 Barents & Brinkhorst 2006, p 298-299.
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citizen and legal person can invest, produce, buy and offer services and products, borrow 
and lend capital and work anywhere in the Union, depending on the place where the 
economic conditions are the most favourable. Barents and Brinkhorst gather from this 
that the rules on free movement and competition should be seen as fundamental rights, 
the purpose of which is to protect economic liberties from being restricted by Member 
States and undertakings.370 This view is underlined by Article 3 TEU which states that the 
Union shall establish an internal market and shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, 
security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is 
ensured. According to Barents:
“The emerging concept of “European area” embodied in this formula reflects 
that the foundation of the European Union is constituted by an area in which the 
individual, in particular the European citizen, is free to exercise his civil, economic, 
social and cultural fundamental rights laid down in the treaties and in the Charter 
of fundamental rights of the Union without, in principle, any obstacle and within 
an environment governed by the rule of law. In comparison to the American 
Declaration of Independence (1776), one may say that in the European area the 
individual is entitled to the “pursuit of happiness”.371”372
It is submitted that this approach fits best into Alexy’s wide scope of principles, because 
it recognizes the conflict between national sovereignty and free movement as a balancing 
process instead of viewing the ‘internal market’ as an end result (without indicating how 
this end result will ultimately be achieved). Individuals and undertakings have a right to 
free movement in the internal market, but EU Member States also have a right to regulate 
within their domestic jurisdictions. Any restriction to economic liberty in cross-border 
situations is, in this approach, a prima facie infringement of the principles underlying the 
internal market. Again, in the words of Barents:
“In more practical terms the single market concept requires the elimination of all 
obstacles to intra-Community movement, which means that all national measures 
which directly or indirectly, actually or potentially affect interstate economic 
intercourse (goods, services, capital, labour) are in principle prohibited.373 As a 
consequence, based on the primacy and direct effect of Community law, the various 
freedoms of the EC Treaty are qualified as fundamental rights for all European 
citizens, the wide interpretation of which can be compared to that of fundamental 
370 Barents & Brinkhorst 2006, p 299. This view is shared by Harbo 2010, p 174, who states that the 
ECJ does not distinguish between human rights and fundamental freedoms: in its view both are 
fundamental rights.
371 Footnote in original: “For the far-reaching implications of this essentially political philosophy 
on markets and competition, see R. Stürner, Markt und Wettbewerb über alles? Gesellschaft und 
Recht im Fokus neoliberaler Marktideologie, München, Beck, 2007.”
372 Barents 2011, p 54.
373 Footnote in original: “Starting with Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Grundig-Consten [1966] ECR 
499 (competition) and Case 8/74, Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para 5 (free movement of goods), 
later on extended, albeit with different formulas, to the other freedoms.”
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rights laid down in national constitutions and international treaties. Together, these 
fundamental Community freedoms guarantee the constitutional right of citizens 
to economic freedom: the right to contract, to exploit property and to exercise a 
profession everywhere in the European Union. The basic philosophy of the single 
market, supplemented by the concept of European citizenship, is the freedom of 
movement in every respect, such as the right of individuals and companies to 
invest, to lend or to borrow capital, to work, to sell or to buy goods and services at 
any place in the European Union, according to their own preferences and without, 
in principle, any unjustified interference from national public or private law. “The 
principles of free movement of goods and freedom of competition, together with 
freedom of trade as a fundamental right, are general principles of Community law 
of which the Court ensures observance”, according to the Court’s case law.374”375
Articles 30, 34-35 and 110-112 TFEU (free movement of goods), Article 45 TFEU (freedom 
of movement for workers), 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment), 56 TFEU (freedom to 
provide services), Article 63 TFEU (free movement of capital and payments), and Article 
21 TFEU (right to travel and reside freely in the EU) thus contain a prima facie prohibition 
of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.376 Article 18 
TFEU contains a prima facie prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
Article 49 TFEU contains inter alia a prima facie prohibition on grounds of the legal form 
of an establishment. These prima facie prohibitions will now be discussed.377
6.3 A prima facie prohibition of obstacles to free movement 
The prima facie prohibition of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is worked out in Articles 30, 34-35 and 110-112 TFEU (free movement of 
goods), Article 45 TFEU (freedom of movement for workers), 49 TFEU (freedom of 
establishment), 56 TFEU (freedom to provide services) and Article 63 TFEU (free 
movement of capital and payments). In addition, Article 21 TFEU guarantees the 
right of citizens of the European Union to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States. Any ‘restriction’ of these liberties is prima facie prohibited. The 
approach taken by these fundamental freedoms is thus, in the words of Craíg and De 
Búrca, essentially negative and deregulatory.378 It seems, therefore, useful to seek guidance 
from Alexy’s ‘principle of negative liberty’ for defining the prima facie scope of the free 
movement provisions.
According to Alexy, the principle of negative liberty includes three sub-principles: i) a 
maximally high degree of freedom of action and non-interference with those actions, ii) 
a maximally high degree of non-interference with states of affairs, and iii) the maximum 
374 Footnote in original: “Case 240/83, ADBHU [1985] ECR 531, para 9.”
375 Barents 2011, p 55.
376 Compare Article 3(1)(c) EC, replaced, in substance, by Articles 3 to 6 TFEU.
377 It should be noted that there is a clear convergence of the free movement provisons in the 
ECJ’s case law; see for example Case 48/75 Royer, § 23. Compare also Kapteyn & VerLoren van 
Themaat 2008, p 593 and Barnard 2010, p 236 and p 569-570.
378 Craig & De Búrca 2008, p 606.
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non-removal of legal positions. There should be no obstacles to the choice of actions. This 
choice is limited directly by prohibitions and commands and indirectly by an interference 
with a right-holder’s state of affairs or legal position; as stated in section 4.3, the removal 
of a power has a limiting character. This implies that the right to liberty is affected if the 
choice of actions has been limited.379 
The fact that the principle of negative liberty has three sub-principles makes it possible 
that freedom of action is affected in several ways within one single legal sub-system. This 
can be illustrated by taking tax law as an example. The imposition of taxes prima facie 
interferes with the right to liberty.380 The command to pay taxes is a limit to the principle 
of free choice of actions. Within the tax system, however, subsequent limits may occur. 
These limits are often enshrined in rules which deviate from the ‘normal’ structure of the 
tax system. A rule in a tax system may, for example, prohibit the deduction of costs which 
are related to a felony although the income from that felony is taxable. This prohibition 
clearly limits the right to liberty further. Another example can be found in a rule which in 
certain situations limits the power granted to a corporate taxpayer to offset losses against 
future profits in situations of a ‘change of control’ of the taxpayer (new shareholders). 
This rule, which removes the general right of loss-compensation in situations which are 
deemed abusive, also functions as a second limit to liberty. 
In the approach outlined above, direct taxation would in principle interfere with the 
EU free movement provisions insofar it concerns cross-border situations.381 Obviously, this 
does not mean that direct tax rules can no longer be adopted: a wide scope of a principle 
implies a wide scope of its limits (see section 4.4).382 In the large majority of cases, the 
principle of proportionality will not affect direct tax rules which are mainly aimed at 
collecting public resources. When an attempt is made to apply the proportionality test to 
a specific direct tax rule it becomes clear that such an application – although theoretically 
required – does not always have a practical effect. After all, the imposition of taxes for 
the collection of public resources should by definition be seen as a suitable and necessary 
means to achieve that aim.383 The goal of collecting public funds is a respectful aim and too 
abstract to make a meaningful aim-and-means assessment in individual cases possible.384 
According to Tipke, the general aim of collecting public resources – as opposed to more 
specific policy rules – does not make it possible to carry out a proportionality test in the 
narrow sense.385 Steenken has argued that the principle of proportionality is generally not 
379 Alexy 2002, p 141, 225 and 230.
380 According to Wacke 1966, p 107, the general right to liberty implies a basic right to tax freedom. 
The EctHR takes the stance that taxation implies an infringement of the right to property 
protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol; see for instance the judgment of 23 October 1990, 
Application no. 11581/85, Darby v. Sweden.
381 See also Isenbaert 2010, p 494.
382 This means that the theoretical assessment model developed in the present study will not turn 
back the clock to the formula of Case 8/74 Dassonville and ignore the doctrine debeloped in 
Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard. See in more detail section 8.2.3.3 of 
the present study.
383 See Steenken 2002, p 32-33.
384 Papier 1983, p 649.
385 Tipke 1993, p 424.
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capable of providing for limits – apart from the requirement that taxes should not have a 
confiscating effect – which the legislature has to observe when enacting direct tax rules 
which are mainly aimed at collecting public resources. If, however, the direct tax rules in 
question also pursue other goals which are aimed at influencing a taxpayer’s behaviour, 
the principle of proportionality can play an important role. In these situations the rule has 
a clear motive – other than just collecting money – as a result of which a meaningful aim-
and-means assessment in individual cases is possible.386
It will be discussed in chapter 7 in which cases the principle of proportionality can 
be applied in a meaningful way. First, we will turn to the prima facie requirements of the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality which is laid down in Article 18 
TFEU.
6.4 A prima facie prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality
Under Article 18 TFEU any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. 
This requirement has found specific expression in the free movement provisions.387 Article 
18 TFEU should be regarded as a principle and not as a rule in Alexy’s sense, which will 
be explained later. Under Alexy’s theory of principles, Article 18 TFEU must be given its 
widest possible scope in the light of its objectives. Two aspects catch the eye. In the first 
place, it has to be determined how the notion of ‘nationality’ as a ground of distinction has 
to be interpreted. In the second place, the question arises more generally of how a prima 
facie infringement of the principle of equal treatment should be determined. These aspects 
will now be discussed.
The first thing to be noted when talking about ‘nationality’ as a distinction ground is 
that rules which make a distinction on this basis are only prima facie prohibited. Erroneous 
is the view that differentiation on this ground is never acceptable, as a result of which it 
could never be substantively assessed for its reasonableness.388 After all, principles can 
never be absolute (section 4.4). A distinction on grounds of nationality of a producer or 
a product (its origin) may in certain situations be regarded as perfectly acceptable, which 
makes it clear that Article 18 TFEU does not reflect a rule but a principle under Alexy’s 
doctrine of collision (section 4.2).
A second thing to be noted is that ‘nationality’ as a distinction ground should not be 
interpreted narrowly, given the fact that the principle of non-discrimination shall be given 
its widest possible scope in the light of its objectives. Every rule which in fact discriminates 
on this ground should be caught by a prima facie prohibition. 
A third thing to be noted is that ‘nationality’ as a distinction ground should be interpreted 
against the background of the aims of the internal market. It has been argued in section 
6.2 that the internal market should be understood in terms of economic freedom of the 
386 Steenken 2002, p 33-34, and the literature there referred to.
387 Article 21 TFEU (right to travel and reside freely in the EU), Articles 30 and 34-35 TFEU (free 
movement of goods), Article 45 TFEU (freedom of movement for workers), Article 49 TFEU 
(freedom of establishment), Article 56 TFEU (freedom to provide services) and Article 63 TFEU 
(free movement of capital and payments).
388 Gerards 2005, p 25, with further references. 
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individual. Every European citizen and legal person should be able to invest, produce, buy 
and offer services and products, borrow and lend capital and work anywhere in the Union, 
depending on the place where the economic conditions are the most favourable. Against 
this background the prima facie prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
supports the view that rules which make a distinction on grounds of cross-border activity 
are prima facie prohibited: if it is prima facie prohibited for the host State of a natural or 
legal person to discriminate on ground of nationality, it would be counterproductive if the 
home State were capable of frustrating this prohibition by discriminating against cross-
border activity into the host State. We can see an interaction here with the prima facie 
prohibition of obstacles which has been discussed in the previous section. 
The more general question of how a prima facie infringement of the principle of 
equal treatment should be determined relates to the method of finding a prima facie 
unequal treatment. It should be noted in this respect that the prima facie prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality reflects a so-called ‘closed system’: the legislative 
classification in question should be able to be linked to that specific ground. This poses, 
as already stated above, a number of problems.389 Firstly, a distinction which is based 
directly on grounds of nationality is not always unreasonable. Secondly, it is problematic 
that a legislative classification which is not based on nationality may have serious adverse 
consequences for the group protected by the legislature. In order to deal with these 
problems, the concept of ‘indirect distinction’ is often used, for which usually a broad 
possibility for justification is accepted. Thus, any legislative classification which in fact 
makes a distinction on grounds of cross-border activity should pursue a respectful aim 
and be suitable, necessary and proportionate in relation to that aim.
6.5 A prima facie prohibition on grounds of the legal form of an 
establishment
According to Article 49 TFEU, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals 
of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such 
prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member 
State. This last prohibition grants to EU nationals and companies a prima facie right to 
freely choose the legal form for exercising their right to set up a secondary establishment 
in another Member State, i.e. a subsidiary or a branch. Tax measures which treat these 
legal forms differently should consequently be seen as a prima facie limit to the principle 
of free movement. 
6.6 Conclusion
It has been argued in this chapter that the EU free movement provisions are principles in 
Alexy’s sense, which means that they are optimization requirements rather than fixed rules. 
Free movement is, in other words, in no way absolute. Its extent should be determined in 
the context of a theoretical optimization model which will be outlined in chapter 7. 
389 Gerards 2004, 180-181.
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The purpose of the present chapter has been to illustrate the prima facie position of 
the principle of free movement. This position has been examined without reference to the 
case law of the ECJ, because the widest scope of the free movement principle should be 
adopted according to Alexy’s theory on the scope of principles. If the ECJ’s case law were 
taken into account here, the theoretical optimization model which will be presented in the 
next chapter would become ‘polluted’ as a result of which it would no longer be possible 
to test the case law against that model (section 6.1). 
It has been argued that the aims of the internal market are best perceived as a set of 
fundamental rights and freedoms which guarantee the economic freedom of the individual 
in cross-border situations. The purpose of these principles is to protect economic liberties 
from being restricted. The prima facie prohibitions of obstacles to free movement and 
discrimination on grounds of nationality or the legal form of an establishment should be 
defined against this background (section 6.2).
The scope of the prima facie prohibition of obstacles has been formulated by having 
recourse to Alexy’s definition of the principle of negative liberty. This principle includes 
three sub-principles: i) a maximally high degree of freedom of action and non-interference 
with those actions, ii) a maximally high degree of non-interference with states of affairs, 
and iii) the maximum non-removal of legal positions. It has been argued that the right 
to liberty is affected if the choice of actions has been limited. The fact that the principle 
of negative liberty has three sub-principles makes it possible that freedom of action is 
affected in several ways within one single legal sub-system. For example, the imposition of 
taxes (a command) interferes with the right to liberty. Within the tax system subsequent 
limits may occur. These limits are often enshrined in rules which deviate from the normal 
structure of the tax system (section 6.3). 
The definition of the prima facie prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality requires that the notion of ‘nationality’ is interpreted. Firstly, rules which 
make a distinction on this basis are only prima facie prohibited. Erroneous is the view 
that differentiation on this ground is never acceptable, and thus never be substantively 
assessed for its reasonableness. Secondly, ‘nationality’ as a distinction ground should not 
be interpreted narrowly. Every rule which in fact discriminates on this ground should be 
caught by a prima facie prohibition. Thirdly, ‘nationality’ as a distinction ground should 
be interpreted against the background of the aims of the internal market. Against this 
background the prima facie prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
supports the view that rules which make a distinction on grounds of cross-border activity 
are prima facie prohibited. 
Article 49 TFEU also provides for a prima facie prohibition of restrictions of the choice 
of the legal form in which a natural or legal person wishes to establish himself in another 
Member State. Any legislative classification in this area should be open to proportionality 
analysis (section 6.5).
Chapters 5 and 6 have discussed the prima facie requirements of the principles of direct 
tax sovereignty and free movement. Chapter 7, to which we shall now turn, will provide a 
theoretical optimization model to resolve the conflict between those principles. 
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7.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to apply Alexy’s theory of principles as optimization 
requirements (see chapter 4) to the principles of direct tax sovereignty (chapter 5) and free 
movement (chapter 6) in order to formulate a theoretical optimization model. This model 
is external to and independent of the ECJ’s current case law. As such it is able to serve as an 
objective framework which can be used to assess whether the ECJ’s case law in the area of 
direct taxation and free movement strikes a fair balance between the competing principles 
or not. In this respect, the model makes a normative claim. It should be stressed that this 
study does not claim that the theoretical assessment model arrived at necessitates only 
one solution in an individual case.390 Rather, the model prescribes the method through 
which the problem should be solved, thus limiting the number of possible outcomes and 
structuring the analysis in a coherent manner. As Von Bogdandy has rightfully stated:
“it should be noted that there is one function that a legal doctrine of principles 
cannot usually fulfil: to delimit right and wrong in a concrete case. This is a result 
of the general vagueness of principles; the conflict usually arising when different 
principles are applied to concrete facts is another reason. The solution to a conflict 
of principles cannot be determined either scientifically or legally, it can only be 
structured.”391
It will become clear in chapter 8 that the model also makes a descriptive claim in the sense 
that it helps to describe the ECJ’s case law and the conclusions reached therein.
I was definitely not the first to think of the possibility of linking Alexy’s theory of 
principles to the conflict of principles in the EU legal order (see chapter 3). Bengoetxea, 
MacCormick and Moral Soriano, for instance, have argued that the ECJ should not 
formulate a systematic order of principles, but should rather promote all of them (demand 
of proportionality). According to these authors, the ECJ understands proportionality in 
Alexy’s sense: as a command to optimize - that is, as a command to find an equilibrium 
among all colliding interests and values.392 Andenas and Zleptnig have reached similar 
conclusions with respect to WTO law.393 This chapter takes these observations one step 
390 Compare Vanistendael 1991, p 225.
391 Compare Von Bogdandy 2010, p 101.
392 Bengoetxea, MacCormick & Moral Soriano 2001, p 76.
393 Andenas & Zleptnig 2007, p 376-379.
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further and aims at formulating a theoretical optimization model on the basis of Alexy’s 
theory. This model will be expressed in section 7.2. Subsequent sections will comment on 
its various phases. 
7.2 The theoretical optimization model
Based on the results presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6, the theoretical model for the 
optimization of the principles of direct tax sovereignty and free movement is phrased as 
follows.394
To which1.  disadvantage does the tax measure lead?
Does the tax measure at issue have a 2. respectful aim?
If yes, is the tax measure 3. suitable to achieve its aim?
If yes, does the tax measure have a sufficient4.  degree of fit in relation to its aim?
If yes, does the tax measure reflect the most 5. subsidiary means to achieve its aim?
If yes, is the cost to free movement caused by the tax measure 6. in proportion to the 
aims pursued by it?
A tax measure can be allowed only if all questions are answered positively; they are 
cumulative requirements. The issue of whether these questions should be answered ex 
tunc or ex nunc depends on the type of legal procedure. In cases concerning a preliminary 
reference by a national tax court to the ECJ, the answers should be provided ex tunc, 
because this procedure concerns a tax assessment which has been issued in the past. In 
cases concerning an infringement procedure initiated by the Commission, the questions 
should be answered ex nunc, because such a procedure concerns the assessment of 
domestic legislation as it currently stands. 
Gerards has argued that the model should be preceded by a preliminary phase where 
the level of intensity of the review should be determined.395 This level could be either 
marginal, neutral or intensive. I have decided not to formally include such a preliminary 
phase for the purposes of the present study. The conflict between the principles of direct 
tax sovereignty and free movement in the vast majority of cases concerns distinctions 
on grounds of cross-border (economic) activity: indirect discriminations on grounds of 
nationality and other obstacles to free movement. There is no need to apply different levels 
of review intensity for those similar cases. However, a higher level of intensity may have 
to be applied to the rare cases where a distinction is based directly on a suspicious ground 
such as the nationality of the taxpayer. A lower level of intensity may have to be applied 
with regard to tax measures without a very precise aim such as ‘equitable taxation’ (e.g. 
progressive tax rates). These specific issues will be dealt with in the next sections where 
appropriate. 
394 J.H. Gerards has developed a similar model for the principle of equality; see the summary in 
Gerards 2005, p 99-102 and p 711-718, The model in the present study focuses on the principle 
of free movement.
395 Gerards 2004a and Gerards 2005, p 79 et seq. See also Rivers 2006.
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7.3 Disadvantage identification396
7.3.1 Why a ‘disadvantage’ test?
Both tax sovereignty and the EU free movement provisions have to be regarded as principles 
rather than rules (see sections 5.1 and 6.1). They are optimization requirements and should 
be realized to the greatest extent legally and factually possible. Their extent is therefore in 
concrete cases determined by competing rules and principles; they cannot determine their 
own extent. In order to achieve the optimum between competing principles it is necessary 
that their widest possible scope is adopted at the beginning of the optimization process. 
After all, if a narrow scope were adopted this would mean that no fine-tuned optimization 
is possible any more (see sections 4.2 and 4.3). The prima facie position of the principle of 
tax sovereignty is a general freedom of action of States, as limited by international law. The 
prima facie position of the principle of EU free movement is a general freedom of action 
of (economic) actors, which should not be hindered by tax measures which discriminate 
on grounds of cross-border activity or legal form, nor by any other tax obstacles. This 
means that any act on the basis of tax sovereignty implies a prima facie infringement of the 
principle of free movement (and vice versa). 
Of course, the result of the optimization process which follows should not be that 
taxation as such would no longer be possible.397 Nor should the result be that free movement 
would be cancelled out altogether. Neither principle should cancel out the other (sections 
4.5.2 and 4.6). Thus, a claim or petitum of the taxpayer which in fact implies a request for 
abandoning direct taxes as such cannot ultimately be sustained, because it would deny 
the existence of a State’s direct tax sovereignty. This will be explained in more detail in 
section 7.4.2. However, a claim in respect of taxation which is so burdensome that free 
movement would be rendered practically meaningless – e.g. a marginal tax rate of 95% 
or the absence of an appropriate freedom of movement for the development of economic 
activities should not be rejected at the outset, because such a rate could be disrespectful 
towards the principle of tax sovereignty.
Whether a tax measure will be allowed to stand in a concrete situation should not 
be verified in the first phase of the theoretical optimization model, but rather in all 
its subsequent phases (it follows from the nature of principles that the threshold for 
optimization is kept as low as possible). Indeed, Gerards has convincingly argued that, with 
respect to the principle of equality, it is not necessary to examine whether comparability 
exists in the first level of assessment.398 The present study follows a similar approach. 
The first phase thus merely serves to identify to which disadvantage a certain direct 
tax measure leads. A court should be able to verify the petitum or claim of the taxpayer: 
which amount of tax should be refunded in the event that the court found in favour of the 
taxpayer?399 This is all that the first phase is concerned about; I will explain this in more 
detail in section 7.3.2.
 
396 A prominent advocate of this test is J.H. Gerards; see Gerards 2005, p 76-79, and p 669 et seq.
397 Compare Cordewener 2002, p 847.
398 Gerards 2005, p 76-79.
399 Gerards 2005, p 76.
Chapter 7
112
 It is, however, necessary to examine in this first phase whether the disadvantage in 
question results from a disparity, because such a disadvantage is outside the theoretical 
optimization model (section 7.3.3). 
I will now give some examples of the various ‘disadvantages’. 
7.3.2 Disadvantages: some examples
Introduction
The EU free movement provisions contain three prima facie positions: a prima facie 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of cross-border (economic) activity, a prima 
facie prohibition of discrimination on grounds of the legal form of an establishment, and 
a prima facie prohibition of obstacles to free movement (a general freedom of action of 
(economic) actors). The last prima facie position includes the other two. First, these two 
will be discussed very briefly. Subsequently, some examples of other tax obstacles will be 
provided.
Disadvantageous treatment of cross-border movement
Legislative classifications on grounds of cross-border movement should be seen as a prima 
facie limit to the principle of free movement (section 6.4). In addition, any legislative 
classification which has the effect of discriminating against nationals of other EU Member 
States should qualify as a prima facie discrimination on grounds of nationality. In these 
cases there is a disadvantage for the taxpayer in comparison with a taxpayer who has the 
nationality of the Member State concerned. 
Disadvantageous treatment of one legal form versus another
Tax measures which treat subsidiaries and branches differently in the context of freedom 
of establishment serve as a prima facie limit to the principle of free movement (section 
6.5). In these cases there is a disadvantage for the taxpayer in comparison with the other 
legal form.
Non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement: basic tax rules
In section 6.3 the position has been defended that direct tax measures as such function 
as a prima facie limit to free movement. The benchmark in that respect is the situation 
in which there is no tax measure left which applies to the situation of the taxpayer. This 
is indeed a ‘disadvantage’ within the meaning of phase 1 of the theoretical optimization 
model. Needless to say, this does not at all mean that direct tax measures which form the 
backbone of an income tax system – the definition of taxable persons, taxable income, the 
tax rate, depreciation rules, rules on loss carry-overs, etcetera – will ultimately be illegal. 
This will be discussed in the subsequent phases of the model. 
International juridical double taxation
A taxpayer may also put forward that he has suffered a disadvantage as a result of the 
fact that he has been exposed to direct taxation in two (or more) States in respect of the 
same income. In such a case, the ‘disadvantage’ is caused by the refusal to provide for the 
avoidance of double taxation. 
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Non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement: tax rules with a specific objective
Here, one can think of rules which make amendments to the basic structure of a tax 
system in order to discourage certain behaviour. These rules may for instance be targeted 
at countering tax avoidance. This can also be explained by bringing to mind that the 
principle of negative liberty includes three sub-principles: i) a maximally high degree of 
freedom of action and non-interference with those actions, ii) a maximally high degree 
of non-interference with states of affairs, and iii) the maximum non-removal of legal 
positions. This makes it possible that freedom of action is affected in several ways within 
one single legal sub-system (section 6.3). Within a tax system, which prima facie limits 
the principle of negative liberty, subsequent limits may occur in the form of additional 
commands or a removal of powers. Rules which are aimed at countering tax avoidance 
have this effect. An example is a rule which in certain situations limits the power granted 
to a corporate taxpayer to offset losses against future profits. This rule, which removes the 
general right of loss-compensation in situations which are deemed abusive, functions as 
a second limit to liberty. Another example can be found in CFC-legislation which – if the 
classification of abusive conduct is overinclusive – in fact results in an extra command 
to pay taxes. In these cases the taxpayer suffers a disadvantage relative to the ‘normal’ 
structure of the tax system. 
Non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement: tax penalties
Another example concerns measures of general economic policy aimed at spending 
money to encourage certain behaviour or at discouraging certain behaviour by imposing 
a special burden on a product of a producer (see section 5.4.3). A tax penalty departs from 
the normative income tax by requiring a greater tax payment than would occur but for 
the measure which imposes the penalty, thereby increasing the taxpayer’s tax burden. An 
example of tax penalties in income taxes can be found in various ‘public policy’ provisions 
that deny deductions for certain business expenses involving lobbying, bribes, or fines.400 
Also in these cases the taxpayer suffers a disadvantage relative to the ‘normal’ structure of 
the tax system.
Non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement: tax rules which are disproportionate 
within the narrow meaning of that term
The taxpayer may also claim that the tax measure at issue is disproportionate within the 
narrow meaning of that term: the cost to free movement caused by the tax measure is not in 
proportion to the objectives pursued by it. This may for instance be the case if the taxation 
at issue is so burdensome that free movement would be rendered practically impossible – 
e.g. a marginal tax rate of 95% or the absence of an appropriate freedom of movement for 
the development of economic activities. In such a case, the disadvantage reclaimed by the 
taxpayer concerns the difference between the current level of taxation and a level at which 
his income is no longer taxed at a level which is disproportionate.401
400 Infanti 2005, footnote 60, with further references.




The theoretical optimization model can only be applied in relation to tax measures which 
have been adopted by the Member State which is accused of restricting free movement. 
This is due to the fact that the theoretical optimization model deals with the conflict 
between the principles of direct tax sovereignty and free movement. Such a conflict is 
absent in the event that the Member State concerned is reproached with the fact that 
another Member State has a different tax system (e.g. a lower tax rate). These situations are 
therefore outside the scope of the theoretical optimization model. An example may clarify 
this. If a taxpayer complains in Member State A that he would have been taxed at a lower 
tax rate if Member State B would have taxed him, which results in unequal treatment 
in the internal market, the theoretical optimization model does not apply. The conflict 
between the taxpayer and Member State A – a conflict between EU free movement and the 
tax sovereignty of Member State A – is not affected by the tax sovereignty of Member State 
B. In other words, there is no collision of principles if such a claim is made.
7.3.4 Conclusions
In this section, it has been argued that the first phase of the theoretical optimization model 
merely serves to identify the disadvantage in question: which amount of tax should be 
refunded in the case that the court would find in favour of the taxpayer? Although direct 
taxation as such will not ultimately give rise to a prohibited restriction on free movement, 
provided that the taxation at issue does not render free movement illusionary, the question 
of how a certain tax measure should be optimized in view of the principle of free movement 
should not be verified in the first phase of the theoretical optimization model, but rather 
in all its subsequent phases (it follows from the nature of principles that the threshold for 
optimization is kept as low as possible). It is clear in phase 1 of the model, however, that 
any disadvantage due to disparities in the tax systems of Member States are outside the 
scope of the theoretical optimization model, because in these cases there is no conflict 
between the principles of direct tax sovereignty and free movement. 
7.4 The requirement of a respectful aim
7.4.1 The idea of a twofold neutrality
A norm can only serve as a limit to a restricted principle if it has a ‘respectful aim’ (section 
4.5.2). A limit does not have a respectful aim if it has no other objective than limiting that 
principle. Conversely, a restricted principle does not have a respectful aim if it does not 
accept that it may be limited. In both cases, the principle and limit do not ‘respect’ each 
other. I have argued in section 4.5.2 that no other requirements may be imposed, apart 
from being formally and substantively compatible with other principles with a similar 
status such as enshrined in the TEU and the TFEU. 
The impact of this definition for the conflict between the principles of direct tax 
sovereignty and free movement is the following. First, the view is erroneous that 
differentiation on grounds of nationality is never acceptable. Principles can never be 
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absolute and a distinction on grounds of nationality of a producer or a product (its origin) 
may in certain situations be regarded as perfectly acceptable (section 6.4). Second, if it 
is accepted that EU Member States have, in principle, retained their sovereignty in the 
field of direct taxation, the application of the principle of free movement should, in 
principle, be neutral towards the internal and external objectives pursued by a national 
tax system and the way in which inter-nation equity is achieved by the Member States. 
The fundamental choices made in this area should be respected. On the other hand, these 
choices should be neutral in regard to free movement. AG Poiares Maduro has made this 
point very clearly in his landmark opinion in Marks & Spencer: In his view, the Member 
States clearly have a legitimate interest in ensuring the integrity and the equity of their tax 
systems. According to Poiares Maduro this does not mean, however, that this concept can 
be used as an argument to be deployed against the objectives pursued in the context of the 
internal market. It cannot be accepted that a tax system be arranged in such a way as to 
favour national situations or traders. According to Poiares Maduro, the “delicate nature of 
this equilibrium” may be conveyed by the idea of “twofold neutrality” which he describes 
as follows:
“On the one hand, the national tax rules must be neutral in regard to the exercise 
of the freedoms of movement. In that connection, it should be recalled that Article 
43 EC lays down a requirement of fiscal neutrality in regard to the establishment of 
undertakings in the Community. On the other hand, the exercise of the freedoms 
of movement must be as neutral as possible in regard to the tax arrangements 
adopted by the Member States.”402
This idea of a ‘twofold neutrality’ means that direct tax measures should have an objective 
which is unrelated to the effect of the measure (i.e. an unequal tax treatment of domestic 
and cross-border situations or a general limitation on economic liberty). In turn, the free 
movement provisions cannot lead to rules which would in fact have as their objective to 
do away with the principle of direct tax sovereignty: the principle of free movement should 
respect the internal and external objectives of national tax systems. Isenbaert has made a 
somewhat similar point, arguing that the normative aspect of the theory of constitutional 
pluralism (see section 5.1 of the present study) implies one principle external limitation 
to the interpretative autonomy of the ECJ: the core functions and objectives of the policy 
areas in which the Member States have retained their (function-)sovereignty. Isenbaert 
states that if it is accepted that there is no conceptual hierarchy between the ‘sovereignty’ 
claims of the Union and the Member States, it must necessarily also be accepted that both 
should allow each other to pursue the objectives and to perform the functions which are 
inherent to the policy areas which have remained with their function-sovereignty. As a 
result, Isenbaert argues, the rules coordinating the limits to the exercise of authority by 
either the Union or the Member States must necessarily be found in the core functions and 
objectives of the policy areas over which the other has remained function-sovereign.403
402 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, § 66-67.
403 Isenbaert 2010, p 226-227.
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It is, therefore, important to examine which objectives tax systems have.404 Although 
there is no conceptual difference in the analysis of rules with internal and external 
objectives respectively, it is useful to distinguish between the two for illustration purposes. 
First, I will explain why taxation as such has a respectful aim and why an EU Member State 
has no obligation to provide for the avoidance of international juridical double taxation.
7.4.2 Taxation as such
The notion of a ‘twofold neutrality’ means that the principle of free movement should 
respect direct tax measures which form the backbone of an income tax system, such as 
the definition of taxable persons, taxable income, the tax rate, depreciation rules, rules on 
loss carry-overs, etcetera. Such respect would be absent if the principle of free movement 
were to set aside tax sovereignty as such, because it would not recognize tax sovereignty 
as its limit. This means that the goal of collecting public funds is a respectful aim. 
Generally, this objective is too abstract to make a meaningful aim-and-means assessment 
in individual cases possible. It has been argued in section 6.3 that the imposition of taxes 
for the collection of public resources should be seen as a suitable (phase 3) and necessary 
(phases 4 and 5) means to achieve that aim. The principle of proportionality is generally 
not capable of providing for limits which the legislature has to observe when enacting 
direct tax rules which are mainly aimed at collecting public resources, except in the case 
of a disproportionate infringement of the principle of free movement (phase 6). 
I have considered the possibility of introducing a ‘but for’ test in phase 1 of the model 
as a result of the above-mentioned observations: a restriction of free movement would 
exist whenever the activity concerned would have been taxed under a less burdensome 
tax rule BUT FOR the tax measure considered. The ‘but for’ test would make it possible to 
calculate the tax due without the measure at issue in a meaningful way. In addition, it would 
acknowledge that taxation as such should not be regarded as a restriction of free movement. 
Thus, the idea of a ‘twofold neutrality’ is duly respected in the sense that neither of the two 
competing principles would cancel out the other. In my view, a ‘but for’ test would be a 
useful tool for identifying disadvantages in (corporate) income tax systems, because these 
systems will normally have rules which define their backbone rules on taxable persons, 
taxable income, the tax rate, etcetera. Measures which have other objectives which can be 
subject to proportionality analysis can be identified by a ‘but for’ test.405 Nevertheless, I 
have finally decided not to include a ‘but for’ test in the model for two reasons. First, a ‘but 
for’ test would filter out in the first phase of the model tax rules which make the exercise 
of the principle of free movement almost impossible (e.g. extremely high tax rates), where 
these rules should be able to be examined for their proportionality in the narrow meaning 
of the term. Second, the ‘but for’ test has already been used in the area of State aid law, but 
not entirely without difficulty. It is settled ECJ case law that the concept of aid may cover 
not only positive benefits, such as subsidies, loans or the taking of shares in undertakings, 
but also action which, in various forms, mitigates the charges which are normally included 
404 See section 4.5.2 on how to establish the objective of a measure and on how to deal with a 
plurality of objectives.
405 Compare Douma & Engelen 2010.
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in the budget of an undertaking and which, without therefore being subsidies in the strict 
meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect. Furthermore, a 
measure by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings a tax exemption 
which places the persons to whom it applies in a more favourable financial situation 
than other taxpayers constitutes State aid.406 The very existence of an advantage may be 
established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation.407 The application of a ‘but for’ 
test has already been subject to some debate under WTO law (the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures). For the purpose of that Agreement, a subsidy inter alia 
exists if “government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits)” (Article 1.1 of the Agreement). In US - FSC, the Appellate 
Body, interpreting the phrase “foregoing of revenue otherwise due”, partly agreed with 
the Panel’s interpretation that the term “otherwise” referred to a “normative benchmark” 
as established by the tax rules applied by the Member in question. The Appellate Body 
rejected the use of a benchmark other than the tax rules of the Member in question, 
holding that to do otherwise would be contrary to a Member’s sovereignty of taxation:
“In our view, the ‘foregoing’ of revenue ‘otherwise due’ implies that less revenue has 
been raised by the government than would have been raised in a different situation, 
or, that is, ‘otherwise’. Moreover, the word ‘foregone’ suggests that the government 
has given up an entitlement to raise revenue that it could ‘otherwise’ have raised. 
This cannot, however, be an entitlement in the abstract, because governments, in 
theory, could tax all revenues. There must, therefore, be some defined, normative 
benchmark against which a comparison can be made between the revenue actually 
raised and the revenue that would have been raised ‘otherwise’. We, therefore, agree 
with the Panel that the term ‘otherwise due’ implies some kind of comparison 
between the revenues due under the contested measure and revenues that would 
be due in some other situation. We also agree with the Panel that the basis of 
comparison must be the tax rules applied by the Member in question. To accept 
the argument of the United States that the comparator in determining what is 
‘otherwise due’ should be something other than the prevailing domestic standard of 
the Member in question would be to imply that WTO obligations somehow compel 
Members to choose a particular kind of tax system; this is not so. A Member, in 
principle, has the sovereign authority to tax any particular categories of revenue it 
wishes. It is also free not to tax any particular categories of revenues. But, in both 
instances, the Member must respect its WTO obligations. What is ‘otherwise due’, 
therefore, depends on the rules of taxation that each Member, by its own choice, 
establishes for itself.”408
This clearly reflects the notion of a ‘respectful aim’, because the Appellate Body emphasizes, 
first, that a court should respect the basic choices made by a State in the exercise of its tax 
406 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission, § 86-87.
407 Case C-88/03 Portugal v. Commission (Azores case), § 56.
408 Appellate Body Report of 24 February 2000 in the case United States – Foreign Sales Corporations, 
AB 1999-9, § 90.
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sovereignty and, second, that this State in turn has to respect its WTO obligations when 
exercising its tax sovereignty. The Appellate Body on US - FSC subsequently expressed 
some reservations about the Panel’s ‘but for’ test:
“The Panel found that the term “otherwise due” establishes a “but for” test, in terms 
of which the appropriate basis of comparison for determining whether revenues 
are “otherwise due” is “the situation that would prevail but for the measures in 
question”. In the present case, this legal standard provides a sound basis for 
comparison because it is not difficult to establish in what way the foreign-source 
income of an FSC would be taxed “but for” the contested measure. However, we 
have certain abiding reservations about applying any legal standard, such as this 
“but for” test, in the place of the actual treaty language. Moreover, we would have 
particular misgivings about using a “but for” test if its application were limited to 
situations where there actually existed an alternative measure, under which the 
revenues in question would be taxed, absent the contested measure. It would, we 
believe, not be difficult to circumvent such a test by designing a tax regime under 
which there would be no general rule that applied formally to the revenues in 
question, absent the contested measures. We observe, therefore, that, although the 
Panel’s “but for” test works in this case, it may not work in other cases.”409
These reservations of the Appellate Body in respect of a ‘but for’ test show concerns that 
Member States may become too ‘clever’ and be provoked to design their tax systems in 
such a way that no alternative rule at all would apply but for a certain tax measure. Here, 
one could think of separate taxes for different sectors or activities. In order not to get lost 
in this discussion, I have concluded that it would be better not to include a ‘but for’ test 
in the first phase of the model, but rather to apply the model as a whole to every tax rule 
which causes an identifiable ‘disadvantage’. This may, therefore, also concern taxation as 
such: a disadvantage compared to zero taxation.
7.4.3 International juridical double taxation
In the case that a disadvantage arises as a result of the fact that a taxpayer is exposed 
to direct taxation in two (or more) States in respect of the same income, the question 
arises of whether one of those States should provide for the avoidance of double taxation. 
In the framework of the development of a theoretical optimization model, the question 
specifically arises of whether the absence of such a provision – and consequently full 
taxation in both States on the same income – can be meaningfully assessed in such a 
model. It is submitted that this question should be answered negatively. The claim of the 
taxpayer essentially entails that a State should refrain from taxing income within its tax 
jurisdiction. The level of taxation ‘but for’ the tax measure at issue would, therefore, be 
zero. If the principle of free movement were to support this result, it would be disrespectful 
409 Appellate Body Report of 24 February 2000 in the case United States – Foreign Sales Corporations, 
AB 1999-9, § 91. These reservations were reiterated by Appellate Body Report of 14 January 
2002 on US — FSC (Article 21.5 — EC), AB-2001-8, § 91.
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towards tax sovereignty – the aim to raise revenue for the State cannot be achieved by the 
tax laws of another State. As a consequence, the principle of free movement would not 
be respectful towards the principle of direct tax sovereignty if it were to oblige a State to 
refrain from taxation once another State has already taxed the income. It would deny the 
very existence of direct tax sovereignty. 
International juridical double taxation arises as a result of the simultaneous application 
by States of nationality, residence and source as criteria to define their tax jurisdiction. 
International juridical double taxation would not occur if all States used the same single 
criterion. Consequently, the question arises as to whether the principle of free movement 
may prescribe that a Member State uses only one criterion to define its tax jurisdiction on 
the ground that only in that scenario can the Member State not be accused of contributing 
to international juridical double taxation.410 In my view, this would not be respectful 
towards the principle of direct tax sovereignty which prima facie requires that a State is 
maximally free to adopt – within its domestic jurisdiction – measures of general tax and 
economic policy and to determine the objectives it wants to pursue through these measures 
(sections 5.3 and 5.4). In turn, the objective of the absence of rules for the avoidance of 
international juridical double taxation is not to limit free movement but to raise taxes in 
the tax jurisdiction of the Member State concerned. This means that the absence of these 
rules does not pursue a disrespectful objective.
7.4.4 General measures of tax policy
‘Internal’ measures aimed at collecting resources for the State may have as their sub-goal to 
do this in a manner which is perceived as fair (tax rates may, for instance, have a progressive 
scale, groups of companies may be taxed on a consolidated basis, measures may be aimed at 
avoiding economic double taxation, etcetera). Further sub-goals may be aimed at granting 
a certain form of equitable treatment only to resident taxpayers (e.g. the prevention of 
economic double taxation only for resident taxpayers or taxation of income on a net basis 
only for resident taxpayers). Clearly, rules which implement these further sub-goals are a 
limit to free movement. They can only be regarded as ‘respectful’ if they can be justified on 
other grounds than tax sovereignty itself (a principle cannot determine its own extent; see 
sections 4.5.2). Budgetary reasons cannot, therefore, be regarded as respectful. If it were 
otherwise, the extent of tax sovereignty would be unlimited and absolute. Rules which are 
targeted at countering tax avoidance clearly have a respectful objective, because these anti-
abuse rules are not aimed at limiting free movement and the principle of free movement 
has to respect the need of the principle of tax sovereignty to collect taxes.411 Anti-abuse 
410 This is known as the ‘internal consistency’ test which has been advocated inter alia by Kofler & 
Mason 2007.
411 Measures aimed at influencing a taxpayer’s behaviour normally have a clear objective which 
makes it possible to perform proportionality analysis without disrespecting the underlying 
principles of direct tax sovereignty. The objective of preventing tax avoidance by an individual 
taxpayer can be fully respected by the principle of free movement under proportionality analysis, 
because the tests of suitability and necessity are factual – not normative – tests (see paragraphs 
4.5.3 and 4.5.4). The function of proportionality analysis in these cases is to make sure that the 
measures are actually suitable and necessary to achieve these objectives. In particular, it can be 
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measures which apply solely because a taxpayer has established itself in another Member 
State with a low effective tax rate do however disrespect the principle of free movement, 
because these measures negate the very existence of a competing principle (the principle 
of free movement).412 The prima facie right to be able to determine the organization 
and aims of the tax system within the domestic jurisdiction (sections 5.3 and 5.4) can, 
however, serve as a limit to free movement, because the principle of free movement has to 
be respectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty, too. 
An example is provided by rules which are aimed at achieving taxpayer equity. These 
rules may either relieve the pressure on liberty by providing for an exemption of income 
from the taxable base or another form of mitigation (e.g. rules aimed at mitigating economic 
double taxation of dividends or a special deduction related to the personal circumstances 
of the taxpayer), or they may increase the pressure on liberty (e.g. by a progressive income 
tax rate). A taxpayer may take the position that the difference between the highest and the 
lowest marginal income tax rate constitutes a ‘disadvantage’ which needs to be refunded. 
Such a claim would however negate the fact that the principle of direct tax sovereignty 
prima facie requires that a State is maximally free to adopt measures of general tax and 
economic policy and to determine the objectives it want to pursue through these measures. 
The pursuit of taxpayer equity is one of these objectives. The principle of free movement 
has to respect this aspect of the principle of direct tax sovereignty (the requirement of 
a respectful aim). It cannot, therefore, impose a concept of its own of reasonable and 
correct law-making.413 This is a result of the idea that principles cannot determine their 
own extent (section 4.2) and that the notion of taxpayer equity is too abstract to make a 
meaningful subsequent proportionality analysis possible. Therefore, the principle of free 
movement has to recognize the principle of direct tax sovereignty as a limit in this area.
Another example is provided by a system of group contribution which does not 
allow a company resident in the Member State concerned to make a deductible group 
contribution to its foreign parent company (see Case C-231/05 Oy AA). The primary goal 
of such a system is structural in nature: the collection of resources for the State. The sub-
goal of the measure is to do so in an equitable fashion and to give groups of companies the 
possibility to have profits taxed at the level of the best-placed group company by making 
a tax deductible contribution of profits by one group company to another group company 
in the hands of which the profits are then taxed. This makes it, among others, possible 
that losses within a group of companies can be used to offset profits made by the group. A 
further sub-goal of such a group contribution regime is that the primary goal – collecting 
resources for the State – is not jeopardized by the first sub-goal (equitable taxation), as a 
result of which the possibility of making group contributions is limited to domestic group 
companies (the extension of the group contribution regime cross-border would mean that 
groups of companies would be allowed to choose freely the Member State in which the 
profits of the group company are to be taxed). If the principle of free movement were to 
examined without harming the principle of direct tax sovereignty whether the measures taken 
have a reasonable degree of fit (the test of under- and overinclusiveness; see phase 4 of the 
model).
412 Compare Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 48-50.
413 Compare in this respect Case C-132/88 Commission v. Greece, § 16-17.
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force the Member State concerned to extend its group contribution regime cross-border, 
it would in fact deprive that Member State of the right to regulate within its domestic 
jurisdiction (it would no longer be possible to tax the profits which are under international 
tax law attributable to that Member State; compare sections 5.3 and 5.5). Therefore, the 
principle of free movement has to recognize the principle of tax sovereignty as a limit in 
such a situation. If it would not do so, it would be disrespectful.
This example of disrespect of the principle of free movement can be contrasted with a 
system such as the one at issue in Case C-319/02 Manninen. This case concerned Finnish 
legislation whereby Finland granted a full imputation tax credit to Finnish shareholders 
in respect of Finnish corporate income tax levied on profits distributed as dividends. 
No tax credit in respect of foreign corporate income tax levied on foreign-source profits 
distributed as dividends was, however, granted. The ECJ held that free movement of 
capital requires Finland to extend this tax credit to account for corporate income tax 
levied on dividends from another Member State. The objective of the rule which limited 
the imputation credit to Finnish corporation tax was purely budgetary in nature. As such, 
it has to be regarded as disrespectful towards the principle of free movement. In contrast 
to Oy AA, we are not dealing with a situation where it would become impossible to levy 
an income tax on dividends within its tax jurisdiction, because the extension of the tax 
credit to cross-border situations will not result in a situation where paying income tax 
in Finland becomes voluntary. In other words, in Oy AA taxation as such was at stake, 
whereas in Manninen income tax could still be levied depending on the amount of foreign 
corporation tax attributable to the dividend, which is a logical end result in view of the 
overarching objective of the system (avoidance of economic double taxation). 
The prima facie right of a State to be able to determine the organization and aims of the 
tax system within its domestic jurisdiction may also serve as a limit to free movement. An 
example is provided by a rule in a tax treaty which states that losses of a foreign permanent 
establishment can only be taken into account locally and are not deductible in the 
residence State at the level of the head office. The effect of such a rule is that undertakings 
in the source State are treated equally, regardless of their legal form (a legal person or a 
permanent establishment). Thus, the tax treaty rule makes sure that there is no interference 
by the State of the head office in the domestic jurisdiction of the State of the permanent 
establishment. This objective is not disrespectful towards free movement. On the contrary, 
free movement would be disrespectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty if it were 
to take away the right of another State to regulate direct taxation in its own domestic 
jurisdiction (compare section 5.3).
Other objectives which may serve as a limit to the principle of free movement include, 
for example, the need to prevent tax avoidance. But as stated, every thinkable rule may 
serve as a limit as long as it is respectful towards free movement.
7.4.5 General measures of economic policy
Rules which have an external objective – tax penalties and tax preferences – have two 
specific features in comparison with rules which have an internal objective. In the first 
place, a measure which, for example, encourages domestic investment cannot be regarded 
as respectful towards the principle of free movement on grounds of inter-nation equity or 
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the prima facie right to be able to determine the organization and aims of the tax system 
within the domestic jurisdiction. The reason for this is that the principle of free movement 
does not disrespect the principle of direct tax sovereignty if it requires that the rules with 
‘external’ objectives be extended to cross-border situations. After all, such an extension 
would not have as its result that the Member State concerned can no longer tax the profits 
which are under international tax law attributable to that Member State, because taxation 
is not the underlying objective of tax preferences at all. An example of a discriminatory 
tax measure concerns a tax credit for research and development activities carried out on 
the national territory. This external goal cannot be justified on ‘internal’ grounds such as 
inter-nation equity.414
In the second place, external objectives may more easily than internal objectives run 
against the requirement that limits to the principle of free movement in this area should 
formally and substantively be compatible with other principles with a similar status. This 
means that these limits also have to abide by other requirements than free movement 
which the TEU and the TFEU contain.
7.4.6 Conclusion
The objective of a tax measure which leads to a certain identified disadvantage should 
be respectful towards the principle of free movement. Vice versa, the principle of free 
movement should respect the principle of direct tax sovereignty. This idea of a ‘twofold 
neutrality’ means that direct tax measures should have an objective which is unrelated 
to the effect of the measure (i.e. an unequal tax treatment of domestic and cross-border 
situations or a general limitation on economic liberty). If a certain measure does not have 
a stated credible objective, it should be assumed that its objective coincides with its effects. 
In turn, the free movement provisions cannot lead to rules which would in fact have as 
their objective to do away with the principle of direct tax sovereignty: the principle of free 
movement should respect the internal and external objectives of national tax systems. 
As a result, taxation is not as such disrespectful towards free movement. This may be 
different with respect to tax measures which pursue a specific objective. Although there 
is no conceptual difference in the analysis of rules with internal and external objectives 
respectively, it is useful to distinguish between the two for illustration purposes.
Tax measures with an ‘internal’ aim which lead to a certain disadvantage are not 
respectful towards free movement if the reason for that disadvantage is of a budgetary 
nature (the principle of direct tax sovereignty cannot determine its own extent). The same 
is true for anti-abuse measures which apply solely because a taxpayer has established itself 
in another Member State with a low effective tax rate. The prima facie right to be able to 
determine the organization and aims of the tax system within the domestic jurisdiction 
can, however, serve as a limit to free movement.
Tax measures with an ‘external’ aim which lead to a certain disadvantage have two 
specific features in comparison with rules which have an internal objective. In the first place, 
‘internal’ grounds of inter-nation equity or the prima facie right to be able to determine 
the organization and aims of the tax system within the domestic jurisdiction may not be 
414 Compare Case C-39/04 Laboratoires Fournier. 
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able to serve as a credible reason for the alleged disadvantage. In the second place, external 
objectives may more easily than internal objectives run against the requirement that they 
also have to abide by other requirements than free movement which the TEU and the 
TFEU contain.
We will now turn to the third phase of the theoretical optimization model: the test of 
suitability’. 
7.5 Suitability
The requirement of suitability is of an empirical nature (section 4.5.3). It entails an 
optimization requirement relative to what is factually possible (as opposed to what is legally 
possible).415 Once it has been ascertained that a measure which causes a disadvantage has 
a respectful objective, it should be assessed, factually, whether the measures is apt to attain 
its objective. For example, a rule which exempts positive and negative income from a 
permanent establishment and consequently leads to a disadvantage in case losses can be 
attributed to the permanent establishment, is a suitable means to achieve its aim of inter-
nation equity.
7.6 Over- and underinclusiveness, or the assessment of the degree of fit
The assessment of the over- and/or underinclusiveness of a legislative classification relates 
to the degree to which the definition of a classification matches the aim of the measure 
(section 4.5.4). Tax measures which are, for instance, targeted at influencing the behaviour 
of individual taxpayers, thereby interfering with the right to liberty of the taxpayer on 
a second level (see section 7.3), lead to a specific interference with the principle of free 
movement. This makes it possible to conduct a very specific examination of the degree of 
fit; a precise aim enables a precise assessment of the degree of fit. However, in respect of 
measures of general tax policy aimed at achieving taxpayer equity – and not so much at 
influencing the behaviour of individual taxpayers – the Member State should have a wide 
margin of discretion. In such a case, the aim of the legislative classification is to levy tax 
in an equitable manner. Such an imprecise aim only allows for a marginal assessment of 
the degree of fit of that legislative classification. After all, the principle of free movement 
cannot impose a concept of its own of reasonable and correct law-making (section 7.4.4). 
In respect of tax measures which have another objective, a more precise scrutiny is possible 
as regards the degree of fit of the measure. In these situations an assessment of the relation 
between aim and means is possible.
7.7 Subsidiarity
The requirement of subsidiarity does not address the way in which the classification is 
defined (i.e. the degree of fit of a measure), but relates to the choice of the classification 
as a means to achieve the intended goal. The subsidiarity test examines whether it was 
actually necessary to make a distinction, aside from the question as to how this distinction 
415 Alexy 2002, p 67.
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is actually defined.416 Thus, the requirement of subsidiarity does not take the classification 
of the contested measure as a given, but requires that the court more or less independently 
investigates the available alternatives which are equally suitable to achieve the objective 
pursued. This investigation runs the risk of coming into the territory of proportionality 
in the narrow sense of the word, i.e. in the realm of what is legally possible as opposed 
to what is factually possible. Firstly, an alternative measure which could lead to the same 
objective may not in fact guarantee the same level of protection of the interests pursued. 
This is what Jans means when he states that the ECJ is prepared not to test the necessity 
of a measure at all if the measure is sufficiently sensitive.417 Secondly, an alternative 
measure may introduce conflicts with other principles. For instance, the financial costs 
of an alternative measure may considerably higher, which makes a balancing exercise 
necessary.418 Thirdly, an alternative measure may run the risk of not meeting the objective 
pursued altogether. This can be explained by giving the example of Marks & Spencer, the 
UK case on cross-border loss relief.419 Why did the ECJ not require the UK to introduce 
a system of cross-border group relief for losses of EU subsidiaries, subject to a recapture 
mechanism? The answer is, in my view, that this alternative measure – the introduction 
of a recapture mechanism – would have lead to the factual abolishment of the system 
of group relief as such. After all, in the UK corporate income tax system companies are 
individually subject to corporation tax. They cannot be taxed for the profits derived by 
another group company; the profits of a company which has surrendered losses to a group 
company are taxable at its own level and not at the level of the group company. In other 
words, the UK system of group relief is not a system of full tax consolidation, but only a 
mechanism for the transfer of losses. This fundamental choice made by the UK legislature 
would have been disrespected if the ECJ would have required the UK to tax profits of a 
foreign subsidiary in the hands of its UK parent company to the extent that cross-border 
loss relief had taken place. Such an application of the requirement of subsidiarity would 
have gone too far; it would have disrespected the principle of direct tax sovereignty. These 
three reasons show that, in my view, the subsidiarity test is politically more sensitive. This 
distinguishes the over- and underinclusiveness test from the subsidiarity test.
An example is an exit tax on a fictitious sale of a certain asset at the moment of 
emigration of the taxpayer (a tax on the difference between the acquisition price of the 
asset and its fair market value at the time of emigration). This rule aims at preserving a 
balanced allocation of taxing rights between the Member States. The court may say here 
that another, less burdensome, measure is available to achieve the same goal, namely the 
introduction of a tax assessment which is payable only in the event that the assets of which 
the unrealized gains should be taxed are alienated.420
416 Gerards 2005, p 52.
417 Jans 2000, p 245, referring to Case C-275/92 Schindler, § 32 and § 61-62..
418 Alexy 2002, p 400.
419 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer.
420 See for this idea Case C-436/00 X&Y, § 49 (reference is made to the French language version, 
as the English version erroneously does not state the important second sentence of that 
paragraph).
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7.8 Proportionality stricto sensu
After having established that a measure has a respectful objective in the light of the 
principle which is prima facie infringed, that it has an adequate degree of fit and that it is 
both a suitable and subsidiary means to achieve this objective, the last step is to look at 
the result of this exercise and to assess whether ultimately a fair balance is struck between 
the competing interests (section 4.5.5). In case of normative classifications, a full abstract 
assessment can be carried out. It should be examined whether the legislator has in abstracto 
weighed the various interests against each other in a reasonable manner. If this abstract 
assessment leads to the conclusion that the classification is acceptable in itself, one should 
examine whether the application of the normative regulation in concreto takes sufficient 
account of the individual interests of the party whose prima facie right was affected. It 
should be examined whether a reasonable balance is struck between those interests and 
the other interests involved. In particular, it should be assessed how important a full 
application of the legislative act is in the concrete case at hand.421 
The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the 
greater must be the importance of satisfying the other. In order to give some more precise 
meaning to the concept, Alexy has proposed a three-stage scale distinguishing between 
minor, moderate and serious infringements of a principle on the one hand, and very 
important, moderately important and relatively unimportant gains on the other (section 
4.5.5). These classifications may serve to give a quick solution in relatively easy cases of, 
for example, a serious infringement of principle A versus a relatively unimportant gain 
to another principle at the other end: the infringement is disproportionate. In the case 
of a ‘draw’ – the principles involved are equally important – the decision-maker enjoys 
‘structural discretion’. The court will in these situations have to respect the choices which 
have been made by the legislature, just as it would have to respect the mirror situation in 
which the legislature would have given preference to the competing principle. 
AG Poiares Maduro has confirmed in an opinion in a free movement of goods case that 
the principle of proportionality indeed consists of three sub-tests (suitability, necessity 
and balance). The third sub-test, to which the AG refers as ‘proportionality stricto sensu’, 
is expressed by the AG as the following rule: “the greater the degree of detriment to the 
principle of free movement of goods, the greater must be the importance of satisfying 
the public interest on which the Member State relies.” Thus, “the Member State must 
demonstrate that the level of protection it decides to afford to its legitimate interests is 
commensurate with the degree of interference this causes in intra-Community trade.” 
According to the AG, the difference from the other sub-tests is that, as a result of the 
third test, “a Member State may be required to adopt a measure that is less restrictive of 
intra-Community trade, even if this would lead to a lower level of protection of its legitimate 
interests.”422 
 
421 Gerards 2005, p 56.
422 Opinion AG Poiares Maduro in case C-434/04 Ahokainen en Leppik, § 26. Italics by the AG. See 
for further references to proportionality stricto sensu Jans et al. 2007, p 158-160. Compare also 
Mathisen 2010, p 1023 and p 1046-1047.
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 These considerations mean for direct taxation and free movement cases that it should 
be examined whether the cost to free movement caused by the tax measure in abstracto is 
in proportion to the objectives pursued by it. The individual burden in concreto caused by 
the tax measure should not be disproportionate in view of the aims pursued.423 
Tax measures which lead to a certain disadvantage (see section 7.3) imply a minor, 
moderate or serious infringement of the principle of free movement. The principle of 
direct tax sovereignty cannot fall out of step with that if the tax measure should be upheld. 
The case of Marks & Spencer, discussed in section 2.4 of this study, provides an example. 
This case concerned the UK system of group relief that allows UK resident companies 
in a group to offset their profits and losses amongst themselves. This is not allowed for 
losses incurred by a group company established in another Member State which does not 
conduct any trading activities in the United Kingdom. The most important objective of the 
refusal of cross-border group relief is to safeguard a balanced allocation of taxing rights 
(inter-nation equity). Although the objective of this refusal is respectful, not overinclusive, 
suitable and subsidiary, the ECJ regarded it as disproportionate not to recognize a cross-
border transfer of losses in a particular, exceptional situation which arose in that case, 
namely where the non-resident subsidiary had exhausted all possibilities of utilizing 
its losses and the losses could not be taken into account in the future either. In those 
circumstances, in the words of AG Kokott, the interest in safeguarding the allocation of 
powers to impose taxes was outweighed by freedom of establishment, and the transfer 
of losses to the non-resident parent company had to be allowed.424 The burden on free 
movement was apparently so great on Alexy’s above-mentioned three-stage scale that it 
could not outweigh the interests of the internal market – equal tax treatment of parent 
companies with domestic and foreign subsidiaries – in a situation of a final loss which 
cannot be used locally. 
Another example is the imposition of a general non-discriminatory marginal tax rate 
of 95%. Let us assume that the taxpayer claims that he suffers a disadvantage which consists 
of the difference between this tax rate and a rate which can be regarded as reasonable in 
the light of the free movement provisions (a tax rate which is as high as 95% renders the 
principle of free movement almost illusionary). If this tax rate does not have the objective 
of prohibiting economic activities but is, for instance, solely related to the objective of 
redistribution of income, it is not in itself disrespectful towards free movement. The 
measure will also meet the requirements of a sufficient degree of fit, suitability and 
subsidiarity. The requirement of proportionality in the narrow sense is however capable 
of striking a balance between the competence to redistribute income and the need of free 
movement in the internal market. The ECJ would in such a case be competent to decide 
that this particular tax is a disproportionate infringement of free movement.425 It would 
423 See the Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-319/02 Manninen, § 49, where the AG expressly 
mentions the need to apply proportionality analysis in the narrow sense of the term to tax 
measures.
424 Opinion in Case C-231/05 Oy AA. 
425 It is interesting to note in this respect that the ECJ held in Case C-47/88 Commission v 
Denmark, § 12, that “it is not permissible for the Member States to impose on products which, 
in the absence of comparable domestic production, escape the application of the prohibitions 
contained in [Article 110 TFEU] charges of such an amount that the free movement of goods 
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subsequently be for the national court to decide how the tax rate should be adjusted, in line 
with the constitutional rules of that Member State (a court may not be able to introduce a 
tax rate which the legislature has not adopted).426
 
7.9 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that Alexy’s theory of principles provides a useful assessment 
model to optimize the principles of national direct tax sovereignty and free movement, 
thereby respecting the idea that both principles should be neutral towards each other in 
their objectives (twofold neutrality). This model is external to and independent of the 
ECJ’s current case law. As such it is able to serve as an objective framework which can be 
used to assess whether the ECJ’s case law in the area of direct taxation and free movement 
strikes a fair balance between the competing principles or not. Thus far, the model makes 
a normative claim. The following theoretical assessment model has been proposed:427
To which1.  disadvantage does the tax measure lead?
Does the tax measure at issue have a 2. respectful aim?
If yes, is the tax measure 3. suitable to achieve its aim?
If yes, does the tax measure have a sufficient4.  degree of fit in relation to its aim?
If yes, does the tax measure reflect the most 5. subsidiary means to achieve its aim?
If yes, is the cost to free movement caused by the tax measure 6. in proportion to the 
aims pursued by it?
Disadvantage identification is necessary because a court should be able to verify the petitum 
or claim of the taxpayer: which amount of tax should be refunded in case the court found 
in favour of the taxpayer? In the event of legislative classifications on grounds of cross-
border movement of the legal form of an establishment, it is clear that the disadvantage 
lies in the difference with the domestic situation and the other legal form. In respect of 
direct tax measures which do not make a distinction on grounds of cross-border activity, 
it depends on the type of the rule how the ‘disadvantage’ is identified (section 7.3.2). In 
respect of anti-abuse rules, for example, the disadvantage would consist of the difference 
between the tax due without these rules and the tax due after application of these rules. 
In respect of taxation as such, the disadvantage would consist of the difference between 
the tax due and no taxation at all. Clearly, such a claim would generally not be sustained, 
because this would mean that the principle of free movement would not respect the 
principle of tax sovereignty as its limit; such a claim denies the very existence of a State’s 
tax sovereignty. Section 7.4.2 has considered the possibility of introducing a ‘but for’ test 
in phase 1 of the model as a result of the above-mentioned observations: a restriction of 
within the common market would be impeded as far as those goods were concerned.”. In Case 
C-383/01 De Danske Bilimportører, § 40, the ECJ reiterated this consideration.
426 See on this issue Douma 2008a with further references.
427 As stated in section 7.3, J.H. Gerards has developed a model for the principle of equality which 
serves as an inspiration for the assessment model presented here. This is particularly true for the 
test of ‘disadvantage’. See Gerards 2005, chapter 2, and in particular p 76-79 and p 99-102.
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free movement would exist whenever the activity concerned would have been taxed under 
a less burdensome tax rule BUT FOR the tax measure considered. The ‘but for’ test would 
make it possible to calculate the tax due without the measure at issue in a meaningful 
way. In addition, it would acknowledge that taxation as such should not be regarded as a 
restriction of free movement. Although a ‘but for’ test would be a useful tool for identifying 
disadvantages in (corporate) income tax systems, it was finally decided not to include a ‘but 
for’ test in the model for two reasons. First, a ‘but for’ test would filter out in the first phase 
of the model tax rules which make the exercise of the principle of free movement almost 
impossible (e.g. extremely high tax rates), where these rules should be able to be examined 
for their proportionality in the narrow meaning of the term. Second, the ‘but for’ test has 
already been used in the area of State aid law in the EU and the WTO, but not entirely 
without difficulty. In order not to get lost in this discussion, section 7.4.2 concluded that 
it would be better not to include a ‘but for’ test in the first phase of the model, but rather 
to apply the model as a whole to every tax rule which causes an identifiable ‘disadvantage’. 
It should be noted in this respect that disadvantages due to disparities in the tax systems 
of Member States are outside the scope of the theoretical optimization model altogether, 
because in these cases there is no conflict between the principles of direct tax sovereignty 
and free movement. 
The second phase of the assessment model requires that the objective of a tax measure 
which leads to a disadvantage is respectful towards the principle of free movement (section 
7.4). Vice versa, the principle of free movement should respect the principle of direct tax 
sovereignty. This idea of a ‘twofold neutrality’ means that direct tax measures should have 
an objective which is unrelated to the effect of the measure (i.e. an unequal tax treatment 
of domestic and cross-border situations or a general limitation on economic liberty). If 
a certain measure does not have a stated credible objective, it should be assumed that its 
objective coincides with its effects. In turn, the free movement provisions cannot lead to 
rules which would in fact have as their objective to do away with the principle of direct 
tax sovereignty: the principle of free movement should respect the internal and external 
objectives of national tax systems. This means that taxation as such is not disrespectful 
towards the principle of free movement. This also means that the absence of rules for the 
avoidance of international juridical double taxation is not disrespectful. Although there 
is no conceptual difference in the analysis of rules with internal and external objectives 
respectively, it is useful to distinguish between the two for illustration purposes. Tax 
measures with an ‘internal’ aim which lead to a certain disadvantage are not respectful 
towards free movement if the reason for that disadvantage is of a budgetary nature (the 
principle of direct tax sovereignty cannot determine its own extent). The same is true 
for anti-abuse measures which apply solely because a taxpayer has established itself in 
another Member State with a low effective tax rate; to this extent, proportionality analysis 
cannot be applied. The prima facie right to be able to determine the organization and 
aims of the tax system within the domestic jurisdiction can, however, serve as a limit to 
free movement. Tax measures with an ‘external’ aim which lead to a certain disadvantage 
have two specific features in comparison with rules which have an internal objective. 
In the first place, ‘internal’ grounds of inter-nation equity or the prima facie right to 
be able to determine the organization and aims of the tax system within the domestic 
jurisdiction may not be able to serve as a credible reason for the alleged disadvantage. In 
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the second place, external objectives may more easily than internal objectives run against 
the requirement that they also have to abide by other requirements than free movement 
which the TEU and the TFEU contain.
The third phase of the assessment model concerns the test of ‘suitability’. Once it has 
been ascertained that a measure which causes an identified disadvantage has a respectful 
objective and has a sufficient degree of fit, it should be assessed, factually, whether the 
measures is apt to attain its objective (section 7.5).
The fourth phase of the model examines the degree of fit or the over- and/or 
underinclusiveness of a classification (section 7.6). Overinclusiveness typically occurs when 
the group on which a particular burden is placed (or an advantage is granted) is defined 
too widely. Underinclusiveness typically occurs when the group on which a particular 
burden is placed (or an advantage is granted) is defined too narrowly. It is important that 
the formulation of each classification matches as closely as possible the intended goal, 
because it should be avoided that persons unjustifiably fail to receive certain benefits or 
are unjustly burdened or disadvantaged. Tax measures which are, for instance, targeted at 
influencing the behaviour of individual taxpayers lead to a specific interference with the 
principle of free movement. This makes it possible to conduct a very specific examination 
of the degree of fit. For instance, with regard to measures of general tax policy aimed at 
achieving taxpayer equity, the Member State should have a wide margin of discretion. 
After all, the principle of free movement cannot impose a concept of its own of reasonable 
and correct law-making (e.g. the principle of free movement cannot prescribe where tax 
brackets should begin or end in an income tax system with progressive tax rates).
The test of subsidiarity requires that of two broadly equally suitable means, the one 
which interferes less intensively with the affected principle should be chosen (section 
7.7). The requirement of subsidiarity does not address the way in which the classification 
is defined, but relates to the choice of the classification as a means of achieving the 
intended goal. The subsidiarity test examines whether it was actually necessary to make a 
distinction, aside from the question as to how this distinction is actually defined. Thus, the 
test of subsidiarity does not take the classification of the contested measure as a given, but 
requires that the court more or less independently investigates the available alternatives 
which are equally suitable to achieve the objective pursued. This politically more sensitive 
task distinguishes the over- and underinclusiveness test from the subsidiarity test.
The sixth and last phase of the assessment model concerns the test of proportionality 
in the narrow sense (proportionality stricto sensu; section 7.8). It requires that the 
disadvantages caused by the measure should not be not disproportionate to the aims 
pursued (a balance test). The greater the burden on the fundamental freedoms, the 
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8.1 Introduction
Part II has been devoted to the clash between national tax sovereignty and the requirements 
of the provisions of free movement in the TFEU. A theoretical optimization model has 
been submitted which should serve to optimize the principle of direct tax sovereignty and 
the principle of free movement. Part III of this study analyzes the ECJ’s case law in the light 
of this model. It will examine three things. First, it will be discussed how the ECJ decides 
tax cases at present. Second, it will be reviewed how this practice fits into the theoretical 
optimization model. To the extent that this practice does not fit into the model, an attempt 
will be made to provide an explanation for that. Third, to the extent that ECJ case law is 
insufficient to draw conclusions regarding the ECJ’s stance on the model in direct taxation 
cases in certain situations, a proposal will be made on how the ECJ should decide these 
situations. Since there are already over 150 ECJ judgments in the area of direct taxation, 
not all of the case law can be discussed; not all 150 judgments can be confronted with 
the theoretical optimization model in extenso. I have, therefore, selected the judgments 
with the highest profile in tax literature, either because they reflect a particularly 
doctrinal stance of the ECJ or because they are regarded as controversial. The selection 
discussed hereafter provides, in my view, a good illustration of how the ECJ operates in 
direct taxation cases in the respective phases of the theoretical optimization model. The 
selection will discuss i) case law which is in line with the theoretical optimization model, 
ii) controversial case law which is nevertheless in line with the model and iii) case law 
which is not in line with the model. It will not be discussed whether the cases in question 
are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ if they are compared to each other, because that is not the purpose of 
the present part of this study: the purpose is to examine to what extent current ECJ case 
law fits into the theoretical optimization model and what future developments should be 
expected on a more general level.428 I have decided to discuss the selected ECJ judgments 
in the phase of the model where they are the most relevant or interesting. In my view, this 
approach is the most reader-friendly way of presenting the findings of the present study; it 
would be a rather dull exercise to take 150 ECJ judgments all the way through the model. 
428 As explained in section 7.1, the present study does not claim that the theoretical optimization 
model at necessitates only one solution in an individual case.
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One may object that this approach does not show to what extent the selected judgments 
indeed essentially follow the approach presented in the model or can be structured by the 
model. I would not agree to such an objection, because the elements of the ECJ judgments 
discussed in the various phases of the model reflect the most controversial parts of the 
judgment; elements which are far more easy to place in the model need not be discussed 
separately. The table in the appendix to this study shows which direct taxation cases would 
have been decided differently under the approach followed in the model. 
8.2 Disadvantage identification or the scope of the principle of free 
movement in direct taxation cases
8.2.1 Current ECJ case law on direct taxation 
8.2.1.1 Introductory remarks
In Säger, the ECJ held that the free movement provisions require not only the elimination 
of all discrimination on grounds of nationality but also the abolition of any restriction 
when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede economic activities.429 Thus, a national 
measure which is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede economic activities restricts 
free movement even in cases where there is no allegation of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality.430 Following this definition, the ECJ has, in its general non-tax case law, 
acknowledged three types of restrictions of free movement. First, there are national rules 
of a Member State regulating the pursuit of (economic) activities which are such as to 
place cross-border activity in conditions of law or of fact that are worse than those of 
domestic activity. Second, there are national rules of a Member State which directly affect 
access to the market by reason of their objective or effects.431 This approach focuses on the 
more general question of whether a national measure is liable to prohibit or otherwise 
impede access to the market or exercise of free movement. Third, Articles 49 and 54 TFEU 
guarantee that a company has the right to choose freely the legal form of a secondary 
establishment in another Member State: a subsidiary or a permanent establishment. A 
differential treatment of those legal forms may constitute a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment. 
In its case law on direct taxation, the ECJ has in practice applied the first type of 
restriction on free movement, although there are possibly a few exceptions.432 The third 
type of restriction has also been recognized,433 even in cases where a different treatment 
on the basis of the legal form of an establishment did not coincide with a disadvantageous 
429 Case C-76/90 Säger, § 12. See also Case C-19/92 Kraus; Case C-55/94 Gebhard, § 37, Case 
C-298/05 Columbus Container Services, § 34, and the case law cited there. 
430 Case C-169/07 Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft, § 33, and the Opinion of AG Sharpston in case 
Case C-96/08 CIBA, § 39.
431 Opinion AG Tizzano in Case C-442/02 CaixaBank France, § 76.
432 Possible exceptions include Case C-433/04 Commission v. Belgium and Case C-293/06 Deutsche 
Shell.
433 Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain; Case 270/83, Commission v. France (Avoir fiscal); 
Joined Cases C-439/07 et C-499/07 KBC Bank, § 76-80.
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treatment of cross-border activity.434 Apart from this case law, according to the majority of 
scholars, a direct tax measure only constitutes a restriction on free movement if it treats 
a cross-border activity worse than a domestic activity: a discrimination approach.435 A 
direct tax measure which does not lead to a disadvantage, either in law or in fact, for 
cross-border investment would in this view not constitute a restriction on free movement 
(see section 2.2.4 of the present study). In his opinion in Test Claimants in Class IV of 
the ACT Group Litigation, AG Geelhoed noted that the ECJ frequently uses the language 
of ‘discrimination’ instead of non-discriminatory ‘restrictions’ in the context of the free 
movement provisions applied to direct taxation measures. The ECJ has consistently held 
these provisions to prohibit discrimination, both direct discrimination (i.e. measures 
differentiating overtly on nationality grounds) and indirect or ‘covert’ discrimination 
(i.e. measures equally applicable in law but with a discriminatory effect in fact). In this 
regard, the ECJ has defined the concept of discrimination as the ‘application of different 
rules to comparable situations’ or ‘the application of the same rule to different situations’. 
The question of whether two cases are in an objectively comparable situation must be 
answered in light of the object and purpose of the measure under consideration.436 It is 
AG Geelhoed’s view “that, in the direct taxation sphere, there is no practical difference 
between these two manners of formulation i.e. ‘restriction’ and ‘discrimination’.”437 AG 
Geelhoed stated his view even more clearly in his opinion in Test Claimants in the Thin 
Cap Group Litigation:
“the concept of indistinctly applicable ‘restrictions’ of freedom of movement used 
in the Court’s general free movement case-law cannot meaningfully be transposed 
per se to the direct tax sphere. Rather, due to the fact that criteria for asserting tax 
jurisdiction are generally nationality- or residence-based, the question is whether 
the national direct tax measure is indirectly or directly discriminatory”.438
Also according to Wattel, the application of the approach of “non-discriminatory 
restrictions” does not seem to make much sense in direct tax cases.439 The question of 
whether this view is actually correct will be discussed below in 8.2.1.5. First, we will review 
the easier cases of disparity, double taxation and discrimination. 
8.2.1.2 Disparities
General remarks
As stated in section 2.2.4, a consequence of the co-existence of discrete national tax systems 
is that disparities, or variations, exist between these jurisdictions.440 For example, a Member 
434 Case C-253/03, CLT-UFA SA, echoed in Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 40.
435 Kingston 2007a, p 309, and Snell 2007, p 349 et seq.
436 Case C-418/07 Société Papillon, § 27. This approach is also apparent in Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 
38.
437 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, 
§ 35-36.
438 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation, § 48.
439 Terra & Wattel 2008, p 344.




State may choose to impose a relatively high tax rate within its jurisdiction. The existence 
of these disparities has inevitable distorting effects on investment, employment and, 
for companies and self-employed persons, establishment decisions. Possible distortions 
resulting from mere disparities between tax systems do not, however, fall within the scope 
of the EU free movement provisions in the TFEU.441 The ECJ has consistently held:
“that, in prohibiting every Member State from applying its law differently on the 
ground of nationality, within the field of application of the Treaty, Articles [18, 
49 and 56 TFEU] are not concerned with any disparities in treatment which may 
result, between Member States, from differences existing between the laws of 
the various Member States, so long as they affect all persons subject to them in 
accordance with objective criteria and without regard to their nationality.”442
Accordingly, it is clear that the obstacles resulting from disparities may be contrasted 
with obstacles resulting from discrimination which occurs as a result of the rules of just 
one tax jurisdiction.443 Discrimination and disparity are two concepts which are mutually 
exclusive. In a discrimination analysis, both the situations to be compared should be 
wholly or partially located within the same jurisdiction. In cases of disparity, one of 
the comparable situations is wholly outside the jurisdiction of the State which is being 
accused of discrimination. It is important to note that the ECJ has accepted that Member 
States enter into tax treaties to allocate between themselves direct tax jurisdiction to avoid 
double taxation. If an allocation of jurisdiction to one of the Member States results in, for 
instance, a higher tax rate than that which would have applied in respect of an allocation 
of jurisdiction to the other Member State, the resulting disadvantage is the outcome of 
a disparity and is not a discrimination.444 Similarly, a disadvantage not resulting from a 
change of jurisdiction by a certain tax treaty rule but by a change of facts – for example 
emigration to another Member State – does not constitute a discrimination but is the 
consequence of a disparity. As the ECJ has held in Lindfors:
“[EU law] offers no guarantee to a citizen of the Union that transferring his activities 
to a Member State other than that in which he previously resided will be neutral as 
regards taxation. Given the disparities in the tax legislation of the Member States, 
such a transfer may be to the citizen’s advantage in terms of indirect taxation or 
not, according to circumstance. It follows that, in principle, any disadvantage, by 
comparison with the situation in which that citizen carried on activities prior to 
that transfer, is not contrary to [Article 21 TFEU], provided that the legislation 
concerned does not place that citizen at a disadvantage as compared with those 
already subject to such a tax (…).”445
441 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, 
§ 46. See also Case C-403/03 Schempp, § 45.
442 Case 1/78 Kenny, § 18; Case C-177/94 Perfili.
443 See Douma 2006, p 524-526.
444 Case C-336/96 Gilly.
445 Case C-365/02 Lindfors, § 34. See also Case C-387/01 (Weigel), § 55. See, in relation to social 
security, Joined Cases C-393/99 and C-394/99 Hervein and Others, § 51.
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In Lütticke the ECJ held that Article 110 TFEU regards “the legal relationships between 
the Member States and persons within their jurisdiction.”446 This is also true in the area of 
State aid:
“30. Under [Article 107(1) TFEU] ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through 
state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in as far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
common market’.
31. This provision thus refers to the Decisions of Member States by which the latter, 
in pursuit of their own economic and social objectives, give, by unilateral and 
autonomous Decisions, undertakings or other persons resources or procure for 
them advantages intended to encourage the attainment of the economic or social 
objectives sought.”447
This is logical, because an advantage or a disadvantage for a taxpayer should be 
attributable to a Member State under the EU free movement provisions, State aid rules 
or the general EU principle of equality. Otherwise, it would be blamed for something 
out of its competence. Porto Antico di Genova concerned the Italian tax on the income 
of legal persons (IRPEG) and the Italian regional tax on production (IRAP). These taxes 
included grants paid by the Community Structural Funds in the assessment of taxable 
income. The taxpayer argued, inter alia, that the differences which existed between the 
beneficiaries of the Structural Funds, by reason of the different rates of taxation imposed 
in the Member States on amounts received by way of Community assistance, should be 
considered as being liable to breach the principle of equal treatment, which precludes 
comparable situations from being treated in a different manner unless the difference in 
treatment is objectively justified. The ECJ rejected this argument:
“For that to be the position, it would be necessary for the situations of the 
beneficiaries of Community aid to be comparable. That cannot be the case since 
those beneficiaries receive that aid in a socio-economic context specific to each 
Member State and, in the absence of Community harmonisation on the assessment 
of taxable income, objective disparities between the rules in Member States still 
exist in that field, thereby inevitably creating such differences between those 
beneficiaries.”448
Again, disadvantages as a result of the fact that other rules apply in other tax jurisdictions 
are outside the scope of the principle of equality. In the same vein, Barnard has argued 
that, “once an individual has been admitted to the territory of a Member State he or she 
cannot be discriminated against on the grounds of nationality in respect of access to, or 
exercise of, a particular trade or profession.”449 
446 Case 57/65 Lütticke.
447 Case 61/79 Denkavit italiana.
448 Case C‑427/05 Porto Antico di Genova, § 20.
449 Barnard 2010, p 237.
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The reason why obstacles resulting from disparities are not a discrimination or 
discriminatory restriction is probably that the TFEU cannot compel a Member State to 
tax persons within its jurisdiction under the rules of another Member State. For example, 
a Netherlands resident company cannot argue that it should be taxed at a lower corporate 
income tax rate on the ground that a company resident in Estonia is subject to this low rate. 
After all, the Netherlands does not have the legislative jurisdiction to amend the Estonian 
tax rate to the Netherlands level. In other words, a taxpayer’s claim for the extension of 
a rule to its own situation is outside the scope of the EU free movement provisions if 
the claim relates to the extension of a rule that was not adopted by the legislator of the 
Member State involved. In respect of disparity in direct tax systems, the free movement 
provisions cannot be applied. 
An illustrative example of a disparity under the Dutch principle of equality is provided by 
a judgment of the Dutch Council of State (acting in its capacity of Supreme Administrative 
Court). A flower shop in the Amsterdam district of Bos en Lommer could not set up flower 
stall on the pavement due to a regulation of the district council. A competing flower shop 
on the other side of the street, however, was allowed to do so because it was located in 
another district (De Baarsjes); the district frontier runs exactly over the middle of the 
road. The flower shop argued that the advantageous treatment of its direct competitor 
infringed the principle of equality. The Council of State, however, decided that decisions 
of De Baarsjes cannot constitute obligations vis-à-vis Bos en Lommer.450 The parallel with 
direct taxation in the European Union is evident. 
Now I will give three examples from the ECJ’s case law in the field of direct taxation 
in which discrimination could not be established because the disadvantageous treatment 
was the result of a disparity in national tax legislation. 
 
Gilly
Mr. and Mrs. Gilly resided in France, near the German border. Mr. Gilly, a French national, 
taught at a State school in France. Mrs. Gilly, who was a German national also with French 
nationality by marriage, taught at a State primary school in Germany in the frontier area. 
With regard to the taxation of employment income, Art. 14(1) of the France-Germany tax 
treaty states that taxpayers receiving remuneration and pensions from the public sector 
are, in principle, taxable in the paying State if the taxpayer has the nationality of that State 
(this was the case because Mrs. Gilly also had German nationality). In respect of double 
taxation, the tax treaty effectively provides for an exemption in France of the positive 
income that is, under the tax treaty, taxable in Germany. This exemption is achieved 
by granting to a French resident a tax credit that corresponds to the French income tax 
attributable to the income taxable in Germany. Consequently, the tax credit to be set 
off against the French tax may be less than the tax paid in Germany, as the tax scale in 
Germany is more progressive. French frontier workers taxed both, in Germany, on income 
received there and, in France, on their total income after deduction of this tax credit may, 
therefore, be taxed more heavily than persons receiving exactly the same income but only 
in France. Mr. and Mrs. Gilly argued that the application of these provisions of the tax 
treaty resulted in unjustified, discriminatory and excessive taxation that was incompatible 
450 ABRvS 26 September 1996, AB 1996/483.
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with the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU), because the higher tax burden 
would not have occurred if Mrs. Gilly had not had German nationality. In effect, Mr. and 
Mrs. Gilly contended that France should make good the increase of their tax burden, 
which was caused by the allocation of taxing power to Germany, by paying the difference 
between the German and French level of taxation. In so doing, Mrs. Gilly would effectively 
be taxed according to the French rules, notwithstanding the fact that Germany had the 
jurisdiction to tax.
The ECJ stated that, whilst the abolition of double taxation within the Community 
is one of the objectives of the EC Treaty,451 it must, however, be noted that no unifying 
or harmonizing measure for the elimination of double taxation had been adopted at 
Community level nor had the Member States concluded any multilateral convention 
to this effect under Article 293 EC.452 Accordingly, the Member States are competent 
to determine the criteria for taxation on income and wealth with a view to eliminating 
double taxation, by way, inter alia, of international agreements, and have concluded many 
tax treaties based, in particular, on the OECD Model Tax Convention. It is, therefore, clear 
that the various provisions of the tax treaty set out different connecting factors to allocate 
jurisdiction.
The ECJ observed that this differentiation cannot be regarded as discrimination 
prohibited under the fundamental freedoms, even if the criterion of nationality is used for 
the purpose of the allocation of fiscal jurisdiction.453 Whether or not the tax treatment of 
the taxpayers concerned is favourable or unfavourable is determined not, strictly speaking, 
by the choice of the connecting factor, but by the level of taxation in the competent 
Member State, in the absence of any EU harmonization of scales of direct taxation.454 
Double taxation could only be fully avoided by a tax credit equal to the tax charged in 
Germany. The ECJ also observed that any unfavourable consequences in Gilly entailed by 
the tax credit mechanism were the result of the differences between the tax rates of the 
Member States concerned and, in the absence of any EU legislation in the relevant area, 
the Member States determined these rates.455 In addition, if the Member State of residence 
had to grant a tax credit greater than the fraction of its national tax corresponding to the 
income from abroad, it would have to reduce its tax in respect of the remaining income. 
This would entail a loss of tax revenue for the Member State and would encroach on its 
sovereignty in matters of direct taxation.456
As stated previously, Mrs. Gilly’s claim would effectively have resulted in taxation 
according to the French rules, notwithstanding the fact that Germany had jurisdiction 
to tax. The reason why the ECJ decided that Mrs. Gilly was not discriminated against 
with regard to a person taxable in France was that France did not have the legislative 
jurisdiction to adjust the German tax rate to the French level. If Germany had applied a 
tax rate that was similar to the French tax rate, the differential treatment between French 
451 Note that Article 293 EC has been repealed in the TFEU.
452 Case C-336/96 Gilly, § 23.
453 Case C-336/96 Gilly, § 30.
454 Case C-336/96 Gilly, § 34.
455 Case C-336/96 Gilly, § 47.
456 Case C-336/96 Gilly, § 48.
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frontier workers taxable in Germany and persons receiving exactly the same income but 
only in France would disappear. Accordingly, the difference was the result of a disparity.
Schempp
Mr. Schempp, a resident of Germany, paid maintenance to his former spouse resident in 
Austria. The deductibility in Germany of maintenance payments by a resident taxpayer 
to a recipient resident in another Member State was conditional on their being taxed 
in that other Member State. Because Mr. Schempp’s former spouse was not taxed in 
Austria on the maintenance payments, Mr. Schempp could not apply for a deduction in 
Germany. Had she been resident in Germany or another Member State which does tax 
maintenance payments, the deduction would have been granted. Mr. Schempp argued 
that this differential treatment infringes Article 21 TFEU (freedom to travel and reside 
freely in the European Union). 
The ECJ held first that the situation at issue falls within the scope of EU law. This 
decision was important because Mr. Schempp had not exercised his right to freedom of 
movement. His former spouse, however, had exercised the right granted by Article 21 
TFEU to every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely in the territory of another 
Member State. Since the exercise by Mr. Schempp’s former spouse of a right conferred by 
the EU legal order had an effect on his right to deduct in his Member State of residence, 
such a situation cannot be regarded as an internal situation with no connection with 
EU law. The ECJ therefore went on to examine whether Articles 18 TFEU and 21 TFEU 
preclude the German tax authorities from refusing deduction of the maintenance paid by 
Mr. Schempp to his former spouse resident in Austria.457
In that regard, the ECJ found it apparent that the unfavourable treatment of which Mr. 
Schempp complains in fact derives from the circumstance that the tax system applicable 
to maintenance payments in his former spouse’s Member State of residence differs from 
that applied in his own Member State of residence. The ECJ then reiterated that it is settled 
case-law that Article 21 TFEU is not concerned with any disparities in treatment, for 
persons and undertakings subject to the jurisdiction of the Union, which may result from 
divergences existing between the various Member States, so long as they affect all persons 
subject to them in accordance with objective criteria and without regard to their nationality. 
It followed that the payment of maintenance to a recipient resident in Germany cannot be 
compared to the payment of maintenance to a recipient resident in Austria. The recipient 
is subject in each of those two cases, as regards taxation of the maintenance payments, to a 
different tax system. Consequently, the fact that a taxpayer resident in Germany is not able 
to deduct maintenance paid to his former spouse resident in Austria does not constitute 
discrimination within the meaning of Article 18 TFEU.458
The differential treatment according to the place of residence of the recipient was, 
therefore, the result of a disparity in tax legislation. As a consequence, the principle of 
equality could not be applied. The German rule was, in itself, completely neutral. At the 
same time, EU law does not guarantee that the transfer of residence of Mr. Schempp’s 
former spouse will be neutral as regards taxation. Given the disparities in the tax legislation 
 
457 Case C-403/03 Schempp, § 22-26.
458 Case C-403/03 Schempp, § 32-36.
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of the Member States, such a transfer may be to Mr. Schempp’s advantage in terms of 
taxation or not, according to circumstance.459
Cassis de Dijon
As stated in the introduction to this section, all national rules of a Member State regulating 
the pursuit of (economic) activities which are such as to place cross-border activity in 
conditions of law or of fact that are worse than those of domestic activity constitute a 
restriction on free movement. Such discrimination can arise through the application of 
different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different 
situations.460 The category of application of the same rule to different situations is often 
applied by the ECJ in situations where a State takes insufficient account of the fact that a 
good of person coming from another Member State has also been regulated in the State 
of origin. The ECJ has developed the principle of mutual recognition for these situations. 
The principle of mutual recognition means that products and services lawfully produced 
and put on the market in Member State A can and should be allowed access to the market 
of Member State B, which can only restrict free movement on the basis of overriding 
reasons in the general interest. Or, in the words of the ECJ in Cassis, the sale of products 
“lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States (…) may not be subject to a 
legal prohibition on the marketing” of those products. However, “[o]bstacles to movement 
within the Community resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to 
the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions 
may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating 
in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the 
fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.”461 Rules justified on 
any of these or other grounds should also respect the principle of proportionality.462 As 
Barnard has explained, indistinctly applicable measures like the ones in Cassis apply in law 
to both national and domestic products but in fact have a particular burden on important 
goods. She explains that this “different burden may arise because, while the national 
producer has to satisfy only one regulator (the home State) the imported goods have to 
satisfy a dual regulatory burden (home State and host State regulation)”. This is a more 
covert type of discrimination.463 This idea has also been applied to the free movement of 
persons and services. Requirements as to holding particular qualifications of licences are 
also considered to be indirectly discriminatory. The discrimination arises “because the 
requirements create a double burden on migrants who have to satisfy two sets of rules 
(those of the home and host States) while nationals only have to satisfy one set of rules 
(those of the home State).”464 Thus, the obstacles arising from disparities in situations like 
Cassis are fundamentally different from cases like Gilly and Schempp, because in Cassis 
the rules of one Member State were at stake which in fact discriminated against cross-
459 Compare Case C-365/02 Lindfors, § 34. 
460 Case C-279/93 (Schumacker), § 30; Case 13/63 Commission v. Italy (Italian refrigerators), 
§ 4(a).
461 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, § 8.
462 Case 261/81 Rau, § 12.
463 Barnard 2010, p 90-91.
464 Barnard 2010, p 239-240.
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border activity. In Gilly and Schempp, however, the Member States concerned did not 
discriminate within their own jurisdiction. Therefore, these cases have to be distinguished 
from Cassis.
8.2.1.3 International juridical double taxation
In section 2.2.4 of the present study it has been explained that international juridical 
double taxation does not imply discriminatory treatment by a single Member State.465 
The disadvantage a taxpayer suffers in case of an overlap of direct tax jurisdictions is 
not attributable to unilateral unequal treatment in one single jurisdiction. As a result, 
international juridical double taxation does not amount to a prima facie restriction on free 
movement.466 The leading case here is Kerckhaert and Morres. Mr. and Mrs. Kerckhaert-
Morres, two residents of Belgium, had received dividends from a French company. In 
Belgium, these dividends were taxable at a rate of 25%. Upon distribution, the dividends 
had already been subject to a 15% withholding levy in France. As a result, the dividends 
were taxed twice, because Belgium – under its tax treaty with France – did not provide 
any relief for the avoidance of double taxation. Mr. and Mrs. Kerckhaert-Morres argued 
that the Belgian tax violated EU free movement of capital (Article 63 TFEU), as cross-
border dividends were taxed twice, whereas an internal dividend would have been 
taxed only once. Following AG Geelhoed,467 the ECJ decided that international juridical 
double taxation is not contrary to the EU rules on free movement. First, it stated that the 
Belgian tax legislation does not make any distinction between dividends from companies 
established in Belgium and dividends from companies established in another Member 
State. Under Belgian law both are taxed at an identical rate of 25% by way of income tax.468 
Second, the ECJ acknowledged that discrimination may consist not only in the application 
of different rules to comparable situations but also in the application of the same rule to 
different situations. However, in respect of the tax legislation of his State of residence, the 
position of a shareholder receiving dividends is not necessarily altered, in terms of that 
case-law, merely by the fact that he receives those dividends from a company established 
in another Member State, which, in exercising its fiscal sovereignty, makes those dividends 
subject to a deduction at source by way of income tax.469 According to the ECJ, the adverse 
consequences which might arise from the application of an income tax system such as 
the Belgian system at issue do not result from any discrimination but from the exercise 
in parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty.470 This does not amount to a 
restriction on free movement, which is a clear statement of principle.471 
The judgment in Kerckhaert is in line with the case law on Article 110 TFEU, 
where double taxation has been accepted. The case of Larsen and Kjerulff concerned a 
465 See Raingeard de la Blétière 2011, p 71.
466 Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres; Case C-298/05 Columbus Container Services; Case 
C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund; Case C-67/08 Block.
467 See § 27-36 of his Opinion. See also Wattel 2003, p 199. 
468 Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres, § 17.
469 Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres, § 19.
470 Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres, § 20.
471 Snell 2007, p 360. 
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dispute between the Danish national authority for the control of precious metals and 
two goldsmiths over the payment of a charge introduced to cover the expenses of the 
supervision of undertakings manufacturing, importing or dealing in articles of precious 
metal. The question arose as to whether the charge was discriminatory if the products in 
question were intended to undergo a fresh control, with the levying of charges in respect 
thereof, in the country of destination. The ECJ held:
“33. (…) that the EEC Treaty contains no provision prohibiting effects of double 
taxation of this type.
34. Although the abolition of such effects is doubtless desirable in the interests of the 
freedom of movement of goods, it can however only result from the harmonization 
of the national systems (…).
35. At present, Community law does not however contain any rules which prevent 
a Member State from also including, in the application of a system of taxation 
intended to finance the control of precious metal, products intended for export.
36. For the same reason, the fact that a system of taxation is arranged so that the 
same quantity of metal marketed on the national territory can be included only 
once for the purpose of establishing the basis of assessment to the levy intended to 
finance the control of precious metal is not such as to make the application of the 
same tax to exported products appear discriminatory when the procedures for the 
control and for the taxation of imports in other states are not within the influence 
of the exporting state.”472
A similar decision was handed down in Nygård.473 Mr. Nygård, a pig breeder established 
in Denmark, exported to Germany live pigs intended for abattoirs. With regard to this, 
he paid a production levy in Germany for each pig supplied to the abattoirs. He refused 
to pay another production fee in Denmark, payable for each pig slaughtered there or 
exported live, concerning the same pigs.474 Mr. Nygård argued primarily that the levy 
imposed on live pigs for export was a charge having an equivalent effect of a customs duty 
on exports within the meaning of Articles 28 and 30 TFEU. The Danish failure to take 
into consideration the fiscal situation on the actual slaughter of the pigs in the country of 
importation gave rise to double taxation in respect of exported pigs. The ECJ, however, 
stressed that the fact that the pigs exported live subsequently incur a levy when they were 
supplied for slaughter in the country of importation had no bearing on the classification 
of the Danish system of taxation.475 According to the ECJ, EU law, as it stands at present, 
does not contain any provision to prohibit the effects of double taxation in the case of 
charges, such as those in the case in question, that are governed by independent national 
legislation. In addition, whilst the elimination of such effects is desirable in the interests 
472 Case 142/77 Larsen and Kjerulff.
473 Case C-234/99 Nygård.
474 Case C-234/99 Nygård, § 6. A production levy is charged in Denmark for every pig bred and 
slaughtered in Denmark and declared fit for human consumption following inspections carried 
out by the public authorities. This levy is also charged for every pig bred in Denmark and 
exported live.
475 Case C-234/99 Nygård, § 37.
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of the free movement of goods, it may nevertheless only result from the harmonization of 
national systems.476 
The case of Scharbatke concerned the mirror image of Larsen and Kjerulff and Nygård 
since it concerned a charge imposed by the importing country. The ECJ held:
“14. In its second question, the national court also asks whether a parafiscal 
charge of that kind at issue in the main proceedings constitutes internal taxation 
prohibited by [Article 90 EC] when a similar charge which has already been levied 
on the same products in the exporting State has not been taken into account.
15. It must be observed in that regard that although under the system of value 
added tax (VAT) and on the basis of the harmonization rules in this field the VAT 
paid in the exporting Member State must be taken into account, as stated in the 
judgment in Case 15/81 Schul v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1982] 
ECR 1409, that solution cannot be applied to charges regulated by independent 
national legislation, such as those at issue in the main proceedings.
16. (…) The mere fact that the charge is levied on imported products without 
deduction of a domestic charge, similar in kind but regulated independently by 
national legislation which was imposed on the same products in the exporting 
Member State, does not render the charge incompatible with [Article 90 EC].”477
This case law is consistent with the judgment in Kerckhaert and Morres. Section 8.2.2.3 
will discuss whether this case law is consistent with the theoretical optimization model.
8.2.1.4 Discrimination
Introduction
Any direct tax rule which makes – in law or in fact – a distinction on grounds of the 
nationality of the taxpayer or on grounds of cross-border (economic) activity amounts to 
a prima facie restriction on free movement. Section 2.2.4 has mentioned some examples 
to illustrate this. Here a selection thereof will be elaborated a little further. The cases have 
been selected on their ability to illustrate how the ECJ deals with jurisdictional arguments 
in the first phase of assessment.478 
Discrimination on grounds of residence: person-related income479
In relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of non-residents are not, as a 
rule, comparable as regards the need to take into account their ability to pay.480 The ECJ 
recognizes the difference between the limited fiscal jurisdiction of the source Member 
State and the unlimited fiscal jurisdiction of the residence Member State. It noted that 
international tax law – in particular the OECD Model Tax Convention – recognizes that 
476 Case C-234/99 Nygård, § 38.
477 Case C-72/92 Scharbatke.
478 See Cordewener 2002, p 888 et seq, for an elaborate discussion.
479 See Van der Vegt & Douma 2005, § 4.2.
480 Case C-279/93 Schumacker, § 31.
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in principle the overall taxation of taxpayers, taking account of their personal and family 
circumstances, is a matter for the State of residence.481 The position is, however, different 
if the non-resident receives no significant income in the Member State of residence and 
obtains most of his taxable income from an activity performed in the Member State of 
source, with the result that the Member State of residence cannot grant the benefits resulting 
from taking into account his personal and family circumstances.482 In such a case, there 
is no objective difference between the situations of such a non-resident and a resident 
engaged in comparable activities to justify different treatment regarding the taking into 
account for taxation purposes of the taxpayer’s personal and family circumstances.483 As a 
consequence, in short, the Schumacker doctrine states that the Member State of residence 
must ensure the effective application of its tax rules on personal and family circumstances, 
unless the taxpayer obtains his income entirely or almost exclusively from the work 
performed in the Member State of source.484 In the latter case, the Member State of source 
must take the personal and family circumstances of the taxpayer into account.485
Discrimination on grounds of residence: source-related income486 
Residents and non-residents are however, as a rule, comparable regarding the consideration 
of costs that are directly linked to a source of income within the jurisdiction of the source 
Member State. Mr. Gerritse, for example, was a tax resident of the Netherlands. He 
performed for a short period as a drummer in Germany. Gerritse’s claim for a deduction of 
business expenses in Germany was rejected by the German tax authorities. The ECJ noted 
that the business expenses in question were directly linked to the activity that generated 
the taxable income in Germany, so that residents and non-residents were in a comparable 
situation in this respect.487 There are a number of further judgments in which the ECJ 
has recognized the effect of the limited fiscal jurisdiction of the source Member State. 
Futura Participations SA, a company with its seat in Paris, had a Luxembourg branch, 
Singer. Futura sought to set off, for Luxembourg corporate income tax purposes, ‘French’ 
losses incurred by the head office against the profits of the Luxembourg branch. Under 
Luxembourg law, the losses must be economically linked to the income in Luxembourg, 
so that only losses arising from Futura’s activities in Luxembourg could be considered. 
According to the ECJ, “such a system, which is in conformity with the fiscal principle of 
territoriality, cannot be regarded as entailing any discrimination” prohibited by EU law.488 
481 Case C-279/93 Schumacker, § 32.
482 Case C-279/93 Schumacker, § 36.
483 Case C-279/93 Schumacker, § 37.
484 This doctrine was further elaborated on in, inter alia, Case C-391/97 Gschwind; Case C-87/99, 
Zurstrassen; Case C-169/03 Wallentin; Case C-329/05 Meindl.
485 If the Member State of source has taken the personal and family circumstances of the taxpayer 
into account, the Member State of residence is not required to do the same. See Case C-385/00 
De Groot.
486 See for a discussion Monsenego 2011, p 306 et seq.
487 Case C-234/01 Gerritse, § 27. See also Case C-265/04 Bouanich, § 40; Case C-346/04 Conijn, § 
20-24; Case C-440/08 Gielen (an option for treatment as a resident taxpayer cannot remedy the 
original discrimination as regards these expenses); Case C-450/09 Schröder.
488 Case C-250/95 Futura Participations SA and Singer, § 22.
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This was further explained in Royal Bank of Scotland where the ECJ recognized the effect 
of the limited fiscal jurisdiction of the source Member State. Specifically, the ECJ observed 
that resident companies are taxed on the basis of their world-wide income (unlimited 
tax liability), whereas foreign companies carrying on business in that State through a 
permanent establishment are subject to tax there only on the basis of profits which the 
permanent establishment earns there (limited tax liability). This circumstance, which 
arises from the limited fiscal sovereignty of the source State, is not such as to prevent the 
two categories of companies from being considered, all other things being equal, as being 
in a comparable situation as regards the method of determining the taxable base.489 
The message is clear. Equal treatment should be guaranteed within the boundaries of 
the limited fiscal jurisdiction of the source Member State. This reveals that this Member 
State should, in any case, provide equal treatment to taxpayers, insofar as their activities 
are within its jurisdiction as determined by customary international law and tax treaties. If 
so, the taxpayers concerned find themselves in comparable situations for purposes of the 
discrimination analysis. This is not only true with regard to internal rules that distinguish 
between residents and non-residents,490 but also for rules enshrined in a tax treaty that 
make this distinction. An illustrative example of the last situation is Saint-Gobain. Briefly, 
Germany’s tax treaties with the United States and Switzerland provided for a participation 
exemption in Germany with regard to dividends paid by a resident of the United States or 
Switzerland to a resident of Germany. Saint-Gobain, a company resident in France, had a 
permanent establishment (PE) in Germany. The profits of the PE included dividends from 
the United States and Switzerland. The ECJ held that the participation exemption should 
apply to the dividends, as a company resident in Germany receiving the same dividends 
would also benefit from the participation exemption. As Saint-Gobain and a company 
resident in Germany were both to the same extent in the tax jurisdiction of Germany 
with regard to the dividends, they were in comparable situations. The ECJ stated that 
the Member States are free, within the framework of bilateral agreements concluded to 
prevent double taxation, to determine the connecting factors for the purposes of allocating 
powers of taxation as between themselves. As far as the exercise of the power of taxation so 
allocated is concerned, however, the Member States may not disregard EU law.491
As appears from the D case, however, the fact that the situations to be compared are both 
within the same jurisdiction does not guarantee the equal treatment of those situations. 
Mr. D resided in Germany. On 1 January 1998, 10% of his wealth consisted of real property 
situated in the Netherlands, whilst the remainder was held in Germany. He was liable to 
Netherlands wealth tax, as a non-resident taxpayer. Taxpayers resident in the Netherlands 
were entitled to an allowance applied to their net worldwide assets, whilst non-resident 
taxpayers taxed on their net assets in the Netherlands were not entitled to an allowance. 
Although he did not hold 90% of his wealth in the Netherlands – as a consequence he did 
489 Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland, §29. This has been confirmed in Case C-345/04, Centro 
Equestre, § 22-25 and Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, 
§ 68. Compare also Case C-284/06 Burda, § 87 et seq, and Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, § 69 
et seq.
490 See, for example, Case 270/83 Commission v. France (Avoir fiscal).
491 Case C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, § 57. See also the insightful article by Gammie 2005, 
p 271-272.
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not meet the requirements of the Schumacker-doctrine, discussed above – Mr. D applied, 
on the basis of EU law, for this allowance. Inter alia, he argued discrimination in respect of 
Article 63 TFEU and the 1970 Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty, under which residents of 
Belgium, who owned the same property in the Netherlands, were entitled to the allowance. 
Mr. D stated that the allowance should also be granted to residents of Germany, as both 
situations were to the same extent located within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands. The 
ECJ, however, considered that the fact that the reciprocal rights and obligations of the 
Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty applied only to persons resident in these Member States 
was an inherent consequence of tax treaties. Consequently, the ECJ held that a taxable 
person resident in Belgium is not in the same situation as a taxable person resident outside 
Belgium so far as wealth tax on real property situated in the Netherlands is concerned.492
Discrimination on grounds of residence: the peculiar cases of Lakebrink and Renneberg
The above-described clear distinction between person-related items of income (which are 
outside the source State’s tax jurisdiction) and source-related items of income (which are 
inside the source State’s tax jurisdiction if they are directly linked to source State income) 
has become blurred in two later cases.493 In Lakebrink, the ECJ extended the Schumacker-
doctrine to any tax advantages connected with the non-resident’s ability to pay tax which are 
not taken into account either in the State of residence or in the State of employment “since 
the ability to pay tax may indeed be regarded as forming part of the personal situation of the 
non-resident within the meaning of the judgment in Schumacker.”494 In Renneberg, the ECJ 
even went a step further. Mr. Renneberg lived in Belgium and worked in the Netherlands 
with the municipality of Maastricht. His dwelling in Belgium was financed with a loan on 
which he paid interest. This interest could not be deducted in the Netherlands because the 
1970 Belgium-Netherlands tax treaty allocated both positive and negative income from 
that dwelling exclusively to Belgium. The ECJ applied the Schumacker-doctrine to the 
negative income (i.e. the interest payments), notwithstanding the fact that this income 
was outside the source State’s (the Netherlands’) tax jurisdiction.495 A person who derives 
most of his taxable income from salaried employment in another Member State and has 
492 Case 376/03, D. v. Inspecteur, § 61.
493 It should be noted that the ECJ noted already in Case C-80/94 Wielockx, § 19, that “the situations 
of residents and of non-residents in a given State are not generally comparable, since there 
are objective differences between them from the point of view of the source of the income 
and the possibility of taking account of their ability to pay tax or their personal and family 
circumstances”.
494 Case C-182/06 Lakebrink, § 34. Note that Case C-152/03 Ritter concerned a situation where 
Germany, under the particular facts of that case, took into account positive income from a 
private dwelling in another Member State for purposes of determining the tax rate, whereas it 
excluded negative income for these purposes. The ECJ held that this contravened free movement 
of workers. Ritter should be distinguished from Lakebrink: in the first case the Schumacker-
doctrine was not relevant because Germany took positive income into account under its 
national legislation, whereas Luxembourg did not do that in the latter case. Compare also Case 
C-35/08 Busley and Cibrian for an example of a case where foreign losses could only be offset 
against positive income from similar foreign sources: this runs contrary to the principle of free 
movement.
495 Case C-527/06 Renneberg, § 66-68.
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no significant income in his Member State of residence is, for the purposes of taking into 
account his ability to pay tax, in a situation objectively comparable, with regard to his 
Member State of employment, to that of a resident of that Member State who is also in 
salaried employment there. Therefore, Article 39 EC (free movement of workers; Article 
45 TFEU) required the Netherlands to take Renneberg’s negative income into account for 
the purposes of determining the basis of assessment of taxable income. In summary, after 
Lakebrink and Renneberg, source-related items of income which are not directly linked to 
income in the source State do not have to be taken into account by the source State, unless 
the taxpayer derives most of his taxable income in the source State and has no significant 
income in his Member State of residence.
Equal treatment in the Member State of origin: jurisdictional arguments not per se accepted
It has been discussed in section 2.2.4 of the present study that any direct tax measure 
which makes a distinction on grounds of cross-border (economic) activity constitutes a 
prima facie restriction on free movement. The fact that the economic activity, or a part 
thereof, takes place outside a Member State’s tax jurisdiction is not relevant in this regard. 
This does not make the cross-border situation incomparable to the domestic situation. In 
Marks & Spencer, the ECJ accepted that by taxing resident companies on their worldwide 
profits and non-resident companies solely on the profits from their activities in that 
State, the parent company’s Member State is acting in accordance with the principle of 
territoriality enshrined in international tax law and recognized by EU law. However, the 
fact that an EU Member State “does not tax the profits of the non-resident subsidiaries of a 
parent company established on its territory does not in itself justify restricting group relief 
to losses incurred by resident companies.” Therefore, jurisdictional arguments are not by 
themselves capable of making a domestic and a cross-border situation incomparable.496 For 
instance, a Member State cannot refuse on the basis of the principle of territoriality that 
a domestic parent company deducts interest payments in relation to the acquisition of a 
foreign subsidiary, where such a deduction is possible in relation to a domestic subsidiary.497 
Moreover, the free movement provisions not only prohibit a disadvantageous treatment of 
cross-border economic activity vis-à-vis domestic economic activity, but also a unilateral 
disadvantageous treatment of one cross-border economic activity vis-à-vis another cross-
border economic activity.498 
Equal treatment in the Member State of origin: the cases of Cadbury Schweppes, FII and 
Columbus Container Services
Three cases concerning equal treatment in the Member State of origin require special 
attention, because they seem to be contradicting each other – this will be discussed in 
section 8.2.2.5. 
496 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, § 39-40. Compare also Case C‑414/06 Lidl Belgium, § 23-26, 
and Case C-337/08 X Holding, § 19.
497 Case C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV.
498 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 45; Case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund 
NV, § 56. Case C-436/08 Haribo, § 48, seems to exclude this comparison in third country 
situations.
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The case of Cadbury Schweppes concerned the UK rules on the taxation of controlled 
foreign companies. This legislation is designed to apply when the CFC is subject, in the 
State in which it is established, to a ‘lower level of taxation’, which is the case, under that 
legislation, in respect of any accounting period in which the tax paid by the CFC is less 
than three quarters of the amount of tax which would have been paid in the United 
Kingdom on the taxable profits as they would have been calculated for the purposes of 
taxation in that Member State. The taxation provided for by the legislation on CFCs is 
excluded when ‘the motive test’ is satisfied. The latter involves two cumulative conditions. 
First, where the transactions which gave rise to the profits of the CFC produce a reduction 
in United Kingdom tax compared to that which would have been paid in the absence of 
those transactions and where the amount of that reduction exceeds a certain threshold, the 
resident company must show that such a reduction was not the main purpose, or one of 
the main purposes, of those transactions. Secondly, the resident company must show that 
it was not the main reason, or one of the main reasons, for the CFC’s existence to achieve 
a reduction in United Kingdom tax by means of the diversion of profits. According to that 
legislation, there is a diversion of profits if it is reasonable to suppose that, had the CFC 
or any related company established outside the United Kingdom not existed, the receipts 
would have been received by, and been taxable in the hands of, a United Kingdom resident.499 
Clearly, the CFC legislation is designed in such a way that the profits of a non-resident 
subsidiary of a UK parent company remain taxable in the UK in situations which the UK 
legislature regards as abusive. In respect of the question of whether the CFC legislation 
constitutes a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment, the ECJ observed that 
the CFC legislation does not apply in situations involving domestic subsidiaries or foreign 
subsidiaries which are resident in a Member State with a level of taxation which is not 
‘lower’. Both comparisons imply a restriction on freedom of establishment.500 
The case of FII concerned the former UK imputation system regarding the taxation of 
dividend distributions. The ECJ held – in the context of the UK system – that an exemption 
of domestic dividends and an indirect tax credit in relation to foreign dividends did not 
infringe the EU free movement provisions, on the condition that the aim of the system 
– i.e. the avoidance of economic double taxation – is equally met in both situations.501 
According to the ECJ, “the mere fact that, compared with an exemption system, an 
imputation system imposes additional administrative burdens on taxpayers, with evidence 
being required as to the amount of tax actually paid in the State in which the company 
making the distribution is resident, cannot be regarded as a difference in treatment which 
is contrary to freedom of establishment, since particular administrative burdens imposed 
on resident companies receiving foreign-sourced dividends are an intrinsic part of the 
operation of a tax credit system.” This is true only if the exemption for domestic dividends 
essentially has the same result as an imputation system would have had. It was for the 
national court to determine whether this was indeed the case.
 
499 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 7-11.
500 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 43-46. Compare also AG Léger’s Opinion in that case at § 
78.
501 Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, § 49-57.
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 The case of Columbus Container Services concerned the German rules regarding the 
switch-over from the exemption method for permanent establishment profits to the 
credit method in the event that the establishment in another Member State was, inter 
alia, subject to a low tax rate and performed ‘passive’ activities.502 These rules essentially 
reflect the application of CFC legislation to permanent establishments: the profits of a 
company or a permanent establishment are not exempted but taxed – with a tax credit 
for foreign corporation tax – in situations deemed to be abusive (erosion of the national 
tax base by relocating activities to another State solely for tax reasons). Contrary to its 
decision in Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes – which concerned the application of 
similar rules to foreign subsidiaries – the ECJ decided that the German rules did not 
constitute a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment. First, the ECJ stated that 
the switch-over to the credit method does not result in a higher tax burden in comparison 
with a domestic activity: in both situations the same amount of German income tax is 
payable (§ 40). Second, the ECJ held that the fact that the switch-over to the credit method 
only applies to permanent establishments in Member States with a low tax rate and not 
to similar activities in other Member States does not amount to a prima facie restriction 
on freedom of establishment. According to the ECJ, the adverse consequences which 
might arise from the application of the switch-over method result from the exercise in 
parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty (§ 43, referring to Kerckhaert and 
Morres, discussed in section 8.2.1.3). With respect to the switch-over method’s distortion 
of the choice that companies and partnerships have to establish themselves in different 
Member States, the ECJ replied: “in the current state of harmonisation of Community tax 
law, Member States enjoy a certain autonomy. It follows from that tax competence that 
the freedom of companies and partnerships to choose, for the purposes of establishment, 
between different Member States in no way means that the latter are obliged to adapt 
their own tax systems to the different systems of tax of the other Member States in order 
to guarantee that a company or partnership that has chosen to establish itself in a given 
Member State is taxed, at national level, in the same way as a company or partnership 
that has chosen to establish itself in another Member State” (§ 51). This incomprehensible 
paragraph means that Germany is free to apply the exemption method for PE profits in 
respect of one Member State and the credit method in respect of another Member State, 
even in the absence of abusive behaviour of the taxpayer, which was after all the objective 
of the switch-over method.
In summary, the ECJ regarded a disadvantageous treatment in comparison with i) a 
domestic situation and ii) another cross-border situation as prima facie discriminatory 
in Cadbury Schweppes, whereas it did not see any discrimination with respect to the first 
comparison in FII and did not see any discrimination with respect to the first comparison 
in Columbus. The question of whether these different results can be explained by the 
theoretical optimization model will be discussed in section 8.2.2.5.
Measures for the avoidance of international juridical double taxation
We have seen in section 8.2.1.3 that international juridical double taxation does not as 
such amount to a restriction on free movement. As soon as a Member State has designed 
502 Case C-298/05 Columbus Container Services.
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rules for the avoidance of such double taxation, however, it seems possible to test these 
rules for compatibility with the EU free movement provisions.
The case of De Groot is the first example.503 This case concerned Mr. De Groot, a 
Netherlands national and resident, who had employment in various Member States. De 
Groot was obliged to make maintenance payments to his former wife. Under Dutch rules 
for the avoidance of international juridical double taxation, De Groot’s income from 
foreign employment was exempt. This exemption was calculated by first deducting a 
proportional part of the maintenance payments from the gross income, which resulted 
in a lower exemption. As a result, a proportional part of these payments was allocated 
to the source States. The ECJ held that De Groot suffered a real disadvantage as a result 
of the application of the proportionality factor since he derived from his maintenance 
payments a lesser tax advantage than he would have received had he received his entire 
income for 1994 in the Netherlands (§ 83). This disadvantage is attributable neither to the 
disparities between the tax systems of the Member States of residence and employment 
nor to the tax systems of the various States in which Mr. De Groot was employed (§ 85): 
it arises as a result of the application of a Dutch rule in the Dutch tax jurisdiction (§ 93-
94). Moreover, it is a matter for the State of residence, in principle, to grant the taxpayer 
all the tax allowances relating to his personal and family circumstances because that State 
is best placed to assess the taxpayer’s personal ability to pay tax, since that is where his 
personal and financial interests are centred (§ 90). International tax law, and in particular 
the OECD Model Tax Convention, recognizes that, in principle, the overall taxation of 
taxpayers, taking account of their personal and family circumstances, is a matter for the 
State of residence (§ 98). For these reasons, the Dutch proportionality factor constituted a 
prima facie restriction on free movement of workers. In the following justification analysis, 
the ECJ noted that the Member States are of course free, in the absence of unifying or 
harmonizing measures adopted in the Union, to alter, by way of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements for the avoidance of double taxation, the correlation between the total income 
of residents and residents’ general personal and family circumstances to be taken into 
account by the State of residence. The State of residence can therefore be released by way 
of an international agreement from its obligation to take into account in full the personal 
and family situation of taxpayers residing in its territory who work partially abroad. The 
State of residence may also be released from that obligation if it finds that, even in the 
absence of a convention, one or more of the States of employment, with respect to the 
income taxed by them, grant advantages based on the personal and family circumstances 
of taxpayers who do not reside in the territory of those States but receive taxable income 
there (§ 99-100). However, the mechanisms used to eliminate double taxation or the 
national tax systems which have the effect of eliminating or alleviating double taxation 
must permit the taxpayers in the States concerned to be certain that, as the end result, all 
their personal and family circumstances will be duly taken into account, irrespective of 
how those Member States have allocated that obligation amongst themselves, in order not 
to give rise to inequality of treatment which is incompatible with the Treaty provisions on 
the freedom of movement for workers and in no way results from the disparities between 
the national tax laws (§ 101).
503 Case C-385/00 De Groot.
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The cases of AMID and Mertens are a second example of scrutiny by the ECJ of rules 
for the avoidance of international juridical double taxation, which did not allow for the 
carry-over of positive foreign source income in situations where the foreign income is 
positive and the domestic income is negative, as a result of which no effective exemption 
can be given in that year.504 The case of AMID concerned the Belgian exemption method 
for the avoidance of double taxation of income from a foreign permanent establishment. 
The Belgian rules allowed a company established in Belgium to deduct a loss incurred in 
a previous year from the taxable profit for the current year only on the condition that that 
loss was not capable of being set off against the profit made during that same previous 
year by one of its permanent establishments situated in another Member State. The ECJ 
held that Article 49 TFEU precludes such legislation since the loss, although set off, in that 
case against the profit made by one of AMID’s permanent establishments in Luxembourg, 
could not be deducted from taxable income in either of the Member States concerned, 
whereas it would have been deductible if the establishments of that company had been 
situated exclusively in the Member State in which the company had its seat. The case 
of Mertens concerned a computer consultant resident in Belgium. He was at the same 
time employed in Germany and self-employed in Belgium. For the 1989 tax year, his self-
employed business in Belgium suffered a loss. In his tax return for the following year, Mr. 
Mertens mentioned the loss that he had incurred in the previous tax year and sought to 
deduct it from the profit generated by his self-employed business in Belgium. However, 
when he received his assessment of personal tax for the tax year 1990, he found that the 
loss carried over had not been taken into account by the Belgian tax authorities, because 
this loss had already been set off against the positive German employment income in the 
previous year and the German income could not be carried over to the next year. The 
ECJ took the opportunity in Mertens to clarify its position in AMID. The ECJ admitted 
that the Belgian legislation applies without distinction to all taxpayers who have suffered 
losses in respect of a self-employed activity, given that business losses incurred during a 
taxable period in respect of any business activity or employment are always to be deducted 
from income from other activities, including, therefore, remuneration received in respect 
of employment in Belgium (§ 30). However, taxpayers who, like Mr. Mertens, exercise 
their right to freedom of movement and are simultaneously self-employed in Belgium and 
employed in another Member State, are – in the light of the applicable bilateral tax treaties 
– not in a position comparable to that of taxpayers who carry on all their occupational 
activities exclusively in Belgium. Under tax treaties, income from employment is normally 
taxable in the State of employment, whereas business income is taxable in the State where 
the business is situated (the loss incurred in Belgium could not be taken into account 
in Germany; § 31). Thus, there is a fundamental jurisdictional difference between both 
categories. By treating these incomparable situations in the same way, the Belgian rules 
amounted to a prima facie restriction on free movement of workers: the Belgian rules 
are likely to dissuade a taxpayer who is in the position of Mertens from entering into or 
continuing with employment in another Member State (§ 32-33). Finally, the ECJ noted 
that the disadvantage suffered by Mertens is the direct result of the application of the 
Belgian legislation and not of an inevitable disparity between the Belgian and German tax 
legislation (§ 36).
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The third example is the case of Seabrokers, which resembles the approach in AMID 
and Mertens.505 Seabrokers is a Norwegian company which operates a real estate business 
in Norway through a parent company and five subsidiaries there. It develops and rents out 
its properties, all of which are regulated as offices/industry. The properties are – or are in 
the process of becoming – developed with office buildings financed by loans guaranteed 
by mortgages on the properties. Seabrokers also has a branch in Aberdeen in the United 
Kingdom (the UK), whose only business activity is ship broking. Renting its office space, 
the branch has no investment in real property, with the exception of a detached house 
purchased for the use of employees. Since its only debts are due to operating expenses, the 
branch has low debt interest costs. Having registered it as a branch of a foreign enterprise 
in the UK, Seabrokers has submitted tax declarations for the branch’s operations in the 
UK and has been charged tax on its operations there. Under Norwegian rules for the 
avoidance of international juridical double taxation, debt interest expenses and group 
contributions were apportioned to the income from the UK permanent establishment 
in accordance with the principle of net income taxation. This apportionment results in a 
lower credit allowance in Norway, because it decreases the foreign income. The question 
arose of whether it is contrary to the EEA Agreement’s freedom of establishment (Article 
31 EEA) to attribute, in accordance with the principle of net income taxation, debt 
interest and group contributions to the income abroad when calculating the maximum 
credit allowance. With respect to interest expenses, the EFTA Court recalled that the EEA 
Agreement does not oblige the Member States to give relief for double taxation within 
the European Economic Area, nor does it lay down any criteria for the attribution of 
areas of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double 
taxation. Consequently, the Member States have retained their competence to determine 
the connecting factors for the allocation of their fiscal jurisdiction, inter alia by concluding 
bilateral agreements. However, as far as the exercise of their taxation power so allocated 
is concerned, the EEA States must comply with EEA rules (§ 48). Thus, it needs to be 
assessed whether rules limiting maximum credit allowance restrict the freedom of 
establishment under Article 31 EEA (§ 49). The difference between Seabrokers’ actual tax 
burden in Norway and the UK and the tax burden which it would have borne had all its 
operations been conducted in Norway, caused by the difference in tax rates under the two 
respective tax regimes (28% and 30%), does not constitute a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment. However, differences caused by the method of avoiding double taxation by 
Norway – assuming that the Norwegian and UK tax systems are otherwise equal – may 
amount to a restriction. In order to determine whether such a disadvantage is the mere 
result of the application in parallel of two different tax systems, or a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment that falls under Article 31 EEA, it needs to be assessed whether 
a company with a branch in another EEA State is in a situation which is, with regard 
to those expenses, objectively comparable to that of a company having all its business 
within the home State (§ 52). The EFTA Court decided that such comparability should be 
decided on the basis of jurisdictional principles (§ 54). Interest expenses which are directly 
attributable to income taxable in the UK may in this approach decrease the maximum 
credit allowance. The same applies to interest expenses which are directly attributable to 
505 Case E-7/07 Seabrokers.
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neither UK nor Norwegian income: these expenses may be attributed pro rata parte to UK 
income (§ 55). However, a company conducting all its business in its home State and having 
all its debt interest expenses linked to that State, and a company conducting its business 
in its home State and through a branch in another EEA State (the host State) but having 
all its debt interest expenses linked to the home State, are in a comparable situation with 
respect to these expenses. Thus, they should get the same tax treatment in the home State 
with respect to these expenses (§ 56). The same is true for deductible group contributions 
between Seabrokers and one of its Norwegian group companies: they cannot in any way 
be attributed to the UK tax jurisdiction. In this light, attributing group contributions in 
circumstances such as in the case at hand to the income of a branch situated in another 
EEA State does not correspond to the situation of the taxpayer. Therefore, the EFTA 
Court concluded that it constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 31 EEA 
to attribute group contributions to the income of a branch situated in another EEA State 
when calculating the maximum credit allowance (§ 68).
A fourth example is the case of Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee.506 This case 
concerned a German company which had a permanent establishment in Austria from 
1982 to 1994. Before the end of 1990, it made losses at that establishment. Those losses 
were taken into account in Germany for German corporate income tax purposes. 
Between 1991 and 1994, at its permanent establishment in Austria, KR Wannsee made 
profits. In 1994, KR Wannsee disposed of that permanent establishment. In accordance 
with the provisions of German tax law then in force, the profits made by the permanent 
establishment in Austria during the period 1991 to 1994 were added to the total 
income obtained by KR Wannsee in Germany (claw-back mechanism). Germany thus 
retrospectively taxed the sums previously deducted in the context of national taxation, 
in respect of the losses incurred by the permanent establishment in Austria. In Austria, 
KR Wannsee was charged corporation tax in 1992 and 1993, during which business 
years its permanent establishment made profits. On that occasion, the losses previously 
incurred by that company in the said establishment were not taken into account. The ECJ 
observed that Germany had granted a tax advantage to KR Wannsee by allowing foreign 
permanent establishment losses as a deduction, in the same way as if that permanent 
establishment had been situated in Germany. However, by subsequently proceeding 
to reintegrate losses by the said permanent establishment into the basis of assessment 
of the head office when the latter had made profits, the German tax system withdrew 
the benefit of that tax advantage. According to the ECJ, even though that reintegration 
operated only up to the amount of the profits made by that permanent establishment, the 
fact remains that, to that extent, the German legislation thus subjected resident companies 
with permanent establishments in Austria to less favourable treatment than that enjoyed 
by resident companies with permanent establishments situated in Germany. In those 
circumstances, the tax situation of a company which has its registered office in Germany 
and has a permanent establishment in Austria would be less favourable than it would be 
if the latter were to be established in Germany (§ 37). As a consequence, the claw-back 
mechanism constitutes a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment. Turning to 
justification analysis, however, the ECJ held that this restriction was justified by the need 
506 Case C‑157/07 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee.
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to guarantee the coherence of the German tax system. The reintegration of losses cannot 
be dissociated from their having earlier been taken into account. That reintegration, in the 
case of a company with a permanent establishment in another State in relation to which 
that company’s State of residence has no power of taxation, as the referring court indicates, 
reflects a logical symmetry. When performing proportionality analysis, the ECJ observed 
that the restriction is appropriate to achieve the objective of coherence in that it operates 
in a perfectly symmetrical manner, only deducted losses being reintegrated. Moreover, 
that restriction is entirely proportionate to the objective pursued, since the reintegrated 
losses are reintegrated only up to the amount of the profits made (§ 44-45). The fact 
that KR Wannsee could not carry forward its losses in Austria to future taxable years, 
as a result of which it was taxed twice on its permanent establishment profits in 1991-
1994, does not mean that the claw-back mechanism is disproportionate. Even supposing 
that the combined effect of taxation in the State where the head office of the permanent 
establishment concerned is situated and tax due in the State where that establishment is 
situated might lead to a restriction of the freedom of establishment, such a restriction is 
imputable only to the latter of those States. In such a case, that restriction would arise 
not from the tax system at issue in the main proceedings, but from the allocation of tax 
competences under the German-Austrian tax treaty (§ 51-52).
A fifth example is the case of Orange European Smallcap Fund.507 This case concerned 
the Dutch special corporate income tax regime for portfolio investment funds. This regime 
provides for (1) taxation of the fund at a rate of 0% and (2) a credit of dividend withholding 
tax (DWT) to the fund with regard to dividends received by the fund. It is aimed at 
providing equal treatment of direct portfolio investments on the one hand and indirect 
portfolio investments – through an intermediary investment fund – on the other. In 1997, 
Orange European Smallcap Fund NV (OESF) - whose shareholders resided in various 
(EU and non-EU) countries – had received dividends from various countries, including 
Portugal and Germany. These dividends had been subject to foreign DWT. OESF claimed 
a (substitute) credit for those foreign withholding taxes. This credit was, pursuant to Dutch 
legislation, restricted in two ways. Firstly, no credit of DWT was granted with regard to 
the dividends from Portugal and Germany, because of the non-existence (in 1997) of tax 
treaties between the Netherlands and those countries providing for a right to a credit 
of foreign DWT against Dutch income tax. Secondly, with regard to the dividends from 
other foreign countries, the credit of DWT was reduced in proportion to the participation 
in OESF by shareholders not residing in the Netherlands. OESF claimed a full credit for 
all foreign DWT. With respect to the just-mentioned first criterion, the ECJ held that the 
exclusion from the DWT credit of dividend from Member States without a tax treaty with 
the Netherlands makes investment in those Member States less appealing than investment 
in the Member States in which the taxation at source of those dividends gives rise to that 
credit. Such legislation is therefore liable to deter a collective investment enterprise from 
investing in the Member States in which the taxation of dividends does not give rise to 
the concession and accordingly constitutes a prima facie restriction on the free movement 
of capital (§ 56). This restriction was however justified by the nature of the Dutch tax 
regime at issue. By granting the DWT credit, the Netherlands legislation at issue seeks to 
507 Case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund NV.
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make dividends received by a shareholder investing directly subject as far as possible to 
the same treatment for tax purposes as those received by a shareholder investing through 
the intermediary of a fiscal investment enterprise, so as to prevent investments abroad 
by such an enterprise from being regarded as less appealing than direct investments. 
However, under such legislation, where a fiscal investment enterprise receives dividends 
from Member States with which the Netherlands has concluded a tax treaty providing for 
shareholders who are natural persons to be entitled to credit the tax which those Member 
States have deducted from the dividends to the income tax for which those shareholders 
are liable in the Netherlands, the situation of that enterprise is different from that in which 
it finds itself when receiving dividends from Member States with which the Netherlands 
has not concluded such a convention, as there is no such entitlement in respect of those 
dividends (§ 61). The conclusion must be that it does not run counter to the free movement 
provisions to restrict measures for the avoidance of international juridical double taxation 
in respect of resident taxpayers in tax treaties to situations falling within the scope of that 
particular tax treaty.508
A sixth example concerns the above-discussed case of Columbus Container Services 
– the description of this case is repeated here.509 This case concerned the German rules 
regarding the switch-over from the exemption method for permanent establishment profits 
to the credit method in the event that the establishment in another Member State was, 
inter alia, subject to a low tax rate and performed ‘passive’ activities. These rules essentially 
reflect the application of CFC-legislation to permanent establishments: the profits of a 
company or a permanent establishment are not exempted but taxed – with a tax credit for 
foreign corporation tax – in situations deemed to be abusive (erosion of the national tax 
base by relocating activities to another State solely for tax reasons). The ECJ decided that 
the German rules did not constitute a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment. 
First, the ECJ stated that the switch-over to the credit method does not result in a higher 
tax burden in comparison with a domestic activity: in both situations the same amount of 
German income tax is payable (§ 40). Second, the ECJ held that the fact that the switch-
over to the credit method only applies to permanent establishments in Member States 
with a low tax rate and not to similar activities in other Member States does not amount to 
a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment. According to the ECJ, the adverse 
consequences which might arise from the application of the switch-over method result 
from the exercise in parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty. With respect 
to the switch-over method’s distortion of the choice that companies and partnerships have 
to establish themselves in different Member States, the ECJ replied: “in the current state of 
harmonisation of Community tax law, Member States enjoy a certain autonomy. It follows 
from that tax competence that the freedom of companies and partnerships to choose, for 
508 Compare however the above-discussed Case C-307/97 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, where 
the ECJ held that such measures should not discriminate against non-resident taxpayers 
receiving income from the same Member State as an otherwise comparable resident taxpayer. 
Compare also the above-discussed Case 376/03 D. v. Inspecteur, where the ECJ decided that tax 
treaty advantages may be restricted to non-resident taxpayers who are a resident of the other 
Contracting State and do not have to be extended to taxpayers resident in other EU Member 
States even if those taxpayers receive exactly the same income from the Netherlands. 
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the purposes of establishment, between different Member States in no way means that 
the latter are obliged to adapt their own tax systems to the different systems of tax of the 
other Member States in order to guarantee that a company or partnership that has chosen 
to establish itself in a given Member State is taxed, at national level, in the same way as 
a company or partnership that has chosen to establish itself in another Member State” (§ 
51). 
A last example is the case of Haribo and Österreichische Salinen. In this case, no effective 
tax credit for a foreign withholding tax on dividends was available for the purpose of 
avoidance of international juridical double taxation, because the recipient of the dividends 
was in a loss position in the tax year concerned. The question arose whether the absence 
of a carry-forward of the non-credited foreign withholding tax to a subsequent tax year 
is contrary to free movement of capital. The ECJ answered this question negatively. It 
reiterated that the disadvantages which may arise from the parallel exercise of powers 
of taxation by different States, in so far as such an exercise is not discriminatory, do not 
constitute restrictions prohibited by the Treaty. Accordingly, Article 63 TFEU cannot be 
interpreted as obliging a Member State to provide, in its tax legislation, that a credit is to 
be granted for the withholding tax levied on dividends in another Member State or third 
country in order to prevent the international juridical double taxation.510 
Exit taxation
The position that jurisdictional arguments are not, by definition, decisive was confirmed 
by the ECJ judgment in the N-case.511 This case concerned the Dutch taxation of latent 
increases in value of shares, the taxable event being the transfer of the residence of a 
taxpayer, with a ‘substantial holding’ in a company, outside the Netherlands. It was 
possible to benefit from suspension of payment until the disposal of the shares, subject to 
conditions, such as the provision of guarantees. In addition, decreases in value occurring 
after the transfer of residence were not taken into account in order to reduce the tax debt. 
The ECJ considered that this ‘exit tax’ at issue is in itself a prima facie restriction on free 
movement which can be justified by the need to maintain a balanced allocation of taxing 
powers between the Member States. Nevertheless, in order to be regarded as proportionate 
to the objective pursued, such a system for recovering tax on the income from securities 
would have to take full account of reductions in value capable of arising after the transfer 
of residence by the taxpayer concerned, unless such reductions have already been taken 
into account in the host Member State.
Discrimination on grounds of legal form
In the case of Saint-Gobain, the ECJ held that the second sentence of the first paragraph of 
Article 49 TFEU expressly confers on economic operators “the freedom to choose the most 
appropriate legal form for the pursuit of activities in another Member State”.512 Likewise, 
in the case concerning Avoir fiscal the ECJ considered that traders are free to choose the 
appropriate legal form in which to pursue their activities in another Member State and 
510 Joined Cases C‑436/08 and C‑437/08 Haribo and Österreichische Salinen.
511 Case C-470/04 N.
512 Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain, § 42.
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that this freedom of choice must not be limited by discriminatory tax provisions.513 Both in 
Saint-Gobain and in Avoir fiscal the discrimination regarding free choice of legal form was 
inextricably bound up with discrimination as to the choice of place of residence, because 
a disadvantageous treatment of a branch vis-à-vis a subsidiary implies a disadvantageous 
treatment of a non-resident company vis-à-vis a resident company. In the judgment in the 
case of CLT-UFA, the criterion of free choice of legal form was however applied separately 
(in respect of the host State). A remark by the ECJ in Oy AA points in the same direction.514 
In respect of the Member State of origin, it is unclear to what extent undertakings may 
invoke free choice of legal form.515 The Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Marks & Spencer 
seems to answer this question positively.516 In any event, there is no case law which firmly 
states that the free choice of legal form can never be invoked in respect of the Member 
State of origin. The case of X Holding is an interesting example.517 This case concerned 
the Dutch fiscal unity regime which makes it possible for a parent company to elect its 
subsidiaries as tax transparent. In case of such an election, the subsidiaries are treated as 
domestic ‘permanent establishments’ of the parent company. The purpose of this option is 
to make it possible that groups of companies – which are economically one undertaking – 
are taxed as one single entity. X Holding argued that its Belgian subsidiary was comparable 
to a Belgian permanent establishment of a Dutch company in view of this objective: to 
make it possible to treat subsidiaries and domestic ‘permanent establishments’ the same. 
The ECJ rejected this argument by pointing out that permanent establishments situated 
in another Member State and non-resident subsidiaries are not in a comparable situation 
with regard to the allocation of the power of taxation in tax treaties. As a consequence, 
the Member State of origin is not obliged to apply the same tax scheme to non-resident 
subsidiaries as that which it applies to foreign permanent establishments (§ 40). I do not 
infer from this judgment that a separate application of the right of free choice of legal form 
is not possible in respect of the Member State of origin. On the contrary: a difference in 
treatment always needs justification.
8.2.1.5 Non-discriminatory tax obstacles
Introduction
At present, the vast majority of ECJ case law in the field of direct taxation does not 
concern situations in which genuinely non-discriminatory tax measures were at issue. As 
a consequence, the ECJ has not been in the position to decide under which circumstances, 
if at all, a non-discriminatory tax measure can be tested for compatibility with the free 
movement provisions.518 The ECJ has however always left it open whether it is prepared to 
513 Case 270/83 Avoir fiscal, § 22.
514 Case C-253/03 CLT-UFA; Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 40.
515 See for a good overview of the case law Joined Cases C-439/07 and C-499/07 KBC Bank, § 76-
80.
516 Opinion AG Poiares Maduro in Case 446/03 Marks & Spencer, § 42-48.
517 Case C-337/08 X Holding.
518 It should be noted that disadvantages resulting from non-discriminatory tax measures should 
be distinguished from disadvantages resulting from disparities: the first type of disadvantage 
results from the application of tax legislation of a single Memer State wheras the second type 
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test truly non-discriminatory tax rules which lead to a ‘disadvantage’. Although Kingston 
has suggested that the ECJ is now definitely moving towards a discrimination approach 
in direct tax cases,519 I agree with Banks520 that the language used by the ECJ in these 
cases continues to use (also) the Säger formula involving national rules which are ‘liable 
to prohibit or otherwise impede’ economic activities, irrespective of any discrimination.521 
Indeed, although the majority of tax scholars is of the view that a direct tax measure only 
constitutes a restriction on free movement if it treats a cross-border activity worse than a 
domestic activity – i.e. a discrimination approach; see the introduction to this section – the 
question arises whether this is always true,522 in particular having regard to the fairly recent 
cases of Commission v. Belgium523 and Deutsche Shell.524 These cases will be discussed after 
an account has been given of ECJ case law on taxation and non-discriminatory obstacles 
to free movement. 
Viacom Outdoor
The question of whether the concept of non-discriminatory restrictions on free movement 
can meaningfully be transposed to direct taxation has been addressed explicitly by 
AG Kokott in Viacom Outdoor.525 This case concerned an Italian rule under which 
municipalities levy a tax payable on advertising services by means of bill-posting in public 
spaces. The question arose as to whether freedom to provide services precludes such 
a municipal advertising tax. AG Kokott noted that freedom to provide services can be 
restricted in two ways. First, it contains a specific expression of the general principle of 
non-discrimination. In the present case, however, it is not clear whether the municipal 
advertising tax could lead to – even only indirect – discrimination against cross-border 
services. She observed that the municipal advertising tax “appears to form part of a general 
system of domestic duties which is subject to objective, non-discriminatory criteria and 
also does not discriminate between domestic and cross-border activities.”526 Second, 
by its very wording, Article 56 TFEU requires the elimination of any restriction on the 
freedom to provide services, even if it applies to national providers of services and to 
those of other Member States alike, when it is liable to prohibit, impede or render less 
attractive the provision or receipt of cross-border services. In this respect, AG Kokott 
noted that the question of whether the imposition of an indiscriminately applicable duty, 
for example a tax, can be considered as a restriction in itself has not been clearly answered 
of disadvantage concerns a taxpayer’s claim relative to the tax legislation of another Member 
State.
519 Kingston 2007.
520 Banks 2007, p 44-45. This is also emphasized by Kokott & Ost 2011, p 498.
521 Case C-76/90 Säger, § 12. 
522 Aujean has suggested that ECJ case law on direct taxation may find itself in a “transitional phase” 
towards a general prima facie prohibition on non-discriminatory tax obstacles”; see Aujean 
2007, p 324.
523 Case C-433/04 Commission v. Belgium.
524 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell GmbH.
525 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor.
526 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor, § 56-57.
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in the existing case law.527 According to the AG, there are two conceivable solutions: i) the 
justification solution: a non-discriminatory domestic duty may constitute a prima facie 
restriction and its justification must be examined, and ii) the definition-based solution: 
a non-discriminatory domestic duty is excluded from the scope of the fundamental 
freedoms from the outset. The AG does not make a fundamental choice for either of 
those options but concludes that both alternatives lead in casu to the same conclusion: 
the municipal advertising tax does not constitute a prohibited restriction on freedom 
to provide services. In respect of the ‘justification solution’, the AG noted that it cannot 
be disputed that even the simple imposition of a duty may make an economic activity 
more expensive and therefore less attractive. As a consequence, all duties, no matter 
what kind, would have to be examined against EU law; the Member States would then 
potentially be required in each individual case to show that their duties were justified for 
compelling reasons in the general interest, i.e. reasonable, necessary and proportionate 
with the aims pursued. It has to be borne in mind, however, that it could not be the task 
of the ECJ to second-guess Member States’ budgetary decisions.528 This leads the AG to 
the conclusion that “[i]f the justification solution is adopted, the municipal advertising 
tax would indeed be a restriction of freedom to provide services, but it could at the same 
time be justified without difficulty. According to all the available information, this – low 
– tax does not have a prohibitive effect and it is not clear to what extent the national and 
the local legislator might have exceeded their broad margin of discretion in budget policy 
in setting the tax.”529 The ‘definition-based solution’ starts from the assumption that the 
imposition of non-discriminatory taxes is not prohibited, and does not have to be justified 
in each individual case.530 Indeed, according to the AG, “[i]f the definition-based solution 
is adopted, an indirect tax which forms part of a general system of domestic duties, is 
subject to objective, non-discriminatory criteria and also does not discriminate between 
domestic and cross-border activities does not fall within the scope of [the fundamental 
freedoms]”.531 The ECJ agreed with AG Kokott that the municipal advertising tax was 
allowed to stand: 
“37. With regard to the question of whether the levying by municipal authorities 
of a tax such as the advertising tax constitutes an impediment incompatible 
with [freedom to provide services], it must first of all be noted that such a tax 
is applicable without distinction to any provision of services entailing outdoor 
advertising and public bill-posting in the territory of the municipality concerned. 
The rules on the levying of this tax do not, therefore, draw any distinction based on 
the place of establishment of the provider or recipient of the bill-posting services or 
on the place of origin of the goods or services that form the subject-matter of the 
advertising messages disseminated.
38. Next, such a tax is applied only to outdoor advertising activities involving the 
527 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor, § 58-60.
528 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor, § 61-63.
529 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor, § 66.
530 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor, § 64-65.
531 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-134/03 Viacom Outdoor, § 66.
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use of public space administered by the municipal authorities and its amount is 
fixed at a level which may be considered modest in relation to the value of the 
services provided which are subject to it. In those circumstances, the levying of 
such a tax is not on any view liable to prohibit, impede or otherwise make less 
attractive the provision of advertising services to be carried out in the territory of 
the municipalities concerned, including the case in which the provision of services 
is of a cross-border nature on account of the place of establishment of either the 
provider or the recipient of the services.”
Thus, the ECJ has not explicitly decided in favour of the AG’s ‘justification solution’ or 
‘definition-based solution’. Rather, the ECJ observed that the tax does not discriminate 
against cross-border activity and that the tax is applicable without distinction to any 
provision of services entailing outdoor advertising and public bill-posting and is fixed at 
a level which may be considered modest in relation to the value of the services. It can be 
concluded, however, that the ECJ is of the opinion that taxation as such does not amount 
to a prima facie restriction on free movement.
Mobistar
This conclusion is supported by Mobistar. This case concerned two Belgian local taxes, one 
on transmission pylons, masts and antennae for GSM, and the other on external antennae. 
The tax was set at a fixed amount per pylon, mast or antenna, and was payable by their 
owner. The ECJ decided that these taxes do not amount to a prima facie restriction on 
freedom to provide services:
“31. (…) measures, the only effect of which is to create additional costs in respect of 
the service in question and which affect in the same way the provision of services 
between Member States and that within one Member State, do not fall within the 
scope of [freedom to provide services]. 
32. As regards the question whether the levy by municipal authorities of taxes such 
as those in question in the main proceedings amounts to a restriction incompatible 
with [freedom to provide services], it is necessary to point out that such taxes 
apply without distinction to all owners of mobile telephone installations within the 
commune in question, and that foreign operators are not, either in fact or in law, 
more adversely affected by those measures than national operators. 
33. Nor do the tax measures in question make cross-border service provision more 
difficult than national service provision. Admittedly, introducing a tax on pylons, 
masts and antennae can make tariffs for mobile telephone communications to 
Belgium from abroad and vice versa more expensive. However, national telephone 
service provision is, to the same extent, subject to the risk that the tax will have an 
impact on tariffs.
34. It is appropriate to add that there is nothing in the file to suggest that the 
cumulative effect of the local taxes compromises freedom to provide mobile 
telephony services between other Member States and the Kingdom of Belgium.”532
532 Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03 Mobistar. Italics by the author.
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Thus, in Mobistar there were no disadvantages within the tax system at issue. Also, there 
was no discrimination against cross-border services. The only effect of the tax was that 
additional costs were raised for all economic operators in question. As a consequence, the 
ECJ did not find a prima facie restriction on freedom to provide services to be present. 
Carbonati Apuani
The case of Carbonati Apuani did concern a prohibited tax measure. It concerned a 
municipal tax on marble which leaves the community of Carrara regardless of its destination 
(Italy or abroad). The ECJ held that this tax constitutes a prima facie restriction on free 
movement of goods (a charge having effect equivalent to a customs duty on exports within 
the meaning of Article 28 TFEU).533 The ECJ stated that the very principle of a customs 
union requires the free movement of goods to be ensured within the union generally, not 
in trade between Member States alone, but more broadly throughout the territory of the 
customs union. The ECJ subsequently noted that this view is supported by Article 26(2) 
TFEU which defines the internal market as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’, without drawing any 
distinction between inter-State frontiers and frontiers within a State.534 This judgment does 
not mean that the ECJ is prepared to accept that taxation as such constitutes a restriction 
on free movement. Rather, the exemption of excavated marble used in the municipality 
itself constituted an advantage and a corresponding disadvantage for ‘exported’ marble 
which taxpayers can claim back. 
Sea-Land
This case concerned the Dutch Scheepvaartverkeerswet (Shipping Act) which provided, in 
the framework of the vessel traffic services system (VTS system), for the introduction of 
a tariff for those services (VTS tariff). The VTS tariff was paid only by sea-going vessels. 
It is intended to serve as payment for vessel traffic services rendered by the State. An 
administrative decree determined the shipping lanes to which the tariff applies, the criteria 
for applying that tariff and derogations. Under this decree the VTS tariff is not payable, 
inter alia, for ships whose length does not exceed 41 metres. Sealand Service Inc. and 
Nedloyd Lijnen BV, supported by the Commission, claimed that the VTS system indirectly 
discriminates against them on the grounds of nationality, since the overwhelming majority 
of inland waterway traffic, which is exempt from the VTS tariff, takes place under the 
Netherlands flag. Ships flying the flag of a Member State are generally operated by national 
economic operators, whereas shipping companies from other Member States as a rule 
do not operate vessels flying this flag. The ECJ disagreed: “there are in this case objective 
differences between sea-going vessels longer than 41 metres and inland waterway vessels, 
in particular as concerns their respective markets - differences which reveal, moreover, 
that those two categories of means of transport are not comparable.”535 The ECJ did 
agree, however, with Sealand’s argument that the tariff constituted a prima facie non-
533 See for a similar conclusion in the area of freedom to provide services Case C-169/08 Presidente 
del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna, § 30.
534 Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani, § 22-24.
535 Joined Cases C-430/99 and C-431/99 Sea-Land, § 37.
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discriminatory restriction on freedom to provide services: “the VTS system at issue in the 
main proceedings, in that it requires the payment of a tariff by sea-going vessels longer 
than 41 metres, is liable to impede or render less attractive the provision of those services 
and therefore constitutes a restriction on their free circulation”.536 Banks fears that on this 
basis, every tax is a restriction on free circulation and can only survive scrutiny under EU 
law if it is a justified tax.537 In my view, however, the approach taken by the ECJ can be 
explained by acknowledging that the VTS tariff was, as a result of derogations from the 
main rule, in the end only payable by sea-going vessels longer than 41 metres. This is a 
disadvantage relative to the exemption for shorter vessels. It does not necessarily mean 
that taxation as such is a restriction on free movement.
 
Sandoz 
This case concerned the Austrian law on stamp duties which stated that legal transactions 
were subject to stamp duty if they are recorded in a written instrument. The law 
distinguished between the case where the instrument is drawn up abroad and the case 
where it is drawn up in Austria.538 If the instrument is drawn up in Austria, the duty is 
payable either when it is signed by the contracting parties or when it is issued or sent by 
one of the signatories. However, if the instrument is drawn up abroad, the requirement 
to pay the duty concerned is dependent on certain conditions being met ensuring that a 
particular connection exists with Austria. If the contracting parties are Austrian residents 
and the subject-matter of the contract has some connection with Austria (e.g. where a 
loan is intended to provide funding for an operation which will take place in Austria or 
if the borrower is resident in Austria) the requirement to pay the duty arises at the time 
when the written agreement is concluded abroad. If one or both of the parties are non-
residents, the duty is payable when the instrument concerned enters Austria. In short, if 
the instrument is drawn up abroad, the duty is payable only if certain conditions are met. 
In the case of legal transactions binding on both parties, the signatories to the instrument 
are jointly liable to pay the duty. Loan agreements are subject to stamp duty at the rate of 
0.8% of the value of the loan. The ECJ held that the levying of stamp duty, also in cases 
where the lender is established outside Austria, constitutes a prima facie restriction on free 
movement of capital:
“As the Advocate General points out at paragraphs 31 and 48 of his Opinion, 
legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings deprives residents of a 
Member State of the possibility of benefiting from the absence of taxation which 
may be associated with loans obtained outside the national territory. Accordingly, 
such a measure is likely to deter such residents from obtaining loans from persons 
established in other Member States”.539
536 Joined Cases C-430/99 and C-431/99 Sea-Land, § 38.
537 Banks 2007, p 28.
538 The following summary of the Austrian law is derived from AG Léger’s Opinion in this case (C-
439/97 Sandoz).
539 Case C-439/97 Sandoz, § 19.
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Advocate General Léger had noted that “[t]he principle of the free movement of capital was 
introduced inter alia in order to enable Community nationals to enjoy the most favourable 
conditions for investing their capital available to them in any of the States which make up 
the Community.”540 Paragraph 48 of the Opinion of Advocate General Léger, to which the 
ECJ refers, reads:
“It is clear that the national law at issue does not prevent Austrian residents 
from taking out a loan from a foreign lender nor does it impose on them stricter 
conditions than if they were borrowing from an Austrian lender. However, it does 
deprive them of the opportunity of being exempt from duties, which would be 
available to them if they took the loan out abroad. A measure which involves a 
Member State offering persons taking out a loan exemption from duty is likely to 
persuade an individual or a company to take out a loan from an institution located 
in a State which offers this type of tax advantage or exemption.”
This did not mean, however, that the Austrian rule was ultimately prohibited, because 
the ECJ held that the restriction was justified. It observed that the main objective of the 
legislation – which, irrespective of the nationality of the contracting parties or of the place 
where the loan is contracted, applies to all natural and legal persons resident in Austria who 
enter into a contract for a loan – is to ensure equal tax treatment for those persons. Since 
the effect of such a measure is to compel such persons to pay the duty, it prevents taxable 
persons from evading the requirements of domestic tax legislation through the exercise of 
freedom of movement of capital. Also, the Austrian legislation did not constitute a means 
of arbitrary discrimination because it applies to all borrowers resident in Austria without 
distinction as to nationality or the place where the loan was contracted.541 According to 
Banks the ECJ wrongly decided that this “perfectly neutral tax measure” – cross-border 
situations are treated equally if not better than domestic situations – constitutes a prima 
facie restriction on free movement of capital.542 In my view, however, the ECJ only in form 
applied a somewhat different approach in Sandoz in comparison with Mobistar: the end 
result in both cases was exactly the same.543
Commission v Belgium 
This case concerned the following situation. In Belgium, the provision of services in the 
construction sector by natural or legal persons was, in principle, subject to a requirement 
of registration as a ‘contractor’ with one of the provincial commissions responsible for 
registration.544 Operators who are not registered in Belgium were not excluded from 
540 Opinion AG Léger in Case C-439/97 Sandoz, § 47.
541 Case C-439/97 Sandoz, § 24-26.
542 Banks 2007, p 37.
543 Compare also Case C-512/03 Blanckaert, where the ECJ first considered that a prima facie 
restriction on free movement of capital existed (§ 38-39) and subsequently considered – 
performing justification analysis – that resident and non-resident taxpayers were objectively 
different in view of the rule in question which provided a tax credit to taxpayers socially insured 
in the Netherlands (§ 50).
544 Opinion AG Tizzano in Case C-433/04 Commission v. Belgium, § 5.
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access to the national market but they were subject to special tax arrangements. Those 
provisions included two measures designed to guarantee that such individuals pay their 
taxes. In the first place, by having recourse to suppliers who are not registered in Belgium, 
the recipient of the services provided was considered to be jointly and severally liable for 
the payment of any tax debts of its own contracting partner. Such a liability is particularly 
broad in scope, since it applies, up to a level equivalent to 35% of the cost of the work 
commissioned, to ‘all’ the supplier’s tax debts, including those relating to ‘taxable periods’ 
prior to the contract in question. Secondly, there was an obligation to withhold for a 
certain period 15% of the amount invoiced by unregistered construction companies.545 
The ECJ has held that these requirements constitute restrictions on the freedom to provide 
services. It recalled its consistent case law that Article 49 EC (freedom to provide services; 
Article 56 TFEU) requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of 
nationality against service providers who are established in another Member State, but 
also the abolition of any restriction on the freedom to provide services, even if it applies 
without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member 
States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of 
service providers from other Member States who lawfully provide similar services in 
their Member State of origin. The ECJ subsequently noted that the fact that the principal 
or contractor must withhold for the Belgian authorities a sum equivalent to 15% of the 
price charged by an unregistered service provider effectively deprives that provider of the 
ability immediately to have at his disposal a part of his income, which he can recover only 
at the conclusion of a specific administrative procedure. The ECJ then held that “[t]he 
disadvantages that the withholding obligation represents for service providers who are 
not registered and not established in Belgium are, consequently, liable to deter them from 
accessing the Belgian market in order to provide services in the construction sector in that 
country.” Also, the fact that the principal or the contractor who contracts with a service 
provider not registered in Belgium is made jointly liable for all of that provider’s tax debts 
relating to earlier taxable periods at the rate of 35% of the price of the work to be carried 
out is liable to deter that principal or contractor from having recourse to the services of a 
provider who is not registered and not established in Belgium, yet who lawfully provides 
identical services in his Member State of establishment. “Even if joint liability applies 
without distinction when an unregistered service provider is used, regardless of whether 
he is established in Belgium or in another Member State, it must nevertheless be stated 
that, while it does not deprive service providers who are not registered and not established 
in Belgium of the ability to supply their services there, the disputed provision does make 
access to the Belgian market difficult for them.”546 
It is clear that Commission v Belgium has not been decided on the basis of any 
discrimination analysis. It is important to note that the ECJ started its reasoning by stating 
that measures which are liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous cross-
border economic activities constitute prima facie restrictions, thereby referring to the 
landmark non-tax cases of Säger (C-76/90) and Commission v France (C-255/04). These 
cases expressly advocate a ‘disadvantage’ approach rather than discrimination analysis. 
545 Opinion AG Tizzano in Case C-433/04 Commission v. Belgium, § 28-29.
546 Case C-433/04 Commission v. Belgium, § 27-31.
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The ECJ then observed that the withholding obligation with respect to unregistered 
service providers leads to ‘disadvantages’ which are ‘liable to deter them from accessing 
the Belgian market’ even if the disadvantages apply to foreign and domestic unregistered 
service providers alike. This case seems to reveal a willingness of the ECJ to give meaning to 
the ‘liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous’ phrase through a disadvantage 
test in direct taxation cases. A caveat should however be made, because the ECJ could have 
achieved the same conclusions in Commission v. Belgium if it had applied a discrimination 
approach. As stated earlier, Belgian resident contractors were under the obligation of 
registration as a ‘contractor’ in order to be able to provide services lawfully. Non-resident 
contractors already lawfully provide services under the regulations of their home State. 
By requiring those non-resident contractors to register again in Belgium, the registration 
requirement was a criterion which de facto leads to indirect discrimination on grounds of 
nationality.
Deutsche Shell
In Deutsche Shell the ECJ also seems to have kept the possibility open to test tax rules 
against the free movement provisions even in the absence of discrimination of cross-
border economic activity. This case concerned the refusal of deductibility in Germany 
of a currency loss suffered by an Italian permanent establishment of a company resident 
in Germany. In 1974, Deutsche Shell GmbH had set up a branch in Italy. The proceeds 
generated by that branch were recorded, in accordance with Italian law, in a commercial 
and tax account drawn up in Italian currency and, for Deutsche Shell, in a separate 
German commercial and tax account. Deutsche Shell provided its branch with start-up 
capital, which was entered in the separate German commercial and tax account with the 
DEM exchange rate prevailing at the time of each payment made in LIT. In 1992, Deutsche 
Shell transferred the assets of the branch to an Italian subsidiary; subsequently it sold the 
shares in that subsidiary to an independent third party. Between 1974 and 1992 the Italian 
Lira had lost value against the German mark. The currency loss on the start-up capital was 
not taken into account in Italy, as the profits of the Italian branch were calculated in the 
local currency. It was not taken into account in Germany either because all results from 
the Italian permanent establishment were exempt from German corporation tax under 
the applicable bilateral tax treaty. Deutsche Shell argued that this infringed its freedom of 
establishment. 
In her opinion AG Sharpston observed that both the referring court and the parties 
to the case expressed doubts on the question of whether the exclusion of the currency 
loss from the German taxable basis discriminates against cross-border economic activity 
or not. These doubts were raised by the absence of true internal comparators: a German 
branch would never be given start-up capital in a foreign currency. The AG considered 
that the answer to this question is irrelevant. According to the AG, the decisive factor is 
not whether there has been discriminatory treatment, but whether the German national 
law produces a situation which has a restrictive effect on those who wish to exercise their 
freedom of establishment.547 The AG then qualified the meaning of “restrictive effect” by 
examining whether Deutsche Shell had suffered a ‘disadvantage’. What would be decisive 
547 Opinion AG Sharpston in Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, § 35-36.
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is whether a company is disadvantaged in a cross-border situation. “The possibility 
that a company can be disadvantaged because a loss arising from an adverse currency 
fluctuation affecting transactions between it and a cross-border establishment is not taken 
into account when computing tax liability arises only where that company engages in 
cross-border establishment.” The AG then noted that this disadvantage arises as a result 
of a currency loss that can be seen only in Germany, as a result of which it is attributable 
to the decisions of the German authorities and does not flow from the co-existence of two 
tax systems.548 
The ECJ agreed with the AG’s approach. Referring to Case C-55/94 Gebhard and Case 
C-442/02 CaixaBank, it reiterated that all measures which prohibit, impede or render less 
attractive the exercise of freedom of establishment must be regarded as obstacles. The non-
deductibility of currency losses “increases” the economic risks incurred by a company 
established in one Member State wishing to set up a body in another Member State where 
the currency used is different from that of the State of origin. In such a situation, not only 
does the principal establishment face the normal risks associated with setting up such 
a body, but it must also face an additional risk of a fiscal nature where it provides start-
up capital for it. The ECJ referred in this context to § 43-44 of the AG’s opinion where 
reference was made to the opinion of AG Lenz in Halliburton (“although that was a clear 
discrimination case, the proposition is general”, AG Sharpston said). That paragraph reads 
as follows:
“Every business which intends to set up a branch must also consider the costs 
and risks associated with the disposal of assets which comprise the whole or part 
of that branch. That normally includes the real property of a business, for it is 
part of its “permanent presence”, which distinguishes activities connected with an 
establishment from those related to the provision of services. A business of that 
kind must consider the need to dispose of such property if there is a change in 
economic circumstances in relation to the time when the establishment was set 
up. Burdens which arise in that connection therefore affect, if only indirectly, the 
“taking up” of activities as self-employed persons within the meaning of [Article 
49 TFEU] and thus, so far as concerns companies from other Member States, their 
previously defined freedom to set up branches.”549
In addition, the ECJ observed in Deutsche Shell that because it exercised its freedom of 
establishment, Deutsche Shell suffered financial loss which was not taken into account 
either by the national tax authorities for the purposes of calculating the basis of assessment 
for corporation tax in Germany or with respect to the assessment for tax of its permanent 
establishment in Italy.550 It is unacceptable for a Member State to exclude from the basis 
of assessment of the principal establishment currency losses which, by their nature, can 
never be suffered by the permanent establishment.551
548 Opinion AG Sharpston in Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, § 41-42.
549 Opinion AG Lenz in Case C-1/93 Halliburton, § 18.
550 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, § 28-31.
551 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, § 44.
Chapter 8
168
It is clear that Deutsche Shell is not based on a discrimination analysis, which is 
illustrated by the fact that the ECJ refers to CaixaBank (which was a market access case), 
but rather on a disadvantage approach. Again, however, a caveat should be made for two 
reasons. First, the exclusion of the currency loss from deductibility was laid down by a 
measure which legally only applied to cross-border activity (the measure was laid down in 
a tax treaty). Second, a measure which results in the non-deductibility of currency losses 
in fact discriminates against cross-border activity because the possibility of a currency 
loss is inextricably linked to cross-border establishment.552 It is still unclear whether a 
‘disadvantage approach’ will also be followed in cases where a certain tax disadvantage 
also occurs in purely domestic situations, although the above statement of AG Lenz in 
Halliburton – to which the ECJ has indirectly referred – may indicate that the ECJ is in 
principle willing to go down that lane.
8.2.2 Relation to the theoretical optimization model
8.2.2.1 A disadvantage test?
In respect of the first phase of the optimization model – the identification of a disadvantage 
– ECJ case law on disparities is in conformity with the model: in these cases there is no 
‘disadvantage’ which can be optimized in the model. In respect of international juridical 
double taxation, the absence of rules for the avoidance of such double taxation amounts 
to an identifiable ‘disadvantage’ under phase 1 of the model (section 7.3.2). The end result 
is however in line with ECJ case law, because it would be a disrespectful application of the 
principle of free movement if a Member State were to be forced to relieve international 
juridical double taxation (section 7.4.3). In respect of the concept of discrimination against 
cross-border activity, there is in form a difference between the theoretical optimization 
model and the ECJ’s approach in direct tax cases. The ECJ formally employs a threshold 
criterion (a comparability test) in many direct tax cases before proportionality analysis can 
be performed. In fact, however, the ECJ uses a disadvantage test: a rule which taxes cross-
border activity at a higher level than domestic activity constitutes a prima facie restriction 
on free movement. It is only after this has been established that the ECJ examines whether 
the two situations are objectively comparable. This question must be answered in light 
of the object and purpose of the measure under consideration (see section 2.2.4).553 This 
means that under current ECJ case law a tax disadvantage must be able to be explained 
by the (legitimate) object and purpose of the measure under consideration. This comes 
very close to the theoretical optimization model (phase 2: the requirement of a respectful 
aim). It is therefore not surprising that there is – apart from cases like Columbus Container 
Services and D – not much ECJ case law on direct taxation which directly contravenes 
552 See for a similar statement the judgment of the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court of 30 
March 2009, No. 3264-05, in relation to the Swedish income tax system which restricts the 
deductibility of currency losses on capital to 70% of the loss. The Swedish Supreme Administrative 
Court decided that this rule contravenes freedom of establishment.
553 Case C-418/07 Société Papillon, § 27. This approach is also apparent in Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 
38. See explicitly Case C-337/08 X Holding, § 22.
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the theoretical assessment model as far as the scope of the free movement provisions is 
concerned. This is also true in respect of situations of ‘dislocation’ or ‘fragmentation’ of 
the tax base which the ECJ does not distinguish from the concepts of discrimination and 
disparity. In respect of non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement, ECJ case law 
neither expressly confirms nor rejects the ‘disadvantage’ test of the theoretical optimization 
model. All these observations will be explained in the following sub-sections.
8.2.2.2 Disparities
It has been explained in section 7.3.3 that the theoretical optimization model can only be 
applied in relation to tax measures which have been adopted by the Member State which 
is accused of restricting free movement. Therefore, the above-discussed case law of the 
ECJ on disparities is in line with the model (any disadvantage as a result of the fact that 
disparities, or variations, exist between discrete national tax systems is outside the scope 
of the free movement provisions).
8.2.2.3 International juridical double taxation
In the event that a disadvantage arises as a result of the fact that a taxpayer is exposed to 
direct taxation in two (or more) States in respect of the same income, the question arises 
of whether one of those States should provide for the avoidance of double taxation. In the 
framework of the development of a theoretical optimization model, the specific question 
arises of whether the absence of such a provision – and consequently full taxation in both 
States on the same income – can meaningfully be assessed in such a model. It has been 
submitted in section 7.4.3 that this question should ultimately be answered negatively. It 
has been observed there that international juridical double taxation arises as a result of the 
simultaneous application by States of nationality, residence and source as criteria to define 
their tax jurisdiction. The principle of free movement cannot, however, prescribe that a 
Member State only uses one criterion to define its tax jurisdiction on the ground that only 
in that scenario can the Member State not be accused of contributing to international 
juridical double taxation. The principle of direct tax sovereignty prima facie requires that 
a State is maximally free to adopt – within its domestic jurisdiction – measures of general 
tax and economic policy and to determine the objectives it wants to pursue through these 
measures. 
This explains a case like Van Hilten. This case concerned a situation in which the 
Netherlands had defined its inheritance tax jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality 
of the testator. Van Hilten died on 22 November 1997. Of Netherlands nationality, she 
had been resident in the Netherlands until the start of 1988, then in Belgium and, from 
1991, in Switzerland. Her heirs were assessed to pay inheritance tax calculated on the 
basis of Art. 3(1) of the Netherlands Succession Tax Law (Successiewet 1956). Under this, 
a Netherlands national, who, having resided in the Netherlands, dies within ten years 
of ceasing to so reside, is deemed to have been resident in the Netherlands at the time 
of death. The question arose as to whether or not this legislation is a restriction on the 
free movement of capital (Article 63 TFEU). The ECJ held that national legislation that 
provides that the estate of a national of a Member State who dies within ten years of ceasing 
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to reside in that Member State is to be taxed as if that national had continued to reside in 
that Member State, whilst granting relief in respect of the taxes levied in the Member State 
to which the deceased transferred his residence, is not a restriction on the free movement 
of capital.554 By enacting identical taxation provisions for the estates of (1) nationals 
who have transferred their residence abroad and (2) of those who have remained in the 
Member State concerned, such legislation cannot discourage the former from investing 
in that Member State from another Member State nor the latter from doing so in another 
Member State from the Member State concerned. Nor can this reduce the value of the 
estate of a national who has transferred his residence abroad. The fact that the legislation 
covers neither nationals resident abroad for more than ten years nor those who have never 
resided in the Member State concerned is irrelevant. As it only applies to nationals of 
the Member State concerned, this is not a restriction on the free movement of capital of 
nationals of other Member States.555 With regard to the differences in treatment, resulting 
from national legislation such as that in question, between residents who are nationals of 
the Member State concerned and those who are nationals of other Member States, the ECJ 
stated that it must be observed that these distinctions, for the purposes of allocating the 
powers of taxation, cannot be regarded as a discrimination prohibited by Article 63 TFEU. 
Rather, the restrictions are derived from the Member States’ power to define, by a tax 
treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation.556 In my view, the 
last observation of the ECJ can be explained by noting that it is not unreasonable that the 
Netherlands had chosen not to exercise tax jurisdiction over non-resident persons who do 
not have Netherlands nationality. After all, for the purposes of the allocation of powers of 
taxation, it is not unreasonable for the Member States to find inspiration in international 
practice and, particularly, the model conventions drawn up by the OECD. The Dutch 
legislation in question complies with the commentaries in the Model Double Taxation 
Convention concerning Inheritances and Gifts (Report of the Fiscal Affairs Committee 
of the OECD, 1982). Although the same commentaries state also that the scope can be 
extended to cover not only nationals of the State concerned but also residents who are not 
nationals of that State, the ECJ apparently held that it was not unreasonable not to extend 
this scope to non-nationals (which is, in my view, in line with general rules on legislative 
jurisdiction under customary international law: non-resident persons who do not have 
Netherlands nationality should not be taxed on their worldwide estate or income; see 
section 5.2). As a consequence of this reasonable choice, the Netherlands treated every 
testator within its domestic jurisdiction, which was delimited by several different criteria 
such as residence and nationality, equally. 
It follows that the above-discussed case law of the ECJ on international juridical 
double taxation is in line with the model. As a consequence, the criticism of Kofler and 
Mason,557 discussed in 2.2.5, seems to be unjustified. The same is true for Wattel’s position 
that Member States are under the obligation to grant a tax credit for foreign withholding 
554 Case C-513/03 Van Hilten, § 45.
555 Case C-513/03 Van Hilten, § 46.
556 Case C-513/03 Van Hilten, § 47.
557 Kofler & Mason 2007, p 79-81. See for a critical analysis also Snell 2007, p 360 et seq.
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taxes on the basis of Case C-319/02 Manninen.558 This case concerned Finnish legislation 
whereby Finland granted a full imputation tax credit to Finnish shareholders in respect 
of Finnish corporate income tax levied on profits distributed as dividends. No tax credit 
in respect of foreign corporate income tax levied on foreign-source profits distributed 
as dividends was, however, granted. The ECJ held that Article 56 EC (free movement 
of capital; Article 63 TFEU) required Finland to extend this tax credit to account for 
corporate income tax levied on dividends from another Member State - in this case, 
Sweden.559 In the light of the theoretical assessment model, the view is erroneous that 
this would force a Member State to grant a tax credit to resident taxpayers in respect 
of foreign withholding tax on dividends levied by a source State.560 In such a case the 
Member State has not chosen to have an imputation tax system, but merely a classical 
system of economic double taxation of dividends (see section 5.4.2). In such a case, there 
is no ‘disadvantage’ in a cross-border situation which can meaningfully be optimized: in 
both cases the residence State levies an equal amount of (corporate) income tax from the 
shareholder.561 An obligation to refrain from taxing a resident shareholder in this situation 
would essentially prohibit taxation as such, which would be a disrespectful application 
of the principle of free movement.562 To put it differently, the objective of raising public 
funds by taxing dividends with (corporate) income tax cannot be achieved by taxation 
in another State.563 This fundamentally distinguishes Manninen from withholding taxes 
in a classical system, because the objective of avoiding economic double taxation by 
refraining from taxing the dividend in the hands of the shareholder can be achieved by 
extending the imputation system cross-border. This in no way disrespects the principle 
of tax sovereignty, because the ECJ fundamentally respects the fact that a Member State 
is completely at liberty to choose whether or not to have an imputation tax system. If it 
chooses to introduce such a system, however, it should not impose disadvantages in cross-
border situations. The ECJ has therefore rightly decided in Orange European Smallcap 
Fund that a Member State which has a classical system has no obligation to refund foreign 
withholding tax on dividends paid to a resident shareholder.564 
558 Terra & Wattel 2008, p 402.
559 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, § 44.
560 Wattel calls this a “mutual recognition of withholding taxes” in the event that a Member State 
grants a tax credit for domestic withholding tax against (corporate) income tax; Terra & Wattel 
2008, p 402.
561 In domestic cases, a withholding tax is only a mechanism to levy (corporate) income tax from 
the shareholder at an earlier point in time. 
562 See explicitly Case C-336/96 Gilly, § 48.
563 This is what the ECJ means in Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres, § 19, where it states that 
the position of a shareholder receiving dividends is not necessarily altered merely by the fact 
that he receives those dividends from a company established in another Member State which, in 
exercising its fiscal sovereignty, makes those dividends subject to a deduction at source by way 
of income tax.
564 C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund, § 34 et seq.
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8.2.2.4 Measures for the avoidance of international juridical double taxation
In section 8.2.1.4, the cases of De Groot, AMID and Mertens, Seabrokers, Krankenheim 
Ruhesitz am Wannsee, and Orange European Smallcap Fund have been discussed. In all of 
these cases the ECJ decided that, although double taxation is not as such contrary to the EU 
free movement provisions, a Member State cannot disregard these provisions once it has 
implemented measures for the avoidance of international juridical double taxation. This 
is fully in line with the theoretical optimization model.565 The optimization of measures 
implemented by Member States is in no way disrespectful towards the principle of tax 
sovereignty: the choices made by a Member State in the exercise of its tax sovereignty are 
fully respected. The Dutch wish to avoid double taxation in De Groot was fully respected; 
also, after the Netherlands had been obliged to design those rules in accordance with the 
notion of ability to pay which underlay its income tax system, the scope of application of 
this notion was underinclusive (phase 4 of the model). The absence of rules in AMID and 
Mertens which allow for the carry-over of positive foreign source income in situations 
where the foreign income is positive and the domestic income is negative, as a result of 
which no effective exemption can be given in that year, could not be explained by the wish 
to achieve a balanced allocation of taxing powers between the Member States, because 
it resulted in taxation by Belgium of foreign profits not taxable in Belgium under the 
applicable tax treaty. Again, the Belgian wish to divide tax jurisdiction was fully respected, 
even after Belgium had been obliged to introduce rules for the carry-over of foreign 
profits. This was also the case in Seabrokers: in view of the objective of achieving a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers between Norway and the United Kingdom, the allocation of 
interest expenses unrelated to foreign income and group contributions could be taken out 
without harming the objectives pursued in the exercise of Norway’s tax sovereignty: the 
rules which linked costs to foreign income were overinclusive. The same is true for the 
case of Deutsche Shell (discussed in section 8.2.1.5). In view of the objective of avoiding 
international juridical double taxation it did not make sense to exempt currency results 
which can by definition never lead to double taxation in two jurisdictions: the German 
exemption rule was overinclusive in relation to its objective. The qualification by the ECJ 
in Krankenheim of the German recapture rule as a prima facie restriction on freedom of 
establishment can also be explained by the theoretical optimization model. This recapture 
leads to an identifiable disadvantage within the meaning of phase 1 of the mode, which 
has a respectful objective in view of the wish to divide tax jurisdiction, which is suitable, 
has a sufficient degree of fit, which is the most subsidiary means to achieve that objective, 
but which might be disproportionate in cases where a certain loss cannot be taken into 
account anywhere without this being the result of a mere disparity between tax systems.566 
The decisions in these aforementioned cases do not deny the taxing right of a Member 
State as such, but merely optimize the measures taken by the Member States in the exercise 
of their sovereignty. This makes it possible to eliminate a lot of ‘disadvantages’. The case 
565 It is, therefore, remarkable that the ECJ seems to have had a different view in Joined Cases 
C‑436/08 and C‑437/08 Haribo and Österreichische Salinen, § 170-172.
566 Compare for this notion of ‘final’ losses Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer and Case C-414/06 Lidl 
Belgium.
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of Orange European Smallcap Fund can also be explained by the theoretical optimization 
model. The ECJ essentially decided that it is not contrary to free movement to divide 
tax jurisdiction in bilateral tax treaties in respect of investments in one Member State, 
while still taxing the income from the same investments in another Member State. This 
disadvantage does not have a disrespectful objective: division of taxing powers is possible 
only if both Member States agree to a tax treaty. Thus, no optimization is possible. The end 
result of ECJ case law and the model is, therefore, the same.
It is less easy to explain the case of Columbus Container Services – also discussed in 
section 8.2.1.4 – by the theoretical optimization model. The unilateral German switch-
over from the exemption rule to a credit mechanism in the case of low-taxed foreign 
permanent establishments of a German undertaking can undoubtedly be optimized 
under the model: it is an anti-abuse measure with a clear objective. The classification of the 
measure was clearly overinclusive in some situations (phase 4 of the model). The German 
switch-over could have been optimized against the free movement provisions without in 
any way harming the principle of German tax sovereignty. Columbus is, therefore, a wrong 
decision in the light of the model. 
The case of Haribo and Österreichische Salinen is also difficult to explain in the light 
of the theoretical optimization model. It is difficult to see why the ECJ did not require a 
carry-forward of the foreign withholding similar to its decisions in AMID and Mertens. 
All of these cases concerned situations where the tax jurisdiction was divided by a tax 
treaty which, in principle, provided for the avoidance of international juridical double 
taxation. This objective could have been realized in Haribo and Österreichische Salinen by 
prescribing a carry-forward of the foreign withholding tax without harming the principle 
of direct tax sovereignty.
8.2.2.5 Discrimination
Introduction
Although the ECJ often formally uses a comparability test in order to assess whether a 
certain tax measure falls within the scope of the free movement provisions, there are in 
practice very few cases where the theoretical optimization model’s ‘disadvantage’ test 
would have led to a different result. The line of reasoning, however, is sometimes a little 
different. This will be discussed now.
Disadvantageous treatment of cross-border movement
Legislative classifications on grounds of cross-border movement should theoretically be 
seen as a prima facie limit to the principle of free movement (section 7.3.2). In addition, any 
legislative classification which has the effect of discouraging cross-border activity should 
qualify as a prima facie limit. In principle, ECJ case law is in harmony with the model 
in this regard. For instance, a tax exemption based on the criterion that the company 
should employ at least five people in the territory of the Member State concerned leads to 
covert discrimination on grounds of nationality.567 This evidences that the ECJ employs 
– in line with the theoretical optimization model – a broad interpretation of the concept 
567 Case C-464/05 Geurts and Vogten, § 19-22.
Chapter 8
174
of discrimination on grounds of nationality and of the prohibition of obstacles to free 
movement. This is again underlined by the fact that the ECJ does not accept jurisdictional 
arguments per se in respect of the unequal treatment by the Member State of origin.
However, the case law which concerns equal treatment in the source State is problematic 
in view of the theoretical optimization model insofar as it excludes from the scope of 
the principle of free movement any negative items of income outside the scope of the 
source State’s tax jurisdiction. The Futura case, discussed above, can serve as an example. 
Futura Participations SA, a company with its seat in Paris, had a Luxembourg branch, 
Singer. Futura sought to set off, for Luxembourg corporate income tax purposes, ‘French’ 
losses incurred by the head office against the profits of the Luxembourg branch. Under 
Luxembourg law, the losses must be economically linked to the income in Luxembourg, 
so that only losses arising from Futura’s activities in Luxembourg could be considered. 
According to the ECJ, “such a system, which is in conformity with the fiscal principle of 
territoriality, cannot be regarded as entailing any discrimination” prohibited by EU law.568 
Theoretically, it would have been better to qualify the Luxembourg measure as a prima facie 
restriction on freedom of establishment. Subsequently, it could have been observed that 
the restrictive measure had a legitimate objective: to preserve inter-nation equity (profits 
and losses of the head office should be taken into account in France only, both under 
customary international law and the applicable tax treaty). The restrictive measure has a 
sufficient degree of fit and is suitable to achieve its objective. As regards the question of 
whether the restrictive measure was the most subsidiary measure to achieve its objective, 
the ECJ could have stated that Luxembourg’s apparent wish not to interfere in the domestic 
jurisdiction of France by allowing loss relief for one of its resident companies could not 
have been achieved by another, less burdensome measure (compare section 5.3). Finally, 
the last step of the theoretical optimization model should have been applied: the question 
of whether the cost to free movement caused by the tax measure is in proportion to the 
objectives pursued by it. Here the ECJ could have held that this cost is disproportionately 
high where the French head office losses cannot be taken into account locally.569
The Schumacker-doctrine is ultimately, in result, not problematic in relation to the 
theoretical optimization model. The reasoning which leads to that result would however 
have been different under the model. Contrary to the model, the ECJ has held that a rule 
which refuses a certain deduction for income tax purposes in relation to non-resident 
taxpayers does not constitute a prima facie restriction on free movement. It reasoned as 
follows. First, it stated that in relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of 
non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable. Then it considered:
“32. Income received in the territory of a Member State by a non-resident is in 
most cases only a part of his total income, which is concentrated at his place of 
residence. Moreover, a non-resident’ s personal ability to pay tax, determined by 
reference to his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances, 
is more easy to assess at the place where his personal and financial interests are 
centred. In general, that is the place where he has his usual abode. Accordingly, 
568 Case C-250/95 Futura Participations SA and Singer, § 22.
569 Compare Case C-414/06 Lidl Belgium.
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international tax law, and in particular the Model Double Taxation Treaty of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), recognizes 
that in principle the overall taxation of taxpayers, taking account of their personal 
and family circumstances, is a matter for the State of residence. 
33. The situation of a resident is different in so far as the major part of his income is 
normally concentrated in the State of residence. Moreover, that State generally has 
available all the information needed to assess the taxpayer’s overall ability to pay, 
taking account of his personal and family circumstances. 
34. Consequently, the fact that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident 
certain tax benefits which it grants to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory 
since those two categories of taxpayer are not in a comparable situation. 
35. Accordingly, [Article 39 EC] does not in principle preclude the application 
of rules of a Member State under which a non-resident working as an employed 
person in that Member State is taxed more heavily on his income than a resident 
in the same employment. 
36. The position is different, however, in a case such as this one where the non-
resident receives no significant income in the State of his residence and obtains 
the major part of his taxable income from an activity performed in the State of 
employment, with the result that the State of his residence is not in a position to 
grant him the benefits resulting from the taking into account of his personal and 
family circumstances. 
37. There is no objective difference between the situations of such a non-resident 
and a resident engaged in comparable employment, such as to justify different 
treatment as regards the taking into account for taxation purposes of the taxpayer’s 
personal and family circumstances. 
38. In the case of a non-resident who receives the major part of his income and 
almost all his family income in a Member State other than that of his residence, 
discrimination arises from the fact that his personal and family circumstances 
are taken into account neither in the State of residence nor in the State of 
employment.”570
Paragraph 38 in particular of the judgment has been criticized by Wattel,571 who obviously 
has a point here. One cannot establish discrimination in the source State by referring to 
what the residence State has or has not done. The ECJ could however have achieved the 
same result if it had used the theoretical assessment model:
The refusal to allow a deduction related to personal circumstances for non-resident i. 
taxpayers constitutes a disadvantage for cross-border movement of workers. 
This ii. prima facie restriction has a respectful aim, namely to give effect to practice 
in international tax law, reflected in the OECD Model Tax Convention, to allocate 
costs related to personal circumstances of a taxpayer to his State of residence.572
570 Case C-279/93 Schumacker, § 30 et seq.
571 Terra & Wattel 2008, p 392.
572 See Case C-385/00 De Groot where the ECJ decided that these costs cannot be allocated by the 
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The rule is suitable to achieve its objective.iii. 
The rule which excludes deductibility has a sufficient degree of fit in relation to its iv. 
objective.
The rule is the most subsidiary means to achieve its objective (allocation of the v. 
costs to the residence State).
The rule is however disproportionate in relation to its objective insofar that the vi. 
taxpayer is unable to claim an effective deduction in his State of residence, which is 
the case if a non-resident taxpayer receives the major part of his income and almost 
all his family income in a Member State other than that of his residence.
In this way, the ECJ could have avoided much of the criticism, because this approach shows 
a disadvantage from a source State’s perspective. Also, it becomes clear that the judgment 
essentially applies the test of proportionality stricto sensu, thereby not overstepping the 
ECJ’s competence.
The above-discussed case of Renneberg concerned a combination of Futura and 
Schumacker. To recall the facts, Mr. Renneberg lived in Belgium and worked in the 
Netherlands. His dwelling in Belgium was financed with a loan on which he paid interest. 
This interest could not be deducted in the Netherlands because the Belgium-Netherlands 
tax treaty allocated both positive and negative income from that dwelling exclusively to 
Belgium. The ECJ applied the Schumacker-doctrine to the negative income (i.e. the interest 
payments), notwithstanding the fact that this income was outside the source State’s (the 
Netherlands’) tax jurisdiction.573 A person who derives most of his taxable income from 
salaried employment in another Member State and has no significant income in his 
Member State of residence is, for the purposes of taking into account his ability to pay tax, 
in a situation objectively comparable, with regard to his Member State of employment, to 
that of a resident of that Member State who is also in salaried employment there. Therefore, 
free movement of workers required the Netherlands to take Renneberg’s negative income 
into account for the purposes of determining the basis of assessment of taxable income. 
The ECJ could also have achieved this result by using the theoretical optimization model:
The refusal to allow the interest deduction constitutes a disadvantage for cross-i. 
border movement of workers. 
This ii. prima facie restriction has a respectful aim, namely to maintain a balanced 
allocation of taxing powers between the Member States: the allocation of income 
to the State where the real estate is located.
The rule is suitable to achieve its objective.iii. 
The rule which excludes deductibility has a sufficient degree of fit in relation to its iv. 
objective.
The rule is the most subsidiary means to achieve its objective (allocation of the v. 
costs to the residence State).
State of residence to the source State. Compare also Case E-7/07 Seabrokers where the EFTA 
Court decided that the residence State can only allocate costs to the source State if those costs are 
directly linked to income in the source State. This is in line with Case C-234/01 Gerritse where 
the ECJ explained that only those costs fall with source State jurisdiction. 
573 Case C-527/06 Renneberg, § 66-68.
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The rule is however disproportionate in relation to its objective insofar that the vi. 
taxpayer is unable to claim an effective deduction in his State of residence, which 
is the case if a non-resident taxpayer receives the major part of his income in the 
State of employment.
This means that Kemmeren’s criticism of this judgment – Renneberg would have concerned 
a case of dislocation of the tax base and not one of restriction of free movement of workers 
– is not justified by the theoretical assessment model.574 Application of the model leads 
to a better optimization of the principles involved than the black-and-white approach of 
dislocation (section 8.2.2.6). 
A difference between Renneberg and Futura is that the first case concerned a natural 
person who is taxed by taking into account his ability to pay, whereas the last case 
concerned a company which by definition has no personal circumstances.575 If the ECJ 
had explained its reasoning in Futura, Schumacker and Renneberg in this way it would 
have been in line with the theoretical optimization model.
This would have been more difficult in the above-discussed case of D. To recapitulate, 
the ECJ refused to extend to other EU nationals the allowance granted by the Netherlands 
for its wealth tax, on the basis of a bilateral tax treaty, to residents of Belgium who own 
real property in the Netherlands. According to the ECJ, residents of Belgium were not 
comparable to other EU nationals because of the necessarily limited personal scope of 
the bilateral tax treaty. This is, however, a petitio principii: this was exactly the taxpayer’s 
complaint.576 Application of the theoretical optimization model would have produced the 
following reasoning:
There is disadvantageous treatment of a tax resident in another Member State than i. 
Belgium. 
This ii. prima facie restriction on free movement of capital does not have a respectful 
aim, because the objective of the rule in the bilateral tax treaty which grants the 
advantage to residents of Belgium is discriminatory in itself.
The rule which granted the advantage did not have anything to do with the allocation 
of taxing rights between the Netherlands and Belgium.577 It led to an advantage, within 
the Netherlands wealth tax jurisdiction with respect to real property located there, to 
certain taxpayers only. Contrary to the ECJ’s decision, the reciprocity inherent in every 
bilateral tax treaty cannot justify this different treatment, because the rule in the tax treaty 
is discriminatory in itself and is, therefore, disrespectful towards the principle of free 
movement: its very aim is to grant an advantage to some taxpayers only in the market place 
(i.e. the tax jurisdiction as delimited by the tax treaty).578 Thus, the case of D is a case of 
574 Kemmeren 2009.
575 This may also explain the outcome in Case C-231/05 Oy AA: a restriction which is justified and 
not disproportionate.
576 See Van Thiel 2005 for harsh but deserved criticism on this judgment.
577 Hilling 2005, p 325, rightly points this out.
578 Case C-376/03 D. v. Inspecteur, § 61.
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which the result cannot be explained by the theoretical assessment model. It is, therefore, 
submitted that the D case was wrongly decided. The ECJ should have decided that the tax 
treaty rule led to a disadvantage for Mr. D which did not have a respectful aim.
Equal treatment in the Member State of origin: the cases of Cadbury Schweppes, FII, 
Columbus Container Services and Haribo
These cases – discussed in section 8.2.1.4 – require special attention, because they seem to 
be at odds with each other.579 In Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ held that the CFC legislation 
in question prima facie infringed freedom of establishment, because it did not apply to 
i) domestic subsidiaries and ii) foreign subsidiaries established in a Member State with a 
‘normal’ tax rate. In FII, the ECJ held that an exemption system for domestic dividends 
and an imputation system for foreign dividends did not constitute an infringement of 
freedom of establishment or free movement of capital provided that the application of an 
imputation system also for domestic dividends would have had the same factual result as 
an exemption system. Clearly, this argument also applies to CFC legislation in domestic 
situations: this leads to the same effective tax burden as an ‘exemption’ of CFC legislation 
in situations where both the domestic parent company and the domestic subsidiary are 
subject to the same corporate income tax rules. In Columbus, the ECJ decided that the 
unilateral German switch-over from the exemption rule to a credit mechanism in the 
case of lowly taxed foreign permanent establishments of a German undertaking does 
not result in a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment on the ground that 
a permanent establishment in a Member State with a ‘normal’ tax rate is not subject to 
the switch-over to the credit method. In Cadbury Schweppes, however, the ECJ had held 
that a similar difference between two foreign subsidiaries did constitute a prima facie 
restriction on freedom of establishment. In Haribo, the ECJ held – in the context of the 
Austrian system of avoiding economic double taxation on dividend payments – that the 
different treatment of income from one non–member State compared to income from 
another non‑member State is not concerned, as such, by Article 63 TFEU. The ECJ did 
not, therefore, review whether the exemption of a dividend arising in one non-member 
State and the taxation of a dividend arising in another non-member State constitutes a 
restriction on free movement of capital. 
The question arises as to how these judgments can be reconciled. It has been argued 
in section 8.2.2.4 that the switch-over rule in Columbus could undoubtedly have been 
optimized under the theoretical optimization model: it is an anti-abuse measure with 
a clear objective. The classification of the measure was overinclusive in some situations 
(phase 4 of the model). Columbus was, therefore, wrongly decided. The judgments in 
Cadbury Schweppes and FII can be distinguished from each other. The first case concerned 
a clear anti-abuse provision which can be optimized under the theoretical optimization 
model. The latter case concerned a general system for the avoidance of economic double 
taxation. Such a system is in principle allowed to stand, as long as it does not lead to a 
disadvantage for cross-border dividends. It is, therefore, not at odds with the theoretical 
optimization model that the ECJ concluded that the difference between domestic and 
foreign subsidiaries in Cadbury Schweppes led to a prima facie restriction on freedom of 
579 Compare Monsenego 2011, p 107 et seq. for a discussion.
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establishment, whereas the distinction between domestic and foreign dividends in FII did 
not lead to a prima facie restriction. The case of Haribo cannot, however, be explained by 
the theoretical optimization model. The taxation of a dividend from a non-member State 
as compared to the exemption of a dividend from another non-member State constitutes 
a disadvantage with a clear anti-avoidance objective which is capable of being optimized 
under the model similar to the Cadbury Schweppes case.
Discrimination on grounds of legal form
It has been indicated in section 8.2.1.4 that ECJ case law tends towards a separate 
application of the criterion of free choice of legal form in direct taxation cases. On the 
basis of the theoretical optimization model, this should indeed be expected.
8.2.2.6 No dislocations 
It follows from the account provided in 8.2.1 that the ECJ generally does not distinguish 
situations of ‘dislocation’ or ‘fragmentation’ of the tax base from the concepts of 
discrimination and disparity. Discrimination analysis is performed in respect of any rule 
which results in a disadvantageous treatment of cross-border activity.580 This is fully in 
line with the theoretical optimization model which requires a ‘disadvantage’ test to be met, 
followed by an optimization process where black-and-white results are avoided. It follows 
that the criticism of the ECJ by Wattel581 and Weber582, discussed in section 2.2.5, is not 
justified by the model. After all, the model requires that the principles of free movement 
and tax sovereignty are optimized to the largest extent possible. The approach to stop 
this optimization process as soon as a ’dislocation’ has been identified is not capable of 
reaching the optimum position between tax sovereignty and free movement.
8.2.2.7 Non-discriminatory tax measures
According to the theoretical optimization model, any direct tax measure which leads 
to a certain ‘disadvantage’ comes within its scope. This test merely serves to identify the 
disadvantage in question: which amount of tax should be refunded in case the court would 
find in favour of the taxpayer? Although direct taxation as such will not ultimately give 
rise to a prohibited restriction on free movement, provided that the taxation at issue does 
not render free movement illusionary, the question of how a certain tax measure should 
be optimized in view of the principle of free movement should not be verified in the first 
phase of the theoretical optimization model, but rather in all its subsequent phases (section 
7.3). At present, the vast majority of ECJ case law in the field of direct taxation does not 
concern situations in which genuinely non-discriminatory tax measures were at issue. As 
a consequence, the ECJ has not been in the position to decide under which circumstances, 
if at all, a non-discriminatory tax measure can be tested for compatibility with the free 
movement provisions. The ECJ has always left it open as to whether it is prepared to test 
580 See Douma 2006.




truly non-discriminatory tax rules which lead to a ‘disadvantage’. The language used by the 
ECJ continues to use (also) the Säger formula involving national rules which are ‘liable to 
prohibit or otherwise impede’ economic activities, irrespective of any discrimination.583 
This is especially clear from the above-discussed case of Commission v. Belgium.584 In my 
view, the above-discussed case of Deutsche Shell585 provides a clear indication that the ECJ 
is willing to extend the scope of the free movement provisions beyond direct tax measures 
which discriminate against cross-border economic activity. This is notwithstanding the 
above-discussed cases of Viacom Outdoor and Mobistar (section 8.2.1), where the ECJ 
held that the non-discriminatory tax measures at issue did not constitute a restriction on 
free movement, because the ‘disadvantage’ in those cases would in any event have served a 
‘respectful’ objective which cannot be optimized further under the model (section 7.4.2). 
The case of Sandoz confirms this because this is a case where the ECJ seems to have labelled 
a tax rule as such as a restriction on free movement, which was allowed to stand because of 
its wholly neutral application in the tax jurisdiction. Still, current ECJ case law is neither 
expressly confirming nor rejecting the ‘disadvantage’ test of the theoretical optimization 
model. On the basis of the theoretical optimization model it should be expected that the 
ECJ will confirm the ‘disadvantage’ test in future case law, as will be discussed now.
8.2.3 Future developments
8.2.3.1 Introduction
On the basis of the preceding section it should be expected that the ECJ will continue 
its position on disparities, international juridical double taxation and dislocations. 
In addition, it should be expected that the ECJ will also in form turn to an approach 
where every legislative classification or ‘disadvantage’ causes a prima facie infringement 
of free movement. Also, it should be expected that the ECJ will be prepared to review 
non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement. These two expectations are now 
discussed.
8.2.3.2 Moving away from a comparability test
It follows from the theoretical optimization model that the ECJ should not formally apply 
a comparability test in direct taxation cases as a gateway to the free movement provisions 
and the proportionality test.586 Every ‘disadvantage’ caused by a direct tax rule in a cross-
583 Case C-76/90 Säger, § 12.
584 Case C-433/04 Commission v. Belgium.
585 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell GmbH.
586 It should be noted that there are many cases in which the ECJ refrains from performing such 
a test at the beginning of the legal reasoning; in these cases this test is performed in the stage 
between the finding of a prima facie restriction and justification analysis. Compare for example 
Case C-256/06 Jäger, where the ECJ first considered that the tax measure in question amounted 
to a prima facie restriction on free movement of capital and subsequently examined whether 
the domestic and cross-border situation were objectively comparable. See also Case C-337/08 X 
Holding, § 20.
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border situation should be within the scope of these provisions. It has been argued in 
section 8.2.2 that the case law which concerns equal treatment in the source State is 
problematic in view of the theoretical optimization model insofar as it excludes from the 
scope of the principle of free movement any negative items of income outside the scope 
of the source State’s tax jurisdiction (the Futura and Schumacker case law), although – 
as explained above – the ‘scoping-out’ by the ECJ may be more of an academic than a 
practical nature. The recent case C-527/06 Renneberg, also discussed above, seems to 
have aligned the case law with the theoretical optimization model. It may on grounds of 
the model be expected that the ECJ will further pursue this route. As a consequence, it 
should be expected that the ECJ will bring any direct tax rule which makes a distinction 
on grounds of cross-border movement within the scope of free movement, the nature or 
reason for the distinction being immaterial at that stage. 
8.2.3.3 Non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement
Introduction
It has been argued in section 8.2.2.7 that it is at present unclear under which circumstances, 
if at all, a non-discriminatory tax measure can be tested for compatibility with the free 
movement provisions. On the basis of the theoretical optimization model it should be 
expected that the ECJ will bring any direct tax rule which applies in cross-border situations 
within the scope of the free movement provisions.587 As mentioned previously, the direct 
tax cases of Deutsche Shell and Commission v. Belgium are indications to this effect. 
A further illustration is provided by settled case law outside the area of taxation.588 In 
Säger, the ECJ held that the free movement provisions require not only the elimination of 
all discrimination on grounds of nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, when 
it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede economic activities.589 A national measure 
which is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede economic activities restricts free movement 
even in cases where there is no allegation of discrimination on grounds of nationality.590 The 
alleged ‘problem’ with this formulation is that it makes no reference to the size or scale of 
the impediment: it is sufficient that there is one or liable to be one (there is no de minimis 
rule).591 According to AG Tizzano, the absence of a borderline would result in “a market 
in which rules are prohibited as a matter of principle, except for those necessary and 
proportionate to meeting imperative requirements in the public interest.”592 Ultimately, 
in the words of AG Tesauro, the question is whether EU free movement is “intended to 
liberalize intra-Community trade or (…) more generally to encourage the unhindered 
pursuit of commerce in individual Member States”.593
587 Kokott and Ost 2011 do not exclude a development to this effect.
588 See the insightful article by Snell 2010.
589 Case C-76/90 Säger, § 12. See also Case C-19/92 Kraus; Case C-55/94 Gebhard, § 37, and more 
recently Case C-298/05 Columbus Container Services, § 34, and the case law cited there. 
590 Case C-169/07 Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft, § 33, and the Opinion of AG Sharpston in case 
Case C-96/08 CIBA, § 39.
591 See Barnard 2010, p 258. Compare Case C-233/09 Dijkman, § 42.
592 Opinion AG Tizzano in Case C-442/02 CaixaBank France, § 63.
593 Opinion AG Tesauro in Case C-292/92 Hünermund, § 1.
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Indeed, as Snell has said, “[t]he most fundamental question for free movement law 
remains whether the law is about discrimination and anti-protectionism, in which case 
a relative or comparative test based on a perceptible disparate impact is appropriate, 
or whether it is about economic freedom, in which case an absolute test not involving 
comparisons is necessary.”594 In order to avoid this stark choice, several AG opinions have 
made a distinction between national measures which restrict access to and exercise of an 
activity respectively. According to Snell, the notion of market access envisages “a third way 
between anti-protectionism and economic freedom.”595 The meaning of this distinction is, 
however, by no means clear and has so far not expressly been applied by the ECJ in cases 
concerning free movement of persons, services and capital, although the term ‘market 
access’ is often mentioned. On the contrary, the ECJ has in some cases refused to apply 
the concept of market access. In recent case law, the ECJ seems to have focused more on 
the degree to which national measures affected free movement. The present section will 
discuss these developments. It will be concluded that they are supported by the theoretical 
optimization model and that a similar development should be expected in direct taxation 
cases.
A distinction between access to and exercise of an activity?
In Bosman, AG Lenz suggested that the ECJ draw a distinction between measures which 
regulate access to activity and measures which are directed more to the exercise of that 
activity.596 AG Fenelly supported this approach in Graf. In his view, “the imposition of 
conditions regarding entry to the market or the taking up of economic activity is itself 
sufficient to establish the existence of a restriction, even if the condition can be relatively 
easily satisfied (this being an element in determining whether or not the restriction is 
justified). The same, broadly speaking, can probably also be said of formal conditions 
imposed regarding matters which are intimately connected with successful access to 
the market, such as those governing recognition of a qualification which is necessary or 
beneficial to the exercise of many professional activities.”597 If, however, “it were proposed 
to treat as restrictions on the exercise of freedom of movement neutral national rules 
which allegedly preclude, deter, impede, hinder or render less attractive such exercise 
simply by raising material barriers, for example, by establishing commercial and regulatory 
conditions in the market in question which are less enticing than in other Member States, 
or by offering benefits which would be lost in the event that a worker changed employment, 
those criteria could not be applied in the same way as in the case of a formal condition”. 
Such rules should in the view of the AG only amount to a restriction on free movement 
in the case of a direct effect on access to the market in question “if the Treaty is not to 
be exploited as a means of challenging any national rules whose effect is simply to limit 
commercial freedom.” Thus, “neutral national rules could only be deemed to constitute 
material barriers to market access, if it were established that they had actual effects on 
594 Snell 2010, p 470. See also Maduro 1998, p 58-60.
595 Snell 2010, p 471.
596 Opinion AG Lenz in Case C-415/93 Bosman, § 205.
597 Opinion AG Fenelly in Case C-190/98 Graf, § 30.
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market actors akin to exclusion from the market.”598 AG Alber does not agree with the 
approach taken by AG Lenz and AG Fenelly. In Lehtonen, he stated that the filter of the 
distinction between access to and exercise of an activity is not necessary outside the free 
movement of goods.599
Snell has criticised the “superficial appeal” of the distinction between access and 
exercise. First, the normative justification for the approach would be dubious. “Whether 
or not the limitation of economic freedom operates at the access stage or at the exercise 
state is irrelevant, all that matters is how much the profitability is reduced.” To put 
it differently, “the impact of a measure on cross-border situations is a function of its 
restrictiveness, and does not depend on the stage at which it operates.” The effect on free 
movement is the same.600 Second, the distinction is difficult to apply in practice.601 Third, 
the language of Article 49(2) TFEU seems to require a similar approach to access and 
exercise regulations.602 Snell emphasizes that the ECJ has not accepted the difference 
either. Commission v. Denmark603 is an example. A resident of Denmark was entitled in 
principle to use in Denmark only a vehicle registered in that Member State and provided 
with registration plates before use. The registration of a vehicle in Denmark is subject 
to payment of a registration tax. In later legislation this requirement was softened. First, 
according to the amended scheme, a vehicle registered in another Member State no 
longer had to be registered with Danish registration plates. Second, the amended scheme 
provided that the registration tax no longer had to be paid at the full rate, but on a pro-
rata basis according to the amount of time the vehicle is used in Denmark. Under ‘the 
temporary registration tax’ the Danish customs and tax authorities may, on request, 
authorize payment of registration tax for taxable motor vehicles which are registered for 
temporary use in Denmark inter alia if the motor vehicle is made available by a company 
or a fixed establishment located abroad to a person resident in Denmark for business and 
private use in the foreign country concerned and in Denmark, where the employment by 
the undertaking or the fixed establishment constitutes that person’s principal employment. 
The person who makes the vehicle available to the person resident in Denmark shall in 
that case be liable for payment of the tax. The Commission argued that the Danish rules 
constituted restrictions on free movement of workers on the ground that both the original 
scheme and the amended scheme have the effect of hindering the right of employees 
to seek employment in another Member State and the freedom of employers in other 
Member States to take on employees resident in Denmark. The ECJ found in favour of 
the Commission. It noted that the Danish tax legislation falls within the scope of free 
movement. The provisions on freedom of movement for persons are intended to facilitate 
the pursuit by EU citizens of occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Union, 
and preclude measures which might place EU citizens at a “disadvantage” when they wish 
to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State, even if they apply 
598 Opinion AG Fenelly in Case C-190/98 Graf, § 30-31.
599 Opinion AG Alber in Case C-176/96 Lehtonen, § 48-49.
600 Snell 2010, p 445.
601 Snell 2010, p 445-446.
602 Snell 2010, p 446.
603 Case C-464/02 Commission v. Denmark.
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without discrimination. The ECJ then noted that, in order to be capable of constituting 
such an obstacle, they must affect access of workers to the labour market. The ECJ then 
said that “legislation which relates to the conditions in which an economic activity is 
pursued may constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement”, from which it follows “that 
the Danish legislation at issue in this case is not excluded from the outset from the scope 
of [Article 45 TFEU].”604 It is noteworthy that the ECJ explicitly states that tax legislation 
– which in my view necessarily relates to the conditions in which an economic activity 
is pursued – falls within the scope of the free movement provisions. Within this scope 
‘measures which might place EU citizens at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an 
economic activity in the territory of another Member State’ are in principle precluded. The 
ECJ found that the Danish legislation leads to such a disadvantage and constitutes a prima 
facie restriction on free movement of workers.605 
Free movement of goods: the Keck doctrine and subsequent developments
In its famous judgment in Keck, the ECJ embraced a distinction between product rules 
and selling arrangements.606 The case concerned a French prohibition on supermarkets 
reselling products at a loss. The ECJ observed that national legislation imposing a general 
prohibition on resale at a loss is not designed to regulate trade in goods between Member 
States (§ 12). Although such legislation may restrict the volume of sales, and hence the 
volume of sales of products from other Member States, the question remained of whether 
such a possibility is sufficient to characterize the legislation in question as a measure having 
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports (§ 13). In view of the increasing 
tendency of traders to invoke Article 34 TFEU as a means of challenging any rules whose 
effect is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products 
from other Member States, the ECJ considered it necessary to re-examine and clarify its 
case-law on this matter (§ 14). It held that, in the absence of harmonization of legislation, 
obstacles to free movement of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods 
coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, 
rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods (such as those relating to 
designation, form, size, weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute 
measures of equivalent effect prohibited by Article 34 TFEU. This is so even if those rules 
apply without distinction to all products unless their application can be justified by a public-
interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of goods (§ 15). By contrast, 
the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting 
or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially, trade between Member States, so long as those provisions apply to 
all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the 
same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from 
other Member States (§ 16). Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of 
such rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the requirements 
laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or 
604 Case C-464/02 Commission v. Denmark, § 34-38.
605 Case C-464/02 Commission v. Denmark, § 45-50.
606 Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard.
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to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules 
therefore fall outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU (§ 17). As a consequence, the French 
prohibition was allowed to stand.
Snell has observed that, after Keck, Article 34 TFEU is concerned with two types of 
measures - first, the category of rules which prevent the importation of products from 
other Member States, and second, the category of rules which hinder imports more than 
national products, i.e. rules which discriminate. Indeed, as Snell has argued, it is difficult 
to see what the notion of market access adds to this.607 In Commission v. Italy (trailers), 
the ECJ seems to have interpreted the notion of market access by embracing the idea of 
a ‘substantial hindrance’.608 This case concerned an Italian prohibition on a motorcycle 
towing a trailer without regard to the origin of the trailer. The ECJ noted that a prohibition 
on the use of a product in the territory of a Member State has a considerable influence on 
the behaviour of consumers, which, in its turn, affects the access of that product to the 
market of that Member State (§ 56). Consumers, knowing that they are not permitted to 
use their motorcycle with a trailer specially designed for it, have practically no interest in 
buying such a trailer. Thus, the prohibition prevents a demand from existing in the market 
at issue for such trailers and therefore hinders their importation (§ 57). It followed that the 
prohibition, “to the extent that its effect is to hinder access to the Italian market for trailers 
which are specially designed for motorcycles and are lawfully produced and marketed in 
Member States other than the Italian Republic, constitutes a measure having equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of [Article 34 TFEU], 
unless it can be justified objectively” (§ 58). The case of Mickelsson and Roos concerned 
Swedish restrictions on areas where jet skis could be used. The ECJ held that “where the 
national regulations for the designation of navigable waters and waterways have the effect 
of preventing users of personal watercraft from using them for the specific and inherent 
purposes for which they were intended or of greatly restricting their use, which is for the 
national court to ascertain, such regulations have the effect of hindering the access to the 
domestic market in question for those goods and therefore constitute, save where there 
is a justification pursuant to [Article 36 TFEU] or there are overriding public interest 
requirements, measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports 
prohibited by [Article 34 TFEU].”609
Free movement of persons, services and capital: direct effect on market access decisive? 
In the above-discussed case of Commission v. Denmark610 the ECJ did not use the Keck 
language in a free movement of workers case, but rather stated that “legislation which 
relates to the conditions in which an economic activity is pursued may constitute an 
obstacle to freedom of movement”. In other cases, the ECJ focused on the directness of 
a hindrance. The case of Alpine Investments involved a Dutch regulation prohibiting 
financial market operators established in the Netherlands from using the telephone, and 
in particular ‘cold calling’, to contact potential customers, either inside or outside the 
607 Snell 2010, p 449.
608 Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy (trailers); Snell 2010, p 455.
609 Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos, § 28.
610 Case C-464/02 Commission v. Denmark.
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Netherlands. The ECJ held that although a prohibition such as the one at issue is general 
and non-discriminatory and neither its object nor its effect is to put the national market 
at an advantage over providers of services from other Member States, it can none the less 
constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide cross-border services. Indeed, such a 
prohibition deprives the operators concerned of a rapid and direct technique for marketing 
and for contacting potential clients in other Member States. It can therefore constitute a 
restriction on the freedom to provide cross-border services.611 Similar restrictions as a 
result of the prohibition of a certain economic activity in the form acknowledged under the 
free movement provisions were at issue in Bosman,612 SETTG,613 Zenatti614 and Torfaen.615 
In Graf the ECJ considered a certain rule to be too indirect and too remotely connected to 
free movement to be tested against its provisions.616 The case related to the compatibility 
with EU law of national measures that potentially impeded the decision of a worker to 
leave one job in order to accept another, possibly in a different Member State, because they 
provided that in such cases the worker was not entitled to compensation on termination of 
employment, thus reducing the economic attractiveness of the transfer.617 The ECJ rejected 
the argument that such a measure was an obstacle to the freedom of movement of persons 
within the internal market. Recalling Alpine, it stated the principle that provisions which, 
even if they are applicable without distinction, preclude or deter a national of a Member 
State from exercising his right to freedom of movement constitute a restriction on that 
freedom, which is prohibited as a matter of principle by the TFEU, only if they affect access 
of workers to the labour market. This does not happen, however, if the restrictive effect 
depends on an event that is too uncertain and indirect.618 Barnard concludes from Graf that 
measures which do not substantially hinder access to the market, but merely structure the 
market, fall outside Article 45 TFEU in much the same way as certain selling arrangement 
cases which do not substantially hinder access to the market fall outside Article 34 TFEU 
under Keck.619 Advocate General Kokott interprets the concept of an obstacle to market 
access broadly to include not only measures that ‘prevent’ but also those that ‘significantly 
impede’ access to the market.620 AG Tizzano welcomed the judgment in Graf by pointing 
out in CaixaBank that the provisions on establishment did not grant the Union general 
powers to regulate economic activities as a self-employed person.621 On the contrary, 
they left in place the State powers in that regard, merely prohibiting discrimination and 
obstacles to establishment and creating defined powers to harmonise national legislation 
(§ 60). Hence, where such harmonisation has not taken place, the Member States remain 
611 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments, § 28 and 35.
612 Case C-415/93 Bosman.
613 Case C-398/95 SETTG.
614 Case C-67/98 Zenatti.
615 Case C-145/88 Torfaen.
616 Case C-190/98 Graf.
617 Summary by AG Tizzano in case C-442/02 CaixaBank France, § 55.
618 AG Tizzano in case C-442/04 CaixaBank France, § 56.
619 Barnard 2010, p 245.
620 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos, footnote 31; AG Mengozzi concurs 
with this view in his Opinion in Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien, footnote 32.
621 Opinion AG Tizzano in Case C-442/02 CaixaBank.
Optimization by the European Court of Justice in direct tax cases
187 
as a matter of principle competent to regulate the pursuit of economic activities, by means 
of non-discriminatory measures (§ 61). Another interpretation “would permit economic 
operators – both national and foreign – to abuse [Article 49 TFEU] in order to oppose 
any national measure that, solely because it regulated the conditions for pursuing an 
economic activity, could in the final analysis narrow profit margins and hence reduce the 
attractiveness of pursuing that particular economic activity” (§ 62). This lead AG Tizzano 
to the view “that where the principle of non-discrimination is respected – and hence the 
conditions for the taking-up and pursuit of an economic activity are equal both in law 
and in fact – a national measure cannot be described as a restriction on the freedom of 
movement of persons unless, in the light of its purpose and effects, the measure in question 
directly affects market access” (§ 66). 
According to Snell, this criterion of directness has at least five disadvantages. First, 
directness is a matter of degree and therefore uncertain in its reach. Second, directness 
is a formal matter. Third, the normative justification for accepting indirect impediments 
is highly unclear, especially in situations where their impact may be considerably higher 
than rules which do meet the criterion of directness. Fourth, the criterion of directness is 
at odds with the very starting point of free movement case law, namely Dassonville622 where 
the ECJ held that both direct and indirect hindrances are caught by the free movement 
provisions. Fifth, the criterion of directness has been tested to death by the US Supreme 
Court under the dormant commerce clause of the US Constitution.623
Free movement of persons, services and capital: substantial effect on market access decisive?
Having regard to the aforementioned criticism, it is not surprising that there is also ECJ 
case law which seems to focus more on the question of where a national measure has a 
substantial or significant624 effect on market access. Rules which actually make the market 
were at issue in Deliège. Ms. Deliège was a successful Belgian judo player who complained 
that the Belgian judo federation had not selected her for various international tournaments, 
thus negatively influencing her sports career. The ECJ held that although selection rules 
inevitably have the effect of limiting the number of participants in a tournament, such 
a limitation is inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports event. Such 
rules may not therefore in themselves be regarded as constituting a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services. Although a selection system may prove more favourable to 
one category of athletes than another, it cannot be inferred from that fact alone that the 
adoption of that system constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services.625 
Barnard has explained this judgment by pointing out that without any rules there would 
have been no competition.626 The case of Deliège shows that a regulatory system as such 
does not constitute a prima facie restriction on free movement. 
 
622 Case 8/74 Dassonville.
623 Snell, p 452-454.
624 Opinion AG Kokott in Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos, footnote 31.
625 Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège, § 64-66.
626 Barnard 2010, p 245.
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 Disadvantages within such a system may however substantially affect access to that 
market. CaixaBank is an example. French national law prohibited banks established in 
France to pay remuneration on sight accounts. The prohibition applied to accounts in 
euros opened by residents of France, whatever their nationality. Caixa-Bank France (Caixa-
Bank), a French subsidiary of the Spanish-based Caixa Holding, marketed in France a sight 
account remunerated at the rate of 2% per annum. By decision of the French authorities 
Caixa-Bank was prohibited from concluding new contracts with residents of France 
relating to remunerated sight accounts in euros. In addition, it was ordered to rescind 
the clauses in existing contracts which provided for the remuneration of such accounts. 
The ECJ held that a prohibition on the remuneration of sight accounts constitutes, for 
companies from Member States other than the French Republic, a serious obstacle to the 
pursuit of their activities via a subsidiary in the latter Member State, affecting their access 
to the market. That prohibition is therefore to be regarded as a restriction on freedom 
of establishment. After all, it hinders credit institutions which are subsidiaries of foreign 
companies in raising capital from the public, by depriving them of the possibility of 
competing more effectively, by paying remuneration on sight accounts (one of the most 
effective means), with the credit institutions traditionally established in the Member State 
of establishment, which have an extensive network of branches and therefore greater 
opportunities than those subsidiaries for raising capital from the public.627 It should be 
emphasized that this prohibition affects equally all companies, domestic and foreign, 
which want to start banking activities on the French market. It is therefore a truly non-
discriminatory prohibition which substantially affected market access. 
CaixaBank was confirmed by the ECJ in Attanasio. This case concerned Italian regional 
legislation laying down mandatory minimum distances between roadside service stations. 
The ECJ held that “a rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which makes 
the opening of new roadside service stations subject to the compliance with minimum 
distances between service stations, constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 
49 TFEU. Such a rule, which applies only to new service stations and not to service stations 
already in existence before the entry into force of the rule, makes access to the activity of 
fuel distribution subject to conditions and, by being more advantageous to operators who 
are already present on the Italian market, is liable to deter, or even prevent, access to the 
Italian market by operators from other Member States.” 628
Commission v. United Kingdom regarded the UK’s special share in the company British 
Airports Authority (BAA).629 This special share prevented any person from acquiring or 
being interested in BAA shares carrying the right to more than 15% of the votes. In addition, 
the national authorities’ prior approval was required for certain important decisions of the 
company. The ECJ held that “although the relevant restrictions on investment operations 
apply without distinction to both residents and non-residents, it must none the less be 
held that they affect the position of a person acquiring a shareholding as such and are thus 
liable to deter investors from other Member States from making such investments and, 
627 Case C-442/02, Caixa-Bank France, § 11-14. Compare also Case 286/81 Oosthoek, § 15. See for 
this and other cases Barnard 2010, p 119 et seq.
628 Case C-384/08 Attanasio, § 45.
629 Case C-98/01 Commission v. United Kingdom.
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consequently, affect access to the market” (§ 47). The ECJ found it relevant to consider that 
“[t]he restrictions at issue do not arise as the result of the normal operation of company 
law” (§ 48). Consequently, the rules at issue constituted a restriction on the movement of 
capital. 
Commission v. Italy (motor insurance) concerned an Italian rule which interfered with 
the freedom to contract.630 Italian law imposed on insurance companies the obligation 
to provide third-party liability motor insurance at the request of any potential customer, 
under terms and rates which the company had to publish in advance. When calculating 
their premium rates, the insurance companies were subject to certain limitations. The ECJ 
held:
“66. (…) the imposition by a Member State of an obligation to contract such as 
that at issue constitutes a substantial interference in the freedom to contract which 
economic operators, in principle, enjoy. 
67. In a sector like that of insurance, such a measure affects the relevant operators’ 
access to the market, in particular where it subjects insurance undertakings not 
only to an obligation to cover any risks which are proposed to them, but also to 
requirements to moderate premium rates. 
68. Inasmuch as it obliges insurance undertakings which enter the Italian market 
to accept every potential customer, that obligation to contract is likely to lead, 
in terms of organisation and investment, to significant additional costs for such 
undertakings. 
69. If they wish to enter the Italian market under conditions which comply with 
Italian legislation, such undertakings will be required to re-think their business 
policy and strategy, inter alia, by considerably expanding the range of insurance 
services offered. 
70. Inasmuch as it involves changes and costs on such a scale for those undertakings, 
the obligation to contract renders access to the Italian market less attractive and, if 
they obtain access to that market, reduces the ability of the undertakings concerned 
to compete effectively, from the outset, against undertakings traditionally 
established in Italy (see, to that effect, CaixaBank France, paragraphs 13 and 14). 
71. Therefore, the obligation to contract restricts the freedom of establishment and 
the freedom to provide services.”
Therefore, ‘substantial’ interferences with the principle of free movement which affect 
access to the market seem to amount to prima facie restrictions which need justification. 
In other cases, however, the ECJ does not employ a ‘substantiality’ test at all. We will now 
discuss some of these cases.
Free movement of persons, services and capital: effect on market access not decisive at all?
In the above-discussed case of Commission v. Denmark631 the ECJ did not find it necessary 
to say anything about the degree to which market access was affected. It just stated that 
630 Case C-518/06 Commmission v. Italy (motor insurance). 
631 Case C-464/02 Commission v. Denmark.
Chapter 8
190
“legislation which relates to the conditions in which an economic activity is pursued 
may constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement”. This approach is also present in 
other cases. The case of Carpenter is a good example. Mrs. Carpenter, a national of the 
Philippines, was given leave to enter the United Kingdom as a visitor for six months. She 
overstayed that leave and failed to apply for any extension of her stay. Later she married 
Peter Carpenter, a United Kingdom national. A significant proportion of Mr. Carpenter’s 
business consists of providing services, for remuneration, to advertisers established in 
other Member States. Mrs. Carpenter applied to the Secretary of State for leave to remain 
in the UK as the spouse of a national of that Member State. Her application was refused, 
which decision was accompanied by a deportation order. Mrs. Carpenter argued that her 
deportation would restrict her husband’s right to provide and receive services. The ECJ 
observed in a remarkable reasoning that Mr. Carpenter is exercising the right freely to 
provide services guaranteed by Article 56 TFEU. The separation of Mr. and Mrs. Carpenter 
would be detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions under which 
Mr. Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom. As a consequence, Article 56 TFEU was 
prima facie infringed.632 Thus, the ECJ presented the disruption of family life as an obstacle 
to the freedom to provide services.633 
A similar approach for the host State was followed in Metock.634 The ECJ considered 
that “if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in the host Member 
State, the exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously 
obstructed” (§ 62). “The refusal of the host Member State to grant rights of entry and 
residence to the family members of a Union citizen is such as to discourage that citizen 
from moving to or residing in that Member State, even if his family members are not 
already lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State” (§ 64). 
The ECJ has confirmed the Carpenter and Metock approaches in Karner. This case 
concerned two Austrian companies, Karner and Troostwijk, which are both engaged in the 
sale by auction of industrial goods and the purchase of the stock of insolvent companies. 
In 2001, Troostwijk acquired, with the authorization of the insolvency court, the stock of 
an insolvent construction company. Karner had also indicated its interest in the purchase 
of those goods. Troostwijk intended to sell the stock from the insolvent estate in an 
auction sale. It advertised the auction in a sales catalogue, stating that it was an insolvency 
auction and that the goods were from the insolvent estate of the company in question. The 
advertising notice was also posted on the internet. In Karner’s view, however, Troostwijk’s 
advertising ran contrary to an Austrian law on consumer protection because it gave 
the public the impression that it was the insolvency administrator who was selling the 
insolvent company’s assets. In the legal proceedings which followed, the Austrian Supreme 
Court decided to refer the case to the ECJ. In the first place, the ECJ examined whether 
the Austrian rule, which prohibits any reference to the fact that the goods in question 
come from an insolvent estate where, in public announcements or notices intended for 
632 Case C-60/00 Carpenter, § 37-39. See for an extensive discussion on the application of general 
principles of EU law in cross-border situations Douma 2008. Compare also Groussot 2006, p 
271 et seq.
633 Hofstötter 2005, p. 551.
634 Case C-127/08 Metock.
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a large circle of persons, notice is given of the sale of goods which originate from, but no 
longer constitute part of the insolvent estate, falls within the scope of application of Article 
34 TFEU.635 The ECJ recalled that all trading rules enacted by Member States which are 
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Union trade are to 
be regarded as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions and thus 
prohibited by Article 34 TFEU (Case 8/74 Dassonville).636 However, “national provisions 
restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements which apply to all relevant traders 
operating within the national territory and affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, 
the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States are not such 
as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States 
(Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard).” The ECJ then applied these 
principles to the Austrian rule in question. It held that the Austrian rule does not relate to 
the conditions which those goods must satisfy, but rather governs the marketing of those 
goods. Accordingly, it must be regarded as concerning selling arrangements within the 
meaning of Keck and Mithouard. Further, the Austrian rule applies to all relevant traders 
operating within the national territory and affects in the same manner, in law and in fact, 
the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States. Accordingly, 
the Austrian provision was not caught by the prohibition in Article 34 TFEU.637 In the 
second place, the ECJ considered Troostwijk’s arguments that the Austrian provision 
is incompatible with the principle of freedom of expression as laid down in Article 10 
ECHR638. In that regard, the ECJ recalled that fundamental rights form an integral part of 
the general principles of law, the observance of which the Court ensures where national 
legislation falls within the field of application of EU law.639 The ECJ then examined 
whether the Austrian legislation is compatible with freedom of expression (conclusion: 
yes). The case of Karner shows that the ECJ is prepared to review national legislation for 
compatibility with human rights as general principles of EU law, even if that legislation as 
such does not constitute a restriction on free movement. Indeed, as Hofstötter has stated, 
the violation of a human right (a general principle of EU law) may cause a restriction 
on free movement even in the absence of any discriminatory treatment of cross-border 
economic activity.640 
The above-mentioned cases are not the only examples of ECJ case law which ignores 
the market access criterion. The Volkswagen case concerned an action for failure to fulfil 
obligations brought in relation to certain paragraphs of the Volkswagen Law. Specifically, 
the Commission complained about the limitation of voting rights to 20% of the share 
capital where a shareholder holds in excess of that amount and the fact that the majority 
required to adopt resolutions is increased to more than 80%, whereas the generally 
applicable Aktiengesetz (German Law on public limited companies) provides for a majority 
635 Case C-71/02 Karner, § 35.
636 Case C-71/02 Karner, § 36. 
637 Case C-71/02 Karner, § 43.
638 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed 
in Rome on 4 November 1950.
639 Case C-71/02 Karner, § 48-49.
640 The ECJ has confirmed this approach in Case C-71/02 Karner.
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of 75%.641 The ECJ held that these measures constitute restrictions on free movement of 
capital:
“46. This requirement, derogating from general law, and imposed by way of specific 
legislation, thus affords any shareholder holding 20% of the share capital a blocking 
minority.
47. Admittedly, as the Federal Republic of Germany has stated, this power applies 
without distinction. In the same way as the cap on voting rights, it may operate 
both to the benefit and to the detriment of any shareholder in the company.
48. However, it is apparent from the file that, when the VW Law was adopted in 1960, 
the Federal State and the Land of Lower Saxony were the two main shareholders in 
Volkswagen, a recently privatized company, and each held 20% of its capital.
49. According to the information provided to the Court, while the Federal State 
has chosen to part with its interest in the capital of Volkswagen, the Land of Lower 
Saxony, for its part, still retains an interest in the region of 20 %.
50. Paragraph 4(3) of the VW Law thus creates an instrument enabling the Federal 
and State authorities to procure for themselves a blocking minority allowing them 
to oppose important resolutions, on the basis of a lower level of investment than 
would be required under general company law.
51. By capping voting rights at the same level of 20%, Paragraph 2(1) of the VW 
Law supplements a legal framework which enables the Federal and State authorities 
to exercise considerable influence on the basis of such a reduced investment.
52. By limiting the possibility for other shareholders to participate in the company 
with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting and direct economic links with 
it which would make possible effective participation in the management of that 
company or in its control, this situation is liable to deter direct investors from other 
Member States.”642
This approach of comparison between the ‘normal’ structure of company law and 
derogations thereof may give a more precise meaning to the notion of a ‘substantial’ effect 
on free movement. 
The case of Commission v. France (performing artists) also hints in this direction. This 
case concerned, inter alia, a French rule which laid down a presumption of salaried status 
for certain artists. The ECJ held that this rule, which applied to both domestic and foreign 
artists, infringed the freedom to provide services:
“the presumption of salaried status at issue, irrespective of whether it is more or 
less difficult to rebut, constitutes a restriction on freedom to provide services within 
the meaning of [Article 56 TFEU]. Even if it does not deprive, in the true meaning 
of the word, the performing artists in question of the opportunity to pursue their 
activities in France in a self-employed capacity, it none the less places them at a 
disadvantage that may impede their activities as service providers. In order to avoid 
641 Summary by AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion is the Volkswagen case, § 4.
642 Case C-112/05 Commission v. Germany (Volkswagen).
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their contract being accorded the status of employment contract, which would 
entail additional costs because of the obligation, in France, to pay contributions 
as affiliates of the social security scheme for employed persons, and bring them 
under the scheme for annual paid leave, they must prove that they do not work 
as employees but, on the contrary, are self-employed. Thus, the presumption of 
salaried status at issue is likely both to discourage the artists in question from 
providing their services in France and discourage French organizers of events from 
engaging such artists.”643
Thus, truly non-discriminatory rules which place competitors at a disadvantage (additional 
costs) may thus constitute a prima facie restriction on free movement. The nature of the 
concept of ‘disadvantage’ implies a comparison with a ‘normal’ situation: it is a relative 
concept. In the case of performing artists the disadvantage is probably arrived at through 
a comparison with self-employed persons who do not fall on the legal presumption in 
question. 
Commission v. Netherlands concerned the golden shares of the Netherlands State in 
respect of TPG and KPN.644 By virtue of these special shares, a series of very important 
management decisions of the organs of KPN and TPG, concerning both the activities 
of those two companies and their very structure (in particular questions of merger, 
demerger and dissolution), depend on prior approval by the Netherlands State. The ECJ 
considered:
“24. (…) Thus, in the first place, as the Commission has rightly pointed out, those 
special shares confer on the Netherlands State an influence over the management of 
KPN and TPG which is not justified by the size of its investment and is significantly 
greater than that which its ordinary shareholding in those companies would 
normally allow it to obtain. Moreover, those shares limit the influence of other 
shareholders in relation to the size of their holding in KPN and TPG. 
25. Furthermore, those special shares can be withdrawn only with the consent of 
the Netherlands State. 
26. By making decisions of such importance subject to the prior approval of 
the Netherlands State and thereby limiting the possibility of other shareholders 
participating effectively in the management of the company concerned, the 
existence of those shares may have a negative influence on direct investments. 
27. Similarly, the special shares at issue may have a deterrent effect on portfolio 
investments in KPN and TPG. A possible refusal by the Netherlands State to 
approve an important decision, proposed by the organs of the company concerned 
as being in the company’s interests, would be capable of depressing the (stock 
market) value of the shares of that company and thus reduces the attractiveness of 
an investment in such shares.”
643 Case C-255/04 Commission v. France, § 38. Italics by the author.
644 Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v. Netherlands (Golden shares).
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Since those restrictive effects were not too uncertain or too indirect to constitute an 
obstacle to the free movement of capital, the ECJ held that the special shares constitute 
restrictions within the meaning of Article 63(1) TFEU. The ECJ significantly extended 
the scope of free movement of capital by indicating that measures which may depress the 
stock value of shares in a company constitute a prima facie restriction of Article 63(1) 
TFEU: any interference with economic freedom is likely to depress the share prices in 
some companies.645
The last case I would like to discuss is Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Government.646 This case concerned the Flemish compulsory care insurance scheme which 
was open to persons working in the Flemish region of Belgium, provided that they also 
resided in that region or in another EU Member State. The scheme was, therefore, not open 
for EU citizens working in the Flemish region but residing in another part of Belgium. The 
ECJ reiterated that Articles 45 and 49 TFEU militate against any national measure which, 
even though applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is capable of 
hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise by EU nationals of the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (§ 45). The Flemish legislation is such as to produce 
those restrictive effects, inasmuch as it makes affiliation to the care insurance scheme 
dependent on the condition of residence in either a limited part of national territory or in 
another Member State (§ 47). Migrant workers, pursuing or contemplating the pursuit of 
employment or self-employment in Flanders, might be dissuaded from making use of their 
freedom of movement and from leaving their Member State of origin to stay in Belgium, 
by reason of the fact that moving to certain parts of Belgium would cause them to lose 
the opportunity of eligibility for the benefits which they might otherwise have claimed. 
In other words, the fact that employed or self-employed workers find themselves in a 
situation in which they suffer either the loss of eligibility to care insurance or a limitation 
of the place to which they transfer their residence is, at the very least, capable of impeding 
the exercise of the rights conferred by Articles 45 and 49 TFEU (§ 48). For a measure to 
restrict freedom of movement, it is enough that the measure should benefit, as in the case 
of the care insurance scheme, certain categories of persons pursuing occupational activity 
in the Member State in question (§ 50). The restrictive effects of the Flemish legislation 
are not to be considered too indirect and uncertain for it to be impossible to regard that 
legislation as constituting an obstacle contrary to Articles 45 and 49 TFEU. In particular, 
unlike the case giving rise to the judgment in Case C‑190/98 Graf, possible entitlement to 
the insurance care benefits at issue depends, not on a future and hypothetical event for the 
employed or self-employed worker concerned, but on a circumstance linked, ex hypothesi, 
to the exercise of the right to freedom of movement, namely, the choice of transfer of 
residence (§ 51). Moreover, any restriction of free movement, even minor, of that freedom 
is prima facie prohibited (§ 52). It followed that the Flemish legislation entails an obstacle 
to freedom of movement for workers and to freedom of establishment. Again, the ECJ did 
not employ a market access test, using terms such as “dissuade”.647
645 See Snell 2010, p 463.
646 Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government.
647 Snell 2010, p 464.
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Towards a third way between anti-protectionism and economic freedom?
The above-discussed case law on the question of under what circumstances a non-
discriminatory measure amounts to a restriction on free movement is multicoloured. Some 
case law focuses on either the direct or substantial impact of a measure on market access, 
whereas other case law does not mention the market access at all but focuses instead on 
the question of whether the measure makes free movement less attractive. According to 
Snell, it is not surprising that the market access criterion has proved difficult to define.648 
First, when pressed, the notion may collapse into economic freedom. “[A]ll limitations 
to economic freedom have more or less significant effects on market access, depending 
ultimately on the impact on profits on the facts. If the law were to prohibit each and every 
hindrance to market access, it would as a matter of logic have to ban all rules limiting the 
commercial freedom of traders.”649 Second, the notion of market access may also collapse 
into anti-protectionism. “Any measure which reduces the ability of or incentives for new 
operators to enter a market will protect the position of the established operators.”650 Snell 
suspects that the notion of market access is used to conceal the need to choose between 
these two competing paradigms of free movement law. If this is indeed true, the notion 
cannot be used as a ‘third way’ between anti-protectionism and economic freedom.651 
In my view, the dilemma discussed by Snell can be solved by application of the 
theoretical optimization model. This model takes economic freedom as a starting point 
in phase 1 (the ‘disadvantage’ test; section 7.3.1): every national measure which – in 
Snell’s terminology –  has a negative effect on profits prima facie infringes free movement. 
The second phase of the model implements an important correction on this very wide 
disadvantage test: the principle of free movement should accept that it may be limited 
by the principle of sovereignty and the national measures implemented under its wing. 
This means that the principle of free movement cannot be interpreted in a way by which 
regulation as such would ultimately be prohibited (compare section 7.4.2). The starting 
point is that Member States are – in the exercise of their sovereignty – competent to 
organize their regulatory systems; the principle of free movement cannot implement any 
law-making of its own which would be ‘better’ (compare section 7.4.4). The principle of 
free movement is, however, capable of optimizing these regulatory systems by application 
of the tests of suitability, degree of fit, subsidiarity and proportionality in its narrow sense 
(phases 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the model). If this is taken into account, a middle ground between 
anti-protectionism and economic freedom is ultimately achieved. 
A number of the cases discussed above illustrate this. Keck’s distinction between 
product requirements and selling arrangements can be explained by accepting that the 
national measures in both situations lead to a disadvantage – a prima facie restriction on 
free movement of goods – within the meaning of phase 1 of the theoretical optimization 
model. Subsequently, one should observe that respectful aims are pursued by both product 
requirements and selling arrangements (phase 2 of the model): e.g. consumer protection 
and the achievement of a level playing field for the marketing of products in the Member 
648 Snell 2010, p 467.
649 Snell 2010, p 468.
650 Snell 2010, p 468.
651 Snell 2010, p 471.
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State concerned. Both categories are suitable to achieve their objective (phase 3 of the 
model). If phases 4 and 5 of the model are applied, however, one will observe that national 
measures which impose product requirements are often overinclusive in relation to their 
objective or that alternative measures are available which are less burdensome for the free 
movement of goods but which achieve the same objective (e.g. health checks may already 
have been performed in the Member State of origin of the product or certain information 
for consumers may easily be made available by an additional sticker on the product). In 
such a case, the model is able to optimize the national measures which impose product 
requirements against the free movement of goods. This is often not possible in relation 
to selling arrangements. For instance, the objectives pursued by these national measures 
cannot be achieved by similar rules in another Member State, as a result of which they are 
not overinclusive. Also, alternative measures which are able to achieve the same objective 
will not be easily available. Thus, the theoretical optimization model is able to explain 
the Keck doctrine and the subsequent developments in that area. A major advantage of 
this approach is that the notions of ‘product requirements’ and ‘selling arrangements’ do 
not become autonomous objects of legal interpretation. In Volkswagen, the ECJ decided 
that the derogation in the Volkswagen Law from the ‘normal’ structure of the German 
company law constituted a prima facie restriction on free movement of capital.652 Thus, 
the power to introduce rules on company law was duly respected. Only the derogations – 
which imposed specific disadvantages – were subject to scrutiny. The case of Commission 
v. France (performing artists) is another example.653 In that case, the disadvantage was 
probably arrived at through a comparison with self-employed persons who do not fall 
on the legal presumption in question. Thus, the power to regulate was duly respected and 
only the derogation which imposed a specific disadvantage was subject to proportionality 
analysis. Commission v. Netherlands concerned the golden shares of the Netherlands 
State in respect of TPG and KPN.654 The ECJ held that these special shares constituted 
restrictions within the meaning of Article 63(1) TFEU, because they may depress the stock 
value of shares in a company. Again, the ECJ emphasized that the disadvantageous effect at 
issue was caused not by the regulatory system as such, but by a derogation thereof. The last 
example is Government of the French Community and Walloon Government.655 This case 
concerned the Flemish compulsory care insurance scheme which was open for persons 
working the Flemish region of Belgium, provided that they also reside in that region or 
in another EU Member State. The ECJ considered that, for a measure to restrict freedom 
of movement, it is enough that the measure should benefit certain categories of persons 
exercising their free movement rights. Again, emphasis was put on the derogations in a 
regulatory system which impose specific disadvantages. If free movement law is phrased in 
such a way, both the objectives of anti-protectionism and economic freedom are achieved, 
without any extreme outcomes, in line with the theoretical optimization model.
 
652 Case C-112/05 Commission v. Germany (Volkswagen).
653 Case C-255/04 Commission v. France, § 38. Italics by the author.
654 Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v. Netherlands (Golden shares).
655 Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government.
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Concluding remarks and examples
It may be inferred from the above-discussed non-tax case law that prima facie restrictions 
of free movement may be caused not only by tax rules which discriminate, legally or 
factually, against cross-border economic activity, but also by tax rules which otherwise 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of free movement rights. It should, 
therefore, be expected that future ECJ case law in the field of direct taxation will also cover 
non-discriminatory direct tax measures, without ultimately prohibiting taxation as such, 
in the same manner as just described. Two examples may illustrate the practical relevance 
of this finding.
The first example is a Dutch anti-abuse provision which applies to the same extent 
to domestic and cross-border situations and concerns the carry-over of losses upon a 
substantial change in ownership of the company concerned. Losses incurred by a company 
may generally only be carried forward if at least 70% of its shares continue to be held by 
the same individual shareholders. If a company reduces its business by more than 70% and 
less than 70% of its shares continue to be held by the same shareholder(s), losses that have 
not been offset may only be set off against future profits arising from the original business 
activities. This change of control rule leads to an identifiable ‘disadvantage’ (in relation to 
the situation applicable without that measure) and therefore to a prima facie restriction 
on freedom of establishment. According to settled ECJ case law, a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment is permissible only if it is justified by overriding reasons in the 
public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that its application be appropriate to 
ensuring the attainment of the objective in question and not go beyond what is necessary 
to attain it. The objective of the Dutch change of ownership rules is to counter the trade 
in companies with tax losses. This is considered to be abusive in situations where the 
acquisition of the activities or organisation of a loss company is not the central reason 
for the acquisition of the shares in that company, but rather the possibility to obtain a tax 
advantage.656 A company could acquire the shares in a loss company with the aim of starting 
a new profitable business in that company. Without any anti-abuse legislation, these profits 
would not be taxable due to loss carry-forward. This may not only result in a disadvantage 
for the treasury, but also in competitive disadvantage for similar businesses, the profits 
of which would be taxable.657 According to settled ECJ case law, the prevention of tax 
evasion can be accepted as justification only if the legislation is aimed at wholly artificial 
arrangements the objective of which is to circumvent the tax laws, which precludes any 
general presumption of tax evasion. Consequently, a general presumption of tax avoidance 
or tax evasion cannot justify a fiscal measure which compromises the objectives of the 
TFEU.658 In my view, it is clear that the Dutch change of ownership rules lay down such a 
general presumption of tax avoidance. This presumption goes beyond what is necessary 
to attain the objective of the prevention of tax avoidance. As a consequence, the possible 
restriction on freedom of establishment imposed by these rules can be upheld only in true 
cases of tax avoidance.
 
656 Kamerstukken II 1999/2000, 27 209, nr. 7, p. 15.
657 Kamerstukken II 1999/2000, 27 209, nr. 3, p. 11.
658 Case C-451/05 ELISA, § 91.
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 A second example of an anti-abuse provision which applies to the same extent to 
domestic and cross-border situations concerns the Dutch thin capitalization provisions. 
Under these provisions, the deduction of interest on intra-group loans may be restricted if 
a taxpayer is deemed to have an inadequate amount of equity compared with his amount 
of debt. The restriction of interest deduction is limited to cases where there is a group of 
affiliated companies. Under the ‘disadvantage’ test, this thin capitalization rule constitutes 
a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment. It is settled ECJ case law that a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment is permissible only if it is justified by overriding 
reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary that its application be appropriate to 
ensuring the attainment of the objective in question and not go beyond what is necessary 
to attain it. Thin capitalization rules are aimed at the prevention of artificial shifts of the 
taxable basis in groups of companies and at the prevention of the erosion of the Dutch 
tax base through the allocation of deductible interest costs.659 Test Claimants in the Thin 
Cap Group Litigation concerned the UK thin capitalisation legislation which had a similar 
objective. The ECJ considered that thin capitalization rules should not be applied insofar 
as the interest payment reflects at arm’s length relations. Moreover, the taxpayer should be 
able to provide a commercial justification for the interest payment.660
8.3 The requirement of a respectful aim
8.3.1 Current ECJ case law on direct taxation
8.3.1.1 Introduction
If a certain ‘disadvantage’ has been identified, the next step of the theoretical optimization 
model requires that the tax measure which leads to this disadvantage has a ‘respectful 
aim’ and that the EU free movement provision which affects this tax measure is also 
respectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty. This is the idea of a ‘twofold neutrality’ 
(section 7.4.1). ECJ case law in the area of direct taxation states that a restriction on free 
movement can be justified if either an express Treaty derogation applies or the tax measure 
at issue pursues a ‘legitimate objective which is compatible with EU law’ and is ‘justified 
by overriding reasons in the public interest’. This section discusses ECJ case law which 
illustrates this justification analysis.
8.3.1.2 Aim determination and plurality of objectives
Introduction
It has been discussed in section 4.5.2 that it may difficult, first, to determine the aim of a 
national measure and, second, to deal with a plurality of objectives. The case of Finalarte, 
albeit not a tax case, will be discussed to illustrate the first problem. The cases of Campus 
oil and Nertsvoederfabriek Nederland serve as an illustration to the second problem. 
659 Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 210, nr. 8, p 9, and Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 210, nr. 8, p 10.
660 Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, § 73-83.
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Finalarte
This judgment concerned the German scheme of paid leave for workers in the construction 
industry.661 In this industry, workers change employers frequently. For that reason, German 
law provides that the various employment relationships entered into by the worker during 
the reference year are to be treated as if they were a single employment relationship. This 
fiction enables the worker to accumulate holiday entitlement acquired with different 
employers in the course of the reference year and to claim that full entitlement from his 
current employer, irrespective of the duration of the employment relationship with that 
employer. The ordinary consequence of that system would be to impose a heavy financial 
burden on the current employer because he is required to pay the worker holiday pay 
even for holiday acquired with other employers. A fund was established in order to 
overcome this drawback and to ensure an equitable distribution of the financial burden 
between the employers concerned. To this end, employers established in Germany pay 
contributions to the fund amounting to 14.45% of their total gross wages. In return the 
employers are entitled, inter alia, to full or partial reimbursement of the benefits paid 
to workers in respect of holiday pay and additional holiday allowance. German law also 
applies the obligation to contribute to the fund to employment relationships between 
undertakings whose registered office is situated outside Germany and workers they send 
to carry out construction work on sites in Germany. None the less there are differences 
between the scheme applying to employers established in Germany and that applying to 
other employers. First, in contrast to the scheme for employers established in Germany, 
the employer established abroad is not entitled to claim reimbursement from the fund. It 
is always the posted worker himself who is entitled to receive holiday pay from the fund. 
Second, employers established outside Germany must disclose more information to the 
fund than those established in Germany. Third, a foreign employer is always subject to the 
obligation to contribute to the fund in respect of workers on a German construction site. 
In a purely German context, however, this obligation applies to the organizational entity 
from which workers are posted to a construction site. 
The ECJ first recalled that freedom to provide services requires not only the elimination 
of any discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are 
established in another Member State but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it 
applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member 
States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of 
a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides 
similar services.662 In particular, a Member State may not make the provision of services 
in its territory subject to compliance with all the conditions required for establishment 
and thereby deprive the provisions of the Treaty whose object is, precisely, to guarantee 
the freedom to provide services, of all practical effect. In that regard, the application of 
the host Member State’s national rules to providers of services is liable to prohibit, impede 
or render less attractive the provision of services to the extent that it involves expense 
661 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and 
Others. The following account of German law and the facts is derived from § 3-14.




and additional administrative and economic burdens. The application of the obligation 
to participate in the fund to providers of services established outside Germany has the 
effect of increasing their costs and administrative and economic burdens, which implies a 
restriction of the freedom to provide services.663
Next the ECJ reiterated that such a restriction of the freedom to provide services is 
justifiable only if it is necessary in order to pursue, effectively and by appropriate means, 
an objective in the public interest.664 Here the judgment becomes interesting for the 
present section of this study. The ECJ observed that the national court had pointed out 
that it appears from the explanatory memorandum of the German law that the declared 
aim of that law is to protect German businesses in the construction industry from the 
increasing pressure of competition in the European internal market, and thus from 
foreign providers of services. The national court adds that, from the start of discussions 
on the draft of that law, it had been pointed out on numerous occasions that such a law 
would, above all, combat the allegedly unfair practice of European businesses engaged in 
low-pay competition.665 According to settled case law, however, measures restricting the 
freedom to provide services cannot be justified by economic aims, such as the protection 
of national businesses; these aims are not legitimate or, in the terminology of the present 
study, not ‘respectful’ towards the principle of free movement.666 Surprisingly, this was not 
fatal for the German system:
“40. However, whilst the intention of the legislature, to be gathered from the 
political debates preceding the adoption of a law or from the statement of the 
grounds on which it was adopted, may be an indication of the aim of that law, it is 
not conclusive. 
41. It is, on the contrary, for the national court to check whether, viewed objectively, 
the rules in question in the main proceedings promote the protection of posted 
workers.”
The ECJ subsequently laid out a number of assessments for the national court to make in 
order to verify whether this criterion is met. For the present study, it is important to note 
that i) the objective of a restrictive national measure should be determined objectively667 
663 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and 
Others, § 35.
664 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and 
Others, § 37.
665 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and 
Others, § 38.
666 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and 
Others, § 39.
667 A similar approach is taken in the area of State aid; compare Case C-487/06 P British Aggregates 
Association, § 82-88. Compare also Case C-521/07 Commission v. Netherlands, where the ECJ 
considered that the non-applicability of Directive 77/799 on information exchange by tax 
authorities was not the ‘real’ reason for the application of the dividend withholding tax in 
question, because the Netherlands apparently did not need any information from foreign tax 
authorities: in situations involving a higher shareholding percentage the Netherlands did not 
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– i.e. not only on the basis of its legislative history but also on the basis of its effects668 – 
and ii) an illegitimate objective may be ‘saved’ by an objective which can be regarded as 
legitimate. This was also the case in Campus Oil.
Campus Oil
This case concerned Irish rules requiring petrol importers to purchase part of their 
requirements from the only oil refinery in Ireland at a fixed price. In the absence of these 
rules, the Irish oil refinery would go out of business, leaving Ireland without any domestic 
refining capacity. The ECJ held that this obligation constitutes a prima facie restriction of 
free movement of goods because of its protective effect.669 In principle, a protective aim 
cannot be regarded as legitimate, because it denies the existence of free movement. In 
Campus Oil, however, the ECJ arrived at a different conclusion. The relevant considerations 
justify quotation in full:
“34. It should be stated (…) that petroleum products because of their exceptional 
importance as an energy source in the modern economy are of fundamental 
importance for a country’s existence since not only its economy but above all its 
institutions, its essential public services and even the survival of its inhabitants 
depend upon them. An interruption of supplies of petroleum products with the 
resultant dangers for the country’s existence, could therefore seriously affect the 
public security that [Article 36 TFEU] allows States to protect.
35. It is true that (…) Article 36 refers to matters of a non-economic nature. A 
Member State cannot be allowed to avoid the effects of measures provided for 
in the Treaty by pleading the economic difficulties caused by the elimination of 
barriers to intra-Community trade. However, in the light of the seriousness of the 
consequences that an interruption in supplies of petroleum products may have for 
a country’s existence, the aim of ensuring a minimum supply of petroleum products 
at all times is to be regarded as transcending purely economic considerations 
and thus as capable of constituting an objective covered by the concept of public 
security.
36. It should be added that to come within the ambit of Article 36, the rules in 
question must be justified by objective circumstances corresponding to the needs 
of public security. Once that justification has been established, the fact that the rules 
levy any withholding tax on the basis of tax treaties whereas the alleged need for information 
should have been the same in those cases.
668 Compare in this respect also Case C-169/07 Hartlauer, § 55, where the ECJ held that restrictive 
domestic legislation “is appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued only if 
it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner”. Similarly, in 
respect of Finnish regulation of games of chance, the ECJ found in Case C-124/97 Läärä, § 37, 
that “the fact that the games in issue are not totally prohibited is not enough to show that the 
national legislation is not in reality intended to achieve the public interest objectives at which it 
is purportedly aimed, which must be considered as a whole.” This shows that the ECJ also looks 
at the system of the law to verify its purpose. Compare also the Opinion of AG Kokott in Joined 
Cases C-436/08 and C-437/08 Haribo and Österreichische Salinen, § 63-69, §88 and § 98-102.
669 Case 72/83 Campus Oil, § 16.
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are of such a nature as to make it possible to achieve, in addition to the objectives 
covered by the concept of public security, other objectives of an economic nature 
which the Member State may also seek to achieve, does not exclude the application 
of Article 36.” 
Thus, in Campus Oil, the ECJ approved of a national measure that had a partially economic 
purpose – the protection of an Irish oil refinery – because the other objectives of the 
measure were non-economic.670 In Nertsvoederfabriek Nederland this line of thinking was 
developed further. 
Nertsvoederfabriek Nederland
This case concerned Dutch legislation which obliged producers to deliver poultry offal 
only to rendering plants licensed by the Dutch authorities. Nertsvoederfabriek Nederland 
was prosecuted for breaching this law. The ECJ held that Article 35 TFEU (prohibition 
restrictions on exports) was applicable in this case, because the imposition of an obligation 
on producers to deliver poultry offal to their local authority implies a prohibition of 
exports. The Netherlands government argued that this obligation was necessary to 
prevent the spread of disease and pollution, but the problem was that the obligation also 
contributed to the profitability of domestic undertakings (which converted the offal into 
animal food which they sold on the market). In respect of this last aspect, the Dutch 
government replied that the licensed plants need these profits to pay for their legal duties. 
The ECJ considered:
“14. With respect (…) to the obligation to deliver poultry offal only to licensed 
rendering plants to the exclusion of any other economic operator carrying 
on business with the national territory, the Netherlands government argued 
convincingly that that obligation was necessary in order to maintain the overall 
effectiveness of the system set up by the [national law], with a view to ensuring that 
all animal waste was removed and disposed of in a manner which providing all the 
required safeguards for the life and health of humans and animals.
15. In those circumstances, it is irrelevant that the poultry offal can, after processing, 
yield a product which can be marketed by the rendering plants, thus ensuring 
their profitability. As the Court acknowledged in [Campus Oil], the mere fact that 
national provisions, justified by objective circumstances corresponding to the needs 
of the interests referred to therein, enable other objectives of an economic nature 
to be achieved as well, does not exclude the application of [Article 36 TFEU]. That 
applies with greater force where the objective of an economic nature necessarily 
enables the objective relating to health to be attained.”
Subsequently, the ECJ found that the objective of health protection could have been 
achieved by less restrictive means. For purposes of the present study it is important to note 
that the ECJ has accepted that the achievement of an economic aim might be necessary for 
 
670 See Snell 2005, p 41-42.
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the achievement of a public interest aim. If that is the case, the measure overall pursues a 
legitimate objective.671
8.3.1.3 Directly discriminatory tax rules
The classic four freedoms of the TFEU – free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital – all prohibit distinctions which are directly based on the origin of the product 
or on the (foreign) nationality of the taxpayer concerned. Such distinctions can only be 
justified on grounds of the express Treaty derogations672 such as public morality, public 
policy, public security and public health.673 This was recognized for direct taxation in 
case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland.674 This case concerned Greek tax legislation which 
introduced a difference of treatment in the calculation of tax on the profits of companies, 
depending on whether they have their seat in Greece or outside that Member State. 
Two rates of tax were applicable to the profits of companies having their seat in Greece, 
which, on certain conditions relating to their legal form and the nature of the shares 
which they issue, may be taxed at the rate of 35% instead of the rate of 40%. The lower 
rate applies to domestic public limited companies of which the shares are quoted on the 
Athens Stock Exchange. In order to be able to carry on banking business in Greece, the 
national legislation on banks requires a company having its seat in Greece to carry on that 
business in the form of a public limited company and to issue registered shares, so that 
it thereby escapes application of the rate of tax at 40%. On the other hand, a single rate 
of tax, the higher one, applies to the profits taxable in Greece of companies having their 
seat in another Member State, whatever their legal form and the nature of the shares they 
issue. Consequently, as regards banks, the higher rate of taxation applies only to banks 
having their seat in another Member State and a permanent establishment in Greece. 
The ECJ found that this difference in tax rate infringes the freedom of establishment 
(Article 49 TFEU). The ECJ then examined whether the discrimination may be justified. 
It held that, according to settled case law, only an express derogating provision, such as 
Article 52 TFEU, could render such discrimination compatible with EU law. As the Greek 
Government had not relied on any of these grounds, freedom of establishment was to be 
interpreted as precluding the tax legislation at issue.675 This approach can be explained by 
acknowledging that the lower tax rate could indeed only apply to companies with Greek 
‘nationality’, as a consequence of which the legislation was directly discriminatory.
671 See Snell 2005, p 42-43. Compare also the Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in case C-347/04 
Rewe Zentralfinanz, footnote 34.
672 Express Treaty derogations are laid down in Articles 36, 45(3), 52(1), 62 and 65(1)(b) TFEU. 
Note that there are no treaty derogations for direct discrimination of goods on grounds of their 
origin as regards internal taxation of these goods (Article 110 TFEU).
673 Case C-423/98 Albore, § 16-17 and Case 2/74 Reyners.
674 See also case C-155/09 Commission v. Greece, § 69 et seq.
675 C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland, § 32-34.
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8.3.1.4 Other restrictive tax rules: legitimate objective and overriding reasons
Introduction 
The rules regarding equality of treatment forbid, however, not only overt discrimination by 
reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the application 
of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result.676 The criterion of 
‘residence’ which is used by all national tax systems is an example of such a criterion.677 
A direct tax measure which amounts to a prima facie restriction on free movement and 
which does not discriminate directly on grounds of nationality may be allowed only if 
it pursues a ‘legitimate objective which is compatible with EU law’ and is ‘justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest’.678 This is often referred to as the ‘rule of reason’.
Legitimate objective compatible with EU law
This first requirement has been at issue in Case C-39/04 Laboratoires Fournier.679 Under 
French tax legislation a tax credit, in respect of corporation tax, for research was available 
solely for research activities carried out in France. Fournier, which manufactures and 
sells pharmaceuticals, subcontracted to research centres based in various Member States 
numerous research projects and took the resultant expenditure into account in calculating 
its tax credit for research for the years 1995 and 1996. The French tax authorities however 
refused to grant a tax credit in respect of that expenditure. The question arises as to 
whether this refusal restricts the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU). The ECJ 
stated that French tax legislation, by restricting the benefit of a tax credit for research 
only to research carried out in that Member State, makes the provision of services 
constituted by the research activity subject to different tax arrangements depending on 
whether it is carried out in other Member States or in the Member State. Such legislation 
differentiates according to the place where the services are provided, contrary to Article 
56 TFEU. The French Government contended, however, that the legislation was justified 
by the objective of promoting research. The ECJ replied that the promotion of research 
and development may indeed be an overriding reason relating to public interest. The 
fact remained however that it could not justify a rule which refuses the benefit of a tax 
credit for research for any research not carried out in the Member State concerned. “Such 
legislation is directly contrary to the objective of the Community policy on research and 
technological development which, according to Article 163(1) EC [now Article 179(1) 
TFEU] is, inter alia, ‘strengthening the scientific and technological bases of Community 
industry and encouraging it to become more competitive at international level’. Article 
163(2) EC [now Article 179(2) TFEU] provides in particular that, for this purpose, the 
Community is to ‘support [undertakings’] efforts to cooperate with one another, aiming, 
notably, at enabling [them] to exploit the internal market potential to the full, in particular 
676 Case 152/73 Sotgiu, § 11.
677 Case C-175/88 Biehl, § 14.
678 E.g. Case C-527/06 Renneberg, § 81; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, §35; Case C-196/04 
Cadbury Schweppes, § 47.
679 Compare also Case C-281/06 Jundt, § 60-63; Case C-248/06 Commission v. Spain. Compare also 
Case C-254/97Société Baxter and Case C-10/10 Commission v Austria.
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through … the removal of legal and fiscal obstacles to that cooperation.’” As a result, the 
objective of the French tax credit was not compatible with the EC Treaty – or, at present, 
the TFEU – insofar as it was restricted to research activities on French territory. 
Overriding reasons in the public interest
A study by Kingston provides an overview of ‘accepted’, ‘accepted in principle but not in 
practice’, and ‘rejected’ grounds of justification.680 The list with ‘accepted’ grounds contains 
the following reasons: 
the requirements of fiscal cohesion- 
the need to counter tax avoidance - 
the need to prevent a double use of losses- 
the need to ensure effective fiscal supervision and tax collection, and- 
the need for a “balanced allocation” of taxing powers between the Member States - 
or the “territoriality” principle. 
The following grounds have been accepted in principle, but never in practice (normally 
due to lack of compliance with the requirement that national measures be proportionate 
to the justification): 
grounds of public health and the prevention of wrongdoing - 
the promotion of research - 
the promotion of national culture - 
(possibly) the need to protect a constitutional right to accommodation - 
objectives connected with the carrying on of the activities of agricultural and - 
forestry holdings 
the preservation of jobs, and - 
the need to simplify the tax system.- 
The list of justifications rejected by the ECJ includes the following grounds:
budgetary concerns underlying a national measure - 
protection of the tax base - 
the existence of other tax advantages to compensate for the alleged tax - 
disadvantage 
the need to preserve competitive neutrality between foreign and domestic - 
companies 
the availability of an alternative legal or business form - 
the lack of EC harmonization concerning the impugned national tax measure, - 
and 
the fact that the otherwise unlawful treatment is required by a bilateral tax treaty. - 
680 Kingston 2007, p 1347. See for a comprehensive overview Cordewener, Kofler & Van Thiel 2009. 
See also Barnard 2010, p 512-516 (“the justifications recognized by the court”).
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It is useful to illustrate the above by discussing the cases of Avoir fiscal, Manninen, Cadbury 
Schweppes, Oy AA and Papillon. These cases typically show how the ECJ deals with grounds 
of justification and serve as a good basis for comparison with the theoretical optimization 
model in section 8.3.2. 
Avoir fiscal
This case concerned a French tax credit, known as an ‘avoir fiscal’, which was intended to 
avoid the economic double taxation of company profits, first in the form of corporation tax, 
and then through tax levied on beneficiaries of dividends, and which was available only to 
companies having their seat in France or in the territory of States having concluded with 
France conventions for the avoidance of double taxation to that effect. French law did not 
contain a general rule which granted an ‘avoir fiscal’ to dividends attributable to a French 
permanent establishment of a foreign company. The European Commission sought to 
establish that the absence of an ‘avoir fiscal’ in these cases discriminates against branches 
and agencies of companies whose registered office is situated in another Member State, 
in particular with regard to insurance companies because they typically operate through 
branches rather than subsidiaries. France brought forward various lines of defence to 
justify this disadvantageous treatment, which were all rejected by the ECJ. 
In its first line of argument the French government argued that the difference in 
question is based on the distinction between ‘residents’ and ‘non-residents’, which is to 
be found in all legal systems and is internationally accepted. Furthermore, branches and 
agencies of companies whose registered office is abroad enjoy various advantages over 
French companies which would balance out any disadvantages in regard to shareholders’ 
tax credits. Finally, those disadvantages would in any event be insignificant and could 
easily have been avoided by setting up a subsidiary in France.
The ECJ held, first, that freedom of establishment would be deprived of all meaning 
if the proposition were accepted that the Member State in which a company seeks to 
establish itself may freely apply to it a different treatment solely by reason of the fact that 
its registered office is situated in another Member State.681 Second, the ECJ observed that 
it cannot altogether be excluded that a distinction based on the location of the registered 
office of a company or the place of residence of a natural person may, under certain 
conditions, be justified in an area such as tax law. In the present case, however, subsidiaries 
resident in France and French permanent establishments of a foreign company are treated 
in the same way for the purposes of taxing their profits. By doing so, the French legislature 
has in fact admitted that there is no objective difference between their positions in regard 
to the detailed rules and conditions relating to that taxation which could justify different 
treatment.682 Third, the ECJ decided that the difference in treatment also cannot be justified 
by any advantages which branches and agencies may enjoy vis-à-vis companies and which, 
according to the French government, balance out the disadvantages resulting from the 
failure to grant the benefit of shareholders’ tax credits. Even if such advantages actually 
exist, they cannot justify a breach of the obligation laid down in Article 49 TFEU to accord 
foreign companies the same treatment in regard to shareholders’ tax credits as is accorded 
681 Case 270/83 Commission v. France (avoir fiscal), § 18.
682 Case 270/83 Commission v. France (avoir fiscal), § 19-20.
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to French companies.683 Fourth, the fact that insurance companies whose registered office 
is situated in another Member State are at liberty to establish themselves by setting up a 
subsidiary in order to have the benefit of the tax credit cannot justify different treatment. 
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 49 TFEU expressly leaves traders free 
to choose the appropriate legal form in which to pursue their activities in another Member 
State and that freedom of choice must not be limited by discriminatory tax provisions.684
In a second line of argument, the French government sought to demonstrate that the 
difference in treatment is in fact due to the particular characteristics of and the differences 
between the tax systems applying in the various Member States and to the double-taxation 
agreements. It argued that since the legislation at issue has not been harmonized, different 
measures are necessary in each case in order to take account of the differences between the 
taxation systems; those different measures are therefore justified under Article 49 TFEU. 
Thus, the rules which are being contested in this case would be necessary, in particular, 
in order to prevent tax evasion. The application of tax legislation to natural persons and 
companies pursuing their activities in different Member States would be governed by 
double-taxation agreements.685
The ECJ noted, first, that the fact that the laws of the Member States on corporation 
tax have not been harmonized cannot justify the difference of treatment, because freedom 
of establishment prohibits the Member States from laying down in their laws conditions 
for the pursuit of activities by persons exercising their right of establishment which differ 
from those laid down for its own nationals.686 Second, the ECJ held that the risk of tax 
avoidance cannot be relied upon in this context. Freedom of establishment does not 
permit any derogation from the fundamental principle of freedom of establishment on 
such a ground. Moreover, the ECJ was not convinced by the calculations submitted by 
the French government in order to prove the risk of tax evasion.687 Third, the ECJ decided 
that the rights conferred by freedom of establishment are unconditional; a Member State 
cannot make respect for them subject to the contents of an agreement concluded with 
another Member State. In particular, those rights cannot be made subject to a condition 
of reciprocity imposed for the purpose of obtaining corresponding advantages in other 
Member States.
As a consequence, the different treatment between domestic insurance companies and 
foreign insurance companies operating in France through a permanent establishment 
constituted a restriction on freedom of establishment which could not be justified. 
Manninen 
This case concerned Finnish legislation whereby Finland granted a full imputation tax 
credit to Finnish shareholders in respect of Finnish corporate income tax levied on profits 
distributed as dividends. No tax credit in respect of foreign corporate income tax levied on 
foreign-source profits distributed as dividends was, however, granted. The ECJ held that 
683 Case 270/83 Commission v. France (avoir fiscal), § 21.
684 Case 270/83 Commission v. France (avoir fiscal), § 22.
685 Case 270/83 Commission v. France (avoir fiscal), § 23.
686 Case 270/83 Commission v. France (avoir fiscal), § 24.
687 Case 270/83 Commission v. France (avoir fiscal), § 25.
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free movement of capital (Article 63 TFEU) required Finland to extend this tax credit to 
account for corporate income tax levied on dividends from another Member State, in this 
case, Sweden. 
To begin with, the ECJ stated that the Finnish tax legislation has the effect of deterring 
fully taxable persons in Finland from investing their capital in companies established in 
another Member State. It also has a restrictive effect as regards companies established in 
other Member States, in that it constitutes an obstacle to their raising capital in Finland. 
It followed that the Finnish legislation constitutes a restriction on the free movement of 
capital which is, in principle, prohibited.688 
The ECJ subsequently examined whether that restriction on the free movement of 
capital is capable of being justified. It first reviewed whether the difference in treatment 
of a shareholder fully taxable in Finland according to whether he receives dividends from 
companies established in that Member State or from companies established in other 
Member States relates to situations which are not objectively comparable. Importantly, 
the ECJ noted that the Finnish tax legislation is designed to prevent double taxation of 
company profits by granting to a shareholder who receives dividends a tax advantage 
linked to the taking into account of the corporation tax due from the company distributing 
the dividends.689 By describing the objective of the Finnish legislation in this way, the 
ECJ removed the discriminatory element inherent in it: the limitation of the avoidance 
of economic double taxation to domestic situations. This can be explained by something 
the ECJ said later in its judgment: whilst, for Finland, granting a tax credit in relation to 
corporation tax due in another Member State would entail a reduction in its tax receipts in 
relation to dividends paid by companies in other Member States, it has been consistently 
held in the case law that reduction in tax revenue cannot be regarded as an overriding 
reason in the public interest which may be relied on to justify a measure which is in 
principle contrary to a fundamental freedom.690 
The ECJ went on to say that, in view of the thus reformulated objective of the 
legislation, the situation of persons fully taxable in Finland might differ according to the 
place where they invested their capital. That would be the case in particular where the tax 
legislation of the Member State in which the investments were made already eliminated 
the risk of double taxation of company profits distributed in the form of dividends, by, 
for example, subjecting to corporation tax only such profits by the company concerned 
as were not distributed. In the present case, however, Sweden levied corporation tax on 
the distributed dividends. Accordingly, where a person fully taxable in Finland invests 
capital in a company established in Sweden, there is no way of escaping double taxation 
of the profits distributed by the company in which the investment is made. In the face 
of a tax rule which takes account of the corporation tax owed by a company in order to 
prevent double taxation of the profits distributed, shareholders who are fully taxable in 
Finland find themselves in a comparable situation, whether they receive dividends from a 
company established in that Member State or from a company established in Sweden.691 
688 Case C-319/02 Manninen, § 22-24.
689 Case C-319/02 Manninen, § 33.
690 Case C-319/02 Manninen, § 49.
691 Case C-319/02 Manninen, § 34-36.
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The ECJ then noted that the Finnish tax legislation cannot be regarded as an emanation 
of the principle of territoriality as that principle does not preclude the granting of a tax 
credit to a person fully taxable in Finland in respect of dividends paid by companies 
established in other Member States.692 Next, Finland maintained that its tax legislation is 
objectively justified by the need to ensure the cohesion of the national tax. In particular 
it stated that, if a tax credit were to be granted to the recipients of dividends paid by a 
Swedish company to shareholders who were fully taxable in Finland, the authorities of 
that Member State would be obliged to grant a tax advantage in relation to corporation 
tax that was not levied by that State, thereby threatening the cohesion of the national 
tax system. Answering that defence, the ECJ held that an argument based on the need 
to safeguard the cohesion of a tax system must be examined in the light of the objective 
pursued by the tax legislation in question. Having regard to the objective pursued by the 
Finnish tax legislation, the cohesion of that tax system is assured as long as the correlation 
between the tax advantage granted in favour of the shareholder and the tax due by way 
of corporation tax is maintained. Therefore, in a case such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, the granting to a shareholder who is fully taxable in Finland and who holds 
shares in a company established in Sweden of a tax credit calculated by reference to the 
corporation tax owed by that company in Sweden would not threaten the cohesion of the 
Finnish tax system and would constitute a measure less restrictive of the free movement 
of capital than that laid down by the Finnish tax legislation.693 In a later case the ECJ had 
the opportunity to clarify that Finland would be obliged to grant a tax credit only up to 
the limit of the amount of corporation tax for which the company receiving the dividends 
is liable. It is not required to repay the difference, that is to say, the amount paid in the 
Member State of the company making the distribution which is greater than the amount 
of tax payable in the Member State of the company receiving it.694 
Cadbury Schweppes 
This case concerned the UK rules on the taxation of controlled foreign companies. 
This legislation is designed to apply when the CFC is subject, in the State in which it is 
established, to a ‘lower level of taxation’, which is the case, under that legislation, in respect 
of any accounting period in which the tax paid by the CFC is less than three quarters of the 
amount of tax which would have been paid in the United Kingdom on the taxable profits 
as they would have been calculated for the purposes of taxation in that Member State. 
The taxation provided for by the legislation on CFCs is excluded when ‘the motive test’ 
is satisfied. The latter involves two cumulative conditions. First, where the transactions 
which gave rise to the profits of the CFC produce a reduction in United Kingdom tax 
compared to that which would have been paid in the absence of those transactions and 
where the amount of that reduction exceeds a certain threshold, the resident company 
must show that such a reduction was not the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, 
of those transactions. Secondly, the resident company must show that it was not the main 
reason, or one of the main reasons, for the CFC’s existence to achieve a reduction in 
692 Case C-319/02 Manninen, § 38.
693 Case C-319/02 Manninen, § 43-46. 
694 Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, § 50-52.
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United Kingdom tax by means of the diversion of profits. According to that legislation, 
there is a diversion of profits if it is reasonable to suppose that, had the CFC or any related 
company established outside the United Kingdom not existed, the receipts would have 
been received by, and been taxable in the hands of, a United Kingdom resident.695 Clearly, 
the CFC legislation is designed in such a way that the profits of a non-resident subsidiary 
of a UK parent company remain taxable in the UK in situations which the UK legislature 
regards as abusive. 
To begin with, the ECJ observed that the CFC legislation does not apply in situations 
involving domestic subsidiaries or foreign subsidiaries which are resident in a Member 
State with a level of taxation which is not ‘lower’. This implies a restriction on freedom 
of establishment.696 The ECJ then stated that such a restriction is permissible only if it is 
justified by overriding reasons of public interest and if its application is appropriate to 
ensuring the attainment of the objective thus pursued and does not go beyond what is 
necessary to attain it. 
Various governments submitted that the legislation on CFCs is intended to counter 
a specific type of tax avoidance involving the artificial transfer by a resident company of 
profits from the Member State in which they were made to a low-tax State by means of the 
establishment of a subsidiary in that State. In this respect, the ECJ reiterated its settled case 
law that any advantage resulting from the low taxation to which a subsidiary established 
in a Member State other than the one in which the parent company was incorporated 
is subject cannot by itself authorize that Member State to offset that advantage by less 
favourable tax treatment of the parent company. The need to prevent the reduction of tax 
revenue is not a matter of overriding general interest which would justify a restriction 
on a fundamental freedom. Also, the mere fact that a resident company establishes a 
secondary establishment, such as a subsidiary, in another Member State cannot set up a 
general presumption of tax evasion and justify a measure which compromises the exercise 
of a fundamental freedom. 697
On the other hand, a national measure restricting freedom of establishment may be 
justified where it specifically relates to wholly artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing 
the application of the legislation of the Member State. It is necessary, in assessing the 
conduct of the taxable person, to take particular account of the objective pursued by 
the freedom of establishment. The concept of establishment within the meaning of the 
Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment involves the actual pursuit of an economic 
activity through a fixed establishment in that State for an indefinite period. Consequently, 
it presupposes actual establishment of the company concerned in the host Member State 
and the pursuit of genuine economic activity there. It follows that, in order for a restriction 
on the freedom of establishment to be justified on the ground of prevention of abusive 
practices, the specific objective of such a restriction must be to prevent conduct involving 
the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a 
view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on 
national territory. Such an artificial shifting of taxable profits from one tax jurisdiction to 
695 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 7-11.
696 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 43-46.
697 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 48-50.
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another would undermine the right of the Member States to exercise their tax jurisdiction 
in relation to the activities carried out in their territory and thus to jeopardize a balanced 
allocation between Member States of the power to impose taxes.698
The ECJ then observed that the inclusion of the profits of a CFC in the tax base of the 
resident company makes it possible to thwart practices which have no purpose other than 
to escape the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried on in national 
territory. Such legislation is therefore suitable to achieve the objective for which it was 
adopted.
Finally, the ECJ determined whether that legislation goes beyond what is necessary 
to achieve that purpose. Here, the ECJ examined to what extent the UK legislation is 
overinclusive in relation to its objective as formulated in the justification stage in which 
the illegitimate objectives were filtered out. The ECJ stated that in order to find that 
there is a wholly artificial arrangement there must be, in addition to a subjective element 
consisting in the intention to obtain a tax advantage, objective circumstances showing 
that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by EU law, the objective 
pursued by freedom of establishment has not been achieved. In order for the legislation 
on CFCs to comply with Community law, the taxation provided for by that legislation 
must be excluded where, despite the existence of tax motives, the incorporation of a CFC 
reflects economic reality: an actual establishment intended to carry on genuine economic 
activities in the host Member State. Insofar as the CFC legislation covers more situations, 
it is overinclusive. 
Oy AA
The case of Oy AA illustrates the idea of a ‘twofold neutrality’ very well: the application of 
the free movement provisions should not render direct tax sovereignty meaningless (see 
section 7.4.1). This case concerned the Finnish system of group contribution. The purpose 
of this system is to remove tax disadvantages inherent in the structure of a group of 
companies by allowing a balancing out within a group that comprises both profit-making 
and loss-making companies. An intra-group financial transfer is regarded as an expense 
of the transferor and is deducted from that person’s taxable income only if it is recorded as 
income of the transferee. In a cross-border situation, where the transferee is not subject to 
tax in Finland, a group contribution is not possible. The question arises as to whether this 
contravenes freedom of establishment. 
The ECJ started off by noting that, in relation to the possibility of deducting as expenses 
a transfer made in favour of the parent company, the legislation introduces a difference in 
treatment between subsidiaries established in Finland according to whether or not their 
parent company has its corporate seat in that same Member State. This difference does 
not follow from any incomparability of domestic and foreign parent companies of the 
aim pursued by the Finnish system. As a consequence, the Finnish system constitutes an 
obstacle to the freedom of establishment. The ECJ emphasized that this conclusion cannot 
be called into question by the argument that the parent company could have attained the 
objective pursued by creating a branch in Finland rather than a subsidiary.699 It is important 
698 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, § 51-55.
699 Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 31-40.
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to observe that the ECJ – just like it did in Manninen above – removes the discriminatory 
element from the aim of the system when performing comparability analysis. 
The ECJ then went on to examine whether the restriction on freedom of establishment 
can be justified, and if so, whether it is appropriate and necessary to ensuring the attainment 
of its objective. The ECJ first dealt with the need to safeguard a balanced allocation of 
the power to tax between Member States. It pointed out that that need cannot justify a 
Member State systematically refusing to grant a tax advantage to a resident subsidiary, on 
the ground that the income of the parent company, having its establishment in another 
Member State, is not capable of being taxed in the first Member State. That element of 
justification may be allowed, however, where the system in question is designed to prevent 
conduct capable of jeopardizing the right of the Member States to exercise their taxing 
powers in relation to activities carried on in their territory. To accept that an intra-group 
cross-border transfer may be deducted from the taxable income of the transferor would 
result in allowing groups of companies to choose freely the Member State in which the 
profits of the subsidiary are to be taxed, by removing them from the basis of assessment 
of the latter and, where that transfer is regarded as taxable income in the Member State of 
the parent company, incorporating them in the basis of assessment of the parent company. 
That would undermine the system of the allocation of the power to tax between Member 
States because, according to the choice made by the group of companies, the Member 
State of the subsidiary would be forced to renounce its right, in its capacity as the State of 
residence of that subsidiary, to tax the profits of that subsidiary in favour, possibly, of the 
Member State in which the parent company has its establishment. Concerning, secondly, 
the alleged risk – submitted by various governments – that losses might be used twice, 
the ECJ found it sufficient to point out that the Finnish system of intra-group financial 
transfers does not concern the deductibility of losses. Concerning, thirdly, the prevention 
of tax avoidance, the ECJ acknowledged that the possibility of transferring the taxable 
income of a subsidiary to a parent company with its establishment in another Member 
State carries the risk that, by means of purely artificial arrangements, income transfers 
may be organized within a group of companies towards companies established in Member 
States applying the lowest rates of taxation or in Member States in which such income is 
not taxed. That possibility is reinforced by the fact that the Finnish system of intra-group 
financial transfers does not require the transferee to have suffered losses. The combination 
of these two factors lead the ECJ to the conclusion that the refusal of cross-border group 
contributions pursues legitimate objectives compatible with EU law and justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest, and is appropriate to ensuring the attainment of 
those objectives.700 
It must, however, still be examined whether or not such a system goes beyond what 
is necessary to attain all of the objectives pursued. The ECJ noted at the outset that the 
objectives of safeguarding the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States and the prevention of tax avoidance are linked. Conduct involving the 
creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a 
view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out 
on national territory is such as to undermine the right of the Member States to exercise 
700 Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 53-60.
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their tax jurisdiction in relation to those activities and jeopardize a balanced allocation 
between Member States of the power to impose taxes. Any extension of the system of 
group contributions to cross-border situations would have the effect of allowing groups 
of companies to choose freely the Member State in which their profits will be taxed, to 
the detriment of the right of the Member State of the subsidiary to tax profits generated 
by activities carried out on its territory. That detriment cannot be prevented by imposing 
conditions concerning the treatment of the income arising from the intra-group financial 
transfer in the Member State of the transferee, or concerning the existence of losses made 
by the transferee. 
As a result, freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) did not preclude the refusal of 
cross-border group contributions.701
Papillon
Société Papillon is a company resident in France. It owns 100% of the shares in Artist 
Performance and Communication BV (APC), a company resident in the Netherlands. 
APC holds 99.99% of the shares in SARL Kiron which is a resident of France. In turn, Kiron 
holds the shares in various French group companies. Papillon applied for the French group 
consolidation regime (intégration fiscale) per 1 January 1989. It wanted to consolidate the 
results of Papillon, Kiron and Kiron’s French subsidiaries, whilst excluding APC from the 
consolidation. The French tax authorities, however, rejected this request on the grounds 
that i) group consolidation is only possible in the case of an ‘uninterrupted chain’ of 
shareholdings between the companies concerned, combined with the circumstances that 
ii) all companies in the ‘uninterrupted chain’ have to be part of the consolidated group 
and iii) non-resident group companies cannot be consolidated. Since APC was not tax 
resident in France, group consolidation between Papillon, Kiron and Kiron’s French 
subsidiaries was not possible. Papillon claimed that this rejection contravened Article 49 
TFEU (freedom of establishment). The French Conseil d’État decided to refer the case to 
the ECJ.
The ECJ noted that a French parent company which holds its French sub-subsidiaries 
through a subsidiary established in another Member State cannot benefit from the tax 
integration regime. By contrast, a French parent company is able to achieve tax integration 
with its French sub-subsidiaries where the intermediate subsidiary is established in 
France. The ability to elect for the tax integration regime is accordingly dependent on 
whether the parent company holds its indirect shares through a subsidiary established in 
France or in another Member State. Consequently, EU situations are put at a disadvantage 
compared with purely domestic situations.702 This restriction on freedom of establishment 
is, in principle, prohibited unless it is justified by overriding reasons of public interest and 
701 Case C-231/05 Oy AA, § 61-65.
702 Already in Case C-200/98 X AB & Y AB, the ECJ held that a refusal of the group contribution 
regime for a resident parent company and a resident sub-subsidiary on the ground that the parent 
company held the shares in the sub-subsidiary indirectly through a non-resident intermediate 
subsidiary, constituted a restriction on freedom of establishment. The case of Papillon has a very 
similar fact pattern. The legal context is however very different, because French group taxation is 
only possible if all of these companies are consolidated. The Swedish group contribution regime 
did not have such a requirement.
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its application is appropriate and necessary to ensuring the attainment of the objectives of 
the French system. In this regard the ECJ held that the restriction cannot be justified by 
the need to preserve the allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States. 
The question as to whether the profits and losses of companies belonging to the group in 
question should be taken into account will arise only in relation to companies which are 
resident in France. This also excludes, prima facie, a risk of tax avoidance. The restriction 
can, however, possibly be justified by the need to ensure the coherence of the tax system. 
The neutralisation of intra-group transactions is an important objective of the group 
consolidation regime. If a non-resident group company is not part of the consolidated 
group, it may not always be possible to fully achieve this objective if the French sub-
subsidiary suffers a loss. After all, that loss may be taken into account both at the level of 
the consolidated group and at the level of the French parent company through a write-
down of the shares in the non-resident group company. It is however disproportionate 
to exclude the possibility of group consolidation altogether. In this respect, the ECJ first 
pointed out that practical difficulties cannot of themselves justify the infringement of 
a freedom guaranteed by the Treaty. Moreover, Council Directive 77/799/EEC allows 
France to request from the competent authorities of the other Member States all relevant 
information. In addition, the French tax authorities are entitled to demand from the 
parent company such documents as they consider necessary to determine whether the 
provisions made by that company for the losses in share values in the subsidiary can 
be explained indirectly by a loss of the sub-subsidiary through the provisions of that 
subsidiary. Accordingly, group consolidation between Papillon, Kiron and Kiron’s French 
subsidiaries should in principle be possible.
8.3.2 Relation to the theoretical optimization model
8.3.2.1 Introduction
The theoretical optimization model requires that the tax measure which leads to a 
‘disadvantage’ has a ‘respectful aim’ and that the EU free movement provision which affects 
this tax measure is also respectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty. This is the idea 
of a ‘twofold neutrality’. This means that direct tax measures should in abstracto ‘accept’ 
that they may be limited by the principle of free movement. In turn, the free movement 
provisions cannot lead to rules which would in fact have as their objective to do away with 
the principle of direct tax sovereignty: the principle of free movement should respect the 
internal and external objectives of national tax systems. No other requirements may be 
imposed, apart from being formally and substantively compatible with other principles 
enshrined in the TEU and the TFEU (section 7.4.1). This section analyzes to what extent 
the case law discussed in section 8.3.1 fits into these theoretical principles. First, however, 
it will be reviewed how the ECJ determines the aim of a national measure and how it deals 
with a plurality of objectives.
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8.3.2.2 Aim determination and a plurality of objectives
How to determine the aim of a measure?
It may be difficult to discover which aim exactly underlies a certain rule. This is a problem 
with which every court is familiar; it should be solved though the normal rules of 
interpretation. It has been argued in section 4.5.2 that the courts should actively investigate 
the existence of any underlying – perhaps less noble – motive. They can have recourse to 
the legislative history of the measure, the system of the law of which the measure is a part, 
the social and political circumstances under which it was enacted and the effects generated 
by the provision. The case of Finalarte, discussed in 8.3.1.2, shows that the ECJ’s case law 
is perfectly in line with the theoretical optimization model in this respect. It has also been 
argued in section 4.5.2 that, if a rule prima facie infringes a certain principle without any 
known ‘real’ objective, this may be an indication that its objective coincides with its effects, 
i.e. to limit that principle, as a consequence of which it cannot be regarded as respectful. 
The case of Finalarte also seems to support this view because that judgment states that the 
effects of a national measure are very important to determine its objective. 
How to deal with a plurality of objectives?
The ECJ has accepted in Campus Oil and Nertsvoederfabriek Nederland that the achievement 
of an economic aim might be necessary for the achievement of a public interest aim. If that 
is the case, the measure overall pursues a legitimate objective, notwithstanding any other 
economic – and therefore illegitimate – objectives (section 8.3.1.2). In section 4.5.2 it has 
been suggested that courts should, in the case of a plurality of objectives, investigate on 
a case-by-case basis whether the measure would also be justified if the unacceptable goal 
were eliminated. There does not seem to be much light between both tests. For example, 
any restrictive tax measure also has a budgetary background. If there is no other reason 
which may serve as a justification, the tax measure is prohibited. What matters is whether 
the disrespectful objective of a tax measure serves to achieve another respectful objective. 
If this is the case, the disrespectful objective is an unavoidable consequence, which does 
not invalidate the measure. The case of Cadbury Schweppes, discussed in section 8.3.1.4, 
may illustrate this. The CFC legislation in this case partially disallowed a company to 
set up a secondary establishment in another Member State in order to benefit from a 
more beneficial tax regime there. This aim cannot be regarded as respectful, because it 
fundamentally denies the existence of freedom of establishment. However, insofar as the 
objectives of freedom of establishment coincide with the aim of the prevention of tax 
evasion, the latter respectful aim may justify the measure to that extent. In summary, 
ECJ case law seems to be in conformity with the theoretical optimization model. A final 
example which may illustrate the point is the State aid case of Gibraltar v. Commission.703 
Gibraltar decided, in the exercise of its tax sovereignty, to replace the system of corporate 
income tax by two other taxes: a tax on occupation of business property and a payroll tax, 
together capped at 15% of profits. This tax system is beneficial for offshore companies 
without significant presence or staff in Gibraltar. This effect does not result, however, in 




an advantage for these companies within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU. If it were 
otherwise, Gibraltar would be precluded form designing its tax system on the basis of 
payroll and occupation of business property, which are both aimed at taxing scarce 
production factors. This in itself respectful aim should be able to be pursued by Gibraltar: 
the prohibition of State aid would be disrespectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty 
if it would positively prescribe how Gibraltar should design its tax system.
8.3.2.3 Direct tax measures which are disrespectful towards free movement
Introduction
It is settled case law that (tax) measures which discriminate directly on grounds of 
nationality cannot be justified unless a specification Treaty derogation applies. Apparently, 
these measures do not meet the ECJ’s requirement that a restrictive rule has to pursue an 
objective which is ‘legitimate’. This is also, as appears from section 8.3.1.3, the case for tax 
measures which are allegedly justified by one of the following reasons: budgetary reasons, 
protection of the tax base, the existence of other tax advantages to compensate for the 
alleged tax disadvantage, the availability of an alternative legal or business form and the 
lack of EU harmonization concerning the impugned national tax measure. These are now 
reviewed.
Directly discriminatory direct tax rules
The classic four freedoms of the TFEU – free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital – all prohibit distinctions which are directly based on the origin of the product 
or on the (foreign) nationality of the taxpayer concerned. Such distinctions can only be 
justified on grounds of the express treaty derogations (section 8.3.1.3). This is problematic 
in view of the theoretical optimization model. The above-discussed case of Royal Bank of 
Scotland, where the ECJ held in general terms that the discrimination in that case could 
be justified only on grounds of the express Treaty derogations, is at odds with the model 
because it categorically states that a tax measure which directly distinguishes on grounds of 
nationality of the taxpayer is disrespectful towards the principle of free movement. Under 
the theoretical optimization model, however, no principle can be absolute; any other rule 
or principle should be able to serve as its limit. This would be different if a third principle 
would come into play: the formal principle that that rules passed by an authority acting 
within its jurisdiction are to be followed (see section 4.2).704 If the EU Member States 
would have decided that the prohibition of direct discrimination should be regarded as a 
rule which the ECJ cannot alter due to formal principles, the optimization process would 
already have been performed by the Contracting States. In my view, however, EU Member 
States cannot have envisaged such a rule, which is shown by the examples discussed below 
in which a direct discrimination seems to make perfect sense. Of course, a distinction 
directly on grounds of nationality may be subject to an intense review of the degree of fit 
of the measure (section 4.5.4), but an outright prohibition of such a distinction is not in 
line with the model.
 
704 Kumm 2004, p 578; Alexy 2002, p 58.
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 This is echoed not only by the above-discussed cases of Campus Oil and Nertsvoeder-
fabriek Nederland, but also by the ECJ’s judgment in ADBHU, where it was held “that the 
principle of freedom of trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to certain 
limits justified by the objectives of general interest”.705 The ECJ has recognized this in its 
case law by operating a balanceable notion of discrimination which it uses to ‘escape’ the 
notion that direct discrimination can only be justified on the grounds expressly mentioned 
in the Treaty. An example of this mechanism is provided by the Walloon waste case.706 In 
that case the Commission argued that Belgium had infringed Articles 34 and 36 TFEU by 
prohibiting the storage, tipping or dumping in Wallonia of waste originating in another 
Member State or in a region of Belgium other than Wallonia. The ECJ first stated that 
waste, whether recyclable or not, is to be regarded as “goods”, the movement of which 
must in principle not be prevented. To justify the restrictions placed on the movement 
of waste, Belgium argued that the contested legislation meets imperative requirements 
relating to environmental protection and the objective of protection of health, which 
takes precedence over the objective of freedom of movement for goods, and constitutes 
an exceptional and temporary protective measure to counter the inflow into Wallonia of 
waste from neighbouring countries. With respect to the environment, it is important to 
note that waste is matter of a special kind. The ECJ considered this argument to be well 
founded. Accumulation of waste, even before it becomes a health hazard, constitutes a 
danger to the environment, regard being had in particular to the limited capacity of each 
region or locality for waste reception. In view of the abnormally large-scale inflow of waste 
from other regions for tipping in Wallonia, there was a real danger to the environment, 
having regard to the limited capacity of that region. The Commission argued, however, 
that those imperative requirements cannot be relied upon in the present case, given 
that the measures in question discriminate against waste originating in other Member 
States, which is no more harmful than waste produced in Wallonia. In other words, there 
is a ‘direct’ discrimination on the basis of the origin of the product which can only be 
justified on grounds of the express Treaty derogations. The ECJ admitted that imperative 
requirements can indeed be taken into account only in the case of measures which apply 
without distinction to both domestic and imported products. Subsequently, the ECJ 
specified this requirement so that it only prohibits arbitrary discrimination on grounds 
of the origin of the product. The arbitrariness of a certain distinction is found through a 
balancing exercise:
“34. (…) in assessing whether or not the barrier in question is discriminatory, 
account must be taken of the particular nature of waste. The principle that 
environmental damage should as a matter of priority be remedied at source, laid 
down by [Article 191 TFEU] as a basis for action by the Community relating to the 
environment, entails that it is for each region, municipality or other local authority 
to take appropriate steps to ensure that its own waste is collected, treated and 
705 Case 240/83 ADBHU, § 12.
706 Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium (Walloon waste). The case is discussed extensively by 




disposed of; it must accordingly be disposed of as close as possible to the place 
where it is produced, in order to limit as far as possible the transport of waste. 
35. Moreover, that principle is consistent with the principles of self-sufficiency and 
proximity set out in the Basel Convention of 22 March 1989 on the control of 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, to which the 
Community is a signatory (…). 
36. It follows that having regard to the differences between waste produced in 
different places and to the connection of the waste with its place of production, the 
contested measures cannot be regarded as discriminatory.”
Thus, according to Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano, the test of non-arbitrary 
discrimination promotes coherence within the legal system because it requires that 
plausible connections be made among colliding reasons, all of them belonging to the same 
legal theory.707 It is remarkable that the ECJ not only refers to the free movement of goods 
and to environmental protection but also to an external treaty. Bengoetxea, MacCormick 
and Moral Soriano note:
“What is important is not the systematic order of principles but rather the 
promotion of all of them (demand of proportionality). A measure such as that 
established by Wallonia restricts free movement of goods but promotes a high 
level of environmental protection, the principle that damage should be remedied 
at its source, and the principle that the polluter pays (…). The Court understands 
proportionality in Alexy’s sense: as a command to optimize, that is, as a command 
to find an equilibrium among all colliding interests and values. The criterion to 
be followed is ‘the more intensive the interference in one principle is, the more 
important must be the realization of the other principle’.708 So an interference into 
the principle of non-discrimination and free movement of goods is justified by the 
realization of other (equally important) principles.”709
It would, in view of the theoretical optimization model, be recommendable that the ECJ 
explicitly drops the notion that direct discrimination can only be justified on the grounds 
expressly mentioned in the Treaty.
Budgetary reasons
It appears from the case law discussed in 8.3.1.4 (e.g. Manninen) that budgetary reasons 
can never justify a restriction on free movement.710 This is fully in line with the theoretical 
optimization model. Restrictive tax measures can only be regarded as ‘respectful’ if they 
can be justified on grounds other than tax sovereignty itself (a principle cannot determine 
its own extent; see section 7.4.4). Budgetary reasons cannot, therefore, be regarded as 
707 Bengoetxea, MacCormick & Moral Soriano 2001, p 76.
708 Original footnote: “Alexy, ‘Rights, Legal Reasoning and Rational Discourse’, (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 
150.”
709 J Bengoetxea, MacCormick & Moral Soriano 2001, p 76. 
710 Compare also Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson, § 15; Case C-96/08 CIBA, § 48.
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respectful. If it were otherwise, the extent of tax sovereignty would be unlimited and 
absolute. In Orange European Smallcap Fund, however, the ECJ left open the question 
whether a loss of tax revenue may justify a restriction on free movement of capital in 
relation to third countries.711 This is odd in view of the theoretical optimization model. 
In Haribo, AG Kokott has, therefore, rightly concluded that a reduction of tax revenue 
cannot justify a restriction of free movement of capital from and towards third countries, 
because this would render Article 63 TFEU meaningless in these situations.712 In other 
words, the principle of tax sovereignty would be disrespectful towards the principle of free 
movement.
Practical difficulties
In Papillon, the ECJ reiterated its settled case law that practical difficulties cannot of 
themselves justify the infringement of a freedom guaranteed by the Treaty. This seems to 
be in line with the theoretical optimization model. The permissibility of an infringement 
of the principle of free movement on this ground alone would essentially mean that the 
principle of tax sovereignty would become unlimited; to a certain extent there are always 
practical difficulties. This would go against the very nature of a principle: it should accept 
that it may be limited by a competing principle.
Protection of the tax base
The same is true for anti-abuse measures which apply solely because a taxpayer has 
established itself in another Member State with a low effective tax rate. Again, such an 
objective disrespects the principle of free movement because it negates the very existence 
of a competing principle (the principle of free movement). The above-discussed judgment 
in Cadbury Schweppes is a good illustration of this. Indeed, the ECJ already stated in 
Eurowings that “such compensatory tax arrangements prejudice the very foundations of 
the single market.”713
Availability of an alternative legal or business form
In the above-discussed cases of Avoir Fiscal and Oy AA, the ECJ rejected the argument 
that the taxpayer could have used an alternative business form – e.g. a subsidiary instead 
of a permanent establishment – in which case no tax disadvantage would have occurred. 
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 49 TFEU expressly leaves traders free 
to choose the appropriate legal form in which to pursue their activities in another Member 
State and that freedom of choice must not be limited by discriminatory tax provisions, 
the ECJ said. This statement is fully in line with the theoretical optimization model. A tax 
measure which restricts free choice of legal form for no reason other than doing precisely 
that does not respect the principle of freedom of establishment. If it were otherwise, the 
extent of tax sovereignty would be unlimited and absolute, which is not possible for a 
‘principle’ which should be prepared to engage in optimization with other principles 
(section 4.5.2). 
711 Case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund, § 93-96.
712 Opinion of AG Kokott in Joined Cases C-436/08 and C-437/08 Haribo and Österreichische 
Salinen, § 125. See § 126 of the judgment itself.
713 Case C-294/97 Eurowings, § 45. See also Case C-136/00 Danner, § 56.
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Existence of other tax advantages to compensate for the alleged tax disadvantage
In the above-discussed case of Avoir Fiscal, the ECJ held that unfavourable tax treatment 
contrary to a fundamental freedom cannot be justified by the existence of other tax 
advantages.714 The theoretical optimization model supports this, because the principle of 
tax sovereignty would be unlimited and absolute if it could freely limit the application of 
other principles on the basis of its own application in other situations of collision with 
these principles. In other words, the limit (the national tax measure) to a principle (free 
movement) would determine its own extent. As explained in section 4.5.2, this would be 
disrespectful towards competing principles. 
The lack of EU harmonization concerning the impugned national tax measure
In Avoir Fiscal the ECJ also rejected the defence that a national restrictive tax measure 
could be justified by the fact that there is (almost) no positive EU harmonization in direct 
taxation. Obviously, this is supported by the theoretical assessment model. If the principle 
of tax sovereignty did not accept that it can be limited as long as there is no positive EU 
harmonization, it would flagrantly disrespect the principle of free movement.
8.3.2.4 Situations where free movement is disrespectful towards tax sovereignty
Introduction
The case law discussed in section 8.3.1.4, but also in section 8.2.1, has not only revealed 
situations where the principle of tax sovereignty is disrespectful towards free movement, 
but also situations where the opposite situation occurs. The cases of Gilly and Oy AA are 
good examples, as will be discussed now.
A prohibition of taxation as such is disrespectful
The principle of proportionality is generally not capable of providing for limits which 
the legislature has to observe when enacting direct tax rules which are mainly aimed 
at collecting public resources (section 7.4.2). In these cases the petitum or claim of the 
applicant which should make it clear to the court what it should decide in the event that it 
would find in favour of the applicant, in fact implies a request for abandoning direct taxes 
as such. Clearly, such a claim cannot be sustained, because it would deny the existence of 
a State’s direct tax sovereignty (the principle of free movement would not be respectful to 
the principle of direct tax sovereignty; see section 4.5.2). The case of Gilly, discussed in 
section 8.2.1.2, clearly supports this aspect of the theoretical optimization model. In this 
case the ECJ held that a Member State does not have to refund to a resident taxpayer any 
income tax levied by another Member State in order to align the total tax burden of the 
taxpayer in line with the tax burden in a purely domestic situation. The ECJ explained this, 
inter alia, as follows:
“if the State of residence were required to accord a tax credit greater than the 
fraction of its national tax corresponding to the income from abroad, it would 
714 See also Case C-182/06 Lakebrink, § 24; compare also Case C-330/91 Commerzbank, § 19; Case 
C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, § 40.
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have to reduce its tax in respect of the remaining income, which would entail a loss 
of tax revenue for it and would thus be such as to encroach on its sovereignty in 
matters of direct taxation.”715
This statement is perfectly understandable if one recognizes that the principle of free 
movement should respect the principle of tax sovereignty: the idea of a twofold neutrality 
(section 7.4.1).
A prohibition to determine the organization and aims of the tax system is disrespectful
The prima facie right to be able to determine the organization and aims of the tax system 
within the domestic jurisdiction should serve as a limit to free movement, because the 
principle of free movement has to be respectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty 
(section 7.4.2). If the principle of free movement did not respect the core aspect of the 
principle of direct tax sovereignty that a State may design its tax system as it sees fit and 
to pursue any measure of general tax policy or any other policy through that system, if 
would have the pretention to prescribe itself what a ‘good’ tax system should look like. 
As a result, the principle of free movement would not accept that it may be limited by 
the principle of tax sovereignty: it would be disrespectful. A good example in ECJ case 
law is provided by the above-discussed case of Oy AA. This case concerned the Finnish 
system of group contribution. The purpose of this system is to remove tax disadvantages 
inherent in the structure of a group of companies by allowing a balancing-out within a 
group that comprises both profit-making and loss-making companies. An intra-group 
financial transfer is regarded as an expense of the transferor and is deducted from that 
person’s taxable income only if it is recorded as income of the transferee. In a cross-border 
situation, where the transferee is not subject to tax in Finland, a group contribution is 
not possible. The ECJ held, essentially, that a Member State is free to design a system of 
group taxation within its domestic jurisdiction. This is the starting point. The next step 
is to verify whether there are legitimate reasons for not applying this system in cross-
border situations. The ECJ answered this question in the affirmative: if the principle of free 
movement were to force the Member State concerned to extend its group contribution 
regime cross-border, it would in fact deprive that Member State of the right to regulate 
within its domestic jurisdiction (it would no longer be possible to tax the profits which are 
under international tax law attributable to that Member State).716 This would in fact mean 
that the principle of free movement would prohibit a Member State from operating a system 
of group contribution under penalty of being unable to collect public resources, which 
would be disrespectful to the aforementioned starting point. The following considerations 
of the ECJ show, in my view, that this is indeed what the ECJ has said:
“64. In a situation in which the advantage in question consists in the possibility 
of making a transfer of income, thereby excluding such income from the taxable 
income of the transferor and including it in the taxable income of the transferee, 
715 Case C-336/96 Gilly, § 48.




any extension of that advantage to cross-border situations would (…) have the 
effect of allowing groups of companies to choose freely the Member State in which 
their profits will be taxed, to the detriment of the right of the Member State of the 
subsidiary to tax profits generated by activities carried out on its territory. 
65. That detriment cannot be prevented by imposing conditions concerning the 
treatment of the income arising from the intra-group financial transfer in the 
Member State of the transferee, or concerning the existence of losses made by 
the transferee. To allow deduction of the intra-group financial transfer where it 
constitutes taxable income of the transferee company, or where the opportunities 
for the transferee company to transfer its losses to another company are limited, 
or to allow deduction of an intra-group financial transfer in favour of a company 
whose establishment is in a Member State applying a lower rate of tax than that 
applied by the Member State of the transferor only where that intra-group financial 
transfer is specifically justified by the economic situation of the transferee, as Oy 
AA has proposed, would nevertheless mean that, in the final analysis, the choice of 
the Member State of taxation would be a matter for the group of companies, which 
would have a wide discretion in that regard.”
In my view, these considerations are based on the idea of a twofold neutrality (section 
7.4.1), as a result of which ECJ case law is in line with the theoretical optimization model. 
The case of Cadbury Schweppes, discussed in section 8.3.1.4, may serve as another example. 
The CFC legislation in this case partially disallowed a company to set up a secondary 
establishment in another Member State in order to benefit from a more beneficial tax 
regime there. This aim cannot be regarded as respectful, because it fundamentally denies 
the existence of freedom of establishment. However, insofar as it coincides with the aim 
of the prevention of tax evasion, the latter respectful aim may justify the measure to that 
extent. The principle of free movement would disrespect the principle of tax sovereignty 
if it did not allow a Member State to prevent tax evasion by wholly artificial arrangements 
which would deprive a Member State of the right to tax the profits of a company which are 
attributable to economic activities in its jurisdiction. In such a case, free movement would 
not accept tax sovereignty as a limit. In summary, ECJ case law seems to be in conformity 
with the theoretical optimization model.
The question arises as to how Oy AA relates to the judgment in Marks & Spencer.717 
In this latter case, which concerned the UK system of group relief (surrender of losses 
between group companies), the ECJ obliged the UK to accept foreign losses from a 
non-resident subsidiary if the possibilities of using the losses had been exhausted in the 
subsidiary’s Member State and the parent company demonstrated this. In contrast, the ECJ 
did not oblige Finland to accept a cross-border transfer of profits by a Finnish subsidiary 
to its UK parent company in a ‘final loss’ situation. In my view, the difference between 
both cases is reflected in the different design of both systems. The transfer of profits in 
a group contribution system is possible regardless of the existence of losses at the level 
of the recipient company. If the principle of free movement required that this system be 
changed so as to allow a cross-border group contribution in a ‘final loss’ situation, it would 
717 Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, discussed in section 2.4.
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impose an entirely new element in that system for which the principle of free movement 
has no authority: it would be disrespectful towards Finnish tax sovereignty. In a system 
of group relief, however, the ECJ could require that losses be surrendered under certain 
circumstances, without changing the essence of the system. 
What happens if the right to determine the objectives of the tax system is disrespected?
The ECJ’s case law becomes unpredictable and arbitrary if the ECJ disregards the 
respectful objectives which underlie a certain tax measure (in such a case the principle of 
free movement would disrespect the principle of tax sovereignty). A striking example is 
provided by the rules established in the cases of Fokus Bank, Amurta, Commission v. Italy 
and Commission v. Spain.718 These cases all concerned a withholding tax on dividends which 
was applicable only to non-resident recipients, in a situation where a resident recipient 
was (effectively) exempt from corporate income tax on the dividend. The background of 
the exemption of resident shareholders from taxation on the dividend is the wish to avoid 
economic double taxation of the dividend. The ECJ and the EFTA Court both decided that 
the disadvantageous treatment of a dividend paid to non-resident shareholders constitutes 
a restriction on free movement of capital which cannot be justified. Subsequently, the 
ECJ went a step further by holding in Amurta that a bilateral tax treaty may enable the 
effects of this restriction on the free movement of capital to be neutralized in the State of 
residence of the taxpayer. A unilateral tax credit in the residence State would in any event 
not suffice, because the source State has not made sure in such a case that the effects of 
the restriction caused by its legislation are neutralized.719 In Commission v Italy the ECJ 
tried to give a more precise meaning to this concept of ‘neutralization’. The ECJ reiterated 
that the possibility cannot be excluded that a Member State might succeed in ensuring 
compliance with its obligations under the Treaty by concluding a convention for the 
avoidance of double taxation with another Member State. It is, however, necessary for 
that purpose that application of the double taxation convention allows the effects of the 
difference in treatment under national legislation to be compensated for. The difference 
in treatment between dividends distributed to companies established in other Member 
States and those distributed to resident companies does not totally disappear unless the 
tax withheld at source under national legislation can be set off against the tax due in the 
other Member State in the full amount of the difference in treatment arising under the 
national legislation.720 The ECJ then held that the grant of an ordinary tax credit in the 
State of residence cannot, generally speaking, neutralize the discriminatory taxation of 
non-resident shareholders:
“38. In this case, such a set-off against the tax due in the other Member State of 
the tax withheld at source in Italy is not guaranteed by Italian legislation. Set-off 
presupposes, in particular, that dividends coming from Italy are sufficiently taxed 
in the other Member State. As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraphs 
718 Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank, Case C-379/05 Amurta, Case C-540/07 Commission v. Italy; Case 
C-487/08 Commission v. Spain.
719 Case C-379/05 Amurta, § 78 and 83.
720 Case C-540/07 Commission v. Italy, § 36-37.
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58 and 59 of her Opinion, if those dividends are not taxed, or are not sufficiently 
taxed, the sum withheld at source in Italy or a part thereof cannot be set off. In 
that case, the difference in treatment arising from the application of national 
legislation cannot be compensated for by applying provisions of the double taxation 
convention.
39. The choice as to whether to tax income from Italy in the other Member State, 
or the level at which it is to be taxed, depends not on the Italian Republic but on 
the tax rules laid down by the other Member State. The Italian Republic is therefore 
wrong to argue that set-off of the tax withheld at source in Italy against the tax 
due in the other Member State, pursuant to the provisions of conventions for the 
avoidance of double taxation, allows in all cases for the difference in treatment 
arising from the application of national legislation to be compensated for. 
40. The Italian Republic cannot therefore argue that, by reason of the application 
of conventions for the avoidance of double taxation, dividends distributed to 
companies established in other Member States are not, in the final analysis, treated 
differently from dividends distributed to resident companies.”
Open questions are what happens in a case where the grant of an ordinary tax credit in the 
State of residence has led to a full refund of foreign withholding tax in a concrete case and 
what happens if only a partial refund has been granted. Does a partial discrimination in 
the source State occur in that situation? The case of Commission v. Spain has not resolved 
this issue.721
The answers to these and similar questions are wholly unpredictable, which is caused 
by the fact that the ECJ has misinterpreted the basic objectives of the tax measures in 
question. As a result, the ECJ will have to create its own benchmark without being able 
to have recourse to the aims of the national tax system. This can be explained as follows. 
The (effective) exemption of resident shareholders from taxation on the dividend is aimed 
at the avoidance of economic double taxation of the dividend. This objective cannot be 
regarded as disrespectful towards free movement. The taxation of a cross-border dividend, 
however, cannot be explained by this objective in a situation where the dividend is exempt 
from taxation in the residence State of the shareholder. In such a case, the source State can 
attain the objective of avoiding economic double taxation. As a consequence, it should 
(effectively) exempt the dividend – there is no respectful objective which supports another 
conclusion.722 Conversely, the taxation of a cross-border dividend can be explained in a 
situation where the dividend is taxable in the residence State of the shareholder. In such 
a case, the source State is unable to achieve the objective of avoiding economic double 
taxation. As a consequence, it cannot be regarded as disrespectful towards the principle 
of free movement if the source State taxes the cross-border dividend. Ad impossibile nemo 
tenetur. In such a case the disadvantageous treatment of a cross-border dividend is not 
motivated by purely budgetary reasons, but by the fact that the objective of avoiding 
economic taxation cannot be achieved. 
 
721 Case C-487/08 Commission v. Spain, § 62 and 67.
722 This explains Case C-170/05 Denkavit. This case was, therefore, rightly decided.
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 This means that the case law established in Fokus Bank, Amurta, Commission v. Italy 
and Commission v. Spain is unfortunate. It is obvious that the question of whether the 
dividend is taxable in the residence State of the shareholder is relevant in the light of the 
objective of avoiding economic double taxation.723 The criterion of ‘neutralization’ by a tax 
credit prescribed by a bilateral tax treaty between the source State and the residence State of 
the shareholder – developed in Amurta and Commission v. Italy – has no basis whatsoever 
in the objectives of the restrictive tax measures at issue in those cases. After all, it is wholly 
irrelevant in the light of those objectives whether the residence State grants a tax credit at 
all, unilaterally of bilaterally, for a withholding tax, because this tax credit aims at avoiding 
international juridical double taxation instead of economic double taxation. The wrong 
approach taken by the ECJ has resulted in a situation where the ECJ itself has to interpret 
what ‘neutralization’ means. This cannot be regarded as respectful to the principle of tax 
sovereignty, because the principle of free movement cannot impose a concept of its own 
of reasonable and correct law-making (section 7.4.4). If the ECJ had found – as it should 
have – that a source State is under no obligation to avoid economic double taxation insofar 
as the residence State of the shareholder makes it impossible to achieve this, the ECJ could 
have spared itself a lot of trouble. 
Another example of a case where the ECJ did not respect the aim of the national 
tax measure is CLT-UFA.724 This case concerned the company CLT-UFA with its seat 
and central administration in Luxembourg and a branch in Germany. The German tax 
administration set the tax rate at 42% of the taxable income of the branch. CLT-UFA 
submitted that this tax rate was discriminatory and that it infringed its right to freedom 
of establishment under Article 49 TFEU. It sought a reduction of the tax rate to 30% of 
taxable income on the ground that subsidiaries of a non-resident parent company were 
entitled to such a tax rate if they distributed their profits to the parent company (a split rate 
system for the avoidance of economic double taxation; see section 5.4.2). The ECJ ruled 
in favour of the taxpayer. It considered that the second sentence of the first paragraph 
of Article 49 TFEU expressly leaves traders free to choose the appropriate legal form in 
which to pursue their activities in another Member State and that this freedom of choice 
must not be limited by discriminatory tax provisions. Therefore, the freedom to choose 
the appropriate legal form in which to pursue activities in another Member State primarily 
serves to allow companies having their seat in a Member State to open a branch in another 
Member State in order to pursue their activities under the same conditions as those 
which apply to subsidiaries. The ECJ then observed that the definitive tax rate of 42% 
applicable to the profits of branches of head offices having their seat in another Member 
State constitutes, generally speaking, unfavourable treatment in relation to the tax rate 
reduced to 30%, which is applicable to the profits of the subsidiaries of such companies. As 
a consequence, the German rules restrict the freedom to choose the appropriate legal form 
723 The ECJ has explicitly and rightly recognized this in respect of the residence State of the 
shareholder which operates a system of imputation credits for the avoidance of economic double 
taxation: insofar as there is no double taxation, no imputation credit is required. See the cases 
of C-319/02 Manninen, Case C-292/04 Meilicke, Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation and Case C-262/09 Meilicke II.
724 Case C-253/03 CLT-UFA. 
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in which to pursue activities in another Member State. It was thus necessary to examine 
whether that differential treatment is objectively justified. As regards the argument that 
there is a fundamental difference between the distribution of profits by a subsidiary to its 
parent company and the transfer of profits within a company, the ECJ made the following 
observation:
“In both cases the profits are made available to the company which controls the 
subsidiary and the branch respectively. The only real difference between the two 
situations lies in the fact that the distribution of the profits of a subsidiary to its 
parent company presupposes the existence of a formal decision to that effect, 
whereas the profits of a branch of a company are part of the assets of that company 
even in the absence of a formal decision to that effect.”725
Subsequently, the ECJ decided that the higher tax rate for branches was discriminatory 
and contravened Article 49 TFEU. The ECJ would have reached a different decision if 
it had respected the aim of the German tax system: the mitigation of economic double 
taxation within groups of companies. Such economic double taxation does not occur if a 
branch transfers profits to its head office, but occurs only if a subsidiary makes a dividend 
payment. Thus, the non-applicability of the reduced tax rate to permanent establishment 
of a foreign head office served a perfectly respectful aim which should have been respected 
by the principle of free movement.
8.3.2.5 Situations where tax sovereignty and free movement respect each other
Introduction
In situations where both the principle of tax sovereignty and the principle of free 
movement respect each other, a process of optimization starts through proportionality 
analysis. Before that, however, it should be assessed whether the objective of a tax measure 
is also compatible with other norms of EU law (section 8.3.1.4). 
The requirement of a legitimate objective compatible with EU law
This requirement is completely in line with the theoretical optimization model which 
requires that a rule or principle can only serve as a limit to the principle of free movement 
if it is formally and substantively compatible with other principles with a similar status 
such as those enshrined in the TEU and the TFEU (see section 7.5). 
The requirement of overriding reasons in the public interest
If the objective of the restrictive tax measure is compatible with other norms of EU 
law and it also respects the principle of free movement, the tax measure can serve as a 
limit to free movement. According to the theoretical optimization model, any objective 
whatsoever may serve as such. The case law discussed in section 8.3.1.4 shows that the 
ECJ in practice accepts any policy objective as long as it respects free movement; this is 
725 Case C-253/03 CLT-UFA, § 23.
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also reflected in the table of direct tax cases in the annex to this book.726 So, contrary to 
the classic requirement that a justification ground should be ‘overriding’, ECJ case law 
allows every thinkable objective as a justification for a restriction on free movement as 
it is respectful towards free movement. Therefore, the present author fully agrees with 
Timmermans’ view that there is no such thing as a general principle of EU law according 
to which the free movement provisions can be deemed to imply a rule of reason as to 
their interpretation and application.727 They do not have a view of their own as to how 
Member States should design their tax systems. If this were otherwise, the free movement 
provisions would prescribe how Member States should organize their tax systems, which 
would be disrespectful. 
In this light, the criticism by tax scholars of the ECJ, summarized in section 2.3, is 
not supported by the theoretical optimization model. In my view, it does not seem very 
fruitful to make lists with ‘actually accepted’ grounds of justification and ‘in principle 
accepted justifications, but never in practice’,728 because the analysis of a restrictive tax 
measure always comes down to its objective. It must be emphasized once again that the 
ECJ does not ‘invent’ grounds of justification, but merely accepts the objective stated by 
the national court.729 If it were to ‘invent’ grounds of justification, the principle of free 
movement would be disrespectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty. It also does 
not seem very helpful to examine why a certain ground of justification appears in one of 
these three lists and not in another,730 to criticize the way the ECJ interprets a ground of 
justification once it has been categorized in one of the lists, or to study whether certain 
‘accepted’ justifications are ‘really’ the same justification.731 For example, an ‘accepted’ 
justification ground such as the need to maintain the cohesion of the tax system cannot 
be examined as if such a justification were an autonomous object of interpretation. Under 
the theoretical optimization model one would not state that in cases like Manninen and 
Marks & Spencer a “new principle of cohesion” would have been born in a “movement 
of cautious relaxation”.732 This does not mean that it cannot be useful to resort to some 
kind of categorization of similar cases (see chapter 3). When using this method a court 
gives clear general guidance on the application and interpretation of fundamental rights in 
certain categories of cases instead of engaging in a balancing exercise in individual cases. 
This leads to a higher degree of legal certainty. As discussed in section 4.2, the process of 
optimization may indeed result in specific ‘rules’ for certain categories of cases. 
Another matter which has exercised many minds concerns the question of ‘how 
many’ justifications have to be present in order for a restriction on free movement to be 
justified. Should three justifications be present, or are two or even one enough?733 Under 
726 Another good example is Case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund NV, where the ECJ 
fully accepts the objective of equal treatment of direct investment or indirect investment through 
an investment fund.
727 Timmermans 2005, p vii.
728 See for instance Roth 2008, p 79 and 94; Kingston 2007, p 1347.
729 See Lang 2009, p 113, for an opposite view.
730 E.g. Mason 2007, p 85.
731 E.g. Wattel 2004, p 92; Wattel 2007 and Terra & Wattel 2008, p 373-374.
732 Vanistendael 2005. See also Kingston 2007, p 1348-1349.
733 Isenbaert 2009, p 274.
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the theoretical optimization model such questions are irrelevant. It is the objective of 
the national tax measures which counts, followed of course by the other phases of the 
model. This is particularly apparent from the above-discussed case of Papillon. One of 
the justifications put forward by France – the need to ensure the coherence of the tax 
system – was reviewed by the ECJ in the light of the objective of the group consolidation 
regime: the neutralisation of intra-group transactions.734 If a non-resident group company 
were not part of the consolidated group, it may not in all cases be possible to achieve this 
objective fully if the French sub-subsidiary suffers a loss. After all, that loss may be taken 
into account at the level of the consolidated group and also at the level of the French 
parent company through a write-down of the shares in the non-resident group company. 
Consequently, the need to ensure the coherence of that regime may serve as a justification 
for the restriction on freedom of establishment in the light of the objective of the group 
consolidation regime.
8.3.3 Future developments
On the basis of the theoretical assessment model, three developments should be expected. 
First, the ECJ should leave its case law on the basis of which distinctions which are directly 
based on the origin of the product or on the (foreign) nationality of the taxpayer can only 
be justified on grounds of the express Treaty derogations. Second, the ECJ should drop the 
formal requirement that only reasons which are ‘overriding’ or ‘compelling’ can serve as a 
justification for a restriction on free movement. Indeed, as the ECJ materially recognises 
in its case law, any principle or rule can serve as a limit to free movement, as long as 
its objective is respectful towards free movement. As a consequence, the only thing that 
matters is the objective and aim of a restrictive rule. Third, scholars could stop making lists 
of ‘accepted’ and ‘accepted in principle but not in practice’ and any analysis based thereon. 
In my view, ECJ case law nor the theoretical optimization model supports this activity. 
Moreover, it may result in a discourse which is too dogmatically focussed on justification 
grounds (section 4.4).
8.4 Suitability
8.4.1 Current ECJ case law on direct taxation
It is settled ECJ case law that for a restrictive tax measure to be justified, it must be 
appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective it pursues.735 This test is not very 
intensive; it is decisive whether the restrictive measure is effective. In the words of Wattel 
and Poiares Maduro: does it make sense in the light of the stated objective?736 Suitability 
presupposes a coherence between a measure and its objective and consistency in pursuit 
734 Case C-418/07 Papillon, § 46-51.
735 Case C-318/07 Persche, § 52.
736 Terra & Wattel 2008, p 34; Opinion AG Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 
Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, § 23 and 31.
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of the objective.737 In the vast majority of direct tax cases the restrictive measure at issue 
passed this test. A rare example of a restrictive direct tax rule which did not meet the 
requirement of suitability is provided by the case of Orange European Smallcap Fund. This 
case concerned the Dutch special corporate income tax regime for portfolio investment 
funds. This regime provides for (1) taxation of the fund at a rate of 0% and (2) a credit 
of dividend withholding tax (DWT) to the fund with regard to dividends received by the 
fund. It is aimed at providing equal treatment of direct portfolio investments on the one 
hand and indirect portfolio investments – through an intermediary investment fund – on 
the other. In 1997, Orange European Smallcap Fund NV (OESF) - whose shareholders 
resided in various (EU and non-EU) countries – had received dividends from various 
countries, including Portugal and Germany. These dividends had been subject to foreign 
DWT. OESF claimed a (substitute) credit of those foreign withholding taxes. This credit 
was, pursuant to Dutch legislation, restricted in two ways. Firstly, no credit of DWT was 
granted with regard to the dividends from Portugal and Germany, because of the non-
existence (in 1997) of tax treaties between the Netherlands and those countries providing 
for a right to a credit of foreign DWT against Dutch income tax. Secondly, with regard to 
the dividends from other foreign countries, the credit of DWT was reduced in proportion 
to the participation in OESF by shareholders not residing in the Netherlands. OESF 
claimed a full credit of all foreign DWT. With respect to the above-mentioned second 
criterion, the ECJ held that the technical rule according to which the credit was calculated 
was not apt to meeting its objective, namely not to provide a tax credit with respect to 
shareholders in OESF which are not fully subject to the Dutch income tax jurisdiction. 
The ECJ noted that that objective cannot be achieved by a reduction of the tax credit to 
the fund in proportion to the interest in those enterprises held by shareholders resident 
or established in other Member States, because such a reduction adversely affects all the 
shareholders of fiscal investment enterprises without distinction, as it has the effect of 
reducing the total amount of profit for distribution. As a consequence, the rule did not 
meet the suitability test.738
Another example – at least in my view – is the case of Bosal.739 In this case, the ECJ held a 
Netherlands rule to be contrary to freedom of establishment. Under this rule, Netherlands 
resident parent companies could only deduct costs relating to income from a subsidiary if 
the subsidiary was taxable in the Netherlands or if its costs were indirectly instrumental 
in the making of profits taxable in the Netherlands. The ECJ held that this rule constitutes 
a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment (section 8.2.1.4). Subsequently, the 
ECJ considered that this restriction could not be justified by the need to preserve the 
coherence of the tax system or the principle of territoriality. In a crucial paragraph, the ECJ 
pointed out that “one is entitled to question the coherence of a system of taxation based on 
the existence of a link between costs incurred in relation to holdings and the existence of 
profits taxable in the Netherlands within the same group of companies, while subsidiaries 
of parent companies established in other Member States cannot deduct from their profits 
737 Mathisen 2010, p 1037-1039.
738 Case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund NV, § 82.
739 Case C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV.
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taxable in the Netherlands the costs in relation to holdings of those parent companies.”740 
This shows that, for example, interest costs which are related to the acquisition of the 
shares in a foreign subsidiary belong – under Dutch national tax principles but also 
under principles of international tax law – in the tax jurisdiction of the State of the parent 
company. The principle of territoriality or the need to preserve a balanced allocation of 
taxing rights between the Member States, which are after all jurisdictional principles, 
cannot be attained by the allocation of these costs to another Member State. The Dutch 
rule was therefore, in my own words, not apt to attain the objectives pursued by it. 
Exactly the same issue arose in the case of Deutsche Shell.741 This case concerned the 
refusal of deductibility in Germany of a currency loss suffered by an Italian permanent 
establishment of a company resident in Germany. In 1974, Deutsche Shell GmbH had set 
up a branch in Italy. The proceeds generated by that branch were recorded, in accordance 
with Italian law, in a commercial and tax account drawn up in Italian currency and, for 
Deutsche Shell, in a separate German commercial and tax account. Deutsche Shell provided 
its branch with start-up capital, which was entered in the separate German commercial 
and tax account with the DEM exchange rate obtaining at the time of each payment made 
in LIT. In 1992, Deutsche Shell transferred the assets of the branch to an Italian subsidiary; 
subsequently it sold the shares in that subsidiary to an independent third party. Between 
1974 and 1992 the Italian Lira had lost value against the German mark. The currency 
loss on the start-up capital was not taken into account in Italy, as the profits of the Italian 
branch were calculated in the local currency. It was not taken into account in Germany 
either because all results from the Italian permanent establishment were exempt from 
German corporation tax under the applicable bilateral tax treaty. Deutsche Shell argued 
that this infringed its freedom of establishment. The ECJ considered that all measures 
which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of freedom of establishment 
must be regarded as obstacles. The non-deductibility of currency losses “increases” the 
economic risks incurred by a company established in one Member State wishing to set 
up a body in another Member State where the currency used is different from that of 
the State of origin. In such a situation, not only does the principal establishment face the 
normal risks associated with setting up such a body, but it must also face an additional 
risk of a fiscal nature where it provides start-up capital for it. Because Deutsche Shell 
exercised its freedom of establishment it suffered financial loss which was not taken into 
account either by the national tax authorities for the purposes of calculating the basis of 
assessment for corporation tax in Germany or with respect to the assessment for tax of 
its permanent establishment in Italy.742 Germany argued inter alia that its bilateral tax 
treaty with Italy on the allocation of tax powers pursues a legitimate objective: Germany 
and Italy decided to exempt permanent establishments situated on the territory of the co-
Contracting State from income tax, which excludes the currency loss concerned from being 
taken into account. The ECJ rejected this argument by noting “that the tax disadvantage 
concerned relates to a specific operational factor which is capable of being taken into 
consideration only by the German tax authorities. Although it is true that any Member 
740 Case C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV, § 36.
741 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell.
742 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, § 28-31.
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State which has concluded a double taxation convention must implement it by applying its 
own tax law and thereby calculate the income attributable to a permanent establishment, 
it is unacceptable for a Member State to exclude from the basis of assessment of the 
principal establishment currency losses which, by their nature, can never be suffered by 
the permanent establishment.”743 In other words, the objective of allocating taxing powers 
between the Contracting States or the avoidance of international juridical double taxation 
could not be achieved by the exemption system at issue: it failed the suitability test. In this 
respect, Deutsche Shell confirms the earlier judgment of Bosal.
8.4.2 Relation to the theoretical optimization model
ECJ case law on direct taxation is fully in line with the theoretical optimization model. 
Just like the model, it is decisive whether a restrictive direct tax measure is ‘capable’ of 
actually protecting the interest that needs to be protected, meaning that there must be 
a causal relationship between the measure and the objective (see sections 4.5.3 and 7.5). 
This requires a strongly factual judgment.744 Normally, tax measures meet this test; the test 
with a ‘bite’ in ECJ case law on direct taxation is the necessity test (in the present model: 
the tests of degree of fit and subsidiarity). When a direct tax measure does fall short of 
the requirement of suitability, fierce criticism is sometimes the result. This is particularly 
true for the case of Bosal. According to AG Geelhoed, the ECJ has not accorded sufficient 
recognition to the Member States’ division of tax jurisdiction in that case.745 He specifically 
refers to the finding of the ECJ that the comparability criterion is satisfied. It is, in AG 
Geelhoed’s view, crucial to the analysis that the Netherlands exempted from taxation all 
‘inward’ profits from non-domestic subsidiaries. According to the AG, the division of 
the tax jurisdiction between the Netherlands and the Member States of residence of the 
subsidiaries is such that jurisdiction to tax the foreign subsidiaries’ profit fell solely on the 
source state. As explained above, this view is based on a misunderstanding of principles 
of national and international tax law. Contrary to what Wattel has stated, Bosal is not “in 
sharp contrast” with Marks & Spencer (Case C-446/03; see section 2.2.5),746 because the 
latter case concerned operational losses which were attributable to another Member State 
under principles of international tax law. This was clearly not the case in Bosal, which was, 
therefore, correctly decided. Also, contrary to what Wattel has argued,747 the currency 
losses in Deutsche Shell cannot in any way be compared with the ‘final’ losses in Marks & 
Spencer: these losses belong to separate tax jurisdictions – the State of the head office and 
the State of the subsidiary respectively – which explains the different reasoning by the 
ECJ.748 In summary, ECJ case law is supported by the theoretical optimization model.
743 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, § 44.
744 Gerards 2005, p 301.
745 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group 
Litigation.
746 Terra & Wattel 2008, p 409. Compare also Weber 2003.
747 Case note P.J. Wattel in BNB 2009/86, § 9.




It is expected that there will be no developments in the case law regarding the suitability 
test, because current ECJ case law is fully in line with the theoretical optimization model. 
8.5 The degree of fit
8.5.1 Current ECJ case law on direct taxation
At present, ECJ case law in the area of direct taxation subsumes the assessment of the 
over- and/or underinclusiveness of a classification – the degree to which the definition of a 
classification matches the aim of the measure – under the necessity test (the application of 
a direct tax measure should not go beyond what is necessary for its purpose). In my view, 
the requirement of a sufficient degree of fit should be distinguished from the subsidiarity 
of a certain classification (section 7.6). 
The case law on direct taxation shows examples of both under- and overinclusiveness. 
The above-discussed case of Manninen is a clear example of a tax rule which was 
underinclusive in relation to its objective.749 Anti-abuse measures are often examples of 
overinclusiveness. The above-discussed case of Cadbury Schweppes is a clear example 
of this. Thin Cap GLO is another example of overinclusiveness.750 This case concerned 
UK provisions regarding ‘thin capitalization’. These provide that, in some circumstances, 
interest paid by a company to another company belonging to the same group in respect 
of a loan granted by the latter is to be treated as a distribution, thereby prohibiting the 
borrowing company from deducting the interest paid from its taxable profits. The rules 
however gave rise to a difference in treatment between resident borrowing companies 
according to whether or not the related lending company is established in the United 
Kingdom. The rules are targeted at the practice of thin capitalization, under which a group 
of companies will seek to reduce the taxation of profits made by one of its subsidiaries by 
electing to fund that subsidiary by way of loan capital, rather than equity capital, thereby 
allowing that subsidiary to transfer profits to a parent company in the form of interest 
which is deductible in the calculation of its taxable profits, and not in the form of non-
deductible dividends. Where the parent company is resident in a State in which the rate 
of tax is lower than that which applies in the State in which its subsidiary is resident, the 
tax liability may thus be transferred to a State which has a lower tax rate. According to the 
ECJ, the different treatment on the basis of the place of residence of the lending company 
constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment which can be justified on the ground 
of prevention of abusive practices if the specific objective of such a restriction is to prevent 
conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect 
economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by 
activities carried out on national territory. By providing that that interest is to be treated as 
a distribution, such legislation is able to prevent practices the sole purpose of which is to 
avoid the tax that would normally be payable on profits generated by activities undertaken 
749 Compare also Case C-152/05 Commission v. Germany (“Eigenheimzulage”), § 28.
750 The judgment in this case was confirmed in Case C-311/08 SGI.
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in the national territory. It followed that such legislation is an appropriate means of 
attaining the objective underlying its adoption.751 Finally, the ECJ examined whether or 
not that legislation goes beyond what is necessary to attain that objective. As so often, 
this proved to be the test with a ‘bite’. Under this test the ECJ came to the conclusion that 
the UK legislation should provide for a consideration of objective and verifiable elements 
which make it possible to identify the existence of a purely artificial arrangement, entered 
into for tax reasons alone, and allow taxpayers to produce, if appropriate and without being 
subject to undue administrative constraints, evidence as to the commercial justification 
for the transaction in question. Secondly, where it is established that such an arrangement 
exists, the UK legislation should treat that interest as a distribution only in so far as it 
exceeds what would have been agreed upon at arm’s length.752 
An awkward case in relation to the ‘degree of fit’ test is the case of Sardinia.753 This case 
concerned a regional tax on stopovers imposed on operators of aircraft or recreational 
craft having their tax domicile outside the territory of Sardinia. This tax served an 
environmental purpose (the polluter pays principle). The ECJ held that, in terms of the 
consequences for the environment, all natural and legal persons who receive the services 
in question are in an objectively comparable situation with regard to that tax, irrespective 
of the place where they reside or are established. The fact that taxpayers in Sardinia 
contribute, through general taxation and, in particular, income tax, to the environmental 
protection activities undertaken by the Region of Sardinia, is irrelevant for the purposes of 
comparing the situation of residents with that of non-residents in relation to the regional 
tax on stopovers.754 On these grounds, the ECJ held that the regional tax constituted both a 
prohibited restriction on freedom to provide services and prohibited State aid for regional 
undertakings – which were not subject to the tax – under Article 107(1) TFEU. 
8.5.2 Relation to the theoretical optimization model
The above-discussed cases of Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap GLO are classic examples 
of the interaction between the requirement of a respectful aim and the assessment of the 
degree of fit of a measure. The ECJ fundamentally accepts that a State may adopt rules 
which prevent tax avoidance. These rules should, however, be respectful towards the 
principle of free movement. Insofar as they, for example, qualify as abusive the situation 
in which a resident company establishes a subsidiary in another Member State for the 
sole reason of benefitting from a tax advantage, that qualification would be disrespectful 
towards free movement as it would render that principle meaningless. Conversely, however, 
the principle of free movement should leave room to prevent conduct by taxpayers which 
would lead to a situation in which the taxpayer himself could decide where to pay tax. 
Such an interpretation of the free movement provisions would effectively deny the right of 
a Member State to regulate within its domestic jurisdiction (see section 7.4). This is why 
751 Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, § 74-77. See extensively on this 
case Vleggeert 2009, p 251-265.
752 Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, § 92.
753 Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna.
754 Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna, § 37-38. 
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the ECJ considers that the artificial shifting of taxable profits from one tax jurisdiction to 
another would undermine the right of the Member States to exercise their tax jurisdiction 
in relation to the activities carried out in their territory. As a consequence, some middle 
ground has to be found between the two competing principles. The ECJ has found this 
in the formulation of the notion of ‘wholly artificial arrangements’. After thus having 
reformulated the benchmark objective of the legislation,755 it was easy to assess that the 
legislation was overinclusive in relation to its objective.756
The Sardinia case could, however, be at odds with the theoretical optimization model. 
The exemption of regional undertakings from the tax was underinclusive in relation to its 
environmental objectives. This underinclusiveness can only be remedied by the recovery of 
the advantage thus granted under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. By holding that the taxation 
of non-resident operators amounted to a restriction on freedom to provide services, the 
ECJ arguably did not respect the environmental objectives implemented by the Region 
of Sardinia in the exercise of its tax sovereignty. There could be, however, another way of 
looking at the issue. A conflict between Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment) and 
Articles 107 and 108 TFEU (prima facie prohibition of State aid) may arise in situations 
where a certain tax measure grants an advantage to certain undertakings. In its judgment 
in Belgium and Forum 187757, the ECJ held that in order to decide whether a certain tax 
measure results in an advantage, it is necessary to compare that measure with the ordinary 
tax system. It is therefore necessary to start by asking whether a person should have been 
taxed and, if so, whether the absence of taxation constitutes an advantage.758 In the case of 
Sardinia, the exemption of domestic operators of aircraft or recreational craft constituted 
such an advantage, because, in terms of the consequences for the environment, all natural 
and legal persons who receive the services in question are in an objectively comparable 
situation with regard to the tax on stopovers, irrespective of the place where they reside or 
are established. In other words, domestic operators should have been taxable in the light of 
the environmental objective of the tax. The exemption from tax constitutes an advantage 
covered by Article 107 TFEU and a corresponding disadvantage to non-resident operators 
covered by freedom to provide services. In case of such a conflict between Article 107 
TFEU and the free movement provisions, Article 107 TFEU in principle prevails. The ECJ 
has held that aid referred to in Article 107 and 108 TFEU do not as such fall within the field 
of application of the four freedoms. Only those aspects of the aid which are not necessary 
for the attainment of its object or for its proper functioning and which contravene the 
provisions of the four freedoms may for that reason be held to be incompatible with the 
relevant freedom.759 In the case of Sardinia, the conflict between Article 107 TFEU and 
the free movement provisions has, therefore, been resolved in favour of Article 107 TFEU. 
Insofar as no conflict arose, however, – this was the case to the extent that other persons 
755 In my view, such a reformulation is acceptable, because it leaves the core of the objective intact 
and only removes the disrespectful elements.
756 The question of how precise the degree of fit should be depends on the objective of the tax 
measure and and the intensity of review enabled by this objective (see section 7.2).
757 Joined Cases C‑182/03 and C‑217/03, § 95.
758 Opinion AG Jääskinen in Joined Cases C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P Commission and Spain v 
Gibraltar and United Kingdom, §165.
759 Case 74/76 Ianelli and Volpi, §17. See also Case C-94/99 ARGE Gewässerschutz, § 36.
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than undertakings meant in Article 107 TFEU were affected by the tax – the freedom to 
provide services could still be applied. Apparently, the ECJ held that to this extent the 
principle of free movement should outweigh the need to prevent pollution. 
8.5.3 Future developments
It has been shown in the preceding sections that ECJ case law does not differ from a practical 
point of view from the theoretical optimization model. However, it would be desirable 
for the ECJ to distinguish in its future case law between the assessment of the degree of 
fit of a measure and the requirement of subsidiarity. The over- or underinclusiveness of 
a measure signifies that the goal could have been achieved by choosing a more careful 
or more finely tuned definition (section 7.6). The requirement of subsidiarity, however, 
does not so much address the way in which the classification is defined, but relates to the 
choice of the classification as a means to achieve the intended goal. In my view, at least in 
direct taxation cases, this is a much more politically sensitive exercise. As the ECJ has been 
accused of failing to appreciate the sovereignty which Member States have retained in the 
area of direct taxation – see section 2.2.5 – it could be advisable to distinguish between the 
more ‘mechanical’ and more ‘political’ exercises which may encroach upon national policy 
choices (see section 7.7).
8.6 Subsidiarity
8.6.1 Current ECJ case law on direct taxation
The best-known examples of cases in which the subsidiarity test is applied by the ECJ 
concern direct tax measures which are in place because of an alleged lack of fiscal 
supervision in cross-border situations. This lack would justify a more burdensome taxation 
or would justify a reverse burden of proof. In intra-EU situations the ECJ normally 
counters these arguments by reference to Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 
1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in 
the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15; ‘Directive 77/799’), which enables tax 
authorities to call upon the authorities of another Member State in order to obtain all the 
information that may be necessary to effect a correct assessment of a taxpayer’s liability 
to tax. That directive provides, with a view to preventing tax evasion, for the possibility of 
national tax authorities requesting information which they cannot obtain for themselves.760 
Thus, there are other measures available which enable the Member States to achieve the 
prevention of tax avoidance.761
760 Case C-318/06 Persche, § 61.
761 Case C-55/98 Vestergaard, § 28. In cases where Directive 77/799 does not apply, the subsidiarity 
test is performed by examining whether the national tax authorities are able to verify the 
necessary information by other means e.g. by information exchange clauses in tax treaties; 
compare Case C-101/05 A and Joined Cases C-155/08 and C-157/08 X and Passenheim-van 
Schoot. Case C-72/09 Rimbaud is at odds with these principles, because the ECJ ruled out the 
possibility for a taxpayer to provide evidence through other means. This poorly motivated ruling 
is dubious in view of the theoretical optimization model, because it fails to accept that the same 
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Case C-436/00 X&Y is another example of the application of the subsidiarity test. 
This case concerned Swedish tax rules which made it impossible to defer Swedish income 
taxation on unrealized gains on shares if the recipient company – in which the transferor 
has a substantial interest – is directly or indirectly resident in another Member State, 
whereas such deferment was possible if the recipient company is a resident of Sweden. 
The ECJ held that this different treatment constitutes a prima facie restriction on freedom 
of establishment or free movement of capital (Articles 49 and 63 TFEU). Sweden argued, 
inter alia, that taxation of the unrealized gain was necessary in view of maintaining the 
coherence of the tax system which would be jeopardized by the fact that the tax base 
is liable to disappear at a subsequent stage following a definitive move abroad by the 
taxpayer. The ECJ however held that “the coherence of the tax system can be safeguarded 
by measures which are less restrictive or less prejudicial to freedom of establishment, 
relating specifically to the risk of a definitive departure of the taxpayer (…). De telles 
mesures pourraient, par exemple, consister à prévoir un régime de cautionnement ou 
d’autres garanties nécessaires afin d’assurer le paiement de l’impôt lors d’un déménagement 
définitif du cédant à l’étranger.”762 In other words, an immediate taxation of the unrealized 
capital gain upon the transfer of the shares to a related company is not the most subsidiary 
means to maintain the Swedish tax claim on that unrealized gain. There are other measures 
available, such as the introduction of a requirement to provide a guarantee to the State for 
the tax due on the unrealized gain. 
In the earlier case of Bachmann, the ECJ also applied the subsidiarity test.763 This 
case concerned Mr. Bachmann, a German national employed in Belgium. The Belgian 
tax administration had refused to allow the deduction of contributions paid in Germany 
pursuant to sickness and invalidity insurance contracts and a life assurance contract 
concluded prior to his arrival in Belgium. The ECJ held that this non-deductibility amounts 
to a prima facie restriction on free movement of workers. It noted that workers who have 
carried on an occupation in one Member State and who are subsequently employed, or 
seek employment, in another Member State will normally have concluded their pension 
and life assurance contracts or invalidity and sickness insurance contracts with insurers 
established in the first State. It followed that there is a risk that the Belgian provisions may 
operate to the particular detriment of those workers who are, as a general rule, nationals 
of other Member States.764 Subsequently, the ECJ considered that this restriction may 
be justified on grounds of coherence of the tax system.765 Under the Belgian rules there 
exists a connection between the deductibility of contributions and the liability to tax of 
sums payable by the insurers under pension and life assurance contracts: pensions and 
payments under life assurance contracts are exempt from tax where there has been no 
deduction of contributions. The cohesion of such a tax system presupposes that, in the 
event of a State being obliged to allow the deduction of life assurance contributions paid 
objective – fiscal supervision – could have been achieved by putting a burden of proof on the 
taxpayer.
762 Case C-436/00 X&Y, § 59. The last sentence is missing in the English version. Therefore, the 
French text is quoted.
763 Case C-204/90 Bachmann. See also Case C-300/90 Commission v. Belgium.
764 Case C-204/90 Bachmann, § 9.
765 Case C-204/90 Bachmann, § 21-28.
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in another Member State, it should be able to tax sums payable by insurers. According to 
the ECJ, this aim could not be achieved by Belgium by less burdensome means such as 
an undertaking by an insurer to pay such tax (enforcement problems) or the deposit by 
the insurer of a guarantee (additional expense passed on in the insurance premiums, with 
the result that the insured would cease to have any interest in maintaining them). Wattel 
has argued that the ECJ has failed to mention the possibility of requiring a guarantee 
upon emigration of the employee from Belgium, as it did in X&Y.766 This does not mean, 
however, that the ECJ did not apply the subsidiarity test.
This test was also followed in Commission v. Belgium, a case concerning Belgian 
withholding tax (discussed in 8.2.1.5 above). The Belgian government had argued that the 
withholding of tax on a certain payment was aimed at combating tax fraud and at ensuring 
that tax liability in Belgium cannot be escaped. As regards the withholding obligation, the 
ECJ held that “a less restrictive means than that of depriving service providers of a not 
inconsiderable portion of their earnings would have been to put in place a system, based 
on an exchange of information between principals and contractors, their contracting 
partners and the Belgian tax authorities, allowing, for example, principals and contractors 
to find out about any tax debts of their contracting partners or introducing an obligation to 
inform the Belgian tax authorities of any contract concluded with unregistered contracting 
partners or any payment made to them.”767 
Both X&Y and Commission v. Belgium are clear examples of the application of a 
subsidiarity test.768 Case C-414/06 Lidl Belgium is a case where the ECJ could have applied a 
subsidiarity test but explicitly chose not to do so. Lidl Belgium GmbH, a company resident 
in Germany, had a permanent establishment in Luxembourg. In 1999, Lidl Belgium’s 
permanent establishment in Luxembourg incurred a loss. When calculating its revenue 
for German tax purposes, Lidl Belgium sought to deduct that loss from the amount of its 
tax base. The German tax authorities disallowed the deduction of that loss on the basis, 
inter alia, of the exemption of income relating to that permanent establishment by virtue 
of the provisions of the tax treaty between Germany and Luxembourg. According to AG 
Sharpston, this disallowance amounts to a restriction on freedom of establishment because 
a domestic loss would have been deductible from the tax base. This restriction is however 
capable of being justified on grounds of its objectives of preserving the balanced allocation 
of the power to impose taxes between Germany and Luxembourg and of avoiding the 
danger that losses would be used twice. In view of the AG, the principle of proportionality 
is however not respected by the non-deductibility of the Luxembourg loss: 
“23. It is, moreover, clear that less restrictive measures are possible. It is common 
ground that, prior to 1999, German legislation expressly provided that a company 
could deduct a loss made by a permanent establishment in another Member State 
to the extent to which it exceeded profits made by the permanent establishment 
and subject to the deduction being brought back into account in subsequent years 
in which the permanent establishment made a profit.
766 Terra & Wattel 2008, p 384. In Case C-422/01 Skandia and Case C-150/04 Commission v. 
Denmark, the ECJ not accept the cohesion justification. 
767 Case C-433/04 Commission v. Belgium, § 39.
768 See also Case C-118/96 Safir, § 33.
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24. Such a rule, which allowed the deduction of losses while providing for the 
recapture of the loss relief in future profitable periods, would manifestly be a less 
restrictive means of avoiding the risk that losses might be used twice than a rule 
altogether excluding relief for such losses. Although a deduction-and-recapture 
rule involves a loss of symmetry and hence does not wholly attain the objective of 
the balanced allocation of the power to tax, that asymmetry is merely temporary 
where the permanent establishment subsequently becomes profitable. Moreover 
provision could be made for automatic reincorporation of amounts previously 
deducted if reincorporation had still not occurred after, for example, five years, or 
if the permanent establishment ceased to exist in that form.
25. Such a deduction-and-recapture rule is unarguably less restrictive of the 
taxpayer’s fundamental right of establishment than an outright prohibition of 
deducting from the profits of a company losses made by a permanent establishment 
in another Member State. At the same time it is still appropriate for attaining the 
objectives of preserving the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes and 
of avoiding the danger that losses would be used twice.”
The ECJ disagreed with this analysis, but did not explain on which points the AG’s analysis 
is incorrect. It held that freedom of establishment does not preclude a situation in which a 
company established in a Member State cannot deduct from its tax base losses relating to 
a permanent establishment belonging to it and situated in another Member State, to the 
extent that, by virtue of a double taxation convention, the income of that establishment 
is taxed in the latter Member State where those losses can be taken into account in the 
taxation of the income of that permanent establishment in future accounting periods.769
8.6.2 Relation to the theoretical optimization model
The requirement of subsidiarity does not so much address the way in which the classification 
is defined, but relates to the choice of the classification as a means of achieving the intended 
goal. Although the above-discussed cases of X&Y, Bachmann and Commission v. Belgium 
clearly show that the ECJ is prepared to perform this test, Lidl Belgium proves that the ECJ 
is also aware of the political sensitivity of this test in cases where the alternative measure 
is not provided by an EU instrument such as Directive 77/799. This is also reflected by the 
non-tax case of Fedesa.770 This case concerned the validity of a directive requiring Member 
States to introduce a prohibition on the use in livestock farming of certain substances 
having a hormonal action. Fedesa argued that the measures of the directive infringed the 
principle of proportionality. The ECJ held:
 
769 The ECJ has extended this line of reasoning to systems of full tax consolidation which make it 
possible to treat a subsidiary as tax transparent (i.e. a permanent establishment) in the sense that 
foreign losses do not have to be accepted by the State of the parent company; see Case C-337/08 
X Holding.
770 Case 331/88 Fedesa. See on this case Jans et al. 2007, p 150.
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“13. The Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is 
one of the general principles of Community law. By virtue of that principle, the 
lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition 
that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve 
the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is 
a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least 
onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
pursued.
14. However, with regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions 
it must be stated that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the 
Community legislature has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political 
responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty. Consequently, the 
legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure 
is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent 
institution is seeking to pursue (…).”771
By the use of the term ‘manifestly inappropriate’ – which could also be applied under 
the suitability test – the ECJ shows that it is fully aware of its constitutional position by 
not conducting a full and intensive review in matters concerning Union legislation.772 
When assessing national measures, the ECJ seems to take a much stricter approach.773 It 
is debatable whether the ECJ should introduce some variation in the intensity of review 
of national measures and free movement in this respect. Indeed, as Gerards has shown, 
there a good arguments for such an approach in general.774 I have however decided not to 
formally include such a preliminary phase for the purposes of the present study (section 
7.2). Regardless of this debate, Lidl Belgium was in my view still wrongly decided. Clearly, 
the objective of avoiding international juridical double taxation could have been achieved 
in the way proposed by the AG in Lidl Belgium. This is underlined by the fact that the 
Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention explicitly gives the State of residence a 
choice between two equally allowable exemption methods: ‘full exemption’ (loss not taken 
into account) or ‘exemption with progression’ (loss temporality taken into account).775 
Thus, the decision in Lidl Belgium is at odds with the theoretical optimization model. It 
is a wrong decision because the ECJ failed to achieve the optimum position between two 
competing principles: the position of free movement – which suffered a major set-back 
because of the German exemption system – could have been improved without detriment 
to tax sovereignty (the requirement of Pareto-optimality; see section 7.7). The same is true 
for the case of X Holding. The ECJ could have applied the Dutch full tax consolidation 
system cross-border without jeopardizing the allocation of taxing powers under the 
Dutch tax treaties by applying rules for the avoidance of double taxation for permanent 
771 Case 331/88 Fedesa, § 13.
772 Gerards 2008, p 681-682.
773 Harbo 2010, p 172.
774 Gerards 2011.
775 OECD Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Articles 
23A and B, § 14 and 44.
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establishments (the objective of the Dutch system was to give parent companies the option 
to treat their subsidiaries as tax transparent or as ‘branches’ of themselves).776 This would 
have been in accordance with settled Dutch Supreme Court case law.777 Instead, the ECJ 
chose to ignore the objectives of the Dutch fiscal unity system and the Dutch tax treaties.778 
In this way, the principle of free movement was applied in a disrespectful way (compare 
section 8.3.2.4).
8.6.3 Future developments
It would be desirable for the ECJ to distinguish in its future case law between the assessment 
of the degree of fit of a measure and the requirement of subsidiarity (section 8.4.3). In 
other words, it would be advisable for the ECJ to distinguish between more ‘technical’ 
and more ‘political’ exercises. This would help to explain cases like Lidl Belgium (although 
the decision would ultimately still be wrong) and it should be expected on the basis of the 
theoretical optimization model.
8.7 Proportionality stricto sensu
8.7.1 Current ECJ case law on direct taxation
According to established ECJ case law in the area of direct taxation, national measures 
which are liable to hinder the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU 
or make them less attractive may be allowed only if they pursue a legitimate objective in 
the public interest and if they 
are appropriate to ensuring the attainment of that objective, and i) 
do not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.ii) 779
ECJ case law in other areas than direct taxation shows that the principle of proportionality 
also has a third element:
the burden caused by the national measure should not be disproportionate in iii) 
relation to its objective (proportionality stricto sensu).780
If the ECJ reviews EU legislation in the light of the principle of proportionality it balances 
individual interests against the general interest of the Union as a whole.781 The leading 
776 See for an extensive analysis Douma & Naumburg 2006, § 5.
777 HR 29 June 1988, No. 24.738, BNB 1988/331, HR 13 November 1996, No. 31.008, BNB 1998/47; 
and HR 20 December 2002, No. 37.073, BNB 2003/286.
778 Case C-337/08 X Holding, § 31 et seq.
779 Case C-470/04 N, § 40.
780 Case T-125/96 Boehringer, § 102; Opinion AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-434/04 Ahokainen and 
Lepik, § 23-26; Jans et al. 2007, p 149. 
781 Tridimas 2005, p 112. Also in respect of Community sanctions an individual interest is balanced 
against a general interest; see Case C-262/99 Louloudakis, § 67, and Case T-77/92 Parker Pen, § 92.
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case in this area is Fedesa, already discussed above.782 This case concerned the validity 
of a directive requiring Member States to introduce a prohibition on the use in livestock 
farming of certain substances having a hormonal action. Fedesa argued that the measures 
of the directive infringed the principle of proportionality. The ECJ held:
“The Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is one of the 
general principles of Community law. By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness 
of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the 
prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the 
objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice 
between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, 
and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.”783
If the ECJ reviews national legislation in the light of the free movement provisions and the 
principle of proportionality, it balances national interests against the interest of the Union. 
There are not many examples where the ECJ applies the principle of proportionality stricto 
sensu in the sphere of free movement. Most of them can be found in the area of free 
movement of goods. In the Stoke-on-Trent case the ECJ described that principle as follows: 
“[a]ppraising the proportionality of national rules which pursue a legitimate aim under 
Community law involves weighing the national interest in attaining that aim against the 
Community interest in ensuring the free movement of goods.”784 Schmidberger is another 
example. This company was a German international transport undertaking. It brought an 
action before an Austrian court seeking damages against the Republic of Austria on the 
basis that it had tacitly agreed to allow a demonstration on the Brenner motorway, as a 
result of which no traffic was possible for almost 30 hours. Austria invoked Articles 10 and 
11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of speech and assembly) in 
order to justify the restriction on free movement of goods. The ECJ held:
“78. First, whilst the free movement of goods constitutes one of the fundamental 
principles in the scheme of the Treaty, it may, in certain circumstances, be subject 
to restrictions for the reasons laid down in Article 36 of that Treaty [now: Article 
36 TFEU] or for overriding requirements relating to the public interest (…). 
79. Second, whilst the fundamental rights at issue in the main proceedings are 
expressly recognized by the ECHR and constitute the fundamental pillars of a 
democratic society, it nevertheless follows from the express wording of paragraph 2 
of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly are also subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the public 
interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated 
by one or more of the legitimate aims under those provisions and necessary in a 
democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (…). 
782 Case C-331/88 Fedesa. See on this case Jans et al. 2007, p 150.
783 Case C-331/88 Fedesa, § 13.
784 Case C-169/91 Stoke-on-Trent, § 15.
Chapter 8
242
80. Thus, unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as 
the right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, which admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression 
nor the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but 
must be viewed in relation to its social purpose. Consequently, the exercise of 
those rights may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond 
to objectives of general interest and do not, taking account of the aim of the 
restrictions, constitute disproportionate and unacceptable interference, impairing 
the very substance of the rights guaranteed (…). 
81. In those circumstances, the interests involved must be weighed having regard 
to all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance 
was struck between those interests. 
82. The competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion in that regard. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to determine whether the restrictions placed upon 
intra-Community trade are proportionate in the light of the legitimate objective 
pursued, namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamental rights.”785
According to AG Poiares Maduro, the EU law principle of proportionality indeed consists 
of three sub-tests. The AG expresses the third test or ‘proportionality stricto sensu’ as the 
following rule: “the greater the degree of detriment to the principle of free movement 
of goods, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the public interest on which 
the Member State relies.” Thus, “the Member State must demonstrate that the level of 
protection it decides to afford to its legitimate interests is commensurate with the degree 
of interference this causes in intra-Community trade.” AG Poiares Maduro explains that 
the difference with the necessity test is that, as a result of the third test, “a Member State 
may be required to adopt a measure that is less restrictive of intra-Community trade, even 
if this would lead to a lower level of protection of its legitimate interests.”786 As a result, this 
balancing exercise prevents a Member State from fully realizing legitimate objectives of 
national legislation, whereas the requirements of degree of fit and subsidiarity do allow 
this. 
Although the ECJ has never applied the principle of proportionality stricto sensu 
explicitly to direct taxation, there are at least two cases in which the ECJ arguably applied 
it.787
The above-discussed judgment in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer is a first example. 
To recapitulate, Marks and Spencer was a UK-based group with subsidiaries in several 
Member States. The continental European subsidiaries (in Belgium, France and Germany) 
became loss-making during the 1990s. UK-resident Marks & Spencer plc sought to 
offset these losses against the profits derived in the United Kingdom. As the UK group 
relief system only allowed for the surrender of losses from UK-resident companies or 
non-resident companies carrying on trade in the United Kingdom via a permanent 
establishment (PE), Marks & Spencer plc was denied the offset of the losses incurred in 
785 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger.
786 Opinion AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-434/04 Ahokainen and Lepik, § 26.
787 See for an extensive discussion Douma 2007.
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the non-resident subsidiaries. As explained before, the ECJ decided that this constitutes 
a prima facie restriction on freedom of establishment. In deciding whether or not the 
UK restriction could be justified, the ECJ stated that it is necessary to analyze what the 
consequences would be if the domestic advantage, i.e. the loss surrender, were to be 
extended unconditionally. This statement forms the basis for the subsequent analysis. In 
this framework, the ECJ considered three justification arguments. First, according to the 
ECJ, the need to preserve a balanced allocation of taxing powers between the Member 
States could make it necessary to apply to the economic activities of companies established 
in one of those Member States only the tax rules of that Member State for both profits and 
losses. Second, the ECJ accepted that Member States must be able to prevent losses from 
being used twice. A double use of losses would occur if the losses of a foreign subsidiary 
could be used both in the subsidiary’s Member State and in the parent’s. Third, the ECJ 
stated that the risk that “losses will be transferred to companies established in the Member 
States which apply the highest rates of taxation” is acceptable in restricting the UK system. 
The ECJ held that “in the light of those three justifications taken together” the restriction 
in the UK system was justified. However, turning to proportionality analysis, the ECJ 
finally held that the preservation of a balanced allocation of taxing rights, the prevention 
of the double use of losses and tax avoidance could be attained by less restrictive measures. 
This was to accept losses from a non-resident subsidiary if the possibilities of using the 
losses had been exhausted in the subsidiary’s Member State and the parent demonstrated 
this. This is remarkable, because the requirement to accept a loss under certain conditions 
means that this loss is transferred from one tax jurisdiction to another, which infringes a 
legitimate policy objective of the UK system, namely to preserve a balanced allocation of 
taxing powers between the Member States.
A second example is provided by the ECJ judgment in the N-case.788 The N-case 
concerned the Dutch taxation of latent increases in value of shares, the taxable event 
being the transfer of the residence of a taxpayer, with a ‘substantial holding’ in a company, 
outside the Netherlands. It was possible to benefit from suspension of payment until 
the disposal of the shares, subject to conditions, such as the provision of guarantees. In 
addition, decreases in value occurring after the transfer of residence were not taken into 
account in order to reduce the tax debt. The ECJ considered that the ‘exit tax’ at issue is in 
itself in accordance with the fiscal jurisdictional principle of territoriality. Nevertheless, 
the ECJ went on to examine whether such a measure goes beyond what is necessary to 
attain the objective it pursues. It concluded that in order to be regarded as proportionate 
to the objective pursued, such a system for recovering tax on the income from securities 
would have to take full account of reductions in value capable of arising after the transfer of 
residence by the taxpayer concerned, unless such reductions have already been taken into 
account in the host Member State. One can recognize a parallel here with Marks & Spencer, 
since losses suffered outside a State’s direct tax jurisdiction should be taken into account 
under certain conditions.789 Clearly, this infringes the previously accepted legitimate aim 
of the Dutch tax system, namely to adhere to the fiscal principle of territoriality.
 
788 Case C-470/04 N.
789 Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, § 55.
Chapter 8
244
 In my view, both Marks & Spencer and N are the result of a balancing exercise between 
national tax sovereignty and the interests of the internal market.790 This is confirmed by 
AG Kokott’s Opinion in the above-discussed case of Oy AA, which concerned the non-
deductibility of a group contribution to a non-resident parent company. To begin with, 
the AG stated:
“A restriction on freedom of establishment is permissible only if it pursues a 
legitimate objective compatible with the Treaty and is justified by imperative reasons 
in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that its application 
be appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective thus pursued and not 
go beyond what is necessary to attain it. It must also be proportionate within the 
narrower meaning of that term.”
The AG then observed that restricting the deductibility of intra-group transfers to transfers 
to Finnish companies is apt to safeguard the allocation of powers to impose taxes between 
Member States, to exclude the possibility that income which is transferred is not taxed, 
and to combat tax avoidance. It ensures that profits earned by group companies in Finland 
are subject to taxation there according to the principle of territoriality. It remained to be 
considered whether the provision does not go beyond what is necessary and proportionate 
(within the narrower meaning of that term) to achieve these purposes. Here the AG 
considered:
“67. If the only issues were to ensure that transferred income was taxed and to 
prevent tax avoidance, the general restriction on deductibility of intra-group 
transfers to transfers to Finnish companies would go too far. Specifically, these two 
purposes could also be achieved by a rule which was less restrictive of freedom 
of establishment. As already explained, one might make the deductibility for tax 
purposes of an intra-group transfer conditional on proof that the income was in 
fact taxed in the hands of the recipient company.
68. However, safeguarding the allocation of powers to impose taxes, which is 
directly connected to the other two grounds of justification, could not be achieved 
by a corresponding, less restrictive national provision. A rule which required the 
State in which the transferor company was resident to allow a deduction provided 
that the transferee was taxed would not preclude a transfer of the power to impose 
taxes.
69. Weighing up the various interests, it also appears that a provision such as is 
laid down by the Finnish Law on Intra-group Financial Transfers is proportionate 
within the narrower meaning of that term.
70. In Marks & Spencer, the Court regarded it as disproportionate not to recognize 
a cross-border transfer of losses in a particular, exceptional situation which arose in 
that case, namely where the non-resident subsidiary had exhausted all possibilities 
of utilizing its losses and the losses could not be taken into account in the future 
either. In those circumstances the interest in safeguarding the allocation of powers 
790 See Douma 2007.
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to impose taxes was outweighed by freedom of establishment, and the transfer of 
losses to the non-resident parent company had to be allowed.
71. However, on the information the reference for a preliminary ruling gives as to 
the facts, it does not appear that Oy AA is in an exceptional situation corresponding 
to that in Marks & Spencer. It follows that there is no cause to consider whether, by 
way of exception, the principle of proportionality requires a divergence from the 
allocation of powers to impose taxes.”
On these grounds, it seems that the ECJ is prepared to apply the principle of proportionality 
stricto sensu also in direct taxation cases. 
 
8.7.2 Relation to the theoretical optimization model
It follows from the discussion in section 8.7.1 that ECJ case law on direct taxation is in 
line with – or at least not contrary to – the theoretical assessment model (see section 
7.8). Ghosh and Wattel are however prominent critics of the ECJ when it comes to the 
performance of this test.791 The ECJ would have no competence to decide under what 
circumstances a certain loss of a foreign subsidiary should be transplanted from one tax 
jurisdiction to another. Wattel has coined the term of ‘the-always-somewhere-principle’ 
which the ECJ allegedly observes in direct tax cases – a tax loss or deduction should be 
able to be deducted somewhere in the Union – but for which there would be no basis 
whatsoever in EU law.792 Similarly, Ghosh has accused the ECJ of requiring that a Member 
State exercises tax jurisdiction where it has explicitly chosen not to do so: the foreign 
subsidiaries of Marks & Spencer were fully outside the UK’s tax jurisdiction. To require 
that a tax loss of these subsidiaries should nevertheless under circumstances be transferred 
to the UK amounts to positive integration by the ECJ, according to Ghosh. The ECJ – being 
a court and not a legislator – would not be competent to formulate positive legislation 
under the guise of the fundamental freedoms.793 Clearly, these views are not supported by 
the theoretical optimization model.
8.7.3 Future developments
On the basis of the theoretical assessment model it can be expected that the ECJ will not 
refrain from examining direct tax rules in the light of proportionality stricto sensu in the 
future. In any case, the ECJ would not be overstepping its competence if it would do so.
 
791 See the discussion in section 2.4 with references to Ghosh 2007, p 81 et seq; Terra & Wattel 2008, 
p 350-351.
792 Opinion AG Wattel before HR 22 December 2006, No. 39258, BNB 2007/134, § 3.2; Terra & 
Wattel 2008, p 350-351.




It has been examined in this chapter how the ECJ decides tax cases at present, how this 
practice fits into the theoretical optimization model and, to the extent that ECJ case law 
is insufficient to draw conclusions on the ECJ’s stance on the model in direct taxation 
cases in certain situations, proposals have been made on how the ECJ should decide these 
situations. 
In respect of the first phase of the optimization model – the identification of a 
disadvantage – ECJ case law on disparities is in conformity with the model: in these 
cases there is no ‘disadvantage’ which can be optimized in the model (there is no conflict 
between two principles; see Gilly and Schempp). In respect of international juridical 
double taxation, the absence of rules for the avoidance of such double taxation amounts 
to an identifiable ‘disadvantage’ under phase 1 of the model. The end result is however 
in line with ECJ case law, because it would be a disrespectful application of the principle 
of free movement if a Member State were to be forced to relieve international juridical 
double taxation (such an obligation would deny the core aspect of the principle of tax 
sovereignty that a State is free to tax income within its jurisdiction in the way it sees fit; 
compare Kerckhaert & Morres). In respect of the concept of discrimination on grounds 
of the legal form of an establishment, ECJ case law is in conformity with the model: in 
these cases the disadvantage is related to the tax treatment of the other legal form (CLT-
UFA). In respect of the concept of discrimination against cross-border activity, there is in 
form a difference between the theoretical optimization model and the ECJ’s approach in 
direct tax cases. The ECJ formally employs a threshold criterion (a comparability test) in 
many direct tax cases before proportionality analysis can be performed. In fact, however, 
the ECJ uses a disadvantage test: a rule which taxes cross-border activity at a higher level 
than domestic activity constitutes a prima facie restriction on free movement. It is only 
after this has been established that the ECJ examines whether the two situations are 
objectively comparable (X Holding). This question must be answered in light of the object 
and purpose of the measure under consideration. This means that under current ECJ case 
law, a tax disadvantage must be able to be explained by the (legitimate) object and purpose 
of the measure under consideration. This comes very close to the theoretical optimization 
model (phase 2: the requirement of a respectful aim). It is therefore not surprising that 
there is – apart from cases like Columbus Container Services and D – not much ECJ case 
law on direct taxation which directly contravenes the theoretical assessment model as far 
as the scope of the free movement provisions is concerned. This is also true in respect 
of situations of ‘dislocation’ or ‘fragmentation’ of the tax base which the ECJ does not 
distinguish from the concept of discrimination (Bosal, Manninen, Marks & Spencer). 
In respect of non-discriminatory tax obstacles to free movement, ECJ case law neither 
expressly confirms nor rejects the ‘disadvantage’ test of the theoretical optimization model 
(Commission v. Belgium, Deutsche Shell). It should be expected, however, that the ECJ will 
move in this direction, also because ECJ case law outside the area of direct taxation points 
in this direction.
The second phase of the theoretical optimization model requires that the tax measure 
which leads to a ‘disadvantage’ has a ‘respectful aim’ and that the EU free movement 
provision which affects this tax measure is also respectful towards the principle of tax 
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sovereignty. This means that direct tax measures should in abstracto ‘accept’ that they 
may be limited by the principle of free movement. In turn, the free movement provisions 
cannot lead to rules which would in fact have as their objective to do away with the 
principle of direct tax sovereignty: the principle of free movement should respect the 
internal and external objectives of national tax systems. No other requirements may be 
imposed, apart from being formally and substantively compatible with other principles 
enshrined in the TEU and the TFEU. ECJ case law in the area of direct taxation states 
that a restriction on free movement can be justified if either an express Treaty derogation 
applies or the tax measure at issue pursues a ‘legitimate objective which is compatible with 
EU law’ (this reflects the model’s requirement of compatibility with other principles) and 
is ‘justified by overriding reasons in the public interest’. Thus, a correct assessment of the 
objective of a tax measure is of the utmost importance under the theoretical optimization 
model. In line with this model, ECJ case law states that the objective of a national measure 
may be inferred inter alia from its legislative history and its effects (Finalarte). If a 
national measure pursues various objectives at the same time, one of which cannot be 
regarded as respectful, the other respectful measure may ‘save’ the measure (Campus Oil, 
Nertsvoederfabriek). This is also in line with the model. Once the objectives of a national 
tax measure are clear, it can be examined whether these are ‘legitimate and compatible with 
EU law’ and are ‘justified by overriding reasons in the public interest’. According to settled 
ECJ case law, (tax) measures which discriminate directly on grounds of nationality cannot 
be justified unless a specification Treaty derogation applies (Royal Bank of Scotland). This 
is problematic in view of the theoretical optimization model: no principle can be absolute 
and any other rule or principle should be able to serve as its limit. Of course, a distinction 
directly on grounds of nationality may be subject to an intense review of the degree of fit of 
the measure, but an outright prohibition of such a distinction is not in line with the model. 
Tax measures which do not meet the ECJ’s requirement that a restrictive tax measure has 
to pursue an objective which is ‘legitimate’ include budgetary reasons, protection of the tax 
base, the existence of other tax advantages to compensate for the alleged tax disadvantage, 
the availability of an alternative legal or business form and the lack of EU harmonization 
concerning the impugned national tax measure. This can be explained by the theoretical 
optimization model, because the national tax measure disrespects the principle of free 
movement in these examples. ECJ case law also contains examples of situations where 
the principle of free movement is disrespectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty. 
A prohibition of taxation as such would, for example, be disrespectful (Viacom Outdoor, 
Gilly). It would also be disrespectful if the principle of free movement were to deprive 
the Member States of the possibility to determine the organization and aims of the tax 
system within their domestic jurisdiction (Cadbury Schweppes, Oy AA, Test Claimants in 
the Thin Cap Group litigation). If the objectives pursued by the national tax measures are 
misinterpreted or disrespected, bad case law is the result. Examples include Fokus Bank, 
Amurta, and CLT-UFA. In the vast majority of cases the ECJ however makes a correct 
assessment of the objectives of a national tax measure. If these objectives are compatible 
with other norms of EU law and also respect the principle of free movement, the tax 
measure can serve as a limit to free movement. According to the theoretical optimization 
model, any objective whatsoever may serve as such. ECJ case law is in line with the model 
in this respect. Contrary to the classic requirement that a justification ground should be 
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‘overriding’, ECJ case law allows every thinkable objective as a justification for a restriction 
on free movement as long it is respectful towards free movement (Orange European 
Smallcap Fund). 
The third phase of the theoretical optimization model requires that the national tax 
measures be suitable to achieve their objectives. ECJ case law is in line with this test, 
where it requires that for a restrictive tax measure to be justified, it must be appropriate 
for securing the attainment of the objective it pursues. Two cases where this test was not 
met apparently include Bosal and Deutsche Shell.
The fourth phase of the theoretical optimization model examines whether the national 
tax measure has a sufficient degree of fit in relation to its objective. At present, ECJ case 
law subsumes the assessment of the over- and/or underinclusiveness of a classification 
– the degree to which the definition of a classification matches the aim of the measure – 
under the necessity test (the application of a direct tax measure should not go beyond 
what is necessary for its purpose). Under the model, the requirement of a sufficient degree 
of fit should be distinguished from the subsidiarity of a certain classification (phase 5 of 
the model). Examples of underinclusiveness include Manninen and Sardinia. Examples of 
overinclusiveness include Cadbury Schweppes and Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group 
litigation. 
The fifth phase of the theoretical optimization model assesses whether the national 
tax measure reflects the most subsidiary means to achieve its objective. Would other, less 
restrictive measures have been available? The best-known examples of cases in which the 
subsidiarity test is applied by the ECJ concern direct tax measures which are in place 
because of an alleged lack of fiscal supervision in cross-border situations. This lack would 
justify a more burdensome taxation or would justify a reverse burden of proof. In intra-EU 
situations the ECJ normally counters these arguments by reference to Council Directive 
77/799 which enables tax authorities to call upon the authorities of another Member State 
in order to obtain all the information that may be necessary to effect a correct assessment 
of a taxpayer’s liability to tax. Thus, there are other measures available which enable the 
Member States to achieve the prevention of tax avoidance. Other examples of application 
of this test include X&Y, Bachmann and Commission v. Belgium. The case of Lidl Belgium 
shows that the ECJ is aware of the higher political sensitivity of the subsidiarity test in 
comparison with the requirement of a sufficient degree of fit. In this case, the ECJ should 
have decided that the objective of avoiding international juridical double taxation could 
have been achieved by less restrictive means as indicated by the Commentaries to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. Also in X Holding the subsidiarity test was misapplied. 
The sixth phase of the theoretical assessment model contains the requirement of 
proportionality in the narrow sense of the term: the disadvantage caused by the direct tax 
measure should not be disproportionate in relation to the interests of the internal market. 
It is a balancing exercise between national interests and interests of the Union. Although 
the ECJ has not explicitly applied this test in its direct tax case law, there is clear evidence in 
case law such as Marks & Spencer and N that the ECJ has used it in practice to avoid black-
and-white consequences of restrictive measures which are, in principle, justified. This is 
completely in line with the theoretical assessment model. The often-heard complaint that 
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In the first chapter to this study, I have explained why it was in my view necessary to write 
this book. It is settled ECJ case law that, although, as EU law stands at present, direct 
taxation does not fall within the purview of the Union, the powers retained by the Member 
States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with EU law. This classic statement 
clearly reveals the conflict between two areas of legal competence of which the rules are 
more or less carved in stone. On the one hand, it is settled ECJ case law that EU law takes 
precedence over national law and that it has direct effect if its provisions are clear, precise 
and unconditional enough to be invoked and relied upon by individuals before national 
courts. The TFEU’s provisions of free movement of goods, persons, services and capital 
meet the criteria of direct effect, so that any national tax measure which contravenes a free 
movement provision is rendered automatically inapplicable (the TFEU contains only a 
few possible exceptions which are almost never applicable to national direct tax rules). On 
the other hand, the Member States as a matter of principle retain extensive competences 
in tax matters. They remain free to determine the organization and conception of their tax 
system and to determine the need to allocate between themselves the power of taxation. 
Apart from these ‘internal’ objectives, the Member States are also at liberty to pursue 
‘external’ objectives through tax measures such as the protection of the environment or 
stimulation of research and development. 
The ECJ, called upon to interpret and apply the free movement provisions of the 
TFEU in direct taxation cases, has the difficult task of interpreting and applying the free 
movement provisions in relation to national direct tax measures. It seems obvious that a 
literal interpretation of the free movement provisions – without any further exceptions 
than the express Treaty derogations – would severely undermine the powers retained by 
the Member States in the field of direct taxation. In turn, not to apply the fundamental 
freedoms to direct taxation on the ground that the latter does not fall within the purview 
of EU law would deny the existence of the obligations to which the Member States have 
committed themselves when they concluded the TEU and the TFEU with the creation of 
an internal market as the primary objective. As a consequence, the ECJ has the difficult 
task of reconciling the consequences of the fiscal sovereignty retained by EU Member 
States with the obligations flowing from EU law.
In direct taxation cases, the ECJ generally uses the following model to assess whether 
a direct tax measure is a prohibited restriction on free movement:
Does the direct tax measure constitute a restriction on free movement? 1. 
If so, does the direct tax measure pursue a legitimate objective which is compatible 2. 
with the TEU and the TFEU and is it justified by overriding reasons in the public 
interest? 
If so, does the application of the direct tax measure ensure achievement of the aim 3. 
pursued? 
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If so, does the application of the direct tax measure not go beyond what is necessary 4. 
for that purpose?794
The approach taken in three of the four steps in the ECJ’s model in direct taxation cases 
has received considerable criticism, discussed in second chapter of this study. In respect of 
the first step, tax literature is currently unable to explain why the ECJ does not distinguish 
dislocations from ‘real’ restrictions (the ECJ would thus not sufficiently respect a Member 
State’s tax sovereignty); why international juridical double taxation does not lead to a 
restriction on free movement, and whether non-discriminatory national tax measures 
may amount to a prima facie restriction on free movement. In respect of the second step, 
tax literature is currently struggling with the question how to place the ECJ’s justification 
analysis in a conceptual framework which goes beyond the necessarily coincidental fact 
patterns of the case law and which is apt to clarify the choices which the ECJ has made 
and is making. In particular, tax literature is struggling with the question of why the ECJ 
‘invents’ certain justifications, why some justifications are accepted where others are not, 
and how to interpret these justifications. The third step is widely accepted. The fourth step, 
however, has led to considerable criticism. According to various authors, the application 
of this step in the case of Marks & Spencer had no basis whatsoever in EU law and amounts 
to positive integration for which the ECJ has no authority. More broadly, it is said that the 
ECJ does not understand the difficult area of tax law and it applies the free movement 
provisions in the area of direct taxation inconsistently and unclearly. As a result, neither 
national legislators nor taxpayers are able to tell which national tax measures are ‘EU 
proof ’ and which are not.
In order to analyze whether this criticism is justified, this study has submitted that a 
proper analysis can only be made in the light of an assessment model which is external 
to and independent of the ECJ’s current case law. This model should recognize that free 
movement and national direct tax sovereignty are fundamentally equal principles. One 
cannot say that free movement always prevails over national direct tax sovereignty. Nor 
can one say that national direct tax sovereignty always prevails over free movement. 
It has been explained in chapter 3 that Robert Alexy’s theory of principles is the best 
theory available to provide an assessment model. As discussed in chapter 4, this theory 
distinguishes rules from principles by examining what happens in case of a conflict 
between those norms. If two rules conflict with each other, the solution will be to disapply 
one of the rules. If two principles collide, however, the solution is not found by disapplying 
one of the principles, but by realizing both of them within what is factually and legally 
possible. Contrary to rules, principles are not definitive but only prima facie requirements. 
They typically lack the resources to determine their own extent, which should be assessed 
in the light of competing principles and what is factually possible. Thus, principles are 
optimization requirements. Their extent can be determined only in confrontation with 
another principle in the framework of an optimization model. This idea of the optimization 
of colliding principles perfectly fits the conflict between direct tax sovereignty and free 
movement. Sovereignty is to be framed as a principle and not as a rule in international 
794 E.g. Case C-527/06 Renneberg, § 81; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, §35; Case C-196/04 
Cadbury Schweppes, § 47.
Summary and conclusions
253 
law (chapter 5). The principle of sovereignty – a prima facie general freedom of action 
of States, as limited by international law – requires that its corollaries are realized within 
what is legally and factually possible. The extent of sovereignty, which can never be 
absolute, can be determined only in confrontation with other principles and rules. This 
confrontation can never lead to the disapplication of competing principles as such, but 
leads to the optimization of all interests involved under Alexy’s theory of principles. The 
same applies to the principle of free movement in the EU’s internal market (chapter 6). 
This principle prima facie protects a general freedom of (economic) action of persons. 
The extent of the principle of free movement can only be determined in confrontation 
with competing rules and principles. If it were otherwise, and its extent were unlimited, 
it would de facto deny that there is such a thing as sovereignty of Member States: it would 
prohibit taxation as such because taxation undoubtedly is an obstacle to free movement. 
Again, this confrontation between the two principles cannot lead to the disapplication 
of tax sovereignty, but the extent of the principle free movement should be determined 
through an optimization process. After all, both principles are of a fundamental equal 
weight. These notions have been developed further in chapters 4, 5 and 6, culminating in 
a theoretical optimization model in chapter 7:
To which1.  disadvantage does the tax measure lead?
Does the tax measure at issue have a 2. respectful aim?
If yes, is the tax measure 3. suitable to achieve its aim?
If yes, does the tax measure have a sufficient4.  degree of fit in relation to its aim?
If yes, does the tax measure reflect the most 5. subsidiary means to achieve its aim?
If yes, is the cost to free movement caused by the tax measure 6. in proportion to the 
aims pursued by it?
This model makes a normative claim as to how the conflict between free movement and 
tax sovereignty should be resolved in theory. It also makes a descriptive claim, because it 
enables scholars to structure and understand ECJ case law as a coherent body of law. It 
should be stressed that this study does not claim that the theoretical optimization model 
necessitates only one solution in an individual case. Rather, the model prescribes the 
method through which the problem should be solved, thus limiting the number of possible 
outcomes and structuring the analysis in a coherent manner. This makes it possible to 
predict certain future developments in the case law at a more general level which would at 
present be regarded as highly controversial. 
The first phase of the model merely serves to identify to which disadvantage a certain 
direct tax measure leads. A court should be able to verify the petitum or claim of the 
taxpayer: which amount of tax should be refunded in the event that the court finds in 
favour of the taxpayer? In the case of legislative classifications on grounds of cross-border 
movement of the legal form of an establishment, it is clear that the disadvantage consists 
of the difference between the domestic situation and the other legal form. In respect of 
direct tax measures which do not make a distinction on grounds of cross-border activity, 
it depends on the type of the rule how the ‘disadvantage’ is identified. In respect of anti-
abuse rules, for example, the disadvantage would consist of the difference between the 
tax due without these rules and the tax due after application of these rules. In respect of 
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taxation as such, the disadvantage would consist of the difference between the tax due 
and no taxation at all. Clearly, such a claim would generally not be sustained, because this 
would mean that the principle of free movement would not respect the principle of tax 
sovereignty as its limit; such a claim denies the very existence of a State’s tax sovereignty. 
Disadvantages due to disparities in the tax systems of Member States are outside the scope 
of the theoretical optimization model altogether, because in these cases there is no conflict 
between the principles of direct tax sovereignty and free movement. 
The second phase of the assessment model requires that the objective of a tax measure 
which leads to a disadvantage is respectful towards the principle of free movement. 
Vice versa, the principle of free movement should respect the principle of direct tax 
sovereignty. This idea of a ‘twofold neutrality’ means that direct tax measures should have 
an objective which is unrelated to the effect of the measure (i.e. an unequal tax treatment 
of domestic and cross-border situations or a general limitation on economic liberty). If 
a certain measure does not have a stated credible objective, it should be assumed that its 
objective coincides with its effects. In turn, the free movement provisions cannot lead to 
rules which would in fact have as their objective to do away with the principle of direct 
tax sovereignty: the principle of free movement should respect the internal and external 
objectives of national tax systems. This means that taxation as such is not disrespectful 
towards the principle of free movement. 
The third phase of the assessment model concerns the test of ‘suitability’. Once it 
has been ascertained that a measure which causes an identified disadvantage has a 
respectful objective, it should be assessed, factually, whether the measure is apt to attain 
its objective.
The fourth phase of the model examines the degree of fit or the over- and/or 
underinclusiveness of a classification. Overinclusiveness typically occurs when the 
group on which a particular burden is placed (or an advantage is granted) is defined 
too widely. Underinclusiveness typically occurs when the group on which a particular 
burden is placed (or an advantage is granted) is defined too narrowly. It is important that 
the formulation of each classification matches as closely as possible the intended goal, 
because it should be avoided that persons unjustifiably fail to receive certain benefits or 
are unjustly burdened or disadvantaged. Tax measures which are, for instance, targeted at 
influencing the behaviour of individual taxpayers lead to a specific interference with the 
principle of free movement. This makes it possible to conduct a very specific examination 
of the degree of fit. For instance, in respect of measures of general tax policy aimed at 
achieving taxpayer equity, the Member State should have a wide margin of discretion. 
After all, the principle of free movement cannot impose a concept of its own of reasonable 
and correct law-making (e.g. the principle of free movement cannot prescribe where tax 
brackets should begin or end in an income tax system with progressive tax rates).
The test of subsidiarity requires that of two broadly equally suitable means, the 
one which interferes less intensively with the affected principle should be chosen. The 
requirement of subsidiarity does not address the way in which the classification is defined, 
but relates to the choice of the classification as a means of achieving the intended goal. The 
subsidiarity test examines whether it was actually necessary to make a distinction, aside 
from the question as to how this distinction is actually defined. Thus, the test of subsidiarity 
does not take the classification of the contested measure as a given, but requires that the 
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court more or less independently investigates the available alternatives which are equally 
suitable to achieve the objective pursued. This politically more sensitive task distinguishes 
the over- and underinclusiveness test from the subsidiarity test.
The sixth and last phase of the assessment model concerns the test of proportionality in 
the narrow sense (proportionality stricto sensu). It requires that the disadvantages caused 
by the measure should not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (a balance test). The 
greater the burden on the fundamental freedoms, the stronger the countervailing objective 
should be. 
It has been examined in chapter 8 how the ECJ decides tax cases at present, how this 
practice fits into the theoretical optimization model and, to the extent that ECJ case law is 
insufficient to draw conclusions on the ECJ’s stance on the model in direct taxation cases 
in certain situations, proposals have been made as to how the ECJ should decide these 
situations. 
In respect of the first phase of the optimization model – the identification of a 
disadvantage – ECJ case law on disparities is in conformity with the model: in these cases 
there is no ‘disadvantage’ which can be optimized in the model (see Gilly and Schempp). In 
respect of international juridical double taxation, the absence of rules for the avoidance of 
such double taxation amounts to an identifiable ‘disadvantage’ under phase 1 of the model. 
The end result is however in line with ECJ case law, because it would be a disrespectful 
application of the principle of free movement if a Member State were to be forced to relieve 
international juridical double taxation (Kerckhaert & Morres). In respect of the concept 
of discrimination on grounds of the legal form of an establishment, ECJ case law is in 
conformity with the model: in these cases the disadvantage is related to the tax treatment 
of the other legal form (CLT-UFA). In respect of the concept of discrimination against 
cross-border activity, there is in form a difference between the theoretical optimization 
model and the ECJ’s approach in direct tax cases. The ECJ formally employs a threshold 
criterion (a comparability test) in many direct tax cases before proportionality analysis can 
be performed. In fact, however, the ECJ uses a disadvantage test: a rule which taxes cross-
border activity at a higher level than domestic activity constitutes a prima facie restriction 
on free movement. It is only after this has been established that the ECJ examines 
whether the two situations are objectively comparable (X Holding). This question must 
be answered in light of the object and purpose of the measure under consideration. This 
means that under current ECJ case law a tax disadvantage must be able to be explained 
by the (legitimate) object and purpose of the measure under consideration. This comes 
very close to the theoretical optimization model (phase 2: the requirement of a respectful 
aim). It is therefore not surprising that there is – apart from cases like Columbus Container 
Services and D – not much ECJ case law on direct taxation which directly contravenes 
the theoretical assessment model as far as the scope of the free movement provisions 
is concerned. This is also true in respect of situations of ‘dislocation’ or ‘fragmentation’ 
of the tax base which the ECJ does not distinguish from the concept of discrimination 
(Bosal, Manninen, Marks & Spencer). In respect of non-discriminatory tax obstacles to 
free movement, ECJ case law neither expressly confirms nor rejects the ‘disadvantage’ test 
of the theoretical optimization model (Commission v. Belgium, Deutsche Shell). It should 
be expected, however, that the ECJ will move in this direction, also because ECJ case law 
outside the area of direct taxation points in this direction.
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The second phase of the theoretical optimization model requires that the tax measure 
which leads to a ‘disadvantage’ has a ‘respectful aim’ and that the EU free movement provision 
which affects this tax measure is respectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty as well. 
This means that direct tax measures should in abstracto ‘accept’ that they may be limited 
by the principle of free movement. In turn, the free movement provisions cannot lead to 
rules which would in fact have as their objective to do away with the principle of direct 
tax sovereignty: the principle of free movement should respect the internal and external 
objectives of national tax systems. No other requirements may be imposed, apart from 
being formally and substantively compatible with other principles enshrined in the TEU 
and the TFEU. ECJ case law in the area of direct taxation states that a restriction on free 
movement can be justified if either an express Treaty derogation applies or the tax measure 
at issue pursues a ‘legitimate objective which is compatible with EU law’ (this reflects the 
model’s requirement of compatibility with other principles) and is ‘justified by overriding 
reasons in the public interest’. Thus, a correct assessment of the objective of a tax measure 
is of the utmost importance under the theoretical optimization model. In line with this 
model, ECJ case law states that the objective of a national measure may be inferred inter 
alia from its legislative history and its effects (Finalarte). If a national measure pursues 
various objectives at the same time, one of which cannot be regarded as respectful, the 
other respectful measure may ‘save’ the measure (Campus Oil, Nertsvoederfabriek). This 
is also in line with the model. Once the objectives of a national tax measure are clear, 
it can be examined whether these are ‘legitimate and compatible with EU law’ and are 
‘justified by overriding reasons in the public interest’. According to settled ECJ case law, 
(tax) measures which discriminate directly on grounds of nationality cannot be justified 
unless a specific Treaty derogation applies (Royal Bank of Scotland). This is problematic 
in view of the theoretical optimization model: no principle can be absolute and any other 
rule or principle should be able to serve as its limit. Of course, a distinction directly on 
grounds of nationality may be subject to an intense review of the degree of fit of the 
measure, but an outright prohibition of such a distinction is not in line with the model. 
Tax measures which do not meet the ECJ’s requirement that a restrictive tax measure 
has to pursue an objective which is ‘legitimate’ include measures which are motivated 
by budgetary reasons, practical difficulties, protection of the tax base, the existence of 
other tax advantages to compensate for the alleged tax disadvantage, the availability of 
an alternative legal or business form and the lack of EU harmonization concerning the 
impugned national tax measure. This can be explained by the theoretical optimization 
model, because the national tax measure disrespects the principle of free movement in 
these examples. ECJ case law also contains examples of situations where the principle of 
free movement is disrespectful towards the principle of tax sovereignty. A prohibition of 
taxation as such would, for example, be disrespectful (Viacom Outdoor, Gilly). It would also 
be disrespectful if the principle of free movement were to deprive the Member States of the 
possibility to determine the organization and aims of the tax system within their domestic 
jurisdiction (Cadbury Schweppes, Oy AA, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group litigation). 
If the objectives pursued by the national tax measures are misinterpreted or disrespected, 
bad case law is the result. Examples include Fokus Bank, Amurta, and CLT-UFA. In the 
vast majority of cases the ECJ however makes a correct assessment of the objectives of a 
national tax measure. If these objectives are compatible with other norms of EU law and 
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also respect the principle of free movement, the tax measure can serve as a limit to free 
movement. According to the theoretical optimization model, any objective whatsoever 
may serve as such. ECJ case law is in line with the model in this respect. Contrary to the 
classic requirement that a justification ground should be ‘overriding’, ECJ case law allows 
every thinkable objective as a justification for a restriction on free movement as long it is 
respectful towards free movement (Orange European Smallcap Fund). 
The third phase of the theoretical optimization model requires that the national tax 
measures are suitable to achieve their objectives. ECJ case law is in line with this test, 
where it requires that for a restrictive tax measure to be justified, it must be appropriate 
for securing the attainment of the objective it pursues. Two cases where this test was not 
met apparently include Bosal and Deutsche Shell.
The fourth phase of the theoretical optimization model examines whether the national 
tax measure has a sufficient degree of fit in relation to its objective. At present, ECJ case 
law subsumes the assessment of the over- and/or underinclusiveness of a classification 
– the degree to which the definition of a classification matches the aim of the measure – 
under the necessity test (the application of a direct tax measure should not go beyond 
what is necessary for its purpose). Under the model, the requirement of a sufficient degree 
of fit should be distinguished from the subsidiarity of a certain classification (phase 5 of 
the model). Examples of underinclusiveness include Manninen and Sardinia. Examples of 
overinclusiveness include Cadbury Schweppes and Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group 
litigation. 
The fifth phase of the theoretical optimization model assesses whether the national 
tax measure reflects the most subsidiary means to achieve its objective. Would other, less 
restrictive measures have been available? The best-known examples of cases in which the 
subsidiarity test is applied by the ECJ concern direct tax measures which are in place 
because of an alleged lack of fiscal supervision in cross-border situations. This lack would 
justify a more burdensome taxation or would justify a reverse burden of proof. In intra-EU 
situations the ECJ normally counters these arguments by reference to Council Directive 
77/799 which enables tax authorities to call upon the authorities of another Member State 
in order to obtain all the information that may be necessary to effect a correct assessment 
of a taxpayer’s liability to tax. Thus, there are other measures available which enable the 
Member States to achieve the prevention of tax avoidance. Other examples of application 
of this test include X&Y, Bachmann and Commission v. Belgium. The case of Lidl Belgium 
shows that the ECJ is aware of the higher political sensitivity of the subsidiarity test in 
comparison with the requirement of a sufficient degree of fit. In this case, the ECJ should 
have decided that the objective of avoiding international juridical double taxation could 
have been achieved by less restrictive means, as indicated by the Commentaries to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. The subsidiarity test was also misapplied in X Holding. 
The sixth phase of the theoretical assessment model contains the requirement of 
proportionality in the narrow sense of the term: the disadvantage caused by the direct tax 
measure should not be disproportionate in relation to the interests of the internal market. 
It is a balancing exercise between national interests and interests of the Union. Although 
the ECJ has not explicitly applied this test in its direct tax case law, there is clear evidence in 
case law such as Marks & Spencer and N that the ECJ has used it in practice to avoid black-
and-white consequences of restrictive measures which are, in principle, justified. This is 
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completely in line with the theoretical assessment model. The often-heard complaint that 
the ECJ has overstepped its competence in this respect is, therefore, unjustified.
The conceptual framework developed in the present study makes it possible to structure, 
understand, assess and – at a more general level – predict ECJ case law in the area of 
direct taxation. The table in the annex to this study shows that the vast majority of ECJ 
judgments can be explained by the theoretical optimization model. The severe criticism 
of the ECJ is, therefore, largely unjustified. Hopefully, the theoretical optimization model 
will serve as a useful tool for both scholars and courts. 
10. Table of direct taxation and 
free movement cases under the 
theoretical optimization model
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Case Name end result in line with the model? Reference
270/83 Avoir Fiscal Yes 8.2.1.4; 8.3.1.4; 8.3.2.3
81/87 Daily Mail n/a 2.2.4
175/88 Biehl Yes 2.2.4; 8.3.1.4
C-204/90 Bachmann Yes 8.6.1; 8.6.2
C-300/90 Comm. v. Belgium Yes 8.6.1
C-112/91 Werner n/a 2.1
C-330/91 Commerzbank Yes 8.3.2.4
C-1/93 Halliburton Yes 8.2.1
C-279/93 Schumacker Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.5; 8.2.3.2
C-484/93 Svensson Yes 8.3.2.3
C-80/94 Wielockx Yes 8.2.1.4
C-107/94 Asscher Yes 2.2.4; 6.4
C-151/94 Biehl II Yes 2.2.4
C-250/95 Futura Yes 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.5; 8.2.3.2
C-118/96 Safir Yes 8.6.1
C-264/96 ICI Yes 2.2.4
C-336/96 Gilly n/a 2.2.4; 8.2.1.2; 8.2.2.2; 8.3.2.4
C-254/97 Baxter Yes 2.2.4; 8.3.1.4
C-294/97 Eurowings Yes 8.3.2.3
C-307/97 Saint-Gobain Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.1; 8.2.1.4
C-311/97 RBS Yes 8.2.1.4; 8.3.1.3; 8.3.2.3
C-391/97 Gschwind Yes 8.2.1.4
C-439/97 Sandoz Yes 8.2.1.5
C-35/98 Verkooijen Yes 2.2.4
C-55/98 Vestergaard Yes 8.6.1
C-200/98 X AB & Y AB Yes 2.2.4; 8.3.1.4
C-251/98 Baars Yes 2.2.4
C-397/98 Metallgesellschaft Yes 8.3.2.2
C-141/99 AMID Yes 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.4
C-136/00 Danner Yes 8.3.2.3
C-324/00 Lankhorst Yes 2.2.4
C-385/00 De Groot Yes 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.4
C-436/00 X & Y Yes 2.2.4; 8.6.1; 8.6.2
C-168/01 Bosal Yes 2.2.5; 8.2.1.4; 8.4.1; 8.4.2
C-234/01 Gerritse Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.5
C-364/01 Barbier Yes 2.2.4
C-422/01 Skandia Yes 8.6.1
C-9/02 Lasteyrie du Saillant Yes 2.2.4
C-42/02 Lindman Yes 2.2.4
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C-315/02 Lenz Yes 2.2.4
C-319/02 Manninen Yes 2.2.5; 2.3; 7.4.4; 8.2.2.3; 8.3.1.4; 8.3.2.5; 8.5.1
C-334/02 Fixed levy Yes 2.2.4
C-152/03 Ritter Yes 8.2.1.4
C-169/03 Wallentin Yes 8.2.1.4
C-242/03 Weidert & Paulus Yes 2.2.4
C-253/03 CLT-UFA No 8.2.1.1; 8.2.1.4; 8.3.2.4
C-268/03 De Baeck Yes 2.2.4
C-376/03 D No 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.1; 8.2.2.5
C-403/03 Schempp n/a 2.2.4; 2.2.5; 8.2.1.2
C-446/03 Marks & Spencer Yes 2.2.5; 2.3; 2.4; 7.4.1; 7.8; 8.2.1.4; 8.3.2.4; 8.3.2.5; 
C-512/03 Blanckaert Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.5
C-513/03 Van Hilten Yes 8.2.2.3
C-39/04 Laboratoires Fournier Yes 7.4.5; 8.3.1.4
C-150/04 Comm. v. Denmark Yes 8.6.1
C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.5; 8.3.1.4; 8.3.2.2; 8.5.2
C-265/04 Bouanich Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.4
C-290/04 Scorpio Yes 2.2.4
C-292/04 Meilicke Yes 2.2.4; 8.3.2.4
C-345/04 Centro Equestre Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.4
C-346/04 Conijn Yes 8.2.1.4
C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz Yes 2.2.5; 8.3.1.2
C-374/04 ACT GLO Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.2.1; 8.2.1.4; 8.4.2
C-386/04 Stauffer Yes 2.2.4
C-433/04 Comm. v. Belgium Yes 8.2.1.1; 8.2.1.5; 8.2.2.7; 8.6.1; 8.6.2
C-446/04 FII GLO Yes 2.2.5; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.5
C-470/04 N Yes 2.2.4; 2.2.5; 8.2.1.4; 8.7.1
C-471/04 Keller Yes 2.2.5
C-492/04 Lasertec n/a 2.2.1
C-513/04 Kerckhaert & Morres Yes 2.2.4; 2.2.5; 8.2.1.3; 8.2.2.4
C-520/04 Turpeinen Yes 2.2.4
C-522/04 Comm. v. Belgium Yes 2.2.4
C-524/04 Thin Cap GLO Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.1; 8.2.3.3; 8.5.1; 8.5.2
C-76/05 Schwarz Yes 2.2.4
C-101/05 A Yes 8.6.1
C-102/05 A and B n/a 2.2.1
C-152/05 Comm. v. Germany Yes 8.5.1
C-157/05 Holböck n/a 2.2.1
C-170/05 Denkavit Yes 2.2.4; 8.3.2.4
C-201/05 CFC GLO Yes 2.2.4
C-231/05 Oy AA Yes 2.2.4; 2.2.5; 4.5.2; 7.4.4; 7.8; 8.2.1.1; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.1; 8.2.2.5; 8.3.1.4; 8.3.2.3; 8.7.1
C-298/05 Columbus No 2.2.4; 8.2.1.1; 8.2.1.3; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.1.1; 8.2.2.4; 8.2.2.5; 8.2.3.3
C-318/05 Comm. v. Germany Yes 2.2.4
C-329/05 Meindl Yes 8.2.1.4
C-345/05 Comm. v. Portugal Yes 2.2.4
C-379/05 Amurta No 2.2.4; 8.3.2.4
C-383/05 Talotta Yes 2.2.4
C-427/05 Porto Antico di Genova Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.2
C-451/05 ELISA Yes 8.2.3.3
C-464/05 Geurts and Vogten Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.2.5
C-104/06 Comm. v. Sweden Yes 2.2.4
C-182/06 Lakebrink Yes 8.2.1.4; 8.3.2.3 
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C-194/06 OESF Yes 2.2.4; 5.4.2; 8.2.1.3; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.3; 8.2.2.4; 8.3.2.5; 8.4.1
C-248/06 Comm. v. Spain Yes 8.3.1.4
C-256/06 Jäger Yes 2.2.4
C-281/06 Jundt Yes 8.3.1.4
C-284/06 Burda Yes 8.2.1.4
C-293/06 Deutsche Shell Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.1; 8.2.1.5; 8.2.2.4; 8.2.2.7; 8.2.3.3; 8.3.2.3; 8.4.1; 8.4.2
C-360/06 Bauer Yes 2.2.4
C-414/06 Lidl Belgium No 2.2.4; 2.2.5; 8.2.1.4; 8.6.1; 8.6.2
C-415/06 SEW n/a 2.2.1
C-436/06 Grønfeldt Yes 2.2.4
C-443/06 Hollman Yes 2.2.4
C-11/07 Eckelkamp Yes 2.2.4
C-43/07 Arens-Sikken Yes 2.2.4
C-48/07 Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves Yes 2.2.4
C-105/07 Lammers & van Cleef Yes 2.2.4
C-157/07 Krankenheim Yes 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.4
C-282/07 Truck Center Yes 2.2.4
C-303/07 Aberdeen Yes 2.2.4
C-318/07 Persche Yes 2.2.4; 8.4.1; 8.6.1
C-330/07 Jobra Yes 2.2.4
C-377/07 STEKO Yes
C-406/07 Comm. v. Greece Yes 2.2.4
C-418/07 Papillon Yes 2.2.4; 8.3.1.4; 8.3.2.5
C-439/07 KBC Bank Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.1; 8.2.1.4
C-521/07 Comm. v. Netherlands Yes
C-527/07 Renneberg Yes 2.2.5; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.5; 8.2.3.2
C-540/07 Comm. v. Italy No 2.2.4; 8.3.2.4
C-544/07 Rüffler Yes 2.2.4
C-562/07 Comm. v. Spain Yes 2.2.4
C-35/08 Busley and Cibrian Yes 8.2.1.4
C-67/08 Block Yes 2.2.4; 8.2.1.3
C-96/08 CIBA Yes 8.3.2.3
C-105/08 Comm. v. Portugal n/a 2.2.4
C-128/08 Damseaux Yes 2.2.4
C-153/08 Comm. v. Spain Yes 2.2.4
C-155/08 / 
C-157/08
X and Passenheim – 
van Schoot Yes 8.6.1
C-169/08 Sardinia Yes 8.5.1; 8.5.2
C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome Yes 8.2.1.4
C-311/08 SGI Yes 2.2.4
C-436/08 Haribo No 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.4; 8.2.2.5
C-337/08 X Holding No 2.2.4; 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.1; 8.6.1; 8.6.2
C-440/08 Gielen Yes 8.2.1.4
C-487/08 Comm. v. Spain No 8.3.2.4
C-510/08 Mattner Yes 2.2.4
C-20/09 Comm. v Portugal Yes 2.2.4
C-72/09 Rimbaud No 8.6.1
C-155/09 Comm. v. Greece Yes 8.3.1.3
C-262/09 Meilicke II Yes 8.3.2.4
C-233/09 Dijkman Yes 2.2.4
C-267/09 Comm. v. Portugal Yes 2.2.4
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C-384/09 Prunus Yes 2.2.4
C-450/09 Schröder Yes 8.2.1.4
C-10/10 Comm. v. Austria Yes 8.3.1.4
C-25/10 Heukelbach Yes 2.2.4
C-287/10 Tankreederei Yes 2.2.4
E-1/04 Fokus Bank No 2.2.4; 8.3.2.4
E-7/07 Seabrokers Yes 8.2.1.4; 8.2.2.4; 8.2.2.5
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Optimalisering van fiscale soevereiniteit en vrij verkeer
Hoewel de directe belastingen tot de bevoegdheid van de EU-lidstaten zijn blijven behoren, 
moeten de lidstaten deze bevoegdheid desalniettemin uitoefenen in overeenstemming 
met het recht van de Unie. Deze vaste jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie van de 
Europese Unie (hierna: HvJ EU) laat het conflict tussen nationale fiscale soevereiniteit 
en de Europese vrijverkeersbepalingen duidelijk zien. Aan de ene kant zijn de lidstaten 
bevoegd te bepalen wie binnen hun belastingjurisdictie subjectief belastingplichtig is, wat 
de belastinggrondslag is en hoe hoog het belastingtarief is. Aan de andere kant mogen de 
lidstaten geen obstakels invoeren die de uitoefening van het vrije verkeer van goederen, 
personen, diensten en kapitaal binnen de Unie minder aantrekkelijk kunnen maken. Het 
HvJ EU ziet zich geplaatst voor de moeilijke taak deze tegengestelde uitgangspunten met 
elkaar te verzoenen. Inmiddels heeft het HvJ EU ruim 150 arresten gewezen die op deze 
problematiek betrekking hebben. Deze arresten zijn bepaald niet zonder kritiek gebleven, 
zoals de in hoofdstuk 2 besproken literatuur laat zien. Het HvJ EU zou volgens sommige 
auteurs teveel inbreuk maken op de fiscale soevereiniteit van de lidstaten. Het zou het 
moeilijke (internationale) belastingrecht niet begrijpen. Het zou zich bezondigen aan 
positieve harmonisatie op fiscaal terrein, hetgeen exclusief tot de bevoegdheid van de 
lidstaten zou behoren. Andere auteurs, vooral in recentere jaren, zijn van mening dat het 
HvJ EU juist te veel ontzag heeft voor nationale fiscale soevereiniteit. Het zou ten onrechte 
hebben geoordeeld dat lidstaten geen EU-rechtelijke verplichting hebben internationaal 
juridisch dubbele belasting te voorkomen. Weer andere schrijvers hebben betoogd dat 
de rechtspraak van het HvJ EU op het terrein van de directe belastingen inconsistent en 
onduidelijk is, zodat belastingplichtigen noch nationale fiscale wetgevers zouden weten 
waar zij aan toe zijn. Dit proefschrift beoogt orde te scheppen zowel in de rechtspraak van 
het HvJ EU als in de zojuist verwoorde verschillende meningen. Het doet dit door een 
toetsingsmodel te ontwerpen dat los staat van deze rechtspraak en literatuur. In hoofdstuk 
3 wordt toegelicht waarom Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights het beste denkraam 
biedt om het conflict tussen fiscale soevereiniteit en vrij verkeer tegemoet te treden. In 
hoofdstuk 4 wordt besproken dat de kern van Alexy’s theorie inhoudt dat beginselen alleen 
prima facie bestaan. De aard van beginselen is hierin gelegen dat zij eisen dat een bepaalde 
waarde of een bepaald idee zoveel als feitelijk en juridisch mogelijk is wordt gerealiseerd. 
Ook regels kunnen prima facie bestaan. Als een regel in strijd is met een bepaald beginsel, 
kan het noodzakelijk zijn de regel in bepaalde gevallen niet (geheel) toe te passen. Er is 
echter één belangrijk verschil tussen regels en beginselen: een regel is vastgesteld door 
een bevoegde autoriteit. Formele beginselen, zoals een toetsingsverbod, kunnen het 
onmogelijk maken de regel aan te passen. Bij het conflict tussen fiscale soevereiniteit 
en vrij verkeer speelt dit probleem niet, zodat nationale belastingmaatregelen en de 




In dit kader moet worden vastgesteld dat de beginselen van fiscale soevereiniteit en vrij 
verkeer fundamenteel gelijkwaardig zijn; het is niet mogelijk om in het algemeen te zeggen 
dat één beginsel belangrijker is dan het andere. Bij een botsing moet van geval tot geval 
worden beoordeeld in hoeverre zij tot gelding kunnen komen. Hierbij is van belang dat 
de botsende beginselen van elkaar accepteren dat zij wederzijds elkaars gelding beperken. 
Een beginsel kan derhalve niet zo worden opgevat dat het een ander beginsel in elk 
geval zou overrulen. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt betoogd dat fiscale soevereiniteit het beginsel 
weerspiegelt dat een Staat een zo groot mogelijke handelingsvrijheid heeft. Het beginsel 
van vrij verkeer streeft uiteindelijk naar een Europese interne markt zonder enig fiscaal 
obstakel voor het vrije verkeer van goederen, personen, diensten en kapitaal (hoofdstuk 
6). Onverkorte uitvoering van één van beide beginselen zou leiden tot de non-existentie 
van het andere beginsel. Het conflict tussen beide beginselen moet dus worden opgelost 
in een optimaliseringsproces. Waar ligt het punt waar beide beginselen zoveel mogelijk 
tot hun recht komen? Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden wordt in hoofdstuk 7 een 
theoretisch optimaliseringsmodel neergelegd dat de volgende stappen bevat:
Tot welk 1. nadeel leidt de belastingmaatregel?
Streeft de belastingmaatregel in kwestie een 2. respectvol doel na?
Zo ja, is de belastingmaatregel 3. geschikt om dat doel te bereiken?
Zo ja, heeft de belastingmaatregel een voldoende 4. degree of fit in relatie tot haar 
doel?
Zo ja, behelst de belastingmaatregel het meest 5. subsidiaire middel om het doel te 
bereiken? 
Zo ja, staat de inbreuk die de belastingmaatregel maakt op het vrije verkeer in een 6. 
redelijk evenwicht tot het nagestreefde doel?
Dit model is normatief van aard in die zin dat het voorschrijft hoe het conflict tussen 
de beginselen van fiscale soevereiniteit en vrij verkeer in theorie zou moeten worden 
opgelost. Het model is descriptief van aard in die zin dat het wetenschappers in staat stelt 
de rechtspraak van het HvJ EU te begrijpen en te structureren als een coherent geheel. 
Het zij benadrukt dat het model niet de pretentie heeft dat in ieder individueel geval 
noodzakelijkerwijs één specifieke uitkomst moet worden bereikt. Wel schrijft het model 
voor op welke wijze het probleem moet worden aangevlogen, waardoor het aantal mogelijke 
uitkomsten wordt beperkt en de analyse op coherente wijze wordt gestructureerd. Dit 
maakt het ook mogelijk om op een iets hoger abstractieniveau voorspellingen te doen 
over toekomstige ontwikkelingen in de rechtspraak die thans als zeer controversieel 
worden gezien. De belangrijkste hiervan is dat het HvJ EU ook non-discrimatoire 
belastingmaatregelen die de uitoefening van het vrije verkeer minder aantrekkelijk maken 
binnen de reikwijdte van het vrije verkeer zal brengen. In hoofdstuk 8 wordt het model 
toegepast op geselecteerde arresten van het HvJ EU. Het blijkt dat de rechtspraak van 
het HvJ EU op het terrein van de directe belastingen en vrij verkeer tamelijk coherent is 
indien zij wordt beoordeeld en bekeken vanuit het theoretische optimaliseringsmodel. 
Mogelijk kan het model dienen om in de toekomst betere en meer gestructureerde kritiek 
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